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ABSTRACT 
Alvin L. Lyons 
The Philanthropic Behavior of Nonprofit Hospitals 
 
The study of the nonprofit sector has traditionally focused on nonprofit 
organizations as recipients of charity.  A perspective that has been relatively 
neglected is that of nonprofit organizations as not only recipients but also as 
donors of charitable resources.   
 
This dissertation explores the phenomenon of philanthropic behavior of nonprofit 
organizations, using studies of the contributions and community health programs 
of nonprofit hospitals in Indiana as an example.  Philanthropic behavior is defined 
as actions and programs initiated by a nonprofit organization to meet additional 
community needs – beyond its primary mission or services.  It presents the 
hypothesis that such activities are undertaken for reasons similar to for-profit 
organizations – and have comparable organizational benefits.  The studies 
reported in the dissertation show a wide variation in reporting such activities as 
well as of the organizational structures in place to manage such behavior.  This 
variation is seen even in seemingly similar hospitals such as religious hospitals 
within an identified system. 
 
The dissertation discovers that while nonprofit organizations may engage in 
philanthropic behavior, these practices go largely unrecognized.  Because the 
iv 
 
actions are not systematically noted or recorded, some very significant residual 
benefits that nonprofits provide for their defined communities are also 
unrecognized.  It also finds that when these activities are evident, they are driven 
more by the professional values and actions of individual employees than by 
organizational policies. 
 
The dissertation concludes that drawing conclusions from this study of the data 
on Indiana hospitals – both from state reports and the IRS Form 990s – is 
difficult.  There is an inconsistency between the two databases as well as within 
each of the datasets that makes any specific conclusions as to the relative values 
of different hospitals or to standards is suspect.  It notes that while the revised 
Form 990 should help in overall transparency, the reporting of areas such as 
health education and donations will most probably continue to be inconsistent.  
This inconsistency makes the information difficult to use as either an evaluation 
tool or as policy to encourage community-serving behavior.   
 
 
________________________________ 
Richard Steinberg, PhD, Chair 
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1AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation identifies and explores the phenomenon of philanthropic 
behavior of nonprofit organizations, using nonprofit hospitals in Indiana as an 
example.  Philanthropic behavior is defined as actions and programs initiated by 
a nonprofit organization to meet additional community needs – beyond its 
primary mission or services.  
The dissertation presents the overall hypothesis that while nonprofit 
organizations may engage in philanthropic behavior, these practices go largely 
unrecognized.  Because the actions are not noted or recorded, some very 
significant residual benefits that nonprofits provide for their defined communities 
are also unrecognized.  Since the existence and benefits of this behavior are not 
reported, governmental agencies fail to develop policies that might encourage an 
increase in this behavior in the future – and that may also yield an additional 
benefit for society.  Recent changes in the Internal Revenue Service year-end 
report Form 990 could help improve the reporting and availability of such 
information, but stop short of requiring the types of information related to this type 
of behavior.  Because information that could track these behaviors is not 
adequately sought or reported, the ability of the changes to encourage increased 
nonprofit philanthropy is limited. 
2Questions Addressed by the Dissertation
The overall question addressed by the dissertation is: “Does nonprofit 
philanthropy exist?”  If it does exist, secondary questions are: “Why would a 
nonprofit organization engage in philanthropic behavior?” and “Do our current 
reporting systems have the ability to measure the extent of that behavior?”  If we 
are able to measure philanthropic behavior it raises a final question: “How much 
philanthropy does a nonprofit organization provide?”
These questions are addressed in six chapters.  Chapter One asks: “What is 
nonprofit philanthropic behavior?” and “Why would a nonprofit organization 
engage in such behavior?”  It further addresses: “Why are nonprofit hospitals 
particularly appropriate to measure philanthropic behavior?”  Chapter Two seeks 
to answer: “Do current reporting procedures allow us to reliably measure 
nonprofit hospital philanthropic behavior?”  Chapter Three asks “How well does 
an existing voluntary state reporting system capture nonprofit philanthropic 
behavior?”  Chapters Four and Five inquire: “What information about 
philanthropic behavior are we able to determine from investigating individual 
nonprofit hospitals?”  Chapter Six summarizes the answers to these questions.
3Background of the Dissertation
Giving USA (2007) is one source that reports annual contribution figures in the 
United States.  These contributions represent private gifts from individuals as 
well as from foundations and corporations.  Nonprofit organizations are the legal 
recipient of these tax-deductible financial donations.  Some contributions from 
nonprofit organizations are included in these contribution figures: those either 
designated as grants from private foundations or identified as transfers of 
philanthropy by pass-through organizations such as United Way or the United 
Jewish Communities appeal.  These are nonprofits that collect funds for 
distribution to other nonprofit public benefit organizations.  
However nonprofit public benefit organizations do not only receive donations.  
They also make donations to other nonprofit organizations, even though national 
philanthropy figures do not report this source of contributions. This dissertation 
notes the existence of nonprofit philanthropy and explores the practice of such 
organizational behavior.  It uses nonprofit hospitals as an example of this type of 
practice.  One reason to focus on nonprofit hospitals is that hospital community 
benefit standard reports do acknowledge that nonprofit hospitals make financial 
contributions. They include “Donations,” as one measurement of nonprofit 
hospital community benefit.1  However official reports generally do not highlight 
these donations of individual hospitals (such as reports they file with the Internal 
                                           
1 As categorized by criteria developed by the Catholic Health Association and Voluntary Hospitals 
of America (CHA/VHA 2006) – and endorsed by members of the United States Senate Finance 
Committee (Senate Committee on Finance 2006) as well as used as a model by the Internal 
Revenue Service in revising their own reporting criteria (Internal Revenue Service, “Schedule H: 
Hospitals,” n.d.).
4Revenue Service or the American Hospital Association).  General public relations 
reports to the hospital’s community also rarely highlight these types of data, 
focusing instead on general programs rather than defining and explaining the 
financial value of the actual philanthropy provided.2  These figures are 
subsequently not meaningfully aggregated into national hospital, nonprofit, or 
philanthropy reports.  
The failure to capture this type of direct nonprofit financial philanthropy also 
raises the question whether other types of in-kind nonprofit philanthropic 
behavior are recognized as part of the total philanthropic effort in the United 
States.  Additional expressions of nonprofit philanthropy include provisions of 
services to benefit broader community needs – activities that go beyond serving 
a nonprofit organization’s primary constituency and purpose.  In the case of 
nonprofit hospitals examples of this are health education programs that seek to 
improve the general wellness of the community.  These programs serve a 
broader public and meet more expanded purposes than the primary mission of 
the hospital to treat the sick and injured.  This paper determines that programs 
comprising philanthropic behavior are a subset of a broader concept of 
community benefit, which is the rationale for the tax-exemption of nonprofit 
hospitals as defined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS, Revenue Ruling 69-
545).
                                           
2 It should be acknowledged that donations figures are included in the IRS Form 990, generally 
as supplementary materials or in the aggregate on Page 2 of the Form 990.  They also may be 
referred to in some individual hospital community benefit reports or newsletters, at the discretion 
of the organization.
5In July 2007 the office of Senator Charles Grassley (at that time, the ranking 
Republican on the Senate Finance Committee) issued a minority Staff Report 
proposing that the current community benefit standard for nonprofit hospitals 
should be replaced by a Charity Care requirement of 5% of operating expenses 
or revenue (whichever is greater). (Senate Committee on Finance – Minority 
2007)
While it is debatable whether Congress would pass such standards, the Staff 
Report did prompt a flurry of response from the healthcare industry.  The 
American Hospital Association replied in a particularly strong letter implying that 
political motivations rather than concern over healthcare was driving this type of 
congressional proposal:
“The real issue here is the lack of health insurance for 47 million 
Americans. In our May 1, 2006 letter to you, we described in some 
detail how hospitals across the nation do their very best to 
compensate in the absence of a national policy to address this 
crisis . . . Unfortunately the proposals in the minority draft do not 
address the problems of the uninsured. Instead, the draft singles 
out hospitals for unfair criticism and recommends punitive 
measures that are unwarranted.”3
The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) also questioned the 
basic assumptions of the Senate Finance Committee’s Minority Report (as well 
as assumptions of other critics of nonprofit hospitals and the community benefit 
standards) that charity care was the proper benchmark for nonprofit hospital tax 
exemption:
“First and foremost, the AAMC strongly opposes . . . limiting the 
definition of `community benefit only to charity care . . .The AAMC 
                                           
3 American Hospital Association letter (September 6, 2007).
6believes it would be inappropriate and is unnecessary to propose 
legislation that would require special rules for hospitals that qualify 
under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.  Voluntary efforts have 
yielded outstanding community contributions by teaching and other 
non-profit hospitals.  We believe that the challenge we collectively 
face is that all hospitals, including teaching hospitals, do not do an 
adequate job of describing the wide range of community benefit 
activities in which they are engaged . . . with the most common 
problem being underreporting of community benefit.”  (AAMC 2007, 
emphasis in original)
A Wall Street Journal front-page article in April 2008 extended the other side of 
this argument with an opening sentence: “Nonprofit hospitals, originally set up to
serve the poor, have transformed themselves into profit machines.”  The article 
emphasized large nonprofit hospitals such as the Cleveland Clinic and 
Northwestern Memorial in Chicago had significant net income and noted many of 
these same profitable hospitals essentially made their surpluses through the tax-
exemptions they enjoyed.  In return, the article maintained, the hospitals provided 
limited charity care or other benefits to the communities that underwrote these 
tax advantages.
In a letter to the editor, the Association for Healthcare Philanthropy (AHP) took 
issue with many of the claims in the Wall Street Journal article, stating it: 
“ . . . gives no coverage on the challenges facing the majority of 
nonprofit hospitals today . . . The reality is however that most 
nonprofits are meeting heir community and financial responsibilities 
. . . we must take into account that the majority of nonprofit 
hospitals are fulfilling their missions in providing community benefits 
and charity care.” (AHP 2007)
Conversely, alternative observations maintain that hospitals use the community 
benefit standard as a public relations tool more than as an objective standard.  
7These critics assert that community benefits are “what hospitals say they are” 
and merely identify elements that are common to all hospitals or even any 
business, such as employing members of the community (Noble et al 1998).
Critics that mislabel a nonprofit hospital’s net revenues as “profits” are missing 
the obvious point that these “profits” do not benefit any individual.  Instead any 
“extra” funds that any nonprofit hospital generates – like any nonprofit 
organization – are reinvested into their community’s future needs.  In the case of 
a nonprofit hospital these future investments are dedicated for an improved 
health system and a board of trustees, composed of community leaders and 
representatives, oversees this investment process.  Ironically these critics of 
nonprofit hospitals could also be encouraging the very behavior they profess to 
be trying to prevent.  A proposal to remove tax-exempt status because a hospital 
generates an “excess” of profits could actually prompt hospitals to spend current 
revenues rather than saving them for future equipment, program, and facility 
needs – particularly if they knew that government was going to penalize such 
savings through a “tax”.  In extreme cases such a proposal could even 
encourage more hospitals to seek for-profit status (if there is less incentive to 
remain nonprofit).  
Beyond the political and public relations rhetoric, the reality is that since 1968 
nonprofit hospitals have undertaken numerous actions to define and meet the 
existing community benefit standards.  The American Hospital Association, 
8Voluntary Hospitals of America, and the Catholic Health Association have 
defined national guidelines and encouraged their member organizations to meet 
those standards.  Many states have implemented various reporting standards,
both mandatory and voluntary.  This dissertation maintains that these actions 
have yielded many benefits for their communities, benefits that can be identified.  
Some of these actions go beyond meeting limited interpretations of the 
community benefit standards and philanthropically contribute to the broader good 
of their community.
This dissertation uses databases of Indiana hospitals to investigate how well 
individual hospitals adhere to and report community benefit as well as to explore 
the existence, extent, and nature of nonprofit philanthropy.  It includes in its 
exploration of Indiana nonprofit hospital philanthropy both contributions to other 
organizations and the costs of health education programs for the benefit of its 
general community.  The former is specifically defined as cash contributions to 
other nonprofit organizations; the latter is designated as an in-kind contributions 
intended for the welfare of the general community rather than for the benefit of 
the primary stakeholders of the hospital – stakeholders that include patients as 
well as employees, board members, volunteers, and medical staff of the hospital.
The importance of identifying nonprofit philanthropic behavior has a greater 
impact than capturing additional giving information.  It also expands our 
understanding of the strategic practices and ethical values of nonprofit 
9organizations.  Exploring the underlying motivations and benefits of nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior identifies an additional aspect of nonprofit organizational 
strategy.  Recognizing this can provide an example for other nonprofit 
organizations to incorporate such practices into their own community and 
resource strategies.  It also has a broader benefit, as it expands our awareness 
of the role nonprofit organizations play within society. 
The Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation seeks to answer the general questions: “Does nonprofit 
philanthropy exist?” and “If it does exist, why?”  To address these questions, the 
dissertation is organized into six chapters.  Each chapter explores specific 
aspects related to investigating the existence, nature, and practice of nonprofit 
philanthropy – as practiced by nonprofit community hospitals.  
Chapter One presents an overview of the concept of nonprofit philanthropy.  It 
addresses the questions: “What is nonprofit philanthropic behavior?” and “Why 
might a nonprofit organization engage in philanthropic behavior?”  The chapter 
outlines a general theoretical approach for exploring the practice of nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior.  This exploration includes incorporating economic, 
sociological, and management theories that help illuminate these practices.  It 
further hypothesizes that organizational motivations for this philanthropic 
behavior might be identified based on the location of philanthropic behavior 
within an organization’s structure.  The chapter concludes by addressing the 
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question: “Why are nonprofit hospitals particularly appropriate to measure 
philanthropic behavior?”  It positions nonprofit hospital philanthropy as a subset 
of the broader community benefit standard that currently serves as a basis for the 
federal tax-exemption of nonprofit hospitals.
Chapter Two seeks to answer: “Do current reporting procedures allow us to 
reliably measure nonprofit hospital philanthropic behavior?”  To identify and 
measure nonprofit philanthropic behavior requires dependable sources for that 
information.  Chapter Two summarizes the existing national and state databases 
on nonprofit hospitals and evaluates the validity of current reports and data that 
capture information related to nonprofit philanthropy.  It specifically addresses the 
question: “How reliable are national and state data sources for determining 
nonprofit philanthropy?”  
Chapter Three continues this investigation into the validity of current databases 
by asking: “How well does an existing voluntary state reporting system capture 
nonprofit philanthropic behavior?”  It explores the publicly available information of 
one state (Indiana) that has required and collected detailed financial and 
community benefit reports from each hospital in the state for the past ten years.  
The chapter analyzes what such reports tell us about nonprofit hospitals in 
general and about their philanthropic behavior in particular.  It further evaluates 
Indiana’s requirements to determine how well these processes might serve as
national models and how similar national reporting requirements might affect the 
11
level of philanthropy and community benefit these hospitals provide.  Finally the 
chapter examines the Indiana information related to hospital ownership and 
system affiliation and determines how these different criteria may affect 
community benefit and philanthropic behavior as well as illuminate the validity of 
this reporting requirement.
Chapters Four and Five ask: “What information about philanthropic behavior can 
we determine from investigating individual nonprofit hospitals?”  The chapters 
specifically summarize and evaluate the available information and organizational 
practices that Indiana hospitals use to determine and manage health education 
and donation programs.  Chapter Four focuses on health education and asks: 
“How and why do Indiana nonprofit hospitals provide community health education 
programs?”  The chapter begins by presenting a hypothetical framework for 
identifying the organizational level where the philanthropic behavior is located as 
a way of defining the organizational motive and values for undertaking such 
behavior.  This hypothesis expands upon the general economic, sociological, and 
management theories presented in Chapter One by developing a four-part 
structural analysis that corresponds to different organizational theories that 
explain possible motivations for nonprofit philanthropic behavior.  The chapter 
then builds on the ISDH data used in Chapter Three by adding and comparing 
information contained in the year-end Internal Revenue Service Form 990 
reports. It then gives the results of written and personal surveys of selected 
Indiana hospitals to determine the extent, the decision processes, and the 
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organizational levels related to determining, presenting, and reporting health 
education programs.  The results of these surveys are then placed within the 
theoretical framework to analyze the relationship of actual practices to the 
theories.  
Chapter Five addresses donations and the question: “How and why do Indiana 
nonprofit hospitals make financial contributions?”  It uses the same 
organizational framework as developed in Chapter Four, as well as a similar 
analysis of reports and surveys to explore how individual hospitals determine and 
disburse donations to their community.  It also notes how these donations relate 
to efforts by nonprofit hospitals to attract contributions from their communities.  
As in Chapter Three, both Chapter Four and Chapter Five note how ownership 
and religious affiliations may affect the philanthropic behavior of these hospitals.
Chapter Six concludes with a summary of the findings of the theoretical and 
empirical exploration.  The conclusion also identifies how understanding nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior can change our perception of the role of nonprofit 
organizations within our society.  These perceptions may be positive as 
philanthropic behavior extends the impact of the values of the nonprofit sector on 
society.  The perceptions also may be negative as such behavior can raise 
questions about continuing the tax-exempt status for organizations that seem to 
adopt behaviors traditionally associated with for-profit behavior. The conclusion 
also reemphasizes how an awareness of philanthropic behavior might enable 
13
other nonprofit organizations to use such behavior to improve their own 
operational capabilities and strengthen their organizational sustainability. Finally, 
this conclusion outlines a potential research agenda for expanding our 
understanding of nonprofit philanthropic behavior.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PHILANTHROPIC BEHAVIOR
This chapter is an overview of the theories behind nonprofit philanthropy and how 
nonprofit hospitals demonstrate this type of behavior.  It addresses the questions: 
“What is nonprofit philanthropy?” and “Why might nonprofit hospitals engage in 
philanthropic behavior?”
The first section outlines the concept of philanthropic behavior and how this 
concept can be used to explore a relatively neglected aspect of nonprofit 
behavior: i.e. nonprofit organizations making in-kind and monetary contributions 
to their communities.  The section proposes a definition that is used in this paper 
to identify and evaluate that behavior.  The second section is the most extensive 
part of Chapter One.  It develops a theoretical approach that can be used to 
explore the practice of nonprofit philanthropic behavior.  Section two outlines the 
economic, sociological, and management theories that illuminate these practices 
and applies these theories to propose a methodological structure that allows 
research into such behavior.  The third section presents nonprofit hospitals as 
especially appropriate for investigating such behavior.  It defines nonprofit 
hospital philanthropy as a subset of the broader community benefit standard that 
currently is the basis for the federal tax-exemption of nonprofit hospitals. The 
chapter evaluates the philanthropic nature of each element of community benefit.  
It then uses this definition to focus on two elements that have been relatively
15
under-studied and most directly reflect organizational philanthropic behavior: a 
hospital’s expenditures for community health promotion programs and donations 
made to other community nonprofit organizations.  
The chapter concludes with an outline of how the theoretical and community 
benefit analyses relate to the empirical investigations pursued later in the 
dissertation.
On Philanthropy and Nonprofit Organizations
The first section of the chapter addresses the question: “What is nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior?” The proposed definition used throughout this paper of 
nonprofit philanthropic behavior is based on three criteria.  The first is that the 
behavior is not required by regulation or otherwise coerced.  The second factor is 
that there should be some kind of demonstrated measurable action involved, 
beyond a theoretical intent or a generalized organizational purpose.  This 
behavior is generally in the form of budgetary financial expenditures, but could 
also be defined in terms of in-kind provision of goods and/or services.  The third 
element is that the services identified as “philanthropic” benefit a wider public 
than is typically assisted through the organization’s primary activities.  
It should be emphasized that this definition of philanthropic behavior is not 
intended to apply to all situations or all practices of nonprofit organizations, 
beyond this paper.  The definition outlined above is used for two purposes within 
16
this paper.  The first is to relate the similarities of nonprofit behaviors to similar 
behaviors of for-profit companies.  The second purpose is to explore an area of 
nonprofit behavior that has not been explored in previous studies.
Philanthropy may be either narrowly defined referring to transfers of funds (or 
sometimes also of volunteer time) or more broadly include any thought word or 
deed for the love of another human being (Steinberg and Powell 2006, p. 3).  The 
definition used in this paper identifies philanthropic behavior based on the more 
narrow definition of the actual transfer of measurable time, property, or money.  
For the purposes of this paper, it further defines the transfer of such gifts as 
being not only from private individuals or businesses to a formal nonprofit or 
philanthropic organization but also includes gifts from that ”philanthropic 
organization” to a broader community.  Nonprofit organizations are commonly 
viewed as using gifts and other resources to meet defined public needs.  This 
paper broadens this concept by identifying nonprofit organizational philanthropy: 
a “gift” made by the nonprofit that addresses a public need or provides a 
community service that goes beyond the nonprofit organization’s defined purpose 
or traditional mission.  In the words of Paul Schervish, this definition focuses on 
activities that “exceed market standards” (Schervish 1993, cited in Steinberg and 
Powell 2006, p. 4).  One premise of this paper is that this “market standard” can 
apply to nonprofit as well as to for-profit organizations.
17
This dissertation begins with a general definition of philanthropy as: “voluntary 
private action for the public good”.1  As applied to nonprofit organizations, it 
further defines “voluntary” as meaning non-regulatory or non-coerced; “private 
action” as organizational behavior initiated by the nonprofit entity; and “for the 
public good” as to the benefits for a broader community beyond the specific 
constituency and immediate purposes directly served by the nonprofit.  Concepts 
that are opposed to or diverge from this definition include: taxes or laws imposed 
by government, as an alternative to “voluntary”; charitable purpose or intent 
instead of “action;” and the private good of the organizational entity in contrast to 
the “public good”.  A further distinction is made between programs that directly 
benefit an individual or group and those that only indirectly benefit various 
publics.  These distinctions are made to better separate the concepts studied in 
this paper from those more traditional clientele and programs of nonprofit 
organizations that have been extensively studied in the literature.
  
Developing a Philanthropic Standard:
Measuring “Voluntary Action for the Public Good”
The concept of philanthropy can be approached from two perspectives.  The first 
is as a generalized set of broad standards and actions that characterize a wide 
range of human actions and motivations that benefit “others” within society – and 
may or may not also benefit the philanthropic actor.  A second approach is 
                                           
1 This definition slightly modifies the definition developed by Robert Payton (1988), adding the 
term “private” to delineate the private actions of the nonprofit sector from the public actions of 
governmental entities. This is partially suggested by Merle Curti’s definition (“private and 
voluntary giving, individually and collectively, for public purposes;” 1973-74).
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grounded in a more definitive treatment of philanthropy – one based on the 
definition presented by Robert Payton: voluntary (private) action for the public 
good (1988). This definitional approach potentially provides the basis for 
research criteria that provides qualitative criteria and leads to the development of 
a measurable basis for evaluating various human and organizational activities.  
This definition is especially useful for applying the concept of philanthropy 
beyond the limited connotations that focus on the large financial gifts of a few 
individual and institutional donors rather than the broader area of human 
endeavors (Katz 1999, Hall 1999). 
The definition of philanthropy as “voluntary (private) action for the public good” 
carries with it three important implications for studying philanthropic behavior and 
its consequences.  The first is the concept of voluntary which has three different 
but related meanings.  The most common – and also the least helpful or accurate 
– is unpaid work or involvement.  A second definition is action motivated by one’s 
own will or volition.  The third definition expands upon the second and involves 
the ease of exit from a situation.  The second and third definitions can be 
combined to understand voluntary action as internally motivated and executed 
achievements, as opposed to acts externally coerced or mandated by regulation.
“Voluntary action” as applied to an organization places the definition within an 
operational context (i.e. budgets and programs) rather than broader 
organizational philosophies (i.e. mission statement or organizational purpose).  
19
Furthermore, because this budgetary or other resource allocation is defined as 
voluntary, it needs to be initiated by internal will of leadership or other agents 
within an organization (i.e. board, administration, and other staff or volunteers 
representing the entire constituency) rather than being defined by external 
constituents.  To provide a non-regulatory example: if a church decides to make 
its facilities available to meetings of community organizations at no charge, 
expenses incurred as part of this program could be considered a philanthropic 
action; if the facilities are rented by an organization and then for whatever reason 
the renting organization ends up not paying for that rental, the expenses incurred 
are not initiated by the church but rather by the non-payment of that external 
organization.  This latter situation would not be considered as voluntary, but as a 
bad debt.  Because philanthropic action is generally budget-based, it can be 
used to develop a quantitative evaluation for “all kinds of noncoerced human 
behavior, collective or individual, that is engaged in because of a commitment to 
values other than direct, immediate remuneration” (ARNOVA, Journal of 
Voluntary Action Research 1985, inside front cover, cited in Steinberg and Powell
2006, p. 4).
A third element of philanthropic behavior is also implied by the concept of “the 
public good” – namely that it addresses a public beyond those that are the focus 
of an organization’s principal mission.  This can be determined by looking at the 
services an organization provides falling into four areas – the final three all being 
considered as philanthropic or beyond an organization’s primary purpose.  For 
20
example, the primary mission of a particular community medical-surgical hospital 
might be to provide healthcare services to individuals who are sick or injured.  
Providing patient care is part of that primary mission, whether through the 
emergency room or other medical or surgical procedures – regardless of a 
person’s financial ability or insurance situation.  If the hospital also offers health 
education or preventive medicine programs, services that benefit a wider public 
beyond those requiring direct patient care, these are examples of a service that 
goes beyond its primary mission.  A contribution to an organization that does not 
provide direct patient care is another example of this type of service.  These 
latter types of public benefit programs serve a broader public than is addressed 
in the organization’s primary mission and are considered as philanthropic 
behavior.  
As applied to nonprofit organizations, philanthropic behavior is therefore broadly 
defined as: “non-regulated budgetary or other expenditure of resources that 
provides a value to a broader public beyond the primary mission and purposes of 
that private nonprofit.”  This extra-ordinary behavior could include activities that 
may be typically considered as within the realm of governmental agencies rather 
than private nonprofit providers.    
21
Organizational Theories and Nonprofit Philanthropic Behavior: An Overview
An essential question that arises in considering philanthropic behavior by 
nonprofit organizations is: “Why would a nonprofit make a contribution to others 
in its community?”  Nonprofits are typically thought of as recipients of the 
generosity of individuals and businesses.  What would encourage them to 
become a source of philanthropic support rather than the destination?  This 
question becomes more complex when we consider that at the same time these 
nonprofits may also be receiving – and actively encouraging – contributions from
their communities.  As nonprofit hospitals are the focus of this dissertation, it is 
also important to incorporate how the particular challenges and considerations of 
the healthcare sector add to this question.
The area of nonprofit philanthropic behavior is one that has not been previously 
recognized or addressed, either by the theoretical literature on organizational 
behavior or through empirical examination of these types of practices.  However 
once it is recognized that such behavior exists, related theoretical and empirical 
studies can provide insights into possible motivations for such behavior.  Most 
applicable are theories attempting to explain the motivations of for-profit 
corporate philanthropy, especially as one expression of corporate social 
responsibility.  Additional theoretical precedents can be found in the literature on 
the rationales for the nonprofit sector, the behavior of nonprofit organizations, 
and studies of hospitals as organizations. A further focus of this section is to 
22
investigate how philanthropic behavior might intersect with, broaden, or differ 
from these theories.
This section also uses the applicable organizational theories to develop a 
proposed structure for researching the practice of nonprofit philanthropic 
behavior and motivation.  This structure locates those practices associated with 
alternative philanthropic motivations at different levels of the organization.  This 
exploration includes theories in organizational sociology as well as related work 
from economics and management theory.  
This theoretical investigation is organized into five parts.  The first part presents a 
proposed four-level research template from the corporate philanthropy 
management literature that identifies potential motivations for corporate 
philanthropy.  This template is used throughout the remainder of the section to 
incorporate additional theoretical motivations drawn from a variety of related 
literature.  A key objective of this compilation is to identify potential motivations 
as well as to relate these motivations to operational or structural practices.  
Associating the location of organizational practices with underlying motivations 
allows the classification of identified philanthropic behavior.  This classification 
provides a method to identify why a specific organization – including a nonprofit 
organization – might behave philanthropically
23
The exploration of the theoretical literature begins in Part B with examining 
corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility.  While nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior has not been previously identified, it is hypothesized that 
nonprofit organizations engage in this behavior for reasons similar to for-profit 
corporations.  This is especially true for nonprofit hospitals that are termed 
“commercial nonprofits” because of their reliance on income from fees and 
services (Hansmann 1980), and therefore can be similar to a for-profit company.  
There also may be important differences between nonprofit and for-profit 
philanthropic motivations – differences that can emerge by also incorporating 
theories related to nonprofit organizations and nonprofit hospitals.  
The remainder of the section integrates the broader theoretical literature with the 
philanthropic research structure.  Part C outlines the various institutional theories 
that apply to philanthropic behavior in the nonprofit sector.  Part D explores how 
the economic and social theories of the nonprofit sector relate to nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior.  Part E adds appropriate insights from social theories 
related to hospitals, emphasizing those that specifically relate to nonprofit 
hospitals.  The section ends with part F, demonstrating how the various 
theoretical approaches might alter the proposed four-part philanthropic research 
template.  It presents a revised structure that applies to nonprofit hospitals based 
upon that compilation.  This final template is used to investigate the philanthropic 
behavior of Indiana nonprofit hospitals later in the dissertation.
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A Structure for Investigating:
“Why a Nonprofit Organization Might Behave Philanthropically”
When nonprofit philanthropy does occur, a key question is: Is nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior a deliberate strategy of a nonprofit organization or 
something that happens as a personal expression of an individual involved with 
the organization?  If it is the latter, that individual could be located at various 
points in the organization, depending upon the structures and policies of that 
organization.  It could be that a chief executive officer decides to make a 
commitment from a nonprofit hospital to a community arts center, or a community 
health nurse chooses to offer a wellness class in a local community center, or a
public relations staff member agrees to sponsor a local softball team.2  Since 
nonprofit philanthropy is not an action that has been typically noted by those who 
track and evaluate nonprofit behavior, it is also possible that the action itself is 
not recognized as a deliberate and well-defined strategy by a nonprofit hospital’s 
leadership team.  Conversely it is also possible that nonprofit philanthropy is as 
strategically determined and placed in a nonprofit organization as corporate 
philanthropy has become for for-profit businesses.  
Table 1A presents a proposed template for categorizing nonprofit giving 
motivations. This template is based on four models defining the motivations of 
corporate giving, defined by Young and Burlingame (1996, see also Burlingame 
and Smith 1999):  
                                           
2 Each of these examples represent actual cases drawn from the research of philanthropic 
behavior by Indiana hospitals, presented in Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation.
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Table 1A: The Corporate Philanthropy Models
Young and 
Burlingame 
Model
Neoclassical/
Productivity 
Model
Ethical/
Altruistic 
Model
Political 
Model
Stakeholder 
Model
Organizational 
Motivation
(from Young and 
Burlingame)
To ensure 
and/or 
increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
Nonprofit 
Philanthropy 
Model
Management 
Function 
Leadership 
Directed
(CEO or 
Board)
Separate 
Organizational 
Function
Stakeholder 
Discretion
Organizational 
Structure
Embedded in 
Dep’t and
Manager 
Hierarchy
Practices at 
Leadership 
Level
Separate 
foundation or 
identified and 
publicly-visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
The following section shows that while there are potential differences between 
for-profit and nonprofit philanthropy that could require revisions in this model, 
motivational similarities validate the grounding of a nonprofit philanthropy 
template in for-profit philanthropy concepts.  
The Corporate Philanthropy Model: Young and Burlingame outline four 
paradigms for corporate giving: the Neoclassical/Productivity Model (focused on 
firm profitability), the Ethical/Altruistic Model (emphasizing a society’s social 
norms), the Political Model (stressing organizational power within a community), 
and the Stakeholder Model (satisfying multiple constituencies).  
The Neoclassical/Productivity Model presents corporate giving as a strategy to 
increase the financial bottom-line of the organization.  Under this model, giving 
by a firm or organization is treated as any other profit center or activity and must 
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yield a corresponding return on that investment, even though that return might be 
long-term, in the case of improved employee morale or public relations (Lewin 
and Sabater 1996), or indirect, as in cause-related marketing (Yankey 1996).  In 
such scenarios, corporate giving programs can be viewed as not being truly 
philanthropic but rather a corporate strategy designed to benefit the firm itself.  
The Ethical/Altruistic Model is based on the concept that corporate giving is one 
aspect of corporate social responsibility, with intended outcomes based in social 
ethical motives rather than profitability. One key aspect of this model is that the 
philanthropic activity of the firm is seen as being “beyond the normal course of 
business operations,” which is “maximizing profits” (Buhl 1996, p. 129, emphasis 
in the original).  Because individual moral standards generally influence 
organizational ethical actions, the motivation for this model is an expression of 
the personal behavior and values of the business leadership and staff as well as 
of the normative principles of the organization itself.  
The Political Model presents corporate giving programs as a means to 
strengthen the societal influence of businesses.  In this perspective, by creating 
networks and relationships with nonprofit partners and other corporate 
supporters, the business is simultaneously limiting the interference of 
government on matters relating to local economic development and community 
need (Himmelstein 1996, 1997).  Young and Burlingame acknowledge the 
Stakeholder Model is both the most comprehensive theory of corporate giving as 
well as the most ambiguous.  The Stakeholder Model maintains that corporate 
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philanthropy is an effort to balance the multiple demands on a corporation by the 
various entities that are its constituency, and to meet their varying needs and 
interests (Wood and Jones 1996).  These multiple Stakeholders include internal 
groups (i.e. managers and workers) and corporate investors (i.e. owners and 
stockholders) as well as external publics with various relationships to the 
business (i.e. customers, suppliers, and other related community members).
Table 1B outlines these four models and identifies the different organizational 
motivations associated with each model:
Table 1B: The Young/Burlingame Models of Corporate Giving Motivation
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stakeholder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase 
firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
Developing the Organizational Giving Template: The Young/Burlingame models 
provide a template within which additional theories related to organizational 
philanthropy, nonprofit behavior, and hospital structures might be incorporated 
into a final research structure.  To provide an initial example: in his 1961 work on 
organizational prestige, Charles Perrow differentiated the intrinsic characteristics 
of an organization as being distinct from its extrinsic characteristics.  He defined 
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intrinsic characteristics as goods or services “fundamental to (the) official 
purpose of the organization,” while “extrinsic characteristics are not essential to 
maintaining production standards though they may be vital in insuring 
acceptance and resources” (p. 336).  Perrow emphasizes that extrinsic and 
intrinsic distinctions will vary depending upon the organization’s goals and the 
“target group” that the organization intends to influence by the image.  He further 
notes that an analytical typology may be derived from these kinds of 
considerations, and that defining organizational activities as intrinsic or extrinsic 
is an initial but crude (sic) step in developing such a typology.  Under this 
perspective, philanthropic behavior generally would be considered to be an 
extrinsic organizational characteristic rather than an intrinsic one.3  This leads to 
an approach for further understanding the nature of philanthropic behavior in a 
nonprofit organization.  When activities are identified as being “philanthropic”, 
they can then be further investigated as to whether those behaviors are treated 
intrinsically by the organization (i.e. operated by staff and departments that 
directly serve the organization’s primary purpose of providing goods or services) 
or are treated extrinsically (i.e. operated by individuals or departments that have 
administrative or external responsibilities).  The extrinsic/intrinsic example is one 
possible categorization that could more specifically identify organizational 
positions of nonprofit philanthropic behavior and potentially lead to better 
understanding the motivations behind such behaviors.  As such they can be 
incorporated into the Young/Burlingame models to expand their application to a 
                                           
3 In the article Perrow refers specifically to charitable donations by organizations as an example 
of an extrinsic, value-laden characteristic that helps build organizational prestige (1961, p. 336).
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theoretical framework.  Under this distinction, the Neoclassical/Productivity Model 
can be identified as an intrinsic use of prestige while the other three models fit 
more logically into the extrinsic category.  When examining the organizational 
location of philanthropic behavior, the more closely that function is linked to staff 
and departments serving the business operations of producing and delivering 
products and services, the more such behavior could be categorized as being 
motivated by financial profitability rationales.  This intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is 
noted in Table 1C, with a cell added to the previous table that includes the locale 
of philanthropic behavior related to Perrow’s concept of prestige.
Table 1C: Intrinsic/Extrinsic Characteristics of Corporate Giving Models
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stakeholder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase 
firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
General 
Locale of 
Philanthropic 
Behavior: 
Prestige 
(Perrow 
1961)
Intrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic
The Organizational Location of a Corporate Function: The function of corporate 
philanthropy involves three actions.  The actions are: 1) the decision to make 
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contributions, 2) the philanthropic action itself, and 3) communicating, reporting, 
or promoting of that action to the desired constituency.  Each of these actions 
could be located either at different organizational levels or within a single entity of 
the organization.  Identifying where in the organizational structural location the 
first action is located, (i.e. the decision to make contributions) is potentially the 
most difficult part of the contribution process to identify.  The literature on 
corporate structure and decision-making does not identify this type of distinction, 
particularly related to external functions of the business.  
Most commentators in the business literature assume that decisions are made in 
the context of profit-making activities.4  The literature on ethical decision-making 
does include a handful of studies trying to link organizational level with ethical 
behavior, but it is observed that these limited studies yield mixed and 
inconclusive results (Bartlett 2003, p. 217, see also Lowe et al 2000, Lozano 
1996, Ford and Richardson 1994, and Boatright 1988).  Boatright (1988) 
concludes that business ethical values and decisions are based on the individual 
values of managers, generally of the chief executive officer.  He differentiates 
between the rational model approach to business ethics (in which all decisions 
are made to further corporate profitability) and the political model (in which 
stakeholder interests are incorporated).  However, while he notes the limitations 
of the rational model related to ethical decisions he also acknowledges that the 
political model has not been fully explored or worked through.  Boatright does 
                                           
4 See James March, Decisions and Organizations, Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell (1988) for one 
compilation of work on organizational decisions.
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identify that organizational legitimacy is a primary motivation for undertaking 
ethical behavior, which raises a key attribute of organizational philanthropy that is 
more fully explored later in this section.  However, his final conclusion is to link 
business ethical values as an expression of the individual values of business 
leaders.  This link of business values with the personal ethics of managers is also 
echoed in Bartlett (2003) and Geva (2006) among others.  Ferrell and Skinner 
(1988) do attempt to construct a formal model in applying ethical behavior in 
market research organizations but limit it to either a centralized or a de-
centralized designation.  Their assumption is that “highly centralized 
organizations would have more opportunity to control ethical decisions” (p. 104) –
leading to the supposition that organizations that have more managerial control 
will also be more ethical.  
There has been some work on the organizational structure of external 
organizational practices.  However this literature only gives limited attention to 
how variable structures might indicate different organizational motives.  Miles 
(1987), while noting that little research (at that time) had been done on the 
process and placement of external affairs activity, identifies two basic 
approaches to this activity.  The first approach is to concentrate the tasks within a 
unit whose primary function is external affairs.  The second approach is that 
external affairs responsibilities are placed in individuals whose primary 
responsibilities lie in other areas.  He further identifies four internal design 
dimensions of this strategy.  The first dimension is breadth, indicating the number 
32
of different units within a company that manage external affairs components.  
The second is depth, involving the intensity that external affairs units may 
research and develop programs.  The third is influence and integration, 
addressing the internal relationships of external affairs with other internal units.  
And the fourth is line-manager involvement, which emphasizes the internal 
relationships with senior management.  Miles then conducts three case studies of 
insurance companies to further develop a classification of the different treatments 
accorded external affairs based on these companies.  He concludes by 
identifying four core concepts governing external affairs: business exposure or 
strategy (external affairs are linked to business goals), top management 
philosophy (external affairs are a reflection of leadership ethics), external affairs 
strategy (that links the business with others in their environment through 
collaboration and/or legitimizing behavior) and external affairs design (relating to 
internal stakeholders).  These core concepts relate to the four models of 
corporate philanthropy previously outlined (see Table 1D).  Recent literature 
hasn’t greatly expanded Miles’ work.  Several commentators have addressed 
categorizing the outcomes or actions relative to corporate social responsibilities 
(for example Mattingly and Bermann 2006, Black and Hartel 2004, Agle and 
Caldwell 1999), but not the internal structures and locations of activity as an 
indicator of corporate motivations. 
While Miles’ application of his structure is limited to three case studies of 
insurance companies, it does provide a potential organizational structural 
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framework within which corporate philanthropy (and nonprofit philanthropy) can 
be classified.  His theoretical conclusions do not make specific distinctions of 
specifically where within an organization external affairs might be located based 
on the core approach that is primarily adopted by the organization, but it requires 
a relatively small logical step to link his explanations of the core concepts, design 
dimensions, and basic components to desirable corporate structural approaches.  
The business exposure model emphasizes that external affairs needs to be 
tightly linked to support the primary products, services, and customers of the firm.  
It can be expected that businesses that have this motivation would locate 
external affairs either within those departments or are closely linked to that 
primary activity through a direct departmental manager reporting structure.  The 
top-management philosophy is based on the ethical values of leadership and 
external activities and it is expected that businesses with this motivation would 
have external affairs coordinated, if not directly managed, at the highest levels of 
the business hierarchy.  A business that adheres to the external affairs strategy 
would seek to have maximum awareness and potential linkages with other 
businesses, government, or agencies in their environment.  This is most 
effectively accomplished through a well-defined external affairs effort, possibly in 
a completely separate department or even an organizational division, such as a 
corporate foundation. The external affairs design concentrates on establishing 
internal linkages with existing organization stakeholders.  With this motivation, 
these stakeholder connections would be differentiated, dispersed, and integrated 
throughout the organization, and the external affairs activities would also be 
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dispersed.  The relationship of the four model corporate philanthropy template, 
the core concepts presented by Miles and the extrapolated locations of these 
actions within the corporate structure are added to the previous tables in Table 
1D.
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Table 1D: Corporate Giving Models and External Affairs Structures
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stake-
holder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community and 
social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
General 
Locale of 
Philanthropic 
Behavior: 
Prestige 
(Perrow 1961)
Intrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic
Core 
Concepts of 
External 
Affairs (Miles 
1987)
Business 
exposure or 
strategy 
- Linked to 
business goals
Top 
management 
philosophy 
- Reflection of 
leadership
ethics
External 
affairs 
strategy 
- Relate to 
environment 
through 
collaboration 
and/or 
legitimizing 
behavior
External affairs 
design 
elements 
- Relate to 
internal 
stakeholders
Expected 
Organization
al Location of 
External 
Affairs, 
Based on 
Core 
Concepts
Linked to internal 
financial and 
marketing 
activities
Directed by 
leadership
A defined 
division, 
providing 
linkage 
opportunities 
with key 
external 
organizations 
Dispersed 
within the 
organization
It is the contention of this thesis that this type of classification related to 
identifying motivations for corporate philanthropy and external affairs has direct 
applicability to nonprofit philanthropic behavior.  A variety of applicable 
organizational and management theories are used to justify this contention.  
Following is a further examination of how existing theories relate to these four 
models of corporate philanthropy – and how ultimately nonprofit philanthropic 
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behavior also reflects and incorporates these distinctions.  As a next step in this 
theoretical exploration, the literature on corporate giving and corporate 
responsibility is investigated, outlining how alternative perspectives add to or 
alter the corporate giving models.  
The Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Philanthropy and 
Corporate Social Responsibility
While nonprofit organizational philanthropy has not been previously investigated, 
philanthropy as practiced by for-profit corporations has received extensive 
academic attention.  Although the ownership structures of nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations may differ, the underlying organizational motivations to acquire 
resources, to provide goods and services for a defined public or market, and to 
strengthen their ability to survive as an organization are held in common.  
Identifying how for-profit organizational philanthropy is currently understood 
becomes an important first step in expanding this understanding to nonprofit 
philanthropy.
Corporate Philanthropy Defined: Nonprofit philanthropic behavior is defined 
previously in this paper as: “non-regulated budgetary or other expenditure of 
resources that provides a value to a broader public and operates beyond the 
primary mission and purposes of that private nonprofit.”  This is more precise 
than typical definitions of corporate philanthropy that are found within the 
corporate philanthropy literature.  In most of the sources is assumed that either 
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the reader “knows” what corporate philanthropy is or it is explicitly identified as a 
gift of money to a nonprofit organization, regardless of the purposes of the 
donations or the motivations involved (for examples, see: Useem 1987, p. 340,
Johnson 1966, p. 489).  One such definition of corporate philanthropy is “. . . a 
transfer, of a charitable nature,5 of corporate resources to recipients at below 
market prices” (Ireland and Johnson 1970 as cited in Fry et al 1982).  However, 
corporate philanthropy is also seen by several commentators as part of the 
broader term of corporate social responsibility, including as being “the top of the 
‘pyramid of corporate social responsibility’” (Carroll 1991, p. 42, cited in Saiia et 
al 2003, p. 169),  “the oldest form of corporate social behavior” (Mescon and 
Tilson 1987, p.49), or “a narrower term (than corporate social responsibility or 
corporate citizenship), restricted to the charitable giving that a company may do 
to meet part of its felt citizenship responsibilities” (Burlingame and Smith 1999, p. 
60).  
The treatment of corporate philanthropy has also evolved into merging business 
and social interests, either through concepts such as “strategic philanthropy” 
(Porter and Kramer 2002, Marx 1999, Mescon and Tilson 1987) or philanthropy 
as a means to increase corporate power or influence (Himmelstein 1977).  For 
the purpose of this paper, corporate philanthropy is termed as expenditures and 
actions that reach beyond a corporation’s primary business purpose, operation, 
and customers to serve a wider public mission and constituency.  This definition 
                                           
5 The phrase “of a charitable nature” can be particularly ambiguous, as will be shown in the 
discussion (below) related to hospital tax exemption and the legal considerations of community 
benefit.  
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focuses on the recipient and use of corporate donations, and does not limit the 
residual values that may accrue to a corporation, such as the recognition of being 
a business donor or sponsor.  This definition is related to Buhl’s concept of 
corporate social responsibility as being “beyond the normal course of business 
operations,” (Buhl 1996, p. 129, emphasis in the original).  This distinction is 
similar to what was previously noted for defining nonprofit philanthropy.  
Much of the current business and management literature tend to stress the 
strategic aspects of corporate philanthropy: that the primary role of making 
contributions by businesses is to advance the long and short-term interests of the 
corporation and its stakeholders.  This is true even when giving seems to benefit 
the greater public.  While a strengthened environmental and community context 
may benefit the larger society, it will also aid the human resources, image, and 
competitive advantages available to the business (Porter and Kramer 2002).  
This view of strategic philanthropy is but one factor that complicates efforts to 
assign single motivations to a multi-faceted practice such as philanthropy.  
Nevertheless there is value to using different manifestations of this practice to 
determine a prominent motivation – while also acknowledging the potential 
existence of additional considerations.  
The Literature on Corporate Philanthropy: The concept of strategic philanthropy 
is one example of how our understanding of corporate philanthropy has evolved 
over the past three or four decades.  The literature on corporate philanthropy has 
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three primary branches: the historical documentation of business giving, the 
identification of various business philanthropic practices in the management 
literature, and the efforts of organizational theorists to develop a conceptual
understanding of why this type of behavior might be undertaken by a business.  
To reach an understanding of nonprofit philanthropic behavior, the branch that 
incorporates the organizational theory literature is especially appropriate to 
investigate for two reasons.  The first is that these theories seek not merely to 
record various actions but also provide insights into possible organizational 
motivations behind various actions and structures.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, these theories have been applied to varying types of organizations 
as well as to various organizational actions.  Tracing the references to similar 
theories can provide possible linkages between otherwise unrelated practices.  
For example, the theory of organizational prestige is used as an underlying 
rationale for both for-profit corporate giving (Kamens 1985) and for nonprofit 
behavior (Perrow 1961).  This provides a motivational link that could help identify 
a key attribute for nonprofit philanthropy, linking two seemingly disparate 
elements of corporate giving and nonprofit behavior.  
Although the organizational theory literature is the primary focus of this thesis, a 
brief summary of the literature related to the historical evolution of corporate 
giving and the management perspective on for-profit philanthropy provides a 
context for viewing the extent and evolution of scholarly attention to corporate 
philanthropy.  In terms of the historical documentation, the Russell Sage 
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Foundation executive F. Emerson Andrews first attempted to trace the history of 
corporate giving in the United States in 1952.  Since that time historians of 
business and of the nonprofit sector have richly explored the historical evolution 
of corporate giving, including Peter Dobkin Hall (1997, 1989), Karl (1991), Useem 
(1987), Hayden W. Smith (1983), Nelson (1970), and Heald (1970).  Marinetto 
(1999) has done a similar historical view of business philanthropy in Britain.  
Several studies of corporate philanthropy have looked at factual trends, including 
equating varying levels of philanthropy with firm size and type (Brown, Helland, 
and Smith 2006, Johnson 1966) or with advertising expense (Fry, Keim, and 
Meiners 1982).  While some of the historical and factual sources do attempt a 
theoretical explanation for noting certain trends, such explorations are limited and 
that one particularly useful application of the works is more descriptive than 
analytical.  However, Young and Burlingame note the value of the historical 
documentation as it indicates shifts in corporate giving behavior that link the 
historical literature to different stages of their four-part model: “The neoclassical 
model grows out of an era of American business domination of the economy 
through the 1950s.  The ethical/altruistic model offers a 1960s flavor of social 
responsibility . . . The political model reflects a growing sense of societal 
participation by corporations in the world of the 1970s and 1980s . . . And 
stakeholder theory integrates the notion of empowerment, a growing societal 
force since the 1960s . . .” (Young and Burlingame 1996, p. 162).  
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The management literature primarily focuses on documenting corporate 
philanthropy practices and presenting analyses that can be applied to either 
assisting corporate decisions or better understanding corporate philanthropy as a 
social resource.  This literature is differentiated from that of organizational theory 
as works within this framework have limited references to the works of 
organizational theory, particularly those themes most closely associated with 
nonprofit behavior.  However they do add valuable insights into characteristics of 
business behavior related to motivations for corporate philanthropy and as such 
are important to investigate in a little more depth.
Key works in the management literature that address corporate philanthropy are 
the previously mentioned works of Young and Burlingame (1996) and 
Burlingame and Smith (1987), which help to synthesize the various explanations 
into a more cohesive framework.  Other sources provide confirmation of one or 
more of these four corporate giving models.  This particularly includes the role of 
community power explored in the work of Himmelstein (1997) and Mitchell 
(1989).  Himmelstein’s work is especially significant in advancing our 
understanding of how corporate philanthropy helps an individual business 
become more influential in its community while also strengthening the overall 
autonomy of a community’s private business sector.  The studies of Galaskiewicz 
(2006, 1991, and 1989) and his explorations of corporate philanthropy in the 
Minneapolis area and resulting depictions of this philanthropy as collaborative 
partnerships reinforce this perspective.  The works of Galaskiewicz and 
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Himmelstein strengthen the rationales for the Political Model of philanthropy as a 
means to increase community power and influence.  Under this model, corporate 
philanthropy is a means for the private sector in a community to join resources to 
address community needs while simultaneously limiting the need for influence 
and intervention of the public sector through government action.  This has a 
potential parallel application to motivations for nonprofit philanthropy as a means 
for the private, nonprofit sector to expand its own influence while minimizing 
governmental involvement and resulting oversight.  
The management literature also helps support the Stakeholder Model for 
corporate giving.  Brudney and Farrell (2002) explore the legal considerations of 
corporate philanthropy as a means for meeting shareholder interests in relation 
to social needs (treating shareholder as a narrow but relevant definition of 
stakeholder).  They determine that stockholders have not only economic interests 
but also concerns about community and social issues.  Brudney and Ferrell 
maintain that management needs to consider identifying and incorporating these 
stakeholder/stockholder interests in their philanthropic decisions, as well as 
addressing the interests of the business itself.  Brammer and Millington (2005) 
also emphasize the role that corporate philanthropy plays in shaping stakeholder 
perceptions of a corporation’s reputation.  Their work reinforces the function of 
philanthropic actions as a way to develop corporate reputation.  They indicate 
that corporate reputation among various stakeholders is an image that is created 
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over time and is an asset that has explicit residual benefits for the business.6  As 
an asset, reputation can be developed through deliberate strategies such as 
philanthropy.  The relationship of corporate philanthropy and reputation with the 
theoretical concepts of prestige and legitimacy is especially notable and helps to 
link the for-profit and nonprofit characteristics, as will be shown in the next 
section.  
The two other models (Productivity and Ethical) are even more extensively 
addressed in the management literature on corporate social responsibility.  As 
mentioned, the strategic philanthropy approach to corporate giving advocated by 
Porter and Kramer (2002) and others relates directly to the Productivity Model.  
Strategic philanthropy can also be considered as an attempt to at least partially 
unify the various models.  However the strategic philanthropy approach 
emphasizes that increased business benefit is always one of the evaluative 
criteria for corporate philanthropy, regardless of what the other criteria may be.  
Therefore it is considered as rooted primarily in the Productivity Model.  
Conversely, the linkage that strategic philanthropy establishes between 
increased productivity and other motivations does illustrate the difficulty in 
assigning a single motive to increasingly complex behavior.  For instance, the 
observation has been made that corporate giving has seen a relative decline in 
the past few years (Burlingame 2003, pp. 178-179) although this does fluctuate 
                                           
6 Corporate reputation is an area that has seen increased interest over the past twenty years, 
particularly as a strategy.  Mahon (2002) and Fombrun and Shanley (1990) are two sources 
relating to this area.  The relationship of reputation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
less explored, but is especially evident in the use of visible CSR as a method to combat negative 
public perceptions (such as Williams and Barrett 2000).
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year-to-year (Giving USA 2007, p. 79).  But this decline has been balanced by 
what is termed corporate-nonprofit partnerships, business practices that are 
beyond simple charity but have dual benefits as their expressed purposes (ibid, 
pp. 81-82, Galaskiewicz 2006, Sagawa and Segal 2000).  Examples of this 
partnership are corporate sponsorships, funding for specific nonprofit programs 
from corporate research or human resources budgets, or true collaborative 
programs with business and nonprofits working together to jointly achieve 
community initiatives and meet social needs (Galaskiewicz and Colman 2006, 
Burlingame and Smith 1989).  It could be notable that the second edition of The 
Nonprofit Handbook (2006) replaced the chapter from the first edition on 
“Corporate Philanthropy” (Useem 1987) with a chapter titled “Collaboration 
between Corporations and Nonprofit Organizations” (Galaskiewicz and Colman 
2006), providing one signal of this shift in the priorities of business philanthropy.  
In noting this expansion, Galaskiewicz and Colman emphasize “that since 
Useem’s (1987) review (i.e. in the first edition), there has been a blurring of the 
boundaries across sectors and an expansion of the interface between nonprofits 
and business” (2006, p. 196).  On one hand, this shift toward partnerships and 
collaborations potentially supports the Political Model, as these represent private 
efforts to address community needs without the explicit role of government.  On 
the other hand, this could also suggest that corporate involvement in programs 
for social benefit have a broader strategic role, seeking to satisfy social, political, 
and stakeholder needs while increasing the benefit to business interests – a new 
paradigm for corporate philanthropy as termed by Burlingame and Smith (1996).  
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These partnerships also potentially provide another unifying mechanism for 
corporate philanthropy, bridging political, stakeholder, and ethical perspectives in 
ways that could provide financial benefits.
The Ethical Model is well represented in the broad management literature on 
business ethics and particularly on corporate social responsibility.  To completely 
examine that extensive literature is beyond the scope of this paper.  However 
several observations are helpful for the theme of the paper.  The broader 
definition of corporate social responsibility or corporate social action contains 
additional concepts that differentiate it from self-serving business strategies: 
“behaviors and practices that extend beyond immediate profit maximization 
goals” (Marquis, Glynn and Davis 2007, p. 926).  In his explorations of the 
evolving definitions of corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility, 
Carroll emphasizes that although the specific measurements and uses of the 
term corporate social responsibility are continually changing, its basic 
foundations, dating back over fifty years, relate to enduring public expectations of 
the social role of businesses (Carroll 1999, pp. 291-292).  Carroll also notes that 
some commentators have defined social responsibility as involving not only 
behavior that goes “beyond economic and legal considerations” but that are 
purely voluntary.  He specifically cites Manne and Wallich (1972, p. 5), “Another 
aspect of any workable definition of corporate social responsibility is that the 
behavior of the firms must be voluntary” (Carroll 1979, p. 498).  Whether this 
“voluntary” behavior differentiates at all from “voluntary” business efforts to 
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increase profits is debatable.  But the fact that social responsibility is not 
something that is forced by an external mandate – such as by government –
does link the concept not only to the “voluntary private action for the public good” 
philanthropy definition but also provides a “softer” context for connecting the 
concept with the more combative-sounding model of power.  The emphasis of 
social responsibility on being voluntary provides a sense that efforts to achieve 
what is termed political and economic power might actually more properly be 
termed as independence or autonomy of the private sector.  This provides an 
additional attribute that has potential application to explaining nonprofit 
philanthropy.
Corporate social responsibility and corporate philanthropy can be characterized 
as an effort by a company to advance its own worth and concern for a community 
in the eyes of its customers and the greater public.  This may also reflect a need 
to emulate similar actions of other businesses.  Both of these motivations are 
explored through the organizational theory literature related to legitimacy and 
isomorphism.
Nonprofit Organizational Theories and Neo-Institutionalism – On Organizational 
Legitimacy, Institutional Isomorphism, and Nonprofit Philanthropy
Legitimacy is one of the two broad theories that this paper maintains provide the 
motivational foundations of organizational philanthropy.  The other theory is 
institutional isomorphism.  Both of these concepts connect to the nonprofit sector 
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within the general designation of neo-institutional theory.  Legitimacy includes 
related concepts such as corporate reputation and prestige and can be closely 
related to and is an outcome of isomorphism. Isomorphism, as developed by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refers to the homogenization of organizations that 
occurs as environmental constraints encourage one organization to resemble 
other organizations occupying similar institutional or other organizational 
population contexts.  Their approach sought a different theoretical approach to 
organizational theory that stressed a “homogeneity of organizational forms and 
practices” (ibid, p.148) that contrasted with theories that focused on explaining 
organizational variations within a population (such as ecology theory as 
expressed by Hannan and Freeman 1977).  One consequence of adapting 
similar structures and practices can be to increase the legitimacy of the 
organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, pp. 149-150).  Legitimacy and 
isomorphism can both be segmented into sub-categories that correspond to the 
four models of corporate giving and provide further insights into nonprofit 
philanthropy.7
The general concept of neo-institutionalism, as presented by Meyer and Rowan 
(1975) and expanded by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) forms the basis for these 
comparative theories.  This includes work grounded in the concepts of Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) on myth and ceremony, of Orton and Weick (1990, and Weick 
                                           
7 As will be explored further below, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) differentiate between coercive, 
normative, and mimetic isomorphism in their work on how institutional system seek rationality.  
Dacin, Oliver and Roy identified a framework of five legitimating functions for corporate strategic 
alliances (of which philanthropy is one expression): market, relational, social, investment, and 
alliance legitimacy.
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1976) on loose coupling, and of Perrow (1961) and Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) 
as well as Suchman (1995) on organizational prestige and legitimacy.  Other 
theoretical work that relates to organizational philanthropy – and are included in 
this summary of theoretical connections with the neo-institutional theories – are 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) on organizational ecology and of Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) on resource dependency. 
The following exploration of these theories first looks at the general concept of 
neo-institutionalism and the various theories related to neo-institutionalism.  It 
next explores specifically how organizational legitimacy relates to these concepts 
and then outlines the concept of institutional isomorphism and its relationship to 
nonprofit organization.  This part concludes by summarizing how these concepts 
relate to the model of corporate philanthropy. 
Neo-institutionalism: Scott (1998) classifies the various organizational theories 
into three broad categories of what he terms perspectives: rational systems, 
formally imposed internally oriented structures; natural systems, focused on the 
informal internal behavioral structures; and a third classification, open systems, 
includes the effects of environmental factors on the function and structure of 
organizations as opposed to closed system perspectives that focus on internal 
organizational mechanisms.  The concept of institutionalism arises within the 
open system perspective. 
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Scott (1987) shared one of the classic definitions of institutionalism: “. . . 
organizational structure as an adaptive vehicle shaped in reaction to the 
characteristics and commitments of participants as well as to influences and 
constraints from the external environment. Institutionalization refers to this 
adaptive process: ‘in what is perhaps its most significant meaning, “to 
institutionalize” is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the 
task at hand’" (Selznick 1957, p. 17, cited in Scott 1987, p. 494).  Jepperson 
echoes this definition in a simpler form in defining an institution as “a social order 
or pattern that has attained a certain state or property” and goes on to clarify that 
these properties refer to particular contexts and external relationships that affect 
organizational structures and functions (1991, pp. 145-146).  Scott (1991) further 
identified the variety and complexity of environmental influences affecting 
institutional theories as including cultural elements such as myth and ceremony, 
concerns over legitimacy, and other relationships connecting the organization to 
its wider society.  This environmental approach to corporate behavior is 
particularly applicable to external and relational actions such as corporate social 
responsibility and its more specific expression of corporate – and nonprofit –
philanthropic behavior. 
Neo-institutional theories are grounded in open system approaches to 
organizational structure and function (Powell and Di Maggio 1991).  The 
institutionalism theories of the 1950s focused on the non-rational institutionalized 
behavior within organizations, separate from their environment. Neo-
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institutionalism8 generally refers to a group of theories developed in the 1970s 
and is similar to institutionalism but considers the pressures of the organizational 
environment affecting organizational behavior.  This group of theories includes 
organizational legitimacy and isomorphism as well as the related concepts of
myth and ceremony (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and on tight and loose coupling 
(Orton and Weick 1990, and Weick 1976).  Open system theory also 
incorporates institutional concepts such as population ecology (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977) and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
These concepts are helpful for expanding the exploration of nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior, but legitimacy and isomorphism have the strongest direct 
application.
Organizational Legitimacy: As stated earlier, Perrow (1961) explored the 
importance of the concept of organizational prestige, a concept related to 
legitimacy, and in some sources used interchangeably.  He based his 
examination on observations of a hospital (generically identified by Perrow as 
                                           
8 This thesis tends to focus on concepts typically included under “new” institutionalism, focusing 
on cultural concepts such as legitimacy.  The concept of new institutionalism or neo-
institutionalism is sometimes contrasted to that of institutionalism, to distinguish the 
advancements to theory in the research and writings of sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s from 
older traditions of linking organizational behavior with social, political, and economic 
environmental influences.  The original institutional approaches were developed in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries by theorists such as Veblen, Parsons, and Coase, and further 
advanced in the mid-twentieth century by Selznick.  The “new institutionalism” of the later 
twentieth century further explored and defined the various environmental influences on 
organizational behavior and is expressed in fields such as economics, social psychology, and 
political science as well as sociology (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, pp. 1-3).  Selznick (1996) 
explores the differences in new and old institutionalism, especially the tendency of the new 
institutional theories to emphasize the theme of incoherence in complex organizations.  In this 
paper, institutionalism and new or neo-institutionalism may occasionally be used interchangeably, 
but unless otherwise indicated either term refers primarily to the work of the more recent 
theorists.
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“Valley Hospital”) and its attempts to construct its public image in a way that 
corresponded to social norms.  He observed that in such situations the quality of 
extrinsic actions (i.e. those outside of an organization’s “official purposes”) 
become as important as those intrinsic approaches that emphasize the quality of 
an organization’s primary purposes.  This may be especially true of organizations 
that have purposes that may be difficult for the typical consumer to judge their 
quality, such as healthcare provided by a hospital.9  In these cases, the style of 
facilities, presence of personal amenities, and public actions such as making 
contributions may be used to convey to a community an image of organizational 
quality.  Prestige also relates to theories such as organizational image10 and the 
related concept of reputation.11  The perspective of image is particularly relevant 
to the enhancement of organizational prestige.  Image has been depicted in the 
management literature as related to external perceptions of an organization, 
whether through manipulation of that image by internal processes (i.e. “public 
relations”) or through normative perceptions rooted through experience of 
external constituencies (e.g. customer experience).  The concept of image is 
generally opposed to more objectively measurable substance (Gioia and Thomas 
1996, p. 370) and is separated from organizational identity (representing the 
perceptions of insiders) as being externally held appraisals (Scott and Lane 
                                           
9 This also relates to the economic theories of the nonprofit sector regarding contract failure –
addressed later in this chapter.
10 Especially work by Avesson (1990) and Dutton and Dukerich (1991), as cited in Scott and Lane 
(2000) and Gioia and Thomas (1996).
11 Corporate reputation has had various explorations in the management literature, particularly 
related to strategy and marketing.  For a fairly extensive identification of the literature, see Mahon 
(2002).
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2000, p. 43).  Perrow (1961) and the management literature provide a connection 
of these theories with the broader central concept of organizational legitimacy.
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) helped expand organizational legitimacy as a factor in 
both organizational and institutional analysis.  They defined organizational 
legitimacy as the “congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger 
social system” (p. 122).  Building on the definitions put forth by Parsons (“the 
appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the 
action in the social system”)12 and Maurer (“the process whereby an organization 
justifies to a peer or subordinate system its right to exist”),13 Dowling and Pfeffer 
identify legitimacy as one of three sets of organizational behavior – with 
economic viability and legal viability being the other two (p. 124).  In their 
definition, legitimacy is seen as strongly linked to societal values and norms –
and is evident in communications among societal entities as well as an influence 
for organizational change (i.e. to conform to changing societal norms and 
values). This behavior is especially seen as an important concept for analyzing 
linkages and relationships between an organization and others in their external 
environment.  Dowling and Pfeffer also specifically identify contributions to 
charity as an example of legitimating behavior.  They present three perspectives 
that can be used for analysis of such corporate generosity: economic benefits, 
truly altruistic behavior, and legitimating behavior.  
                                           
12 Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, New York: Free Press (1960): 
175.
13 J.G. Maurer, Readings in Organization Theory: Open-System Approaches, New York: Random 
House, (1971): 136.
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Suchman (1995) further delineates three broad types of legitimacy: pragmatic, 
moral, and cognitive.  Within Suchman’s definition of legitimacy (“a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions.” p. 574), pragmatic legitimacy is the first type identified.  It refers 
to organizational actions that are self-interested, using political, economic, or 
social conformity to the systems of societal norms for organizational benefit.  He 
demarcates within this category exchange legitimacy (related to economic 
profitability as well as power-dependency), influence legitimacy (attracting 
support because of the perception the organization is responsive to larger 
interests), and dispositional legitimacy (the organization is personified in the 
minds of external constituents, as being trustworthy and mindful of their 
interests). Each of these is presented as an organizational attempt to manipulate 
the public perception of the quality of the organization for internal benefit. 
The second type of legitimacy presented by Suchman is moral legitimacy.  
Related to altruism, moral legitimacy involves various behaviors of the 
organization as being primarily in the interest of external actors rather than of the 
internal organization.  Identifying moral legitimacy involves various levels of 
evaluation, including consequences of the actions, procedures involved with the 
behavior, structures of the activity, or the motivations and subsequent actions of 
an organization’s leaders.  Cognitive legitimacy relates to an organization’s 
actions being culturally accepted as deserving existence and support due to it 
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being perceived as socially necessary or inevitable, based on taken-for-granted 
cultural accounts.  An example of cognitive legitimacy might be a church being 
assumed to be primarily interested in the spiritual benefit of its community (rather 
than the personal enrichment of the churches leaders) or a police car 
representing the legal enforcement of socially developed regulations (rather than 
the personal beliefs of the police officers).  Cognitive legitimacy is especially 
vulnerable to cases of organizational scandal or transgressions.  When an 
organization violates the conditions underlying the societal assumption, it can 
cast doubt on the entire organizational field or institution that represents that 
specific set of values.
Dacin, Oliver, and Roy (2007) have strengthened the motivations for corporate 
alliances to increasing legitimacy.  They have further identified five legitimating 
roles for strategic alliances: market, relational, social, investment, and alliance.  
These roles correspond to three of the four models of corporate philanthropy 
(market and investment = Productivity, social = Ethical, and relational and 
alliance = Political), with even the Stakeholder Model potentially being addressed 
through the relational classification.
Legitimacy and myth and ceremony: The theory of legitimation and the process 
by which organizations acquire and use it to interact with the environment are
expanded through the concept of organizational myth and ceremony as put forth 
by Meyer and Rowan (1977).  Meyer and Rowan’s paper is especially significant 
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as it unifies several theories into a broader institutional theory, creating a context 
for later theorists such as Powell and DiMaggio (1991) and Haley (1991) who 
conceptualized the entire philanthropic process as a masque, with the purpose of 
strengthening the image of the organization as one of prestige and legitimacy.  
How myth and ceremony supplement the concept of legitimacy also led Chen, 
Patten, and Roberts (2008) to explain the connection between corporate 
philanthropy and employee relations, environmental polices, or product safety.  
Meyer and Rowan not only emphasized that rationalized myths help support 
organizational legitimacy but also link professional and other institutionalized 
norms with organizational policies.  These institutionalized myths help encourage 
organizational isomorphism as conformity to ceremony leads to organizations 
developing similar policies, procedures, and rules based on those 
institutionalized standards.  These institutionalized myths and ceremonies help 
link the theoretical concept of the desire of an organization to attain external 
legitimacy with isomorphism and its corresponding need to emulate other 
organizations that have that desired legitimacy.14  Meyer and Rowan also show 
how the potential conflict between organizational efficiency and ceremonial rules 
(which they note may be costly for an organization to satisfy, without a 
corresponding direct financial benefit) may be addressed through a process of 
organizational decoupling of the ritualized elements related to legitimacy from the 
units of financial production of goods and services.  This helps preserve the 
                                           
14 Institutionalized isomorphism is explored more fully by DiMaggio and Powell (1983).  
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ceremonial aspects valued by society from the goods and service outputs related 
to the economic viability of the organization.  
However, decoupling certain activities from the rest of the organization can also 
lead to organizational anarchy.  Meyer and Rowan present a further concept they 
title the logic of confidence and good faith, as a mechanism whereby 
organizational ceremony broadly applies to an entire organization by reinforcing 
the myth of legitimacy both internally and externally for standardized, 
institutionalized aspects of an organization while the actual practices related to 
production of goods and services may have relative diversity.  It is the 
combination of the decoupled institutionalized activity with the legitimating 
ceremonial behavior that allows organizations to incorporate regulated or other 
requirements related to professionalism and other inter-organizational standards 
while also allowing the productive aspects of the organization to develop more 
individualized, competitive – and presumably profitable – strategies.  
Legitimacy and loose coupling: The concept of decoupling advanced by Meyer 
and Rowan relates to loose coupling as presented by Weick (1976) and 
subsequently expanded by Orton and Weick (1990). Decoupling or loose 
coupling15 is presented as a way for organizations to deal with problems brought 
                                           
15 Orton and Weick (1990) make a distinction between decoupled and loosely coupled 
organizations.  The distinction depends upon the extent the organizational structure allows for the 
individual elements to be distinct, while the organizational function allows them to be responsive 
to each other.  According to Orton and Weick, if the organizational elements are distinct and non-
responsive, they are decoupled.  If they are distinct but responsive, they are loosely coupled (p. 
205).  The other two possibilities are non-coupled (not distinct or responsive – and therefore not a 
system) and lightly coupled (not distinct but responsive).  One of the concerns they express in the 
57
about through information asymmetry, a particular need in organizational fields 
that provide goods and services that cannot be easily evaluated by consumers –
such as healthcare and hospitals.  This parallels the concept of decoupling with 
an economic rationale for the nonprofit sector as one mechanism to address 
contract failure and establish trustworthiness (Hansman 1980).  In this case the 
nonprofit designation could be said to act as the legitimating myth to address this 
product uncertainty.  Weick (1976) and others have helped define and clarify the 
role decoupling or loose coupling plays in helping to mediate processes related 
to institutional legitimacy. They stress that loose coupling of disparate 
organizational elements helps the organization maintain its stability and viability 
through the simultaneous existence of both rationality and indeterminacy.  This 
simultaneous functioning allows the technical level of the organization to function 
as a closed, rational system while the institutionalized level can operate as an 
open system with more subjective linkages to external influences (Orton and 
Weick 2004).16  Evaluating the degree that the philanthropic function of an 
organization is either tightly or loosely coupled to other organizational functions 
allows us to potentially understand the primary motivation for an organization to 
act philanthropically.  If philanthropy is closely aligned with the organization’s 
primary purpose – through strong departmental and managerial lines of reporting 
and authority – it can be hypothesized that the motivations behind that activity 
                                                                                                                                 
article is that researchers and theoreticians have tended to use the terms decoupled and loosely 
coupled either interchangeably or in very imprecise ways, weakening the explanatory value of the 
concept.
16 Orton and Weick cite Thompson (1967) as their source for this concept of technical and 
institutionalized simultaneity.  J.D. Thompson, Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of 
Administrative Theory, New York: McGraw-Hill (1967).
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are also closely tied to improved financial outcomes.  If the activity is tightly 
related to the top leadership, ethical motivations may be presumed.17  
Conversely, when the actions are loosely coupled in relation to the organization’s 
primary services they may be found dispersed throughout the organization.  In 
this case of loose-coupling, stakeholder motivations can be a primary motivation 
for philanthropic behavior.  Philanthropy that is well-defined but loosely-coupled
from other organizational activities could also be seeking the political visibility 
and influence that goes along with the Political Model.  These designations are 
noted in Table 1E.
The development of the concept of legitimacy over the past fifty years has 
increasingly identified specific programs and actions that serve to connect the 
organization with external factors and mores.  These externally connecting 
programs (such as organizational philanthropy) are also increasingly understood 
as potentially being separate from – or at east loosely-coupled to – the internal 
operations and the primary services of the organization.  A complete de-coupling 
of these activities from the core operations of the organization is at the extreme 
end of this development process, but there can be some very real advantages to 
this type of separation.  By separating the activities that primarily link the 
organization with social expectations (such as philanthropic behavior) from 
                                           
17 The intrusion of chief executive desires can serve as a signal that the activities are tightly 
coupled to the ethical model, even if the structure appears to be loosely coupled through a 
separate organizational function or stakeholder model.  The distinction is how much power the 
executive has to alter the desires of the seemingly separate operations, as opposed to the 
stakeholder autonomy. 
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operational activities, an organization can potentially satisfy both social norms 
and internal organizational objectives.
Institutional isomorphism: A second overall theory that has significant application 
to organizational philanthropy is institutional isomorphism – a theory that 
explores the organizational actions that are consequences of their efforts to 
achieve legitimacy.  This theory maintains that organizations within a given field 
(or community environment) evolve to resemble each other as well as to emulate 
those organizations they wish to be seen like.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
developed earlier treatments of institutional isomorphism into a coherent theory.  
Based on the structuration theories of Giddens (1979) related to the 
institutionalized coherencies of organizational fields, DiMaggio and Powell 
maintained that it wasn’t competition or efficiency that drove structural change 
but rather environmental forces that encouraged homogeneity.  They especially 
identified the state and the professions as “the great rationalizers of the second 
half of the twentieth century” (p. 147).  They state that the process of this 
“institutional definition or ‘structuration’” has four parts: increased interactions 
among organizations in a given field; interorganizational structures, reflecting 
domination and coalitions; an increase in inter-agency information; and a rise in 
the mutual awareness of organizations involved in common efforts (p. 148).  As 
organizations begin to coalesce into a common field, they also come to resemble 
each other in terms of structure and function.  In such a scenario, isomorphism 
brings not only institutionalized legitimacy that generally carries increased cost 
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requirements, but also a strategic asset that can provide direct benefit to the 
organization, including possible financial resources. 
DiMaggio and Powell differentiate three types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, 
and normative (p. 150).  Coercive isomorphism stems from political pressures, 
influences of other organizations, rules legitimated by institutions, and legal and 
regulatory requirements of the state.  As such it is related to at least one type of 
legitimacy, that which is associated with standardized accountability of various 
kinds.  It could be linked to Suchman’s (1995) concept of pragmatic legitimacy, 
being sought for self-interested reasons.  As is outlined more extensively later in 
this section, coercive isomorphism identifies a potential fifth model or motivation 
for nonprofit organizational behavior that may be more prominent for nonprofit 
organizations than for-profit organizations, but that may also be an over-looked 
motivation for corporate philanthropy.  This fifth motivation is termed the External 
Mandate Model and refers to structures or practices imposed by regulation or 
accreditation – or also because an organization is part of a larger system that 
has determined certain standardized forms will be adopted by their subsidiaries.  
Mimetic isomorphism develops as a response to problems of uncertainties.  
DiMaggio and Powell link this specifically to the concept of modeling, or copying 
other organizations that are considered “modern” or “progressive” or some other 
desirable characteristic.  This also is a manifestation of the type of legitimacy 
characterized by Suchman (1995) as cognitive legitimacy, reflecting assumed 
values by society.  Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalism, 
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both of workers within an organization as well as of the managers.  The 
professionalization of workers within an organization means they are increasingly 
likely to belong to professional associations that bridge organizational boundaries 
and encourage similar ethical practices.  The professionalization of the managers 
generally includes formal and professional education that enables them to learn 
increasingly standardized organizational approaches to specific situations within 
identified organizational fields.  While the DiMaggio and Powell focus their 
definition of normative isomorphism on professional criteria, it can also relate to 
broader social concepts expressing general ethical values, which links it to 
Suchman’s concept of moral legitimacy.  The degree that an organization’s 
philanthropic actions and structure mirror other organizations within their 
community is a potential indication of their motivations behind those actions.
Other Organizational Theories - Organizational Ecology and Resource 
Dependency: Two other theories based in open systems approaches have a 
relationship with organizational philanthropy: organizational population ecology 
and resource dependency.  Hannan and Freeman (1977) apply to organizational 
theory the social Darwinian concept of populations occupying unique niches
within a larger ecological environment.  To be competitive, individual 
organizations within each niche must adapt to the environmental factors within 
the niche as well as to meet the demands of the broader ecology.  To adapt to 
multi-level environmental constraints, organizations will assume similar structural 
forms. Hannan and Freeman term this tendency structural inertia.  These 
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constraints are both internal and external, and one major external constraint they 
identify is legitimacy.  They point out that any organizational adaptation that 
violates this institutional legitimacy incurs a significant competitive cost and 
jeopardizes the organization’s fitness to thrive or even exist within that ecology.18  
This theory provides a further linkage of legitimacy with organizational 
isomorphism, similar to that provided by Meyer and Rowan (1977) above.
Hannan and Freeman identify several concepts that relate how ecology 
encourages the development of isomorphic structures and behavior.  One 
concept is that organizations face multiple environments and therefore must 
develop alternative (and in many cases similar) structures to address this variety 
of constraints (p. 939).19  A second concept is the effect the expansion of political 
and economic centers, as well as government regulations, have on replacing 
local adaptations with broader institutional standards (p. 944).  A third concept is 
that organizations of different size occupy different niches and therefore even 
though organizations may be in similar fields, larger organizations may reflect 
different organizational structures than small organizations (p. 945).  The 
overriding theory behind their analysis is that competition will tend to produce 
similar organizations occupying the same ecological niche.  This competitive 
drive within the organizational ecology connects to the Political Model of 
philanthropic behavior. 
                                           
18 An example Hannan and Freeman give of adaptation that would violate legitimacy is a 
university eliminating undergraduate education (p. 932).
19 This need for alternative structures within a single organization could be further examined using 
the concept of decoupling, although this is not a concept Hannan and Freeman include in their 
analysis.
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The emphasis Hannan and Freeman place upon competition as a factor in 
shaping an isomorphic organizational structure has a corollary in resource 
dependency theory. Resource dependency theory (developed most thoroughly 
by Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) emphasizes that organizations not only adapt to 
the environment but also are particularly influenced by environmental 
considerations of political as well as economic factors (Scott 2004).  Resource 
dependency theory holds that environmental constraints force organizations to 
adapt to the changing environmental conditions and seek relationships that 
provide access to needed resources.  As an organization acknowledges their 
dependence on other organizations it also searches for methods to manage 
those dependencies and to minimize the power it must sacrifice to the source of 
the desired resource.  Growing out of theories of power-dependence relations 
(Emerson 1962), this theory holds that power rather than efficiency best explains 
the actions and results of those actions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  This link to 
financial and other resources also relates actions like philanthropic behavior to 
resource dependency and the Productivity Model of organizational philanthropy.
Neo-institutionalism and Nonprofit Theories: Organizational social theory that is 
specifically related to identifying the origins and operations of the nonprofit sector 
as distinct form the for-profit or governmental sectors, is more indefinite than that 
found in economic theory (outlined later in this section).  Much of that undefined 
quality is due to the heterogeneity found in the sector.  Sociological theory has 
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generally been found to be more valuable through analysis at the industry-level 
rather than the sector-level (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990, p. 137).  Nevertheless 
several theories related to the nonprofit sector have provided perspectives on the 
nonprofit sector.  These are primarily found within neo-institutional theory, 
defined as effects on organizations due to their membership in various socially 
constituted and normative structures.  
Sociological approaches to understanding the behavior of nonprofit organizations 
were generically outlined in the general perspective of sociology and the 
nonprofit sector by DiMaggio and Anheier (1990).  They concluded that the
behavior of nonprofit organizations reflected state and institutional factors and 
influences as well as internal choices.  These factors are influenced by the 
organizational ecology at an industry level, an element they claim economic 
theories don’t fully account for.  They further emphasize that status groups, 
professionals, and state policies have provided important influences for the 
development and operations of nonprofit organizations.  These influences reflect 
theories related to organizational prestige and legitimacy as well as to factors of 
ecology and resource dependency.  Dimaggio and Anheier’s work is also 
particularly relevant to the topic of nonprofit hospitals as they emphasize that up 
to that time hospitals, along with schools, had seen the most attention by 
researchers (p. 147).
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Dimaggio and Anheier incorporated and applied to the nonprofit sector theories 
on organizational prestige developed by Perrow (1961) and of organizational 
legitimacy by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), as well as the related concepts of myth 
and ceremony of Meyer and Rowan (1977).  They also acknowledged the 
importance of institutional isomorphism presented by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) as well as incorporated the related theories of organizational ecology by 
Hannan and Freeman (1977) and resource dependency of Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978). 
The work exploring the role of organizational legitimacy and institutional 
isomorphism in the nonprofit sector emphasize a need for nonprofit organizations 
not only to consider how well they provide a given service but also how the 
external society perceives the relative value of their services.  It is important not 
only that a nonprofit “does good,” but that its community is aware that it does 
good.  In many cases, these dual expectations can be most advantageously 
approached as two separate processes requiring two different organizational 
strategies.  By decoupling the activities designed to improve an organization’s 
external perceptions (such as philanthropic behavior) from operational activities, 
a nonprofit can most effectively meet their external goals while supporting – but 
not adversely affecting – the operations fulfilling their primary mission.  
Institutional Theories and Organizational Philanthropy – A Summary: Various 
organizational theories, linked with the generic concept of neo-institutionalism, 
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have potential application to explaining not only corporate philanthropy but also 
why a nonprofit organization might also practice such behavior.  Seeking to 
emulate other organizations – both other nonprofits as well as for-profits – can 
also provide legitimacy for their commitment to larger community actions or as a 
key player in their community’s political structure.  Philanthropy can also be a 
way nonprofit organizations – for reasons similar to a for-profit organization –
may meet the interests of various stakeholders or the ethical values of their 
leadership while being separated or de-coupled from the organization’s primary 
activity or mission.  The theories link at various places in their relationship to the 
four part corporate model of giving and provide a potential for hypothetically 
locating the different motivational sources within different levels of the nonprofit 
organization.  Table 1E pulls together the various perspectives from the 
organizational theory literature and shows their role within the respective four 
models of corporate giving (as was initially presented in Table 1A).
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Table 1E: 
Relationship of Organizational Theories to Corporate Giving Models
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stake-
holder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet community 
and social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
3 Perspectives 
of Legitimacy 
– (Suchman) –
(Dowling and
Pfeffer)
Dacin, Oliver, 
and Roy
Pragmatic – self-
interested 
Economic 
benefits
Market and
Investment 
legitimacy
Moral 
Altruistic behavior
Social legitimacy
Cognitive:
Political
legitimacy 
(Prestige) –
Legitimating 
behavior
Relational 
and Alliance 
legitimacy
Legitimating 
behavior
(Partially) 
Relational 
legitimacy
Level of 
Coupling
Tightly coupled Tightly coupled to 
leadership, but 
loosely coupled or 
de-coupled from 
other organizational 
activities
Loosely 
coupled or 
de-coupled 
from the 
organization –
Linked with 
other external 
organizations
Loosely 
coupled
Isomorphism
(DiMaggio and
Powell)
Coercive Normative Mimetic Normative
Other Theories Resource 
Dependency 
Normative theories Population 
Ecology
Population 
Ecology
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
Philanthropic 
Function
Linked with 
primary mission 
or operation
Board or CEO 
leadership
Separate 
foundation or 
identified and 
publicly-
visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
Corporate Philanthropy and Organizational Theory: The next step is to look at the 
key institutional and organizational literature that has been incorporated into 
analyses of corporate philanthropy.  The relation of these neo-institutional 
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theories to the nonprofit sector provide a link to the models of corporate 
philanthropy as well as a mechanism for expanding those models to include 
nonprofit philanthropic behavior.
The historical evolution of the concept of corporate social responsibility and 
corporate philanthropy in the management literature is well documented (see 
particularly Lee 2008, Frederick 2006, Carroll 1999).  The theoretical literature is 
of more concern to this thesis and has related roots in the organizational 
sociology literature.  Particular attention is paid to related theoretical work that 
has direct application and use both to organizational philanthropy (as it is 
practiced by corporations) and to the behavior of nonprofit organizations – found 
predominantly in the organizational theories of institutionalism and new 
institutionalism as expressed by DiMaggio with Powell (1983) and Anheier 
(1990).  How and where these two groups of theories intersect can provide 
insight into nonprofit philanthropic behavior.
There has been considerable attention to documenting corporate philanthropy 
and to exploring ramifications of corporate philanthropic practices from both the 
perspective of the business sector as well as the nonprofit literature.  However, 
there have been only a handful of social theorists who have attempted to explore 
the theoretical motivations that might underlie corporate philanthropy or have 
been used as foundations for further examination.  Those that have looked at 
corporate philanthropy in terms of institutional theory primarily focus on the 
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broader topic of corporate social responsibility rather than the narrower element 
of corporate philanthropy per se.  However, as Campbell notes in a recent article, 
“little theoretical attention has been paid to understanding why or why not 
corporations act in socially responsible ways.” (Campbell 2007, p. 946)  
One of the first works to address corporate giving from an institutional theory 
perspective was Kamens (1985) looking at corporate giving as a strategy to 
develop organizational legitimacy.  Kamens explores the theory of how 
organizational legitimacy is drawn from the interactions of the organization with 
its environment, with corporate giving being a primary example of that interaction.  
He draws his work from the normative perspectives of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) relating to ethical legitimacy and the concept of 
political legitimacy of Perrow (1961).  He also notes that legitimacy and corporate 
philanthropy could tie-in with other theories such as resource dependency 
(Pfeffer and Sancik 1978) and population ecology (Hannan and Freemen 1977), 
which places legitimacy as an overall concept that could bridge the four models 
of corporate philanthropy.  Kamens goes on to investigate how differing 
environments may affect different giving strategies, suggesting these different 
situations might prompt different giving responses by corporations by using 
giving as one way to bridge the boundary between the organization and its 
environment.
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Useem (1987) does address institutional theory in passing with mention of 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) work on organizational isomorphism but doesn’t 
expand much upon it except to note that nonprofit organizations will attempt to 
resemble their sponsors, i.e. corporations.  While the implication by Useem is 
that it is the general business-like values and structures that nonprofits will try to 
emulate, it is not difficult to extend these isomorphic practices to specific 
business practices including philanthropic actions.  David Campbell (2000), while 
looking at decisions by corporations to voluntarily report on corporate social 
behavior (CSR) rather than corporate philanthropy, advances legitimacy theory 
as a key motivating factor for voluntary social disclosure.  Echoing Kamens 
(1985), Campbell identifies CSR as a strategy that can be used to gain societal 
support and shape the corporate image in the community, drawing upon the 
legitimacy theories of Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Suchman (1995).
Saiia et al (2003) develop the argument that increased institutionalization will 
shift the locus of control of the giving function from the top of a bureaucratic 
structure to more decentralized professional control.  They base this on the 
theories of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that as goals become more ambiguous 
firms will engage in isomorphic behavior of firms that they perceive to be 
successful – e.g. those with visible philanthropic divisions.  This relates to one 
rationale behind the Political Model of corporate giving, as previously defined.  A 
similar theory can be applied to nonprofit organizations that seek to emulate for-
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profit firm behavior.  This could be especially true for commercial nonprofits (such 
as hospitals) that have debatable differences with their for-profit counterparts.
Marquis et al (2007) also focus on isomorphism as a primary force for 
corporations to act with social motivations in their communities.  They specifically 
cite the work of Galaskiewicz (1989, 1991) as providing evidence that local 
geographic community expectations of corporate behavior give rise to isomorphic 
business giving patterns by other businesses that seek influence in their 
community.  John Campbell (2007) develops an institutional-level theory of 
corporate social responsibility based on several societal conditions.  While he 
doesn’t apply these to the organizational level, his approaches emphasize 
connections to the institutional environment that could explain organizational 
level behavior in terms of being a response to governmental pressures, 
institutionalized norms, and collaborative strategies.
According to the corporate management literature, corporate giving has two 
essential motivations beyond financial benefit to the company: enhanced 
reputation (or prestige – or legitimacy) and the opportunity to limit governmental 
intervention in meeting community needs, thus strengthening the political 
influence of the organization.  The relationship of the latter motivations to the 
Political Model has been fairly well defined.  But where enhanced reputation or 
legitimacy might be specifically placed in relation to the four models is a little 
more subjective.  Enhanced legitimacy could apply to any of the four models, 
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depending upon the specific constituency that a corporation wishes to enhance 
its legitimacy for.  Any actions designed to enhance legitimacy actually involve 
four steps: first to identify the constituency of interest; second to determine the 
appropriate action to meet the interests of that constituency; third to take the 
action; and fourth to communicate that action back to the intended constituency.  
The fourth action, communication – also termed variously as public relations, 
marketing, and/or advertising – is critical in the corporate philanthropy process.  If 
enhanced legitimacy (in the view of some targeted or defined constituency) is an 
important rationale for corporate giving (as the management literature seems to 
suggest), then it is imperative that both the action and results of that action are 
communicated to the desired constituency.  If this final communication step is not 
taken, then it will be left to chance whether the philanthropic action will achieve 
the desired effect of enhanced legitimacy.  In the subsequent examples 
communications is seen as a “follow-up corporate action” (to the initial corporate 
action of the giving itself).
One hypothesis of this thesis is that this process of constituency identification, 
philanthropic activities, and reporting back to that constituency will be located in 
different levels in a corporation based on how they give philanthropic activities 
visibility with different constituencies.  Identifying the corporate location of the 
giving function – as well as the method of communicating that giving – can 
provide a way to potentially identify the underlying motivation for the specific 
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behavior.  The next section uses this hypothesis to further define underlying 
corporate motivations suggested by the broader concept of enhanced legitimacy. 
The Legitimacy Process and Corporate Philanthropy: A quest for legitimacy can 
apply to any of the four models of corporate philanthropy.  How and where the 
philanthropic activities occur can help to further determine which model is most 
appropriate.  According to the Neoclassical/Productivity Model as defined by 
Young and Burlingame, the purpose of giving is to increase firm profitability.  This 
relates to the primary theoretical motivation (identified by the management 
literature), which is to increase profit.  If profit were the primary motivation, the 
targeted constituency the company would most seek to enhance legitimacy with 
would be the beneficiaries of that profit – i.e. the owners, stockholders, and 
potential future investors in the company.  A constituency that would also be 
important would be customers and potential customers – i.e. those who have 
potential interests in the product and would be more inclined to purchase the 
goods or services because of this enhanced legitimacy.  A third constituency 
could be an organization’s employees and programs that strengthen the human 
relations function of the organization.  A matching gifts program that supports 
organizations that an employee contributes to could be an example of this type of 
human relations emphasis.  Because the desired outcome of corporate 
philanthropy is improved financial profit, the corporate strategic actions would be 
expected to support causes with images and interests directly related to the 
services produced and sold by the company.  This would also mean that once 
74
the philanthropy occurred, follow-up corporate actions would involve integrated 
marketing activities designed to develop and carry out philanthropic strategies 
that strengthen the financial return of the company and to subsequently 
communicate those actions and the consequences of those actions to current 
and potential investors and customers.  Communication would focus on 
prominence in corporate annual reports distributed to stockholders and potential 
investors.  Marketing strategies would be designed to interact with targeted 
customer populations, such as on product labels or other direct marketing 
methods.  If employees were one of the constituencies targeted by a human 
relations-oriented contribution program, such as a matching gifts program, then 
communication through internal media would also be important.  These 
strategies would be directly tied to the product or service. Under the 
Neoclassical/Productivity model, corporate giving is just one strategy that is part 
of the normal development and promotion of the goods and services.  As such its 
operation could be expected to be located within that same existing corporate 
structure, within an integrated marketing effort involving closely linked 
departments, coordinated at a departmental managerial level.
Corporations that might be motivated by the Ethical/Altruistic Model would seek 
to meet broad community and social responsibility and to convey a general 
image of ethical corporate behavior.  Under this model it is the entire community 
that the corporation would seek to communicate with, to broadly enhance their 
public image of reputation or legitimacy. The desired outcome of corporate 
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philanthropy would be to use giving as a means to express the social values of 
the overall corporation and/or of the individual corporate leaders.  The corporate 
strategic actions would support causes based on social values rather than tied to 
specific products or services.  Follow-up corporate actions would be to 
communicate the philanthropic actions and their consequences to a larger
community, beyond the primary owners or customers.  Under the Ethical/Altruism 
Model corporate giving decisions would expect to be separated from the location 
and process of philanthropic activity and communication.  Giving decisions and 
possibly activities would be located in top management while the communication 
of the benefits of that philanthropic action would be an effort of a separate public 
relations department, distinct from its efforts to promote products and services to 
customers.  
Beyond programs matching employee gifts, the human relations aspect of and 
uses of corporate philanthropy has potentially broader application to both the 
Neoclassical/Productivity model and to the Ethical/Altruistic model, linking their 
motivations and practice.  Fostering an image of ethical behavior can help reduce 
the cost of recruiting personnel as well as help retain personnel, reducing the 
training costs of new employees.  An organization that has a strong image of 
being ethical might also be able to pay less in salaries to their employees, as 
sharing in the image of being part of an ethical organization may be perceived as 
one “benefit” an employee receives by working at such an organization.  From an 
external constituency perspective, being considered as an ethical organization 
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may justify customers paying a higher price for a product.  Finally it may serve as 
a signal to regulatory agencies that the organizational field is proactively meeting 
community needs and help to forestall additional regulatory provisions that could 
increase expenses and limit profits.
Under the Political Model the motivation for corporate giving is to strengthen the 
economic and community power of the private business community in general 
and of the company in particular.  That enhanced power involves improving the 
reputation of the company with other community leaders in order to achieve the 
desired outcome of limiting government intervention and increasing the 
company’s influence in the community.  Corporate strategic philanthropic actions 
could involve programs that improve the community’s infrastructure through 
private support. Collaborative projects with other businesses, nonprofits, and 
community agencies would also help achieve those outcomes.  Such community 
improvement activities may also have direct benefits for the corporation, such as 
neighborhood improvement or redevelopment programs.  Follow-up corporate 
communications activities would focus on communicating the philanthropic 
actions and their consequences to others in positions of influence in a way that 
would strengthen that political influence.  Locating the action (and promotion) 
within a separate giving entity or department helps give maximum exposure to 
the ongoing commitment of the company to this mission.  This separation of 
community giving from the primary corporate operation is important even if one 
strategy is to get the corporate leadership involved with these community-
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building activities.  Separating the chief executive’s involvement from the ongoing 
business operations can enhance the image and political position of the activity 
as well as the corporation.  It positions the activity as focused on the good of the 
community rather than the advantage of the corporation – even though the 
residual benefits of increased political power can be a very real asset for the 
company.  Under the Political Model, being able to internally unify and coordinate 
a strong external image through a separate foundation or defined department for 
that specific purpose would help ensure the permanence of the company’s 
commitment and strengthen that internal power.  
Under the Stakeholder Model, corporate philanthropy is undertaken to satisfy 
multiple constituencies, to enhance the business’s reputation among various 
stakeholder constituencies.  These constituencies might include some of the 
fore-mentioned constituencies (such as owners, customers, or corporate leaders) 
but also could involve such seemingly secondary groups such as neighbors, 
vendors, or competitors.  In order to support the interests of a variety of 
stakeholders, corporate philanthropic actions could be expected to support 
various potentially individualized causes based on specific stakeholder interests.  
As the company undertakes those activities it would want to communicate those 
actions and their consequences directly to those different stakeholders.  Because 
of this need to differentiate and directly communicate actions to groups with 
different linkages to the company, it could be expected that giving decisions as 
well as the communication of those decisions would be scattered throughout the 
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organization, involving those departments or individuals that would have the best 
connections with disparate groups.  Under the Stakeholder Model, corporate 
philanthropy can be seen as an ethical value of the business that permeates the 
entire organization, rather than being focused at a single point in the 
organizational chart.  
Both the Political and Stakeholder Models provide examples of how decoupling 
philanthropic behavior from the primary activities of the business can provide 
legitimacy within different organizational ecologies.  This enables the legitimizing 
behavior to become isomorphic with the broader ethical values of that particular 
ecology while preserving the competitive autonomy of their primary operations.  
Under the Political Model the organization seeks legitimacy within their broader 
community, being able to mirror behavior of other corporate players within that 
population, regardless of their professional or industrial sector.  Conversely, 
under the Stakeholder Model the isomorphic behavior allows the organizational 
actors to reflect the values and actions of a broader professional institution while 
also meeting the immediate operational needs of the organization.  How these 
motivations and locations of the giving and communication structure relate are 
outlined in Table 1F (adding to the initial corporate model outlined in Table 1A).
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Table 1F: Motivational Characteristics of Corporate Giving Models
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stake-
holder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
consti-
tuencies 
Theoretical 
motivation (from 
the Management 
Literature)
[Enhanced 
reputation]
Increased profit 
Enhanced 
Reputation
Enhanced 
Reputation
Enhanced 
Power
Enhanced 
Reputation
Targeted 
Constituency 
Owners/
stockholders and 
Future Investors
Community Community 
Leaders
Various 
Stakeholders
Desired 
Outcome of 
Corporate 
Philanthropy
Improve Financial 
Profit
Express 
corporate social 
values
(or values of the 
individual 
leaders?)
Limit 
government 
intervention 
Increase 
company’s 
influence 
(Himmelstein)
Support 
interests of 
stakeholders
Corporate 
Strategic 
Actions 
Support causes 
related to primary 
services produced 
and sold
Support causes 
based on broad 
social values
Improve 
community 
infrastructure
Collaboration 
(Galaskiewicz)
Support 
targeted 
causes based 
on stakeholder 
interests
Follow-up 
Corporate 
Actions –
Communications
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences to 
current and 
potential investors
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to the broad 
Community
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to others in 
positions of 
influence
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to the different 
stakeholders
Potential 
Location of 
Corporate 
Giving within the 
Structure
Formal Giving 
Structure, tied-in 
with primary service 
departments
Located in Top 
Management
Internally 
Unified and 
Externally 
Presented:
A separate 
giving entity or 
department for 
maximum 
exposure 
Internally 
Scattered 
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What does the Corporate Giving Literature tell us?  The corporate giving 
literature related to organizational theory reinforces the four models of corporate 
giving previously presented.  They identify multi-faceted motivations for corporate 
giving behavior based primarily in the broad concept of legitimacy, but expressed 
in different motivational forms.  These motivations help to strengthen the four-
model approach while providing grounds for potential hypothetical linkages to 
different organizational levels or approaches.
Table 1G compiles all the various theories previously covered into a single 
template showing the relationships and applications of the various approaches to 
the corporate giving model.
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Table 1G: Corporate Structure Elements of Philanthropic Behavior
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stakeholder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
General 
Locale of 
Prestige 
(Perrow 1961)
Intrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
External 
Affairs, Based 
on Core 
Concepts
Linked to internal 
financial and 
marketing 
activities
Directed by 
leadership
A defined 
division, visible 
to key external 
organizations 
Dispersed within 
the organization
Targeted 
Constituency 
Owners/stockhold
ers and Future 
Investors
Community Community 
Leaders
Various 
Stakeholders
Corporate 
Strategic 
Actions 
Support causes 
related to primary 
services produced 
and sold
Support 
causes based 
on broad 
social values
Improve 
community 
infrastructure
Collaboration 
(Galskiewicz)
Support 
targeted causes 
based on 
stakeholder 
interests
Follow-up 
Corporate 
Actions –
Commu-
nications
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences to 
current and 
potential investors
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to the broad 
Community
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to others in 
positions of 
influence
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to the different 
stakeholders
Potential 
Location of 
Corporate 
Giving within 
the Structure
Formal Giving 
Structure, tied-in 
with primary 
service 
departments
Located in 
Top 
Management
Internally 
Unified and 
Externally 
Presented:
A separate 
giving entity or 
department for 
maximum 
exposure 
Internally 
Scattered 
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
Philanthropic 
Function
Linked with 
primary mission or 
operation
Board or CEO 
leadership
Separate 
foundation or 
identified and 
publicly-visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
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To fully incorporate the theories of the nonprofit sector into our understanding of 
nonprofit philanthropy also requires looking at the economic theories of the 
nonprofit sector.  The next section outlines those theories and how they help us 
more fully understand the motivations involved with nonprofit philanthropy.  
Economic Theories of the Nonprofit Sector20
The economic theories of the nonprofit sector don’t specifically address the 
question of the location of an organization’s motivation to engage in philanthropic 
behavior.  But they do help define the rationales for the existence and operation 
of nonprofit organizations and their tax-exempt purpose and mission.  Because of 
this relationship to an organization’s mission, a brief overview of these economic 
theories is included.
Perhaps the most influential rationales for the existence of the nonprofit sector 
revolve around the three-failure theories first developed by the economists 
Burton Weisbrod (1975) and Henry Hansmann (1980) and expanded upon by 
Salamon (1987).21 The three failure theory maintains that each of the three 
sectors of our economy (i.e. the government, business, and nonprofit sectors) is 
able to only partially fulfill the needs and desires of society for private and public 
goods and services.  The limitations of each sector to fully meet society’s needs 
are defined by their “failures,” inherent in each sector’s respective parameters.  
                                           
20 This outline of the economic theories of the nonprofit sector is based in part on the overview by 
Steinberg (2006).
21 Salamon (1987) is primarily credited with defining the third part of the three-failure theory: 
voluntary failure, addressed in a later part of this chapter.  
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For-profit firms are limited by market failure and contract failure.  Market failure
occurs primarily with public or collective goods where consumers may utilize the 
goods and services produced without paying for them.22  This leads to a free-
rider problem – that consumers cannot be prevented from benefiting from a good 
or service despite not paying for it.  This problem cannot be solved by the profit 
motive of the for-profit sector, so the government sector is needed to collect 
funds for these services through taxation and then provide them for their public 
constituency.  Contract failure refers to the consequence of the inability of 
consumers to judge the quality of a good or service (such as quality healthcare) 
and therefore to make an informed decision in the marketplace, termed 
“information asymmetry”.  Hansmann (1980) proposed that the nonprofit sector 
helped address this failure because its nondistribution constraint prohibited 
nonprofit leaders from directly profiting from consumer decisions.  According to 
the contract failure theory, government agencies and nonprofit organizations are 
more trustworthy providers of these types of goods or services due to their 
limited profit motives, termed as the nondistribution constraint. 
Government may be able to help meet public good needs underprovided by the 
market through taxation and public provision of needed public goods and 
services.  However government failure may occur, primarily because of its need 
to respond to the majority of a given constituency – termed as the median-
                                           
22 Samuelson (1954) defined “pure public goods” as those that are non-excludable (unable to 
prevent some individuals from consuming them, regardless of whether they paid for them) and 
non-rival (they are not used up by another consumption).  Popular examples of public goods are 
clean air, national defense, and public radio.  
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preference voter.  In this scenario, the wishes of a minority for a particular good 
or service may not be met.  This encourages for the provision of that particular 
collective good by a private, nonprofit provider.23
Several aspects of the failures of government and for-profit sectors help define 
the motivations of nonprofit organizations that engage in philanthropic behavior.  
Philanthropic behavior allows the nonprofit organization to utilize a portion of the 
net revenue it generates to help support other community needs, beyond its own 
primary purpose or mission.  The motivations of a nonprofit organization to 
engage in this type of behavior can be partially understood through these 
economic theories of the failures of the for-profit and governmental sectors.  This 
is especially true for a commercial nonprofit (such as a hospital) that because of 
its market-orientation may have the financial and professional resources to meet 
community needs beyond those they primarily address.
The primary societal attribute a nonprofit organization brings to philanthropic 
behavior relates to its trustworthiness due to the nondistribution constraint, and 
as identified within the contract failure of the for-profit sector.  The nondistribution 
constraint brings two advantages to nonprofit philanthropy not shared by for-profit 
corporate giving.  The first is there is less incentive for the nonprofit organization 
to use contributions as a means for profit enhancement.  This can help provide a 
                                           
23 Other identified sources of government failure include the involuntary nature of taxation, the 
inability of government to identify or detect certain needs, and constitutional restrictions on 
governmental actions (such as noninvolvement with religious provisions). (Steinberg 2006, 122-
123).
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level of trust that a nonprofit organization will support causes for other 
motivations, such as those of greatest community need or of primary interest to 
their stakeholders.
The second advantage of the nondistribution constraint is because the nonprofit 
organization is “owned” by the community and is not responsible for 
supplementing the income of shareholders and/or owners, it is appropriate that 
any net revenue is utilized for additional public needs.  In many cases those 
additional public needs may involve expanding the services provided through the 
organization’s primary mission (such as for a hospital buying new health 
diagnostic equipment).  But those community needs may also lie with other 
related or even unrelated organizations. A nonprofit organization that is led by a 
community board and is primarily serving under-served populations, is well 
situated to be aware of and to respond to such needs through the dispersal of a 
part of their net revenues.  This rationale also relates to the role of nonprofit 
organizations addressing the problem of market failure.  Nonprofit organizations 
are positioned in a community to be aware of additional unmet public good 
needs, as they deal with underserved populations through their primary mission.  
While for-profit organizations may be primarily aware of the needs, wants, and 
desires of their owners, customers and potential customers, nonprofit 
organizations have the potential to be aware of populations underserved by 
these for-profit firms. 
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A second societal attribute of a nonprofit organization involves its ability fill in the 
gaps from market failure to also attract philanthropic contributions to help meet 
underprovided goods or services – a societal alternative to taxation as a means 
to address free-rider problem related to funding public goods.  This role is 
already an important part of the nonprofit sector through private foundations, 
community foundations, and societal benefit organizations such as United Way.  
For commercial nonprofit organizations to also assume this broader role of 
addressing other community needs provides an additional philanthropic resource 
for the community.  Many of these organizations are already organized to seek 
and accept private contributions for their primary mission; to expand that activity 
to include other community needs requires an adjustment to its existing 
fundraising operation and strategy.  
Government failure theories also provide a strong societal rationale for nonprofit 
philanthropy.  Nonprofit organizations are able to more readily respond to the 
needs of specific populations.  This potentially includes those groups that are not 
able to mobilize political consensus or as a percentage of the political 
constituency make up less than the median-preference voter threshold that may 
command the government’s primary attention.  In many cases nonprofit 
organizations are directly working with these populations and are in a position to 
know first-hand what services are being provided and what others might be most 
needed.  This is especially true when identifying public needs that are not 
sufficiently addressed through public and governmental resources.  For society 
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this provides a clear private alternative to public provision.  Additionally, private 
nonprofits acting as philanthropic agents face fewer constraints than government 
agencies to shift their priorities to meet changing needs or to convince “others” 
such as stockholders, how such public actions are also of private benefit.
The third failure theory relates to the weaknesses of the nonprofit sector.  
Salamon (1987) is primarily credited with defining the third part of the three-
failure theory: voluntary failure.  Voluntary failure is defined as the limitations of 
the nonprofit sector to solely provide goods and services to society.  These 
limitations include: philanthropic insufficiency (due to the deficiencies of voluntary 
funding), paternalism (by those who work for or fund an organization to address 
problems in ways as they see fit, rather than necessarily in ways as the client 
sees them), particularism (the tendency of nonprofits to focus on a specific group 
or issue), and amateurism (meaning under-qualified volunteers or staff may 
provide services as opposed to credentialed or more qualified professionals, 
potentially related to philanthropic insufficiency or paternalism).
In some cases, these voluntary failures represent organizational characteristics 
that nonprofit leadership might seek to directly address and surmount.  In other 
cases, these failures may identify accepted parameters of a nonprofit’s operation 
and their limitations may be accommodated within that structure.  Put simply, an 
organization may want to preserve the particularism or amateurism that an 
outside perspective might label as a “failure”.  Philanthropic insufficiency is one 
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aspect that generally (but not always) a nonprofit seeks to redress rather than 
accept.  On the other hand, philanthropic paternalism may be an organizational 
trait that leadership seeks to extend, as it becomes an expression of their 
individual views and influence.  It is proposed that some of the reasons a 
nonprofit organization might engage in philanthropic behavior are related to the 
organization trying to either extend the characteristic of voluntary failure theory or 
to overcome organizational limitations identified by the theory. 
Before assembling all of the previously categorized theoretical and organizational 
criteria, there remains one other literature to investigate: the organizational 
theories relating specifically to hospitals.  Since nonprofit hospitals are the 
subject of the research portion of this thesis, particular considerations involving 
hospitals has relevance for advancing our understanding of their actions and 
motivations.
Economic and Sociological Theories – and Nonprofit Hospitals
Henry Hansmann (1980) coined the term commercial nonprofits to identify 
nonprofit organizations that received fees as their primary source of financial 
income. These types of nonprofit organizations are differentiated from donative 
nonprofits that rely on contributions and grants as their principle source of 
revenue.  Nonprofit hospitals, which are used as an example in this thesis, are a 
principal example of commercial nonprofits.  As noted by Hall and Colombo 
(1991a), precise statistics on the percentage of total nonprofit hospital revenue 
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that comes from donations are limited and uncertain.24  But various sources 
confirm that it is less than 1% (ibid, p. 406, n. 350).  The remaining 99% of 
hospital revenue comes from fees-for-service either from private patients, private 
insurance, or reimbursement from government programs such as Medicare and 
Medicaid.25  Mark Hall and John Colombo observe, “ . . . nonprofit hospitals have 
increasingly taken on the appearance of business enterprises by serving mostly 
paying patients, decreasing their reliance on donations or volunteer labor, and 
striving to generate as much surplus revenue as possible through commercial 
transactions” (ibid, p. 319).  In other words, nonprofit hospitals seem to adopt 
similar commercial strategies as for-profit businesses.  Examining the theoretical 
literature related to hospitals can help to further define the motivations for 
nonprofit hospitals to engage in philanthropic behavior.  
                                           
24 The American Hospital Association annually gathers statistics from its members but 
contributions are not a separate line item.  Instead they are included within the more generic 
“Non-operating Revenue” (American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics, 2008 Edition, 
Chicago IL: Health Forum, 2008, p. 221). Comparative statistics on hospital giving as a 
percentage of hospital revenues is not a figure that is currently compiled by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) or typically gathered by annual member surveys of the Association for Healthcare 
Philanthropy.  The revised IRS Form 990 and its accompanying Schedule H may help address 
this shortcoming in the future, although additional complications exist.  
Part of the difficulty in identifying contributions as a percentage of revenue is that much of 
the philanthropic activity related to hospitals may occur in separate hospital foundations.  These 
foundations file separate Form 990s, act as separate nonprofit corporations, and may transfer 
contributions directly to their member hospitals, or may hold them for investment or for transfer in 
future years.  In some cases hospital foundations may disperse funding to organizations other 
than the hospital – or there may be a transfer of funds from the hospital to the foundation that is 
recorded by the foundation as a contribution (either as indirect or direct public support).  In many 
hospital systems, a single foundation may collect and record contributions for multiple hospital 
facilities.  The designation of contributions for special capital or endowment purposes, rather than 
operational expense, also complicates precise recording and comparisons – as some reporting 
criteria exclude “designated gifts” from total contributions.
25 It should be noted that some portion of annual hospital revenue may also come from income 
from previous investments or income from other business interests. 
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Organizational Theories – The Elements and How Hospitals Relate to These 
Elements: As was previously stated, sociological theory has generally been 
found to be more valuable through analysis at the industry-level rather than the 
sector-level (DiMaggio and Anheier 1990, p. 137).  This seems to hold true for 
nonprofit hospitals: nonprofit hospitals appear to have more in common with for-
profit and public hospitals than they do with other nonprofits in different 
organizational fields.  All hospitals are influenced by many of the theories that 
affect institutional and professional norms and standards and therefore fit many 
of the concepts outlined earlier in the neo-institutional theories.  
Neo-institutionalism theories have particular application to the hospital field in 
their emphasis on the environment and ecology within which organizations 
function.  The neo-institutional incorporation of myths and culture into 
organizational decisions includes medical ethics and community benefits as 
important hospital considerations.  The need for institutionalized expressions of 
professional ethics emphasizes organizational legitimacy as well as encourages 
institutional isomorphism, two unifying concepts related to nonprofit philanthropy.  
The de-coupling process of formal administrative structures from the daily 
medical activities helps preserve the organizational culture and myths that are 
furthered through ceremonial displays revolving around evaluation (such as 
through the accreditation process or being selected as “one of the 100 best 
hospitals in the U.S.” or support of broad community benefits).  These myths play 
91
a prominent role in hospital marketing processes and materials – as well as in 
philanthropic behavior.  
Institutional isomorphism as an outcome of organizational ecology is critical if a 
hospital is to be seen as “up-to-date” as well as legitimate in the eyes of its 
community.  Standardization – and rewards for being standardized – prompted 
by regulatory and accrediting agencies further this isomorphism process.  And 
the role of medical professionalism in both legitimizing the individual organization 
and connecting it to the broader profession is in potential conflict with the 
organization itself.  This forms a source of continual negotiation and 
organizational compromise between medical professionals and hospital 
administration that can be addressed through legitimating activities such as 
philanthropy as well as de-coupled situations separating the financial activities of 
the hospital from the medical services.
Hospital Organizational Theories: Beyond some general descriptions of hospital 
structures and practices by The Commonwealth Fund (Bachmeyer and Hartman 
1943), it wasn’t until the 1960s that organizational theorists began to address the 
particular organizational characteristics of hospitals (Perrow 1961, Friedson 
1963, Scott 1966, in Zola and McKinley 1974).  Much of this was related to the 
perception that hospitals were either public utilities governed by public policy or 
charitable facilities operated by the philanthropic structure.  In this perception 
hospitals were either subject to similar governmental controls as other public 
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services or to local charitable impulses similar to churches.  For-profit facilities, 
generally operated and owned by physicians, were an additional but minor part of 
this medical organizational landscape.
An early observation by Perrow (1961) on the importance of prestige in shaping 
hospital organizational goals and decisions was one of the first 
acknowledgements that hospitals might have some unique theoretical 
characteristics.  Perrow demonstrates that prestige could address the difficulties 
of patients in determining quality and the role of the intermediating professional 
(i.e. the physician) in directing organizational resources. Through the 1970s and 
1980s empirical studies of individual hospitals predominated the literature.  
These include mention of the dominant factors of environmental, ethical, and 
professional influences being important theoretical concepts.  They also re-
emphasized the role of status or prestige as an organizational motivation for 
hospitals (Lindsay 1969, Newhouse 1970, Lee 1971, Shortell and Brown 1974), 
providing additional justification for the role of legitimacy theories in defining 
hospital behavior.  
One key perspective of hospital organizational values relates specifically to the 
organizational structure: the image of the hospital as a public service 
organization rather than a business concern.  Since a 1963 article by Kenneth 
Arrow, the special economic problems faced by hospitals and healthcare 
providers have been acknowledged.  This particularly focuses on traditional 
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market uncertainties of when the “product” being delivered needs to maintain 
continual availability and be conducted within standards of expected behavior of 
physicians.  This gives hospitals an image of being more a welfare and public 
service organization than a business-oriented entity (Arrow 1963).  Yet financial 
issues are significant elements for management.  The issue of for-profit vs. 
nonprofit governance – as well as private vs. public ownership - reflects a 
concern over an increased business-orientation of hospital leadership.  However, 
the ethical concerns of healthcare professionals can also outweigh ownership 
form.  Physicians and health care professionals may emphasize the mission of 
their professional calling rather than the business concerns of the organization.  
Many patients may prefer to believe (and to have demonstrated in practice) that 
medical decisions regarding healthcare are motivated by altruistic concern for the 
patient’s welfare, not by bottom-line profit motives.  But as financial pressures 
become more complex and more visible to the community, it becomes an 
increasing challenge for hospital administration to assure the public that 
decisions are being made for the benefit of the community’s healthcare rather 
than for personal or organizational profit (Cuellar and Gertler 2003).  This 
concern also extends to the employees – particularly the nursing staff who have
the most direct contact with patients – who may be torn between a personal pride 
in serving the community and the realities of bureaucratic and financial power 
structures and compromises (Chambliss 1996).  Nurturing the “myth” of being a 
health service organization through ceremony and other techniques forms an 
important element for any healthcare organization, regardless of ownership or 
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ultimate organizational ends.  The actions of reaching out to the community 
through philanthropic behavior provide a critical expression of that myth and 
image of legitimacy.
A 1980 article by Fennell and a more in-depth analysis by Colle (1986) take a 
broader theoretical treatment.  Fennell tested organizational ecology theory by 
studying the effects of the entry of new healthcare providers into a given market.  
However, her findings contradicted the expected theoretical condition of 
increased isomorphism as the population of healthcare providers expanded
within a defined service area.  Instead she found that individual organizations 
tended to move into specific ecological niches within larger clusters of other 
related healthcare providers.  The needs and composition of these larger clusters 
influenced the size and form of the organizations, rather than the organizations 
imitating other similar providers in different niches.  She conjectured that 
healthcare provision might be more properly looked at as clusters of providers 
rather than as individual entities, paving the way for understanding the future 
growth of formal health networks and systems.  Fennell also confirmed Perrow’s 
earlier emphasis on prestige as a key factor in organizational success and 
growth (Fennell 1980).  In his book on the future changes in health care, Colle 
emphasized the environmental pressures on hospitals of shifting financial 
resources (private and public) and medical practices (especially from in-patient to 
out-patient), escalating technology (equipment, communication, and intellectual), 
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the increased role of the consumer in the decision process, and the increasingly 
complex ethical considerations (Colle 1986).
Recently more extensive work has focused on hospitals and healthcare as 
unique theoretical studies, with combinations of characteristics and responses 
peculiar to the industry.  Examples of this include the organizational effects of 
professionalization (Robinson 1999), ethical conflicts coupled with power, 
political interest groups, and bureaucratic routines (Chambliss 1996), the effects 
of health systems on local markets (Mobley 1997), and the position of individual 
hospital structures within the broader public health environment (Weiss 1997).  
Many theorists have acknowledged the broad complexity of factors affecting 
hospital decisions, with an emphasis on the conflicting roles of professionalism 
with other organizational requirements and the effect of the environment on 
individual organizational decisions (Scott 2000, Mick et al 1990, Shortell and
Kaluzny 2000).  W. Richard Scott (2000, and introductory chapters in Zola and
McKinley 1974, Scott and Backman in Mick et al 1990) has particularly shaped 
the direction of hospital organizational theory through an emphasis on hospitals 
as a collection of related networks of professionals, health specialists, 
administrators, and employee segments, building directly on the more informal 
approaches of neo-institutional theory.  He particularly notes how theoretical 
attention has shifted over the years.  An initial focus was on the conflicts between 
the medical profession and the hospital organization.  Subsequent attention was 
given to environmental issues.  More current awareness incorporates the role of 
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medical ethics (Mick et al 1990).  This attention to organizational ethics
emphasizes maintaining organizational legitimacy amidst shifts in increased 
ownership of hospitals by for-profit entities and involvement with multi-hospital 
systems.  Balancing the locus of decision-making power (both professional and 
management), access to financial resources (both capital and insurance), and 
maintaining ethical standards and image lies at the heart of understanding 
contemporary hospital structures and actions.  Growing financial power and 
concern coupled with increased competition, means a business orientation needs 
to be balanced in a hospital’s public service mission.  This dual mission leads to 
questioning whether nonprofit hospitals truly deserve their tax-exempt status, as 
they seem to operate in a manner similar to for-profit organizations.  A thorough 
exploration of the extensive literature involving hospital ownership issues is 
beyond the scope of this section, but the work of Schlesinger and Gray (2006a) 
particularly note the role of social theories related to isomorphism (especially 
mimetic isomorphism) in understanding the factors influencing hospital ownership 
and similarities of behavior among different ownership types.  The final section of 
this chapter addresses part of this consideration through the community benefit 
debate.  However, it should be noted that whether either ownership form 
produces improved healthcare and outcomes is contested,26 and the influences 
on both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, as on all organizations, are multi-
faceted.  As commercial nonprofits, hospitals are reliant on market-based income 
for their existence.  This focuses attention on income-generating activities and 
                                           
26 See Schlesinger and Gray (2006a and 2006b) for a compilation of the differing studies and 
viewpoints.
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motivations as depicted through resource dependency theory.  However, other 
organizational theories beyond resource dependence also play a part in 
understanding hospital organizational changes including the role of the 
professional, the ethics and organizational culture involved with an organization 
that has a tradition of care for others before financial concerns, and responses to 
environmental and organizational ecology influences.  These include efforts to 
increase organizational legitimacy and to adopt policies and structures prompted 
by institutional isomorphic forces.
The key theories referred to in relation to hospitals echo those that explain 
nonprofit theories as well as corporate philanthropy theories.  They also have a 
strong correlation to the four corporate giving models presented by Burlingame 
and Young.  The relationship of resource dependency theory to the Productivity 
model has already been well noted.  The role of ethics and organizational culture
in demonstrating that the hospital has a tradition of care for others that it places 
before its own financial concerns relates strongly to the Ethical/Altruism Model.  
The Political Model, as associated with environmental and organizational ecology
theory, addresses the role of the hospital within its broader community.  In 
addition, the decision-making power of nonprofit hospital philanthropic actions 
can reinforce the image of philanthropic decisions – and by extension, healthcare 
decisions – as being within local control.  The importance of the role of the 
professional in a hospital necessitates that a hospital can respond to the various 
professional stakeholders that are an integral part of its institutional family, as 
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well as the external stakeholders.  Philanthropic support allows for a 
decentralized and individualized response to these varying motivations.
Table 1H shows how the various theoretical considerations related to nonprofit 
hospitals relates to the four corporate giving models.
Table 1H: Hospital Organizational Theories and Corporate Giving Models
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stake-
holder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community and 
social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
Hospital 
Organiza-
tional 
Theories
Resource 
dependency
Ethics and 
organizational 
culture
Decision-
making power; 
Organizational 
Environment 
Role of the 
professional
A Research Template for Nonprofit Organizational Philanthropy: Table 1I 
compiles all of the previously noted theoretical perspectives and shows how 
these perspectives relate to the four corporate giving models as well as to each 
other.  The comparison shows first that the four model structure seems to be able 
to contain the perspectives from the various structures.  There emerges a pattern 
to the types of theories that help explain – and to bridge – the various 
perspectives.  
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This thesis maintains that the intersection of these theories provides a structural 
basis for identifying the motivations and behaviors of nonprofit organizations 
acting philanthropically.  Specifically it presents four different organizational 
structures that correspond to the underlying primary motivations the 
organizational theory indicates as a rationale for this behavior.  These structural 
categories are subsequently used in the research portion of this paper 
investigating the philanthropic behavior of Indiana hospitals.  Table 1A identifies 
the key categorizations from the compilation in Table 1I that relate directly to 
corporate structure.  
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Table 1I: 
Compilation of Theoretical Perspectives to Corporate Giving Models
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stake-
holder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and 
community power
To satisfy 
multiple 
constituencies 
General 
Locale of 
Prestige 
(Perrow 1961)
Intrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic Extrinsic
Core 
Concepts of 
External 
Affairs (Miles 
1987)
Business 
exposure or 
strategy 
- Linked to 
business goals
Top 
management 
philosophy 
- Reflection 
of leadership 
ethics
External affairs 
strategy 
- Relate to 
environment 
through 
collaboration 
and/or legitimizing 
behavior
External affairs 
design elements 
- Relate to 
internal 
stakeholders
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
External 
Affairs, Based 
on Core 
Concepts
Linked to internal 
financial and 
marketing 
activities
Directed by 
leadership
A defined division, 
visible to key 
external 
organizations 
Dispersed within 
the organization
Theoretical 
motivation 
(from the 
Management 
Literature)
[Enhanced 
reputation];
Increased profit 
Enhanced 
Reputation
Enhanced 
Reputation;
Enhanced Power
Enhanced 
Reputation
Targeted 
Constituency 
Owners/
stockholders and 
Future Investors
Community Community 
Leaders
Various 
Stakeholders
Desired 
Outcome of 
Corporate 
Philanthropy
Improve Financial 
Profit
Express 
corporate 
social values
(or values of 
the individual 
leaders?)
Limit government 
intervention;
Increase 
company’s 
influence 
(Himmelstein)
Support 
interests of 
stakeholders
Corporate 
Strategic 
Actions 
Support causes 
related to primary 
services 
produced and 
sold
Support 
causes 
based on 
broad social 
values
Improve 
community 
infrastructure;
Collaboration 
(Galskiewicz)
Support targeted 
causes based 
on stakeholder 
interests
Follow-up 
Corporate 
Actions –
Communi-
cations
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences to 
current and 
potential 
investors
Communicat
e actions and 
consequence
s to the broad 
Community
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences to 
others in positions 
of influence
Communicate 
actions and 
consequences 
to the different 
stakeholders
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Table 1I: Compilation of Theoretical Perspectives to Corporate Giving Models 
(cont.)
Young and
Burlingame 
Models
Neoclassical/
Productivity
Ethical/
Altruistic
Political Stake-
holder 
Corporate 
Motivation
To increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and
community power
To satisfy 
multiple 
consti-
tuencies 
Potential 
Location of 
Corporate 
Giving within 
the Structure
Formal Giving 
Structure, tied-in 
with primary 
service 
departments
Located in 
Top 
Management
Internally Unified and 
Externally Presented:
A separate giving 
entity or department 
for maximum 
exposure 
Internally 
Scattered 
3 Perspectives 
of Legitimacy 
– (Suchman) –
(Dowling and
Pfeffer)
Pragmatic – self-
interested 
Economic 
benefits
Moral 
Altruistic 
behavior
Cognitive:
Political legitimacy 
(Prestige) –
Legitimating behavior
Legitimating 
behavior
Level of 
Coupling
Tightly coupled Tightly 
coupled to 
leadership, but 
loosely 
coupled or de-
coupled from 
other 
organizational 
activities
Loosely coupled or 
de-coupled from the 
organization –
Linked with other 
external 
organizations
Loosely 
coupled
Isomorphism
(DiMaggio and
Powell)
Coercive Normative Mimetic Normative
Other 
Theories
Resource 
Dependency 
Normative 
theories
Population Ecology Population 
Ecology
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
Philanthropic 
Function
Linked with 
primary mission 
or operation
Board or CEO 
leadership
Separate foundation 
or identified and 
publicly-visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
Hospital 
Organizational 
Theories
Resource 
dependency
Ethics and 
organizational 
culture
Decision- making 
power; 
Organizational 
Environment
Role of the 
professional
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The Proposed Nonprofit Philanthropy Model: As Table 1G (above) and Table 1I 
show, it is hypothesized that there are four potential organizational levels where 
nonprofit philanthropic behavior may occur.  This thesis offers that there is a fifth 
model related to nonprofit organizations that is not directly identified in the 
existing literature of for-profit organizations.  This fifth level of motivation relates 
to the concept of coercive isomorphism and is termed External Mandate, and is 
included in the template in Table 1J (and Table 1A).  
Table 1J: The Nonprofit Philanthropy Models
Nonprofit 
Philanthropy 
Model
External 
Mandate
Management 
Function 
Leadership 
Directed
(CEO or Board)
Separate 
Organi-
zational 
Function
Stake-
holder 
Discretion
Organizational 
Motivation
(from Young 
and 
Burlingame)
To comply 
with 
External 
Criteria
To ensure 
and/or 
increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community and 
social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
consti-
tuencies 
Organizational 
Structure
Imitative of 
Mandates
Embedded in 
Dep’t and
Manager 
Hierarchy
Practices at 
Leadership 
Level
Separate 
foundation 
or identified 
and 
publicly-
visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
Philanthropic 
Function
(Similar to 
regulatory 
mandates 
or system 
structures)
Linked with 
primary 
mission or 
operation:
DEPARTMENT
Board or CEO 
leadership:
ADMINISTRATIVE
Separate 
foundation 
or identified 
and 
publicly-
visible 
department:
FOUNDATION
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
STAFF
This model refers to practices and structures imposed from outside the 
organization, which could include governmental regulations or criteria dictated by 
an organizational system, such as a hospital system.  In the case of nonprofit 
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organizations – and particularly nonprofit hospitals – while financial gain may be 
part of their motivation, this is seen as only one potential external “mandate” that 
may affect its actions.  Governmental regulation or even systemized structures 
and practices that are required by than overall health system may also govern 
these decisions.  Organizations that conform to this motivation are expected to 
have philanthropic structures that conform to the structures outlined by those 
outside regulatory criteria or that have a similar structure as other organizations 
within their systems.  The External Mandate Model is strongly related to the 
Productivity Model and shares many similar characteristics of operation but may 
have very different evaluative and practical outcomes.  To accommodate these 
additional criteria, the Nonprofit Philanthropy Template, divides the Productivity 
Model into the External Mandate Model and the Management Function Model.  
Both structures are hypothesized to have tightly coupled departmental and 
managerial hierarchical connections within the management structure of the 
organization – either reflecting profit concerns or conformity to he mandates.  
The primary difference between the two models is that organizations motivated 
by External Mandates will have structures similar to those mandates and the 
communication function of the process may also be expected to be uncoupled 
from the philanthropic activities, as the philanthropic activity comes from external 
forces rather than as an integrated approach embedded in the organization’s 
mission.
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The other Nonprofit Philanthropic Models relate to the corporate models used 
throughout this classification process.  The Management Function Model 
identifies practices institutionalized into the formal mid-management levels of the 
organization and are closely tied to profit motivations.  Organizations that engage 
in philanthropic behavior primarily due to this profit motivation would be expected 
to have the function and its subsequent communication embedded within the 
normal or existing organizational structures of the organization.  The Leadership 
Directed Model includes practices controlled by the personal actions of 
organizational leadership, particularly of the board and/or Chief Executive Officer.  
A Separate Organizational Model identifies practices centralized into a discreet 
entity to gain maximum exposure for the behavior, yet separate from its primary 
mission.  The Stakeholder Discretion Model refers to practices that arise at 
different levels in the organization as responses by various internal stakeholders 
to diverse external requests and situations.  Table 1J outlines the five Models of
Nonprofit Philanthropy.  
These five models can be used to further identify decisions located within 
different levels of the corporation.  As was previously stated, organizations that 
are motivated by financial return and exemplify the Productivity approach will 
probably have the philanthropic activity well integrated into the corporate 
structure and strategies, with well-defined departmental processes and reporting 
criteria closely linked to product and service production and delivery.  
Conversely, it could be expected that philanthropic behaviors under the Ethical 
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model would be determined and managed through the organizational board and 
executive leadership as expressions of a generic corporate standard or ethic.  
Such normative motivations may have institutional or professional influences, 
they may be definitive policies passed by present or past leadership, or may be 
controlled by the individual views of the organization’s current leadership.  Such 
a scenario relies on individual adherence to and expression of ethical standards 
and therefore would be considered as something that pervades the company 
structure rather than is isolated within a defined department or activity.  
A philanthropy program with the Political motivation might be expected to 
organize its philanthropic programs in a manner visible to the greater community 
with numerous community linkages and connections.  Corporate structural 
responses could include unifying philanthropic activities and reports to provide 
the maximum community impact, or even possibly placing those activities in a 
separate corporate entity to provide for increased identity.  Organizations 
adhering to the Stakeholder rationale will face the problem of identifying and 
communicating with multiple constituencies and therefore face a communications 
challenge.  A firm with such motivations might locate philanthropic programs 
within a public relations or other communications department that has the 
expertise and resources to respond most directly and continuously with the 
various constituents.  
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Nonprofit Hospitals, Public Policy, and Community Benefit
The third section of the chapter outlines why nonprofit hospitals are particularly 
appropriate for investigating nonprofit philanthropic behavior.  As outlined earlier 
in this chapter, for the purposes of this paper nonprofit hospital philanthropy is 
considered as a subset of the broader community benefit standard that currently 
serves as a basis for the federal tax-exemption of nonprofit hospitals. It 
addresses the question: “What is the relationship of nonprofit hospital 
philanthropic behavior to community benefit?”
The section first introduces the current debate over nonprofit hospitals and 
community benefit.  It then provides a brief overview of the community benefit 
standards, including a definition of the concept as currently determined by the 
Internal Revenue Service.  The next part of the section outlines the origins and 
evolution of the concept of community benefit and its relationship to tax exempt 
organizations.  The fourth part of the section looks at the general structure of the 
community benefit standard and part five evaluates the specific elements of 
community benefit to determine which of these elements fit within the definition of 
nonprofit philanthropic behavior.  The chapter concludes by outlining the next 
step in the paper, to verify the validity of the databases for potentially evaluating 
hospital community benefit and nonprofit philanthropic behavior.
Part five of this section is of particular interest for identifying nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior.  Each of the elements of these community benefit 
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standards are evaluated separately to determine their applicability to nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior, focusing on those benefits that are voluntary and of 
benefit to a wider public beyond the primary mission of the nonprofit hospital.  
The analysis ultimately identifies two elements that most directly reflect 
organizational philanthropic behavior and can potentially be evaluated and 
compared among community hospitals: i.e. a hospital’s expenditures for 
community health promotion programs and donations made to other community 
nonprofit organizations.  Community health promotion programs are defined as 
those education and wellness programs that improve the general health of the 
community.  These are considered services that are beyond the primary health 
care activities and mission that provide direct patient care.  The other category is 
“donations.” This refers to the cash donations made by a nonprofit community
hospital to another community organization.  This section first outlines the scope 
and criteria of community benefit and how this relates to nonprofit hospitals. 
The Current Debate over Community Benefits and Nonprofit Hospitals
Perhaps the most visible and debated example of nonprofit philanthropic 
behavior revolves around the community benefit standards of nonprofit hospitals.  
Since 1969 the Internal Revenue Service has determined that nonprofit hospitals 
incorporated under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Service tax code 
enjoy certain tax advantages because they exist primarily for community benefit.  
Specifically the IRS Revenue Ruling 69-545 states:
“To qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under section 
501(c)(3) of the Code, a nonprofit hospital must be organized and 
108
operated exclusively in furtherance of some purpose considered 
‘charitable’ in the generally accepted legal sense of that term, and 
the hospital may not be operated, directly of indirectly, for the 
benefit of private interests.
In the general law of charity, the promotion of health is 
considered to be a charitable purpose (Restatement (Second), 
Trusts, sec. 368 and sec. 372; IV Scott on Trusts (3rd ed. 1967), 
sec. 368 and sec. 372).
. . . The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the 
advancement of education and religion, is one of the purposes in 
the general law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the 
community as a whole even though the class of beneficiaries 
eligible to receive a direct benefit from its activities does not include 
all members of the community . . .” 
(Internal Revenue Service, Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1969-2 
C.B. 117)
The debate arises because the 1969 IRS ruling does not define what precisely 
those services that provide “promotion of health” and are “beneficial to the 
community” (i.e. community benefits) should be, how they should be measured, 
or what constitutes an acceptable level of community benefit.
Critics of community benefit maintain that tax exemption should primarily be 
based on providing services to the poor.  These critics, notably including Senator 
Charles Grassley (as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis) and the legal 
scholar John Colombo (“I come to bury the community benefit test, not to praise 
it.”  Colombo, 2005, p. 29).  Colombo maintains that among other problems the 
standards have been “a behavioral failure” (ibid) and others have claimed that 
while regulations may only have a minimal effect on actual programming, 
perhaps “a community health orientation process (might serve as) a form of lip 
service to social values” (Ginn and Moseley 2006, p. 342).  However, even 
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community benefit critics observe that the 1969 IRS ruling does provide for a 
more refined definition of community benefit as “promotion of health”, a concept 
that could be more closely related to the original intent of charitable purpose 
(Koprowski and Arsenault 2003, Hall and Colombo 1991).
This paper does not try to add to this already well-worn debate.27  Instead its 
emphasis is on how well the accepted elements comprising the community 
benefit standard are defined and reported through existing and proposed 
methods and how well these standards meet the criteria of philanthropic 
behavior.  It is a contention of this thesis that philanthropy and community 
benefit, while not synonymous are nevertheless related, with philanthropic 
behavior as a subset of community benefit.  Nevertheless, a brief summary of the 
origins and situations of the community benefit standard is useful for the 
purposes of this paper.
The Origins and Evolution of the Community Benefit Standard
There are two important strands within the general debate on tax exemption: 
whether a charitable purpose refers only to providing charity care for the poor or 
if it has broader application as “public benefits”.  This dichotomy actually dates 
from the earliest attempts to codify what qualifies as charitable.  The distinction 
has been defined as either a “technical or legal meaning” of charity derived from 
charitable trust law – being the broader definition of public benefit – or the 
                                           
27 For examples of extensive explorations of nonprofit hospitals and tax-exemption, see Horwitz 
(2003, 2007), Colombo (2005), Noble et al (1998), and Gustafsson (1996).
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“ordinary and popular” usage of charity meaning aid to the poor and the relief of 
poverty (Gustaffson 1996, pp. 620-621).  This distinction becomes important 
when defining the relationship of philanthropic behavior to the community benefit 
standards.
Community benefit is important for the definition of what it means for an 
organization to have a charitable purpose and be exempt from various forms of 
taxation – and to enjoy other tax-related benefits such as the ability to issue tax 
exempt bonds and accept tax deductible contributions.  Nonprofit hospital 
community benefit and the related definition of charity, have roots in two 
branches of law: one is from tax-exempt corporate law and the other from 
charitable trust law.  
Contemporary tax-exempt corporate legal criteria were established in 1954, with 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Section 501(c)(3).  This code defined 
categories of corporations that are not subject to federal income tax, particularly 
those organized and operated exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, 
scientific, or literary purposes.  Legal definitions of an organization’s charitable 
purpose, specifically related to organizations exempt from corporate tax in the 
United States, historically date to the initial 1894 Tariff Act that stated an 
organization was exempt from these taxes if operated for “charitable, religious, or 
educational purposes.”28  This is the standard that essentially remained in effect 
                                           
28 This Act was subsequently ruled to be unconstitutional but when revived in 1913 it had 
essentially the same wording.
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for all nonprofit organizations including hospitals, with only slight revisions and 
differing judicial interpretations,29 until the codification of the 501(c) designations 
by the IRS in 1954 and their ruling on hospitals in 1956.  
The definition of charity in United States charitable trust law is founded in English 
common law as it evolved from the 1601 Elizabethan Statute of Charitable 
Uses30 to an 1891 House of Lords ruling written by Lord MacNaughten in the 
case of Commissioners v. Pemsel.  The definition of charitable as delineated by 
Lord MacNaughten was referenced in 1959 in the United States through 
Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2), which attempted to refine the differing 
definitions of charitable and tax-exempt status (Smith and Crabtree 2006).  
The Preamble to the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses delineates a wide 
variety of charitable purposes and while it does not explicitly include a reference 
to “community benefit” there is the overall implication that the types of activities 
that are charitable are those that benefit a general community rather than a 
private individual or group.  Many of the itemized charitable uses refer directly to 
aid to the poor or to charities that may have a relative emphasis on the poor, 
while other defined purposes have broader uses that provide advantages to 
                                           
29 See Smith and Crabtree (2006) for a summary of the pre-1954 rulings.
30 Jordan, W.K., Philanthropy in England 1480-1660: A Study of the Changing Pattern of English 
Social Aspirations (1959): 18; cited in Lieber (2001): 733.
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everyone in a community (e.g. “repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, 
churches, seabanks, and highways”).31
Lord MacNaughten refined the definition of charitable in the Elizabethan Statute 
of Charitable Uses by enumerating four areas that qualified as charity.  His “four 
heads of charity” included in addition to “relief of poverty” also the advancement 
of religion and education – and “for other purposes beneficial to the 
community.”32  It is these criteria that are the basis of the definition of charitable 
“in the generally accepted legal sense” – referred to in the 1959 Treasury 
Regulation and the 1969 IRS Revenue Ruling outlining the community benefit 
standard.  Under charitable trust law in the United States, “the promotion of 
health” is noted as one of the six general categories of charitable purposes.33  
The 1959 Treasury Department ruling included a clarification of the 501(c) 
definition of “charitable,” to conform to a broader “generally accepted legal 
definition,” that goes beyond relief of the poor34 based on the British precedents 
which also included the advancement of education, religion, and community 
benefit (CBO 1994, pp. 14-15).  
In 1969 the IRS determined community benefit was the critical rationale for the 
tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals in the United States (IRS, Revenue Ruling 
                                           
31 “An Act to Redress the Mis-Employment of Lands, Goods, and Stocks of Money Heretofore 
Given to Certain Charitable Uses,” (1601) 43 Eliz., ch. 4 reprinted in 7 Stat. At Large 43 (Eng. 
1763).
32 Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, 1891 App. Cas. 531, 543 
(H.L.).
33 Restatement (Second) of Trusts, section 368 (1959).
34 “Relief of the poor” as a definition of charitable had been in effect since a 1923 Internal 
Revenue Service Ruling (CBO 1994).
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69-545).  This replaced a previous 1956 ruling (IRS, Revenue Ruling 56-185), in 
which, along with three other provisions,35 the IRS had determined that nonprofit 
hospitals served a charitable purpose because they provided charity care and 
therefore “relief of poverty.” The 1969 ruling was not a decision without 
precedent.  In 1969 – most probably because of the adoption of the Medicaid and 
Medicare programs – the IRS in accordance with this broader definition, re-
defined nonprofit hospitals as deserving the advantages of nonprofit status 
because they provide services that are “deemed beneficial to the community”.  
But as has been emphasized from its origins, this definition is vague and lacks 
any specific requirements or measurements.  
Despite the attention given to these “community benefit standards”, the 1969 
Ruling only refers obliquely to community benefit.  The 1969 Ruling is actually a 
fairly brief modification of the 1956 IRS Ruling as opposed to a complete re-
writing of the ruling.  The tax exemption of hospitals is further identified in the 
1969 Ruling not through a definition but by outlining two hypothetical hospital 
situations, one defining a nonprofit hospital example as charitable even though it 
has an operating surplus (because the organization operates according to the 
four criteria outlined in the above footnote) and the other example defining a 
hospital to not be “charitable” since it operates for the financial benefit of 
                                           
35 The Internal Revenue Service Revenue Ruling 56-185 identified four criteria that must be met 
by hospitals to be tax-exempt, charitable organizations: 1) “ . . . organized as a nonprofit 
charitable organization for the purpose of operating a hospital for the care of the sick . . . “; 2) “ . . 
. operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered . . 
. ”; 3) “ . . . not restrict the use of its facilities to a particular group of physicians and services . . .”; 
and 4) “Its net earnings must not inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.” (IRS, Revenue Ruling 56-185)
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designated individuals.  The 1969 ruling focuses primarily on disallowing private 
benefit and, only by implication, encouraging community benefit.  It emphasizes 
the modification of the fourth requirement (i.e. the non-inurement of benefit to 
individuals, see footnote #36 above) rather than the second criteria (i.e. “for 
those not able to pay for the services rendered”).  The 1969 Ruling concludes:
“Revenue Ruling 56-185, C.B. 1956-1, 202, sets forth 
requirements for exemption of hospitals under sections 501(c)(3) 
more restrictive than those contained in this Revenue Ruling
with respect to caring for patients without charge or at rates 
below costs . . . Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) of the regulations 
promulgated subsequent to Revenue Ruling 56-185 makes it clear, 
however, that an absolute dedication of assets to charity is a 
precondition to exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
Revenue Ruling 56-185 is hereby modified to remove 
therefrom the requirements relating to caring for patients without 
charge or at rates below cost.  Furthermore, requirement four has 
been modified by section 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) of the regulations.” 
- (IRS, Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, emphasis 
added)
In the early 1970s various nonprofit hospital agencies began to try and define 
criteria for determining community benefit – prompted at least partially by a 
desire to proactively establish their own standards before external bodies 
imposed regulations upon the industry.  Among those nonprofit advocacy 
agencies were the Catholic Health Association (CHA), Voluntary Hospitals of 
America (VHA), and the American Hospital Association (AHA) – and the 
community benefits included not only providing care to those not able to pay for it 
but also such programs as research, education, and various services defined as 
“unprofitable”.  In the 1980s and 1990s state governments began to question 
how well nonprofit hospitals were meeting these community benefit standards 
115
and several states began to take steps to define them.36  In 1990 the United 
States Congress began similar inquiries, but reached no consensus on the most 
proper action.  However in 2005 Congress again raised the issue and began to 
more seriously question what nonprofit hospitals should do to “qualify” for tax 
exemption and how this qualification should be measured.  As of 2008, the 
Congressional examination of the tax exemptions of nonprofit hospitals 
continues.  The primary outcomes to date have been a revision of the IRS Form 
990 and, of most relevance to nonprofit hospitals, the introduction of a new 
Schedule H to be included as part of their year-end report to the IRS.  This 
Schedule H includes detailed information on charity care and other related 
community benefit data and processes.
Community Benefit Defined: A Brief Overview of the Standard
There have been several efforts to define community benefits – what they should 
include and how they should be measured.  These efforts have primarily been 
led by the hospital industry and most recently through guidelines jointly 
developed by the Catholic Health Association (CHA) and Voluntary Hospitals of 
America (VHA).  However, adherence to these guidelines remains voluntary.  
The American Hospital Association (AHA) has also developed guidelines for its 
membership.  The IRS community benefit standard has not been officially altered 
since 1969, except for the 1983 provision (IRS, Revenue Ruling 83-157) that 
removed the necessity for nonprofit hospitals to maintain emergency rooms (to 
allow for specialty nonprofit hospitals) and the 1986 regulation to expand the 
                                           
36 See Chapter Two of this dissertation for a brief outline of these state actions.
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requirement for hospitals with emergency rooms and that accept Medicare to 
admit patients regardless of ability to pay, regardless of their ownership structure 
– a requirement that applies to for-profit as well as nonprofit hospitals.  The latter 
was instituted as part of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA 1986), also known as the “anti-dumping legislation,” to prevent 
hospitals from unnecessarily transferring unprofitable patients.
The EMTALA provision is relevant to the community benefit discussion in that it 
does mean for-profit hospitals that operate emergency rooms (and accept 
Medicare) are required to treat any patient who seeks emergency treatment, 
regardless of ability to pay.37  This expands the concept of the charity care 
provision of the community benefit standard to encompass for-profit as well as 
nonprofit hospitals, if they accept Medicare payments.  Conversely, because of 
the 1983 ruling, nonprofit hospitals that do not have emergency rooms also do 
not have to provide medical services to indigent patients.  This complicates the 
issues surrounding nonprofit hospitals and community benefit even more than 
the vague language of the 1969 IRS Ruling, as some of the provisions currently 
also apply to for-profit hospitals, but may not apply to all nonprofit hospitals.  
Policy makers as well as scholars have investigated the extent that nonprofit 
hospitals differ from for-profit hospitals in terms of quality of care, costs, or 
                                           
37 It should also be noted that for-profit hospitals are not required to report on any other aspects 
of community benefit that they may provide.  But as the Indiana hospital database shows, many 
for-profit hospitals will voluntarily respond to requests for documentation of other elements of 
community benefit beyond their treatment of emergency room patients.
117
delivering care to the poor.38  Much of the definition and controversy surrounding 
community benefit involve its relation to charity care and what constitutes an 
adequate provision of charity care to justify tax-exempt status.  One point of 
contention is the difference between charity care and uncompensated care – with 
the latter defined as the combination of charity care and (some percentage of) 
bad debt and/or shortfall in Medicaid (and possibly Medicare) reimbursement.  
The difference is most obviously seen in the guidelines of the CHA/VHA (CHA 
2006, CHA/VHA 2006) that recommend counting only charity care (and Medicaid 
shortfall) and the AHA guidelines that include bad debt (and Medicare shortfall) in 
its reporting of uncompensated care (AHA 2006).  Table 1K compares these 
basic differences.  How charity care/uncompensated care is measured and how it 
should be evaluated are areas of disagreement found throughout policy 
interpretation, scholarly treatment, reporting practices, associational guidelines, 
and state regulations.  
Table 1K: Comparison of Definitions of “Charity Care”
Charity 
Care
Include 
Medicaid 
shortfall
Include 
Medicare 
and 
Medicaid 
shortfall
Uncompensated 
Care – including 
Bad Debt
CHA/VHA 
(and IRS 
2008)
X X
IRS (2004) X X X
AHA X X X X
                                           
38 Especially see the work of Schlesingner, Mitchell, and Gray (2003), and Schlesinger and Gray 
(2006b).
118
Recent congressional investigations and judicial challenges to the tax exempt 
status of nonprofit hospitals have primarily focused on whether nonprofit 
hospitals deliver a sufficient level of charity care to satisfy their charitable 
provision and be exempt fro taxes.  Various states have implemented criteria 
and/or evaluated the community benefit of hospitals based on charity care.  But 
other elements besides charity care/uncompensated care may also enter into 
determining potential community benefit (see Chapter Two for an overview of 
state programs).  Broad programmatic approaches (termed Process-oriented) 
include having a board that represents the community as well as a community 
health needs assessment and a community benefit plan.39  Prescriptive 
approaches that are more quantitative include documenting and evaluating the 
existence of specific community benefit programs or activities as well as the 
extent of these services through usage and/or expense data.  Community benefit 
elements include – along with charity care/uncompensated care – such activities 
as research, education, health promotion, and donations.
Perhaps the most widely recommended format for documenting community 
benefits is the guidelines developed by the CHA/VHA, updated in 2006 
(CHA/VHA 2006). These guidelines are fairly comprehensive, with a notable 
distinction of not including bad debt.  The range of activities the CHA/VHA 
guidelines include within community benefit is fairly extensive.  Beyond the 
figures for charity care and Medicaid shortfalls, broad categories are Community 
                                           
39 For example, see Olden and Clement (2000), Proenca et al (2003), Seay (1994), and Seay and 
Sigmond (1989).
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Health Services, Health Professions Education, Research, and Financial 
Contributions.  Other areas they recommend including are activities related to 
Community-Building, losses on Subsidized Health Services (such as Burn Units, 
Renal Dialysis, and Women’s and Children’s Services, among others – in short, 
any service that results in an operating loss), and costs associated with actually 
providing and reporting community benefits.  They also recommend reporting 
Foundation-Funded Community Benefits, tying in the fund development efforts to 
community benefit.
There are currently no federally mandated standards or requirements for 
determining or reporting community benefit by nonprofit hospitals.  However, 
starting in 2009 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will include a Schedule H as 
part of its revised year-end Form 990 for nonprofit organizations.  Schedule H 
asks nonprofit hospitals to document various community benefit activities and 
expenditures.  However this reporting does not correspond to any required levels 
of expenditures or compliance.  Various states have legislatively and judicially 
established criteria for community benefit, but currently there is a lack of 
consistency as to what is considered to be community benefit, which of these can 
be measured, how it should be measured, how these measurements should be 
evaluated, what is an acceptable level of community benefit, and the 
consequences if a nonprofit hospital fails to meet these standards.  Most states 
require some level of compliance with at least procedural standards for 
developing community benefit policies and community needs assessments.  But 
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increasingly there is a call for more quantitative standards.  It is one contention of 
this thesis that the philanthropic behavior of hospitals could provide a valid 
picture of the efforts of nonprofit hospitals to meet the needs of their 
communities.  How the individual elements of community benefit are able to be 
quantified and satisfy the philanthropic behavior criteria is outlined in the next 
section.
The Elements of Community Benefit 
This section explores how well the accepted elements comprising the community 
benefit standard meet the criteria of philanthropic behavior.  It is a contention that 
philanthropy and community benefit, while not synonymous are nevertheless 
related, with philanthropic behavior being a subset of community benefit.  The 
following outlines the specific elements of nonprofit hospital community benefit as 
defined by the Internal Revenue Service and the CHA/VHA standards.
As previously stated, according to the Exempt Organizations division of the 
Internal Revenue Service (Gitterman and Friedlander 2004), “The promotion of 
health for the benefit of the community is a charitable purpose,” and that it 
“promotes health as its charitable purpose, (and) the organization must meet the 
community benefit standard described in Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, as 
well as the other requirements of IRC 501(c)(3) and its regulations” (ibid, p. 2).  
This ruling further delineates two categories for determining community benefit: 
an Organizational Test and an Operational Test (“that it is organized and will be 
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operated for exclusively charitable purposes”) as specified in section 501(c)(3).  
To meet the community benefit standard a nonprofit hospital must satisfy five 
factors: 1) has a board composed primarily of community members, 2) has a 
medical staff open to all qualified physicians in the area, 3) operates a full time 
emergency room open to all, regardless of ability to pay, 4) provides non-
emergency services to anyone who is able to pay, and 5) serves a broad cross 
section of the community through research or charity care (ibid, p. 10).  The final 
provision specifically references Rev. Rul. 56-185 and further defines charity care 
and research as well as training and other related activities.  Charity care is 
defined as not including bad debt but does indicate that treating patients covered 
through Medicare and Medicaid may “demonstrate community benefit”.  This is 
an interesting observation as it starts to identify a complicating factor in 
determining the type of patient that is or isn’t charity care, elaborated upon 
below.  The IRS also includes other activities that serve the health care needs of 
the community, such as medical training or research as well as “additional 
activities demonstrating community benefit” (and provides five examples of these 
activities including free health education programs, seminars, or community 
health fairs) (ibid, p. 15).
These broad IRS statements or definitions have been refined and codified by the 
Catholic Health Association, joined by Voluntary Hospitals of America, and 
adopted for the new reporting format adopted by the IRS for use beginning in 
2009 (i.e. the Form 990, Schedule H).  According to the Catholic Health 
122
Association’s (CHA) “Instructions for Hospital Community Benefit Report: IRS 
Form 990, Supplement to Part III” (CHA n. d.), the community benefit report has 
two sections.  Section 1 is a “Qualitative Description of Community Benefit,” and 
Section 2 is “Quantifiable Community Benefit Information.”40  The Qualitative 
Description section asks for written descriptions of the hospital’s mission and 
exempt purpose, their approach to providing community benefit, their financial 
assistance program as well as how the hospital satisfies the provisions of tax 
exemption (being the five factors identified above).  It also asks for descriptions 
of specific community benefit programs the hospital offers as well as web links to 
available financial assistance information or community benefit reports.  
The categories of “Quantifiable Community Benefit” according to the Catholic 
Health Association’s (CHA) “Instructions . . .” are: 1) Charity Care; 2) 
Government Sponsored Health Care; and 3) Community Benefit Programs (net 
expense).  Charity Care is the cost of providing medical services to those 
determined not to be able to pay and is not to include bad debt.  Government 
Sponsored Health Care is defined as the net expense of “unpaid cost of public 
indigent care programs (includes Medicaid, SCHIP, other safety net programs; 
does not include Medicare shortfall)” (CHA n. d., p. 5).
Under the third category “Community Benefit” seven sub-categories are included: 
Community Health Services, Health Professions Education, Subsidized Health 
                                           
40 These two sections relate roughly to the Process-Oriented Approach and the Prescriptive 
Approach (referred to above) as well as to the Organizational Test and Operational Test referred 
to the 2004 IRS guidelines.
123
Services, Research, Financial and In-Kind Contributions, Community-Building 
Activities, and Community Benefit Operations.  Table 1L outlines these standards 
and categories.  It should be noted that the Charity Care quantification is the one 
area of community benefit that has the most disagreement as to what should be 
counted.  One controversy has to do with whether bad debt should be counted or 
not.  The American Hospital Association holds that all “uncompensated care” 
should be considered as charity care; the IRS and the CHA/VHA standards 
maintain bad debt is not charity care.  A second question is whether the shortfall 
from government reimbursement programs is counted as charity care. The IRS in 
their 2004 guidelines say that both Medicare and Medicaid shortfall is part of 
charity care; the revised IRS standards say only the shortfall from Medicaid 
should be counted. 
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Table 1L: Hospital Community Benefit Report 
(According to CHA and IRS Form 990)
Section 1: Qualitative 
Description of Community 
Benefit
Section 2: Quantifiable 
Community Benefit Information
1. Organizational Commitment to 
Providing Community Benefit
1. Charity Care – at cost
 NOT including Bad Debt
A. Hospital’s mission and primary 
exempt purpose
2. Government Sponsored Health 
Care
 Unpaid cost of public 
indigent care programs
 NOT including Medicare 
shortfall
B. Summarize approach to providing 
community benefit
3. Community Benefit Programs 
(net expense)
C. Describe financial assistance 
programs
 Community Health Services
2. Organizational Description for 
Tax Exemption – Indicate
 Health Professional 
Education
 Operates an open emergency 
room
 Subsidized Health Services
 Has an open medical staff  Research
 Has a community board  Financial and In-Kind Contributions
 Conducts medical research 
programs
 Community Building Activities
 Health professional training  Community Benefit Operations
 Participates in gov’t sponsored 
health care programs
3. Description of Community 
Benefit Program
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Nonprofit Philanthropic Behavior and the Elements of Community Benefit
In the beginning of this Chapter, nonprofit philanthropic behavior as used in this 
paper is defined as “non-regulated budgetary or other expenditure of resources 
that provides a value to a broader public beyond the primary mission and 
purposes of that private nonprofit.”    This definition contains three critical 
elements for evaluating if a given action by an organization is truly philanthropic.  
The first element is that it’s non-regulated (related to the concept of voluntary or 
non-coerced).  The second element is that this voluntary action is budgetary and 
therefore represents a deliberate quantifiable action on the part of the 
organization.  This combines with the first element to define that budgeted 
expenditure as not being influenced by regulatory requirements.  The third 
element is that the action benefits a broader public beyond the primary mission 
and purposes of that private nonprofit.  Since the purpose of identifying nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior is to determine the amount of philanthropy given by a 
hospital, the focus of this evaluation is on the elements included under the 
Quantifiable Information (Section 2) rather than the Qualitative Description 
(Section 1).
Applying the proposed philanthropic behavior to the first two categories, we see 
that the initial criteria of the definition are not met for either category of Charity 
Care or for Government Sponsored Health Care.41  Providing care for those 
unable to pay is a governmental regulation for all hospitals that accept Medicare 
                                           
41 Defined as “Unpaid cost of public indigent care programs (includes Medicaid, SCHIPO, other 
safety net programs; does not include Medicare shortfall” (CHA 2008).
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and have an emergency room.  Therefore treating these patients is not voluntary 
(no matter how willing the hospital might be to treat those patients).  And the 
unpaid cost of public indigent programs” is a figure determined by external 
funders rather than internal decision-makers (although the expense is probably 
“budgeted” as most hospitals can probably make a reasonable estimate as to the 
projected expense of charity care and unpaid public assistance programs for a
coming year.  The distinction is that the internal leadership did not initiate the 
expense.  Rather it was determined by external entities).  These categories also 
do not satisfy the third factor of philanthropic behavior: Benefit to a broader 
community than determined by their primary purpose.  While a broader 
community might be comforted by knowing that their community’s hospital 
provides this care and may be appreciative of those efforts, they do not directly 
benefit from that care or expenditure.  If the first two categories of community 
benefit are not part of the philanthropic behavior subset, this leaves as potential 
candidates for philanthropic behavior the seven sub-sections of the third category 
of community benefit elements: “Community Benefit Programs (net expense42).”
The first of the sub-categories is “Community Health Services.”  Examples of 
these programs (given in the CHA “Instructions”) are Community health 
education, Community-based clinical services, and Health care support services.  
These types of programs do satisfy a majority of the philanthropic behavior 
                                           
42 While net expense is a stipulation for quantifying community benefit, there could be an 
argument that gross expense is more appropriate for determining philanthropic behavior – as it 
represents the entire organizational budget action of the donation to the community.  This is 
addressed later in this paper in computing philanthropic behavior of Indiana hospitals.
127
criteria and so would (generally) be considered as a key expression of a 
hospitals philanthropic behavior.  It is entirely voluntary for a hospital to decide to 
offer these programs, and how much it spends on these programs is a deliberate 
budget decision.  Most programs are made available to a broader community and 
the provision of these programs goes beyond their primary mission to care for the 
sick and injured, as they tend to promote general wellness and health.
Health Professions Education is a little more problematic and questionable as a 
form of philanthropic behavior.  This questionability is especially true for a 
community hospital as opposed to a teaching hospital affiliated with a school of 
medicine or other formal medical preparatory program.  A community hospital 
does not have a similar primary mission to provide such professional education, 
nor is there a corresponding expectation by society that it has a mission to 
provide such training.  When continuing professional education opportunities are 
provided by a community hospital for its employees and medical staff, there is a 
mixture of public and private benefit.  The public benefit is improved medical 
services that are presumed to be an outcome of the educational expenditures.  
The private benefit may accrue to both the hospital (that may use these 
expenses as one form of human relations benefit as well as a way to improve its 
workforce) and for the employee or physician (who have advanced their own 
level of medical expertise and potentially their value in the market).
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Examples given on the IRS Form 990, Schedule H are programs for 
“Physicians/medical students, Nurses/nursing students, Other health professional 
education, and Scholarships/funding for professional education”.  These are non-
coerced and self-directed budgeted expenses (unless such expenses were 
mandated by union or other employment agreements), satisfying the first two 
criteria.  However the extent these programs are primarily of direct benefit to the 
broader public is uncertain.  Therefore it is suggested that these expenses do not 
necessarily satisfy the third criteria: that the program is of broad direct public 
benefit.
  
Subsidized Health Services (including programs such as “Emergency and trauma 
services, Burn unit, Renal dialysis services, Behavioral health services, and 
Palliative care and hospice”), refer to specific medical care programs that happen 
to be termed “not profitable”.  Some of these may be non-coerced although some 
programs within this area, primarily emergency services, may be required by 
various accreditation agencies such as the Joint Committee on Hospital 
Accreditation and, as previously noted, is a requirement for hospitals that receive
Medicare.  As in the case of Health Professions Education there is a mix of public 
and private benefit that fails to completely satisfy the third element of 
philanthropic behavior.
Research expenses (e.g. “Clinical research, “Community health research”) may 
satisfy the philanthropic definition, and are generally related to the educational 
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role of a teaching hospital rather than to the general healthcare role of a 
community hospital.  The programs are voluntarily provided and budgeted, and 
their eventual purpose is to provide a broad public benefit.  However the actual 
number of community hospitals providing research is limited.43  Because of this 
limitation – research expenses are indicated as philanthropic behavior for 
individual hospitals, but are not included in the community hospital comparisons 
later in the thesis.
Financial and In-Kind Contributions (including “Cash donations, Grants, In-kind 
donations”) is the second category considered to be part of philanthropic 
behavior.  Making contributions to other organizations is an area that is generally 
under-acknowledged by the public as a significant action by nonprofit hospitals 
(with the possible exception of awarding scholarships to students, which is 
included in this listing under Professional health education).  These expenditures 
are generally non-coerced and self-directed as a budget expense – and are of 
potential benefit to publics beyond the primary mission of the hospital.  As is 
shown in Chapter Five of this paper, many “donations” may actually be internal 
transfers, but also include direct financial contributions to other nonprofit 
organizations.  One complicating factor in this category should be acknowledged: 
as found in the surveys (see Chapter Five), this area has a potentially 
problematic aspect in the “in-kind” donation description.  Hospitals can have 
varying experiences and processes in how well personnel and overhead 
                                           
43 For instance, only five of the 107 community hospitals in Indiana reported any consistent or 
significant level of research expense.
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expenses involved with community outreach programs are being captured and 
reported.  This variability can make some of the comparisons somewhat suspect 
– and also indicate one example where most hospitals may be under-reporting 
the level of their community benefit.
Community-Building Activities include examples such as “Physical 
improvements/housing, Economic development, Environmental improvements, 
and Coalition building”.  This has somewhat similar considerations to 
contributions and is also an area that should be considered as philanthropic 
behavior, assuming the expenditures are for projects that are not directly related 
to the development of the hospital’s own facilities (or those of affiliates), but are 
directed at the broader public.  While this is another area that is considered to be 
part of philanthropic behavior (along with Community Health Programs, 
Research, and Donations), it is not included in the analysis of Indiana hospitals in 
this paper.  This is because current databases do not specifically identify this 
category and so become difficult to identify comparable information.  Some of 
this activity is captured in donations and when it can be identified is included 
under these distinctions.  
Community Benefit Operations is the final sub-category under “Community 
Benefit programs and includes “Dedicated staff and Community health 
needs/health assets assessment”.  This would not satisfy the philanthropic 
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behavior criteria as the direct benefit is to the organization itself (even though the 
broader community is the indirect beneficiary of at least some of that activity).  
In summary, there are two major areas that are identified as being indicative of 
philanthropic behavior of nonprofit hospitals and can potentially be equitably 
compared across general, medical-surgical community hospitals: Community 
Health Education and Donations.  These are the focus of the in-depth study in 
Chapter Four and Five of this paper.  To other areas, Community-building 
activities and Research, may also satisfy the criteria but are not included in the 
comparative study since they are either not defined in the existing databases or 
otherwise are not able to be readily compared among different hospitals.
Conclusion
The community benefit worksheets that will be required from every nonprofit 
hospital starting in 2009 include donations as one of the elements falling under 
community benefit.  This implies that nonprofit hospitals may not only receive 
philanthropic support from its community but also may provide such support.  
One question is: why would nonprofit organizations make contributions to others?  
As the theoretical literature shows, there are multiple benefits and motivations 
related to organizational philanthropic behavior. In some cases the benefits 
attain legitimacy within a particular community or professional institution, leading 
to isomorphic behavior in relation to the norms of those entities.  Philanthropic 
behavior is decoupled from the primary operations of the organization, allowing it
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to conform to the norms while also maintaining operational individuality.  In other 
cases, the benefit fulfills internal goals and is tightly coupled to the operation of 
the organization.  In still other cases the benefits are ethical reflections of the 
organization’s leadership, and this behavior is located at that leadership level.  
Any of these benefits may accrue to both the organization as well as to the 
general community, and can apply to for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations 
– such as hospitals.  By examining the specific elements of community benefit 
we can also see that in addition to donations, health education programs may 
also be included as an expression of a hospital’s philanthropic behavior.
A critical question becomes: If such quantitative behavior is to be evaluated, do 
we have adequate data resources, procedures and criteria to determine how well 
hospitals meet those standards?  This paper evaluates a database of hospital 
community benefit data collected by the state of Indiana as an example of how 
well national self-reporting of community benefit activity might work.  This is 
addressed more completely in Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five of this 
paper.  It begins by looking at the information that is currently available through 
national and state databases, the primary focus of Chapter Two.
 133 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THE VALIDITY OF EXISTING DATABASES FOR 
DETERMINING HOSPITAL COMMUNITY BENEFIT 
 
Nonprofit philanthropy is not regularly reported in national giving studies (e.g. 
Giving USA 2007).  As a consequence there are not regular surveys that capture 
this information.  One question is whether appropriate databases exist to 
evaluate nonprofit philanthropy.  Additional questions are: If databases do exist 
that might be adopted for this use, how valid are they; and: Do organizations 
keep and report uniform records of these figures?  This chapter investigates the 
types of hospital community benefit data that exists and the relative validity of 
this information for measuring philanthropic behavior.  This investigation focuses 
on the reliability of the existing databases and how well they provide the 
information needed to assess philanthropic behavior. 
 
The paper examines a publicly available Community Benefit database from the 
Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) data as a viable tool to determine the 
level of nonprofit hospitals’ community benefit and philanthropic behavior within 
the state of Indiana.  This database is subsequently used later in this paper to 
evaluate the general level of community benefit and compares that information to 
other existing databases to determine the consistency and comprehensiveness 
of this particular public reporting mechanism.  This information is further applied 
to evaluate the level of philanthropic behavior evidenced by Indiana hospitals.   
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An Overview: Do Current Databases Satisfy the Need? 
To measure and evaluate a hospital’s philanthropic behavior requires reliable 
and consistent information on a hospital’s level of community benefit.  This is 
complicated by the lack of an accepted national database or reporting criteria for 
community benefit.1  A further challenge is due to a lack of common definitions or 
agreements as to what constitutes community benefit or how it should be 
measured.  One basic disagreement is whether charity care or uncompensated 
care should be counted and what exactly is included in these categories.  Two 
other disparities are determining when charity care becomes bad debt – and 
agreeing on the relative role of contractual allowances?  Much of this 
disagreement stems from varying definitions of these basic terms. 
 
Definitions: The following section attempts to define the key terms used by the 
various national and state databases related to hospital community benefit 
information.   
Charity care (according to the Catholic Health Association) is defined as: 
“free or discounted health services provided to persons who cannot 
afford to pay and who meet the organization’s criteria for financial 
assistance. Generally, a bill must be generated and recorded and 
the patient must meet the organization’s criteria for charity care and 
demonstrate an inability to pay. Charity care should be reported in 
terms of costs, not charges. Charity care does not include bad debt. 
Count: 
• Free and discounted care 
                                            
1 It should be noted that the most widely used format for reporting community benefits is the 
“Community Benefit Reporting: Guidelines for Standard Definitions for the Community Benefit 
Inventory for Social Accountability” (2006), prepared by the Catholic Health Association and 
Voluntary Hospitals of America (CHA/VHA).  Congressional representatives have called for these 
guidelines to be adopted for national use (Grassley 2006) and recent revisions by the Internal 
Revenue Service have generally followed the categories outlined in these guidelines. 
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• Expenses incurred by the provision of charity care 
• Indirect costs not already included in calculating costs 
Do not count: 
• Bad debt 
• Contractual allowances or quick-pay discounts 
• Any portion of charity care costs already included in the 
subsidized health care services category (This would constitute 
double-counting.)”2 
 
Uncompensated care is defined by the American Hospital Association as: 
“. . . an overall measure of hospital care provided for which no 
payment was received from the patient or insurer. It is the sum of a 
hospital's "bad debt" and the charity care it provides. Charity care is 
care for which hospitals never expected to be reimbursed. A 
hospital incurs bad debt when it cannot obtain reimbursement for 
care provided. This happens when patients are unable to pay their 
bills, but did not apply for charity care, or are unwilling to pay their 
bills. Uncompensated care excludes other unfunded costs of care, 
such as underpayment from Medicaid and Medicare.”3 
 
Bad debt is further defined by the American Hospital Association as: 
“. . . services for which hospitals anticipated but did not receive 
payment. Charity care, in contrast, consists of services for which 
hospitals neither received, nor expected to receive, payment 
because they had determined the patient’s inability to pay.  In 
practice, however, hospitals have difficulty in distinguishing bad 
debt from charity care.”4 
 
The differentiation of bad debt from charity care is contested both in the 
definitions by the various agencies but also in the congressional hearings.  Much 
of the debate has to do with processes (i.e. how “aggressively” does a hospital 
                                            
2 The definition is from the website of the Catholic Health Association, “What Counts as 
Community Benefit.” 
http://www.chausa.org/Pub/MainNav/ourcommitments/CommunityBenefits/whatcounts/ (last 
accessed 9/24/2008). 
3  “Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet” (October 2006). 
www.aha.org/aha/content/2006/pdf/uncompensatedcarefs2006.pdf (last accessed 9/24/2008) 
4 Ibid. 
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attempt to collect a bad debt/charity care bill) rather than actual designations.  
The American Hospital Association elaborates: 
“Hospitals typically use a process to identify who can and cannot 
afford to pay, in advance of billing, in order to anticipate whether 
the patient’s care needs to be funded through an alternative source, 
such as a charity care fund. Hospitals also identify patients who are 
unable to pay during the billing and collection process. Depending 
on a variety of factors, including whether a patient self-identifies as 
medically indigent or underinsured in a timely manner, care may be 
classified as either charity care or bad debt. Bad debt is often 
generated by the medically indigent and uninsured, making the 
distinctions between the two categories arbitrary at best. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to consider bad debt as a component of hospitals’ 
total cost of care to the medically indigent and underinsured.”5 
 
Contractual allowances are defined as “the difference between billed charges 
and unreimbursed costs,” which primarily refer to third party payers and can be 
termed as really sales discounts.”6  The precise definition of contractual 
allowances varies between states and usually refers only to the discounts 
hospitals give to private insurance carriers.  However it may also refer to the 
shortfalls of costs (not charges) between what state governments reimburse for 
Medicaid patients and/or what the federal government reimburses for Medicare 
patients – also termed “government-sponsored health care community benefits” 
by the Catholic Hospital Association: 
“Government-sponsored health care community benefits include 
unpaid costs of public programs—the shortfall created when a 
facility receives payments that are less than the cost of caring for 
public program beneficiaries. This payment shortfall is not the same 
as a contractual allowance, which is the full difference between 
charges and government payments. It does not include any 
shortfall that results from inefficiency or poor management. 
                                            
5 Ibid. 
6 Cleverly, William O., Handbook of Health Care Accounting and Finance, 2nd edition, Rockville 
MD: Aspen Publishers (1989) P. 274. 
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Count: Losses related to: 
• Medicaid shortfall 
• State Children’s Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP) 
• Public and/or indigent care: Medical programs for low-income or 
medically indigent persons 
• Days, visits, or services not covered by Medicaid or other 
indigent care programs 
Do not count: 
• Medicare shortfall (This can be included in other financial 
reports but not in a quantified community benefit report.)”7 
 
The CHA maintains that Medicaid shortfalls should be included in charity care as 
these programs serve the indigent and represent losses incurred by a hospital in 
serving this population.  One additional distinction is whether shortfalls from 
Medicare patients (applying to all patients over age 65, regardless of their 
financial situation) should also be counted.  The CHA maintains that these 
shortfalls should not be part of the charity care formula: 
“CHA recommends that hospitals not include Medicare losses as 
community benefit. The reasons are: 
• If there are specific programs with large numbers of vulnerable 
Medicare patients, and if these programs lose money, then they 
can be included in “subsidized health services.” 
• The point of prospective payment was to make facilities 
efficient. Medicare losses for some hospitals may be associated 
with inefficiency, not underpayment. 
• In many communities, Medicare is one of the best payers. Per 
diem and per case payments can be higher for Medicare than 
for managed care payers. 
• Serving Medicare patients is not a true, differentiating feature of 
not-for-profit health care. Hospitals of all kinds compete 
aggressively to attract Medicare patients. This is not true of 
Medicaid and charity care patients. 
• Including Medicare jeopardizes the credibility of the community 
benefit report.”8 
 
                                            
7 Catholic Health Association, “What Counts as Community Benefit” (available at: 
www.chausa.org/Pub/MainNav/ourcommitment/CommunityBenefit/whatcounts last accessed 
9/24/2008). 
8 Ibid. 
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Definitions can be significantly different between different agencies, even when 
applied to charity care, a concept that initially appears to be fairly straightforward.  
Table 2A shows the discrepancy between the AHA and the CHA/VHA criteria 
that relates specifically to charity care.  The table also includes the information 
that will be gathered by the new Schedule H, from the IRS.9 
 
Table 2A: Comparison of Community Benefit and Charity Care Criteria 
 Uncompensated 
Care – including 
bad debt 
Charity Care Shortfall from 
Medicaid 
Shortfall from 
Medicare 
American 
Hospital 
Association 
x x   
Catholic 
Health 
Association 
 x x  
Collected in 
the New IRS 
Form 990: 
Schedule H  
X – collected, 
But NOT included 
in Community 
Benefit cost data 
x x X – collected, 
But NOT 
included in 
Community 
Benefit cost 
data 
 
Considerations on existing databases: Existing healthcare databases provide 
comprehensive information on inpatient and outpatient categories of disease and 
outcomes.  But these do not focus on the breadth of outreach activities included 
in community benefit nor do they provide extensive financial data, especially on 
uncompensated care, charity care, and other community benefit elements.  
Current nonprofit databases also can have questionable validity.10  Even the 
audited financial reports of individual hospitals – the defined “gold standard” of 
                                            
9 See Exhibit 2B, below.  Note that the IRS Schedule H collects additional information on bad 
debt and Medicare shortfall that is not part of the Community Benefit Costs. 
10 See Gronbjerg (2002) for an assessment of nonprofit databases. 
 139 
 
financial reporting – vary in detail and are not easily accessible to the public.  In 
this absence, individual states have initiated various reporting requirements, with 
variations in public availability.  Concerns over the validity of the IRS Form 990 
further complicate the question of available valid data (Gordon et al 2007, 
Keating and Frumkin 2003, Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak 2000, Froelich and 
Knoepfle 1996). 
 
Validity of data is important to accountability but also as an aid to organizational 
planning.  Reliable data ensures that fraud is not occurring as well as identifies 
an organization’s most effective programs, for both internal and external 
application (Brody 2001).  Public policy uses reporting requirements to ensure 
their priorities are being met.  However if the priorities are mistakenly identified, 
reporting processes may not encourage those activities that are most beneficial 
to the public benefit.  If the areas identified in this paper as philanthropic behavior 
have an intrinsic value to society, limitations on collecting and reporting the data 
can dilute the societal effectiveness of nonprofit organizations.  
 
The limitations of these databases become evident when the data is refined to 
apply to philanthropic behavior.  One example of this limitation is whether the 
donation and health promotion figures represent gross or net expenditures.  
Looking at only the hospital financial reports further complicates the donation 
category, by not considering the actions of an associated hospital foundation – 
which may contain donation activity and in some cases health promotion 
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programs.  A key question is whether donations to the hospital foundation are 
considered when reporting contributions – a question that does not seem to be 
addressed in any of the existing databases or their critiques. 
 
Pervasive weaknesses in the constancy, comprehensiveness, and reporting 
availability – among national and state sources, as well as from individual 
organizations – highlight a concern whether additional reporting criteria will in 
reality provide any better understanding of the activities of nonprofit organizations 
in general and of nonprofit hospitals in particular.  Conversely a more focused 
categorization based on philanthropic behavior could lead to more consistent 
reporting and evaluation standards.  Even the revised IRS Form 990 (for 
nonprofit organizations) and Schedule H (for nonprofit hospitals), while being a 
major step in the right direction, still fails to capture some of the information that 
might be most important to properly compare and evaluate differing institutions.  
It is one contention of this paper that the political policy focus on charity care has 
diminished the attention to health education programs of nonprofit hospitals – a 
critical element of assessing philanthropic behavior, and potentially of community 
benefit itself.   
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Desired Database Criteria for Philanthropic Behavior 
To evaluate community benefit, two key data sets are required.  The first is 
uncompensated care that distinguishes between charity care, Medicaid shortfall, 
Medicare shortfall and bad debt.  The second is financial data identifying 
expenditures for additional community benefit areas, i.e. research, education, 
health promotion, and donations.  To further evaluate philanthropic behavior, two 
other criteria are essential.  One is income data for health promotion and 
donations, as well as expense data.  The other is multi-year financial information 
(at least three years) that is readily available to the public.  
 
Other considerations for a valid database include whether the community benefit 
information is collected and centralized for public reporting purposes or left 
scattered throughout financial reports – and whether it is readily available to the 
general public in an easily-understood format or might only be accessible by 
researchers willing to go to the time and effort to seek out the data on site, pay 
for it, and/or scour through reports for the information.  One other attribute of a 
valid database is whether the information is collected by an agency of the state 
government or by the state hospital association.  This is important because 
reports from state hospital associations can tend to mirror the standards from the 
AHA, while state government agencies might be more reflective of legislative 
regulations. 
 
 142 
 
Indiana provides a test case for this information using a database collected and 
reported by the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH).  This database 
provides multi-year information with all community benefit elements easily and 
consistently identifiable through a convenient, publicly available format.  How 
valid it is as a database for determining nonprofit philanthropic behavior is one of 
the objectives of this study. 
 
National Databases 
The two primary national databases reporting hospital operations are the annual 
survey of its membership by the American Hospital Association and the yearly 
reports required by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid.  Both of these 
databases have limitations in their use for evaluating community benefit.  
Information from the Internal Revenue Service on nonprofit hospitals can also be 
found via individual hospital 990 forms (publicly available through guidestar.org).  
None of these existing national databases are particularly satisfactory for 
analyzing community benefit, although revisions to the IRS Form 990 attempt to 
address this situation.11  
 
The American Hospital Association (AHA) conducts an annual survey of more 
than 5,000 hospitals in the United States and makes the results of this survey 
available through their AHA Guide to the Heath Care Field (2006a) and AHA 
                                            
11 Two helpful summaries of the available national databases are: Needleman (2003) and Gray 
and Clement (2002).  Another useful source is Wynn, et al (2002) and a critique of databases 
related to hospital ownership is Mitchell et al (2001/2002). 
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Hospital Statistics (2005).12  While these two compilations from the AHA have 
much information on hospital ownership, size, and services, their use in 
determining community benefits is limited.  One of the categories in the survey is 
uncompensated care, but financial information specific to an individual hospital 
(beyond total expenses) is not made public.  The AHA does publish an aggregate 
summary of uncompensated care provided by hospitals during the year, which 
includes estimated bad debt and charity care costs but not costs associated with 
Medicaid or Medicare shortfall (AHA 2006b).  Details on the breakdown of the 
uncompensated care figures are not included nor are data on other areas of 
community benefit. 
 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) annually collect 
Medicare Cost Reports as part of their reimbursement process.  While these 
reports do have a wealth of service and financial data they also have limited 
applicability for determining community benefit, as uncompensated care 
information or other information on community benefits is not collected.  As these 
reports are not audited, there have also been questions as to the validity of the 
information shared.13 
 
The previous two sources are also expensive for the public to acquire, although 
the AHA Guide is often available in local community and educational libraries.  A 
                                            
12 For an evaluation of the AHA data see Mullner and Chung (2002): pp. 614-618.  Some of the 
limitations found in the reports are noted as the voluntary nature of the reporting, lack of 
independent verification, errors in reporting, and a low response rate. 
13 See: Kane and Magnus (2001) and Chen, et al (2004). 
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free source to nonprofit hospital financial data is available through 
www.guidestar.org, which includes access to the Form 990 completed by all 
nonprofit hospitals in the United States.  However, until recently the value of 
these forms related to community benefit has also been marginal, as there have 
not been specific requirements by the IRS to detail expenditures on charity care, 
uncompensated care or other forms of community benefit.  Selected hospitals 
may choose to include information on these programs in supplementary 
materials, but this has been a voluntary provision and is not consistent or suitable 
for comparisons or analysis. 
 
Revised Form 990 and Schedule H 
Starting in 2009 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will require nonprofit 
organizations to complete a revised IRS Form 990.  Nonprofit hospitals will be 
asked to also submit a Schedule H form that will more definitively identify 
expenditures related to community benefit.  These revisions culminate a three-
year process prompted by the Congressional challenges related to nonprofit 
oversight.14  The general format mirrors the guidelines developed by the Catholic 
Health Association and the Voluntary Hospitals of America (CHA/VHA) and are 
projected to cause few reporting problems for those hospitals that have been in 
compliance with those guidelines.  However, these impending changes have 
encouraged many other hospitals to better collect and report the level of 
community benefit they provide.  The purposes of the revised Form 990 include 
                                            
14 This summary, and detailed overviews of the revisions, are available from the Internal Revenue 
Service website http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/..id=176613.00.html.  
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promoting improved transparency, increased compliance, and reduced reporting 
burdens.  The third purpose is accomplished by expanding the ability of smaller 
organizations to file the shorter 990-EZ15 form.  Other key changes to the Form 
990 are: 
Exhibit 2A: Summary of key changes to the IRS 990, for tax year 2008   
• Revised Summary Page, incorporates a two-year financial summary  
• Moves program description information, following the summary (page 
2) 
• A checklist of supplementary schedules16  
• Revised and expanded governance and compensation sections 
 
Evaluation of National Databases – The national databases, with the exception of 
the IRS Form 990, are relatively ineffective as evaluation tools for community 
benefit.  The revised IRS Form 990 – and especially the Schedule H for nonprofit 
hospitals – does attempt to address the need for reliable information on 
community benefit and philanthropic behavior.  It will identify and make public 
information on charity care vs. uncompensated care, information on all areas of 
community benefit, and income data for programs as well as expense.17  For the 
                                            
15 The 990-EZ form may be used by any nonprofit organization under $1 million in gross receipts 
or with assets under $2.5 million (in 2009).  It might be assumed that the Schedule H would also 
need to be completed for any hospitals that fall in this category – an assumption that is theoretical 
rather than practical, since the income of community hospitals generally far exceeds $1 million. 
16 Including Schedule H, for nonprofit hospitals. 
17 While there is not an explicit statement that www.guidestar.org and other sources that collect 
the IRS 990 forms will also include the Schedule H, there is every expectation that this 
information will be included, as currently numerous supplements to the form are included.  As the 
new form is only starting to be required by the IRS in 2009, the earliest that the inclusion of 
Schedule H will be able to be verified will be in 2010.   
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first two or three years only limited multi-year information will be collected, but 
this limitation will be addressed as the new form continues to be used.   
 
Exhibit 2B: 
Summary of Schedule H “Hospitals” supplement to revised Form 990 
 
Part I: Charity Care and Certain Other Community Benefits at Cost  
• Part I: Lines 1a-6b – including: 
- 10 Qualitative (yes/no) questions on community benefit policies and 
practices 
• Part I, Line 7: Charity Care and Certain Other Community 
Benefits at Cost 
- Activities and costs of “Charity Care and Means Tested Programs” 
– 3 categories 
- Activities and costs of “Other Benefits” – 6 categories 
 
Part II: Community Building Activities – 9 categories including:  
- Activities and costs of Economic development, Environmental 
support, and community health advocacy  
 
Part III: Bad Debt, Medicare, and Collection Practices 
- 1 Qualitative (yes/no) question and 2 financial figures on Bad Debt 
expenses and practices 
- 3 financial figures on Medicare revenue and costs, including the 
accounting method used to arrive at those figure 
- 2 Qualitative (yes/no) descriptions of Collection Practices of debts 
 
Part IV: Management Companies and Joint Ventures  
- Ownership descriptions and percentages 
 
Part V: Facility Information  
- Describing the various types of health-related facilities operated by 
the entity  
 
Part VI: Supplemental Information 
- 8 Qualitative descriptive narratives expanding upon the various 
(above) areas  
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Part 1, Line 7 is the primary area of interest to this paper and for determining the 
philanthropic behavior of nonprofit organizations.  The information that will be 
gathered in this section is outlined in Exhibit 2C: 
 
Exhibit 2C: Part I, Line 7  
Charity Care and Certain Other Community Benefits at Cost 
 
- Activities and costs of “Charity Care and Means Tested Programs”  
a. Charity Care at Cost 
b. Unreimbursed Medicaid 
c. Unreimbursed Costs – Other Means-tested Government Programs 
d. (TOTAL Charity Care and Means Tested Programs) 
  
- Activities and costs of “Other Benefits”  
e. Community Health Improvement Services and Community Benefit 
Operations 
f. Health Professions Education 
g. Subsidized Health Services 
h. Research 
i. Cash and In-kind Contributions to Community Groups 
j. (TOTAL Other Benefits) 
k. (TOTAL – line 7d and line 7j) 
 
One shortcoming of Schedule H of the revised Form 990 is that donations (Line 
7i: “Cash and In-kind Contributions to Community Groups”) do not necessarily 
include the activities of a related hospital foundation.  Also each of the above 
areas have extensive worksheets that accompany the categories, but according 
to the Schedule H instructions these worksheets are not to be filed with the 
Schedule H, so will not be available for public viewing or available to oversight 
agencies and researchers.   
 
One other concern is that currently many hospitals detail their community benefit 
activities in supplements to their Form 990 – providing extensive detail on such 
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areas as specific expenditures on health programs and donation activities.  It’s 
hoped that these hospitals will continue to provide such information as it can 
provide a high level of detail to anyone who wishes to search for such 
information.  However, such supplements are voluntary and with more extensive 
formal criteria, it could be that the supplemental information will no longer be 
included.  An additional ongoing limitation to data from the IRS Form 990 is the 
problem of their validity.  They are subject to limited audited scrutiny, meaning 
that figures noted in various categories may or may not be reliable or uniform.  
But overall the revised Form 990 and its accompanying Schedule H seem to be 
positive steps toward providing increasingly useful information on hospital 
community benefit.  In the future, one other improvement might be to require this 
type of reporting not only from nonprofit hospitals but also from public and for-
profit entities. 
  
State Community Benefit Requirements and Databases 
A 2008 study in Montana tried to follow the IRS Schedule H criteria, utilizing a 
survey from the attorney general’s office as well as IRS 990 forms.  They 
categorized the components into eight categories: Charity Care, unreimbursed 
Medicaid costs, unreimbursed costs for other government programs, community 
health improvements, health professions education, subsidized health services, 
research, and donations.  They found the results were inconclusive due to 
hospital reporting inconsistency (with the exception of charity care and Medicaid 
costs), in both the survey and the 990 forms (White 2008).  This problem of data 
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variability is something that the many states attempting to define these standards 
have had to face.  However, these limitations have not prevented states from 
attempting to define and enforce varying community benefit efforts. 
 
During the past twenty years, in the absence of federal community benefit 
guidelines, many states have led the legislative and judicial efforts to define 
community benefit.  Some states have challenged the tax-exemption of nonprofit 
hospitals.  However as of 2008, no nonprofit hospital has lost its tax-exempt 
status solely on the basis of failing to provide a determined level of community 
benefit (Salinsky 2007).  Court challenges in three states in the late 1980s led to 
legislative actions in the 1990s and the development of various state guidelines 
give examples of this process.  However these cases led to little agreement 
among the states on how those guidelines should be structured and applied.  
The following timeline (Exhibit 2D) shows how the challenges to nonprofit 
hospitals in state courts have led to individual state legislatures passing more 
defined community benefit requirements.  In the following cases, the legislative 
actions were joint efforts between a state hospital representatives and 
government officials to codify the guidelines as a way to protect nonprofit 
organizations from judicial decisions. 
 
The 1985 case of Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care marked the first time 
in recent U.S. history (i.e. since the enactment of the 1969 community benefit 
standards) that local tax assessors successfully challenged the tax-exemption of 
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two hospitals and prevailed.18  The state Supreme Court ruled that the hospitals 
were not charities since devoted less than one percent of their gross revenues to 
charity care, and that they “confuse[d] the element of gift to the community, which 
an entity must demonstrate in order to qualify as a charity under our Constitution, 
with the concept of community benefit, which any of countless private enterprises 
might provide” (Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 709 P.2d 265 
(Utah 1985) at 276).  In response to this judicial action, Utah’s hospitals and tax 
commissioners developed proposed standards that were adopted by the state’s 
legislature in 1990.  The Utah State Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
these guidelines in 1994 (Fremont-Smith 2004, p.131).   
 
In 1985, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against a hospital support 
organization in Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 
1985).  They issued a five-prong test to establish if an entity is a public charity, 
including: advances a charitable purpose; donates or renders gratuitously a 
substantial portion of its services; benefits a substantial and indefinite class of 
persons who are legitimate subjects of charity; relieves the government of some 
of its burden; and operates entirely free from private profit motive.  Following that 
ruling other states made similar challenges including noteworthy challenges in 
Vermont, New Hampshire and Texas, but none prevailed until 2002 when the 
Director of the Illinois Department of Revenue, brought suit against a hospital in 
State of Illinois v. Provena Covenant Medical Center.  As of mid-2008, the case 
                                            
18 Between 1928 and 1956 (when the IRS 501(c) rulings were applied to hospitals), several states 
had challenged the tax exemption of hospitals on the grounds that they did not meet the 
presumed charitable standard of providing services for the poor (see Mancino 1988).  
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was still in appeal but subsequently the Illinois legislature has passed more 
definitive community benefit standards.   
 
A brief historical time line of key state activities illustrates the evolution of these 
court challenges and the subsequent legislative actions by various states: 
 
Exhibit 2D: State Community Benefit Court and Legislative Actions 
State court cases – 1985-1989: 
1985 – Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care [Utah]  
- Tax exemption revoked – and the court enumerated charity guidelines that 
apply to hospitals 
1985 – Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth [Pennsylvania]  
- Tax exemption revoked – and the court enumerated charity guidelines that 
apply to hospitals. NOT a hospital, but rather a nonprofit hospital support 
organization; 
1989 – Medical Center Hospital of Vermont, Inc. v. City of Burlington [Vermont] 
- Tax exemption upheld 
1989 – Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center et al v. City of Lebanon [New 
Hampshire] 
- Tax exemption upheld 
 
State Legislation – 1990 and forward:  
1990: New York becomes the first state to propose state CB legislation19   
- Six others followed with reporting requirements - - - including Indiana.  
- Massachusetts initiated voluntary reporting 
 
[Bold = first eight states to enact reporting requirements] 
[Italics = significant subsequent state court cases] 
 
1990 – Utah  
1991 – New York 
1993 – State of Texas v. The Methodist Hospital [Texas] 
1993 – Texas  
1994 – Indiana 
1994 – Massachusetts (voluntary) 
1995 – California  
1997 – Pennsylvania  
1999 – Idaho  
                                            
19 Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care 1999. 
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2000 – New Hampshire 
2000 – Rhode Island 
2002 – State of Illinois v. Provena Covenant Medical Center [Illinois] 
2004 – Illinois  
As the above notes, Indiana was the fourth state to legislatively require reporting 
of community benefit activity and the second (after New York) to do so without a 
preliminary court case.  In looking at the relative timing of the court cases and the 
legislation, it can be seen that it is the court rulings that have had a greater affect 
on revoking tax exemption than the legislation.  In fact it could be conjectured 
that the primary result (if not the purpose) of legislation is less as a punitive 
measure than to define the guidelines and encourage compliance.   
 
State Databases 
State regulations require varying levels of information reporting processes, with 
corresponding variability in existing and publicly available databases.  Much of 
this variability is due to their origins in satisfying the specific challenges and 
rulings from the court cases, rather than being prompted by legislative initiatives.   
 
The National Association of Health Data Organizations (NAHDO) does attempt to 
collect information on the available state databases covering a variety of hospital 
procedures and services.  However, as in the case of a majority of the national 
resources, community benefit information is not one of the areas addressed by 
the NAHDO.   Individual states have recently begun to require more specific 
information on hospital financial operations, including data related to community 
benefit programs.  While the types of information and reporting process vary 
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across states, many states do provide information that can be helpful to 
researchers seeking to investigate community benefit behavior.   
 
Several health agencies and consumer advocacy organizations have provided 
summaries of the states that have community benefit regulations and/or reporting 
requirements.  However, they reveal a wide difference in defining exactly 
reporting community benefit might mean as well as some discrepancy in 
identifying which states require which level of accountability.  The fluid ever-
changing nature of state legislation in this area also limits the 
comprehensiveness of these compilations.  They also vary on whether they focus 
on charity care procedural guidelines, specific charity care data, a broad range of 
community benefit processes, or specific community benefit data. Some of the 
more reliable sources include those compiled by the Minnesota Department of 
Health (22 states: 2007), the Congressional Budget Office (5 states: 2006), the 
Missouri Foundation for Health (22 states: 2005), Community Catalyst (47 states: 
2003b; 15 states: 2003c), and the Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care (22 states: 
2001; 8 states: 1999).  The most recent report is from Minnesota (Minnesota 
Department of Health 2007), and is included in Appendix 2-A, although this 
compilation does not include all states especially those that require fairly loose 
reporting requirements.  It must be cautioned that not only do different 
compilations reflect a wide spectrum of state reporting criteria (especially related 
to whether qualitative reporting include “normal” hospital fiscal reports needed for 
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Medicaid reimbursement purposes) but also as the compilations become older, 
the more probable it is that they are out of date. 
 
The hospital financial reports (which can help identify various community benefit 
line items) required by most states are also somewhat limited, although as of 
2001 twenty states collected financial reports that were publicly available in some 
fashion (Coalition for Nonprofit Healthcare 1999, 2001).  Exhibit 2E compiles a 
list of the states that require Prescriptive (quantitative) reporting from those that 
ask only Process-oriented (qualitative) standards: 
 
Exhibit 2E: States that Require Prescriptive (Quantitative) Community 
Benefit Reports and Process-Oriented (Qualitative) Community Benefit 
Reports20 
 
States that Require Reporting to Meet  States that Require Process- 
Prescriptive (Quantitative)    Oriented (Qualitative) Community  
Community Benefit Standards   Benefit Reporting 
Pennsylvania     Arizona  New Hampshire 
Texas      California New Jersey   
Utah      Colorado  New York 
      Florida  Ohio 
      Georgia Oregon  
Idaho  Rhode Island 
Indiana  South Dakota 
Louisiana  Virginia 
Massachusetts 
 
Needleman (2003) identifies California, Massachusetts and New York as 
requiring particularly detailed financial reports and Gray and Clement (2002) 
single out Texas and Indiana as having a desirable level of detail and public 
                                            
20 Based on information from the Coalition for Nonprofit Healthcare (2001) and updated using 
various additional sources including Minnesota Department of Health (2007) and Community 
Catalyst (2003b). 
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availability specifically related to community benefit information.  The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2006) focused on California, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, and Texas for their study of uncompensated care – 
emphasizing that these were five states that did have reliable data.  However 
Florida and Georgia have limited information available on community benefit 
measurements beyond uncompensated care.  The Consumer Health Ratings 
(n.d.) identifies Indiana, Minnesota, and Missouri as including community benefit 
information beyond basic financial information.21  The Coalition for Nonprofit 
Healthcare (1999) identifies three states that require quantitative (prescriptive) 
reporting of community benefits: Texas, California, and Pennsylvania.  The state 
of Utah also has a quantitative requirement for tax exemption, although public 
reporting is not required (Minnesota Department of Health 2007, p. 22).   
 
Research into State Provision of Charity Care and Other Community Benefits 
Many researchers have investigated the provision of community benefit in 
different states at varying levels of detail and analysis.  Some of these have 
focused on qualitative efforts (Process-oriented approaches) while others have 
tried to analyze quantitative efforts (Prescriptive approaches).  Most of the 
studies that have addressed the prescriptive approach have focused on charity 
care and/or other types of uncompensated care.  A few have also looked at other 
aspects of community benefit.  The research shows a wide variability in the 
                                            
21 Available at 
http://www.consumerhealthratings.com/index.php?action=showSubCatsandcat_id=213 
(accessed 2/10/07). 
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availability of certain types of data as well as in the potential limitations of 
available data. 
 
Most of the broader state summaries were done during the 1990s.  More recent 
scholarship tends to focus on individual states.  The broad studies include 
community benefit but also topics such as legislative attitudes toward nonprofit 
hospital tax exemption (Jervis 2005),22 health reform and the uninsured (Paul-
Shaheen 1998), the status of state laws (Sullivan and Karlin 1999), looking at the 
different effect of voluntary or legislated standards (Boraks 1995), and 
observations on the potential effects of federal and state policies (Rosenberg 
1994, Moskowitz 1993). 
 
Recently researchers have tended to look more specifically at individual states.  
Since the mid-1990s, California has probably had the most scrutiny of hospital 
charity care and other community benefit programs.  California is particularly 
attractive for research as its healthcare data is readily available and detailed and 
the state has a wide variety of market conditions, including a mix of rural vs. 
urban facilities and for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.23  Gruber (1994) examined 
the effect that “price shopping” for hospital services by insurers had on the level 
of uncompensated care provided by California hospitals.  It concluded that a lack 
of competition also leads to lower levels of uncompensated care.   
 
                                            
22 While Jervis’ paper is dated 2005, the study it was based on was conducted in 1996. 
23 Jervis 2005, p. 64, n. 65. 
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Clement, Smith and Wheeler (1994) studied California hospital community 
benefit practices and helped establish criteria for measuring community benefit.  
The definition of community benefit they used was extremely broad and in 
addition to uncompensated care (inclusive of bad debt) and services below cost, 
they also included net income as a community benefit.  They defended this 
inclusion by maintaining net income was used for future investment in health care 
in the community, and therefore constituted a community benefit asset.  They 
evaluated the expenditure on community benefit against total hospital assets, 
providing possible comparative median figures for California hospitals between 
1980 and 1987.  Clement, Smith and Wheeler concluded that while hospitals did 
tend to meet the standards (using their criteria) the level of community benefit 
declined over time and there was a need for hospitals and communities to work 
more closely to establish mutually beneficial standards into the future.   
 
A study of California hospitals by Buchmueller and Feldstein (1996) differentiated 
process-based criteria from quantitative standards.  Their study reflected 
California’s actual procedural community benefit criteria that emphasizes 
community benefit needs assessments and plans rather than quantitative 
standards.  It is one of the few studies to look at community benefit elements 
besides charity care or uncompensated care. 
 
Two doctoral dissertations used California data to assess community benefit.  
One (Pfaff 1999) offers a comparison of the level of uncompensated care 
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between California and Pennsylvania (a state with quantitative standards) and 
concludes that state legislation has an effect on the behavior of nonprofit 
hospitals.  The second dissertation (Finocchio 2001) looks at changes in 
uncompensated care in California hospitals from 1994-1998.  It emphasizes the 
complexities of determining uncompensated care, determining which elements to 
include, and varying methods of measuring those elements can dramatically 
affect a hospitals ability to meet varying community benefit measurement 
standards.  One of its conclusions is that nonprofit hospitals may be “maxing out” 
the amount of charity care they can reasonably provide and that increasingly 
stringent regulations may not have the effect of providing an increased level of 
charity care by nonprofit hospitals. 
 
Other California studies have indirectly included community benefit analysis as 
part of assessing the level of the “non-poor uninsured” (Yegian et al 2000) and 
the changes in hospital ownership from 1986-1996 (Spetz, Seago and Mitchell 
1999). 
 
Texas – A Model for Defined Quantitative Standards? 
Texas was one of the first states to pass legislation addressing community 
benefit and it is one of the few states that have very defined quantitative 
standards for reporting community benefit.  Its criteria are also the most rigid of 
the states that have instituted quantitative or prescriptive criteria.24  This is helpful 
                                            
24 The other two prescriptive states are Utah (total Community Benefit as 1-1.5% of operating 
costs) and Pennsylvania (total Community Benefit as 3% of operating expenses).  See below. 
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as it can seemingly provide a comparison for other states to determine how well 
they provide community benefits.  On the other hand how these quantitative 
standards are defined and reported – even by state agencies – actually can 
illustrate some of the problems involved with determining community benefits. 
 
The standards in Texas are fairly straightforward.  Texas has a standard that 
Charity Care should be either 4% of Patient Revenue or that all Community 
Benefit expenditures should be 5% of Patient Revenue.25  Enacted in 1993, the 
Texas legislature determined that there are three potential measurements that 
can be used.  Individual hospitals need to satisfy any one of these three 
requirements, and hospital systems may choose to consolidate the expenditures 
of the entire system. 
 
The Texas standards are: 
1. Charity Care plus Community Benefit = 5% of Net Patient Revenue 
2. Charity Care plus government-sponsored Indigent Care = 4% of Net 
Patient Revenue 
3. Charity Care plus government-sponsored Indigent Care = 100% of the 
value of a hospital’s tax-exemption, excluding federal income tax 
The accompanying definitions provide further explanation: 
- Charity Care: Unreimbursed cost of providing care to patients who are 
financially indigent (income below 200% of the federal poverty line) or 
                                            
25 Texas Health and Safety Code Section 311.045. 
 160 
 
medically indigent (income over 200% of the federal poverty line, but 
lack cash assets to pay outstanding medical bills). 
- Community Benefits: Unreimbursed cost of providing charity care and 
government-sponsored indigent care – AND donations, education, 
government-sponsored program services, research, and subsidized 
health services. 
- Government-sponsored Indigent Care: Primarily costs associated with 
Medicaid. 
 
These definitions provide several examples of the confusion and misconceptions 
that can surround community benefit, not only in Texas but also throughout the 
United States.  First, costs associated with treating Medicaid patients 
(Government-sponsored Indigent Care) are defined as being separate from 
Charity Care. This is a significant point, as political and public perception can be 
that Charity Care applies to all those who are financially indigent.  In practice 
many of the poorest patients qualify for Medicaid and therefore are considered as 
being insured.  The Texas definitions clearly define and combine those 
categories.  However, many other state and national criteria do not always make 
such a clear distinction.  A second source of potential confusion is found within 
the Texas definitions and formulae themselves.  While the definition states that 
Community Benefit includes Charity Care and Government-sponsored indigent 
care, the first standard states that the 5% standard should be determined by 
combining Charity Care plus Community Benefit (emphasis added).  This could 
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lead to the implication that Charity Care can be counted twice (but not 
Government-sponsored care).  It can be logically concluded that this duplication 
is not intended, but the potential confusion remains.   
 
The second standard (Charity Care plus government-sponsored Indigent Care = 
4% of Net Patient Revenue) seems less confusing than the total Community 
Benefit standard.  However a complication arises from the report prepared from 
this information by the Texas Department of State Health Services.  They report 
not on Charity Care but on Uncompensated Care (including Bad Debt) and 
compare this to Gross Patient Revenue (rather than Net Patient Revenue).26   
 
Other States with Quantified Standards and Required Reporting of Expenditures 
The Texas standards provide one set of benchmarks for comparisons with other 
states.  The other two states with quantitative or prescriptive standards – 
Pennsylvania and Utah – also provide potential benchmarks, although the 
standards they present are relatively low.  Utah evaluates whether the total level 
of community benefit (including charity care) is equal to the value of a hospital’s 
property tax exemption, defined as 1-1.5% of annual gross operating expenses.  
Pennsylvania considers a minimum level of community benefit to be 3% of the 
institution’s operating expenses (Noble, Hyams and Kane 1998, p. 121).  Both of 
these standards have been established by the state legislatures, following state 
court rulings. 
                                            
26 “Texas Acute Care Hospitals Fact Sheet” prepared by Hospital Survey Unit, Center for Health 
Statistics, Texas Department of State Health Services (2003): www.tdh.state/.tx.us/chs/hspsurv. 
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Other standards used or averages found by researchers involve Uncompensated 
Care rather than Charity Care – and include Uncompensated Care as 4.5% of 
Net Patient Revenue (Mann et al 1995) or as 6% of Operating Costs (Mann et al 
1997), or as 2.8% of total charges in Minnesota in 1996 – compared to 6% 
nationally (Blewett et al 2003).  The Hill-Burton Act of the 1950s and 1960s 
established a target figure of 3% of operating costs (ibid).  The Congressional 
Budget Office found that in the five states it studied, Uncompensated Care as a 
percentage of hospitals’ operating expenses was higher at government hospitals 
(13.0%) than at nonprofit hospitals (4.7%) or for-profit hospitals (4.2%) (CBO 
2006, p. 2).  The CBO report also provides an estimate of the value of various tax 
exemptions provided to nonprofit hospitals for the year 2002. 
 
Minnesota 
Minnesota Department of Health (2007) conducted an in-depth analysis of 
community benefit expenditures in the state for 2005.  It used multiple survey 
methods27 and accessed a variety of state records to assess not only a 
comprehensive picture of the levels and types of community benefit provided by 
Minnesota hospitals but also the various values of their tax exemptions. 
 
This study is one of the more recent and comprehensive analyses of a state’s 
community benefit provision – and its categories anticipate the IRS Form 990 
                                            
27 These methods include examining publicly available data, conducting a special survey of 
Minnesota hospitals, using information from a Minnesota Hospital Association survey, and 
augmenting this information with data and a survey from the Minnesota Department of Health 
(Minnesota Department of Health 2007, p. 2). 
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Schedule H format.  It is also based on the CHA/VHA guidelines, mirroring the 
Schedule H format.  It is this study that forms the basis for the Indiana study that 
is part of this dissertation. 
 
The Minnesota report (2007) noted that even though they had access to a variety 
of governmental and survey data, the results were at best a rough estimate.  
Their caveats are applicable to any method that attempts to capture this type of 
information.  They identified three limitations, which could apply equally to the 
examples of the states shared earlier in this chapter.  First despite extensive and 
multiple follow-ups, the results were marred by missing information.  On any 
form, information may not be included because a hospital was unable to quantify 
the question, or did not have activities to report, or merely chose not to report it. 
 
A second limitation was differences found between information reported on the 
survey and comparable information from a hospital’s annual report.  And a third 
limitation was uncertainty about the consistency of data across hospitals.  Many 
categories could be interpreted in different ways and included differing factors in 
their totals.  These concerns are magnified if tried to apply to a much larger field 
of hospitals in the country, with a minimum of oversight and follow-up as well as 
only single contacts or sources. 
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Nonprofit Hospital Databases – A Summary 
The wide variety of state standards, methodologies, and data sources illustrate 
the problem that researchers and oversight agencies face when trying to define 
objective standards for nonprofit hospital community benefit – much less to 
compare them across states.  The caveats to the Minnesota study emphasize 
that this process is far from being an exact science.  The IRS Form 990 revisions 
and development of Schedule H should help to provide a partial remedy for this 
situation and for the first time establish a nation-wide format for reporting of 
community benefit activities.  Yet many of the complexities and limitations noted 
above will remain.  These drawbacks could be an indication that a simpler 
methodology might also be called for, such as identifying philanthropic behavior.  
In the absence of alternatives, it is possible that only partial data will be reported 
as being “significant:” namely, charity care.  This could lead to discouraging the 
very type of organizational behavior that the public sector most wants to 
encourage from nonprofit hospitals. 
 
While future studies may be able to utilize a vastly improved national database to 
evaluate community benefit activities, current researchers still face existing 
limitations.  One of the more obvious omissions in current research in this area is 
a lack of studies of Indiana hospitals – especially considering the strength and 
longevity of their database.  As Gray and Clement (2002) noted, Indiana is one of 
two states with a particular level of detail and public availability related to 
community benefit information.  Indiana could also be considered as an 
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“average” U.S. state, particularly in terms of size and geographic location, 
providing a potential model for testing policies and activities that may have a 
national intention.  The next section of this paper looks specifically at the types of 
available data and reports that are available from Indiana. 
 
The Indiana Hospital Database 
The Indiana database appears to be one of the more comprehensive and 
accessible databases for analyzing the community benefit expenditures of 
nonprofit hospitals.  It also has the advantage of providing information on for-
profit and public hospitals, although not with the depth of information as there is 
for nonprofit hospitals.  The drawbacks revolve around the data being self-
reported and unaudited.  This not only can lead to questioning the validity of the 
data, compounded by notable discrepancies in reporting from year-to-year, even 
by the same hospital.   
 
Background of the Indiana Community Benefit Regulations 
In 1994 Indiana enacted legislation requiring the reporting of financial information 
by all hospitals and of community benefits by nonprofit hospitals in the state.   
Prior to this action, Governor Evan Bayh had called for a repeal of hospital tax 
exemption although there was no evidence that Indiana hospitals were not being 
charitable (as was not the case in Utah or Pennsylvania).  At the time Indiana 
collected very little hospital data, including charity care.  A measure to require a 
defined level of charity care and community benefit expenditures was proposed, 
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but then abandoned in favor a process-based requirement focused on planning 
and reporting.28    
 
Indiana laws regulating the hospital reporting of community benefits are 
contained in two regulations: the Hospital Financial Disclosure Act (IC 16-21-6) 
and the Provision of Charitable Care by Nonprofit Hospitals (IC 16-21-9). 
 
The Hospital Financial Disclosure Act (IC 16-21-6)29 defines the annual financial 
data that needs to be filed with the Indiana State Department of Health by all 
hospitals in Indiana (IC 16-21-6-3) as well as the patient information (IC 16-21-6-
6).  The financial data includes charity care30 and bad debt31 as well as 
contractual allowances32 from government programs.  It also reports donations, 
research and education – including professional education, patient education, 
and community health education.  
 
                                            
28 Coalition for Nonprofit Health Care (1999), pp. 1-2; Sullivan and Karlin (1999), pp. 288-289. 
29 The Indiana Code IC 16-21-6-1 – IC 16-21-6-12 is found at 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title16/ar21/ch6.html. 
30 “Charity Care” is defined by the Indiana Code as “the unreimbursed cost to a hospital of 
providing, funding, or otherwise financially supporting health care services to a person classified 
by the hospital as financially indigent or medically indigent on an inpatient or outpatient basis.”  IC 
16-18-2-52.5, available at: www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title16/ar18/ch2.html (last accessed 
3/21/2009). 
31 “Bad Debt” is defined by standardized hospital accounting procedures as the “total amount of 
payments that providers anticipated but did not receive.”  This emphasis on whether the hospital 
expects the payment distinguishes Bad Debt from Charity Care that “consists of the value of 
services for which providers never expected payment.”  J.S. Weissman, “The Trouble with 
Uncompensated Hospital Care,” New England Journal of Medicine, 352:12 (2005): 1171-1173, 
cited in Center for Health Policy, Indiana: Research for a Healthier Indiana, School for Public and 
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (November 2008).   
32 “Contractual Allowances” is defined by the Indiana Code as “the difference between revenue at 
established rates and amounts realizable from third party payers under contractual agreements.” 
www.ai.org/legislative/ic/code/title16/ar21ch6.html (last accessed 3/21/2009). 
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The Provision of Charitable Care by Nonprofit Hospitals (IC 16-21-9)33 defines 
Community Benefit as including the unreimbursed costs of charity care, 
government sponsored indigent health care (i.e. Medicaid), donations, education, 
governmental sponsored program services, research, and subsidized health 
services (IC 16-21-9-1).  It specifies that each nonprofit hospital develop a 
mission statement and a community benefit plan that identifies goals and specific 
communities served related to charity care and other community benefits, as well 
as conducting a community-wide needs assessment (IC 16-21-9-4 and IC 16-21-
9-5).  The act further states that the hospital must prepare a budget of the 
expenses involved with providing community benefit.  It requires all nonprofit 
hospitals file an annual report on the activities and expenses with the state health 
department and that this report is made available to the public.  They are further 
required to post prominently within the hospital a public notice that the report is 
available (IC 16-21-9-6 and IC 16-21-9-7).  If a hospital fails to file that report in a 
timely manner, they are liable to a fine of $1,000 per day (IC 16-21-9-8). 
 
Since 1998, the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) has issued a yearly 
report on the provision of community benefit in the state of Indiana.34  It also 
maintains a web site with individual data from all hospitals in the state.35  It 
should be noted that in March 2008 the data was posted for 2006.  However, due 
                                            
33 The Indiana Code IC 16-21-9-1 – IC 16-21-9-9 is found at 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title16/ar21/ch9.html. 
34 Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) 2004a.  
35 Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) 2004b 
http://www.in.gov/isdh/regsvcs/acc/fiscal/04/index.htm.  The website contains three years of 
information, 2002-2004.  Data from 1998-2001 is available directly from the Indiana State 
Department of Health.  
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to a change in staff at the ISDH there has been a delay in posting the complete 
data from the questionnaires and as of May 1, 2008 the data on the website is 
partial.36  
 
An Overview of the Indiana Hospital Fiscal Reports 
The ISDH database contains more details on the community benefit activities of 
nonprofit hospitals than it does for either for-profit or county/city owned.  
However, there is still relevant data collected from the for-profit and city/county 
hospitals to allow for valid comparisons – especially regarding charity care and a 
broad assessment on other community benefits. 
 
The Indiana State Department of Health website has four successive pages that 
provide information leading to the individual hospital databases for a given year.  
The first page gives the range of reports available for health care providers (see 
Appendix 2-B).37 
 
An advantage to page one is that three years of information are available.  
Reports going back to 2001 are also available on the web (although not featured 
on the website).  A drawback to page one is that it does not specify that 
community benefit information is contained within the Fiscal Reports, making it 
less than visible to anyone who does not know to look for these reports. 
 
                                            
36 Email correspondence with ISDH staff, April 17 and 23, 2008. 
37 The examples given are from the 2004 ISDH Fiscal reports.  The format for later years is the 
same as 2004, with only the years changed. 
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The second page provides the link to the desired Report and Year.  A map 
makes it relatively easy to access a desired hospital and/or location – assuming 
that the person searching for the information knows the county a desired hospital 
is located.  A potential drawback is that a couple of hospitals have been found to 
be either misplaced or because of their system affiliations are grouped with other 
hospitals in a different county.  But this seems to be a minor problem. 
 
The map of Indiana can be used to access the health care facilities within a 
desired county (Example I): 
Example I 
Vigo County Facilities: 
Terre Haute Regional Hospital 
   
Nonprofit Acute Care Hospitals: 
Union Hospital 
 
The “County Facilities” are either for-profit or publicly owned facilities, leading to 
a potential confusion.  Nonprofit hospitals are separately categorized.  In this 
example, Terre Haute Regional Hospital is a for-profit facility; Union Hospital is a 
nonprofit hospital.  Specialty facilities are grouped together with general medical-
surgical hospitals – but are separately noted on the fourth page under “Peer 
Group”.38 
   
                                            
38 It should be noted on the actual page for “Vigo County Facilities” that one other facility is also 
included: “Health South Rehabilitation Hospital – Terre Haute”.  This facility is a specialty hospital 
and therefore is not included in the example – nor is this facility are other similar specialty 
facilities included in the subsequent analyses, which focus on general community hospitals, not 
specialty facilities. 
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The fourth web page gives the financial data for the individual hospital (Example 
IV).  Information is reported from nonprofit hospitals as well as public hospitals 
such as those owned by the city or county.  The only difference is that nonprofit 
hospitals are required to give more detailed information about their community 
benefit activities.  However there is still a great deal of information related to 
community benefits from for-profit and city-county hospitals, allowing ownership 
comparisons to be made.  A serious limitation of the information when used for 
evaluating community benefit is that the applicable information is a bit scattered 
throughout the report, although Statements Three and Four are basically devoted 
to community benefit information.   
 
To demonstrate the level of detail in the reports from all hospitals – including 
those that are NOT nonprofit – the example used is the for-profit hospital in Terre 
Haute (a two hospital county, one for-profit and one nonprofit).  The information 
is arranged in four sections – and the first three sections require identical 
information regardless of the ownership of the hospital.  Only the fourth section 
asks for more detail from nonprofit hospitals. 
 
Terre Haute Regional Hospital is considered to be a “Medium” facility, according 
to its Peer Group designation (Example II).   
Example II 
ISDH Hospital Fiscal 2004 Report and Statistical Comparison 
Hospital: Terre Haute Regional Hospital 
Year: 2004 City: Terre Haute Peer Group: Medium 
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Unfortunately, the ownership designation is not provided and from the available 
information it can’t be determined if this is a for-profit or a city/county facility.  
There is also not readily available information about how the “Peer Group” 
designation is defined or determined. 
 
Detailed financial Information then follows, arranged in Four Statements: 
Statement One: Summary of Revenue and Expenses; Statement Two: 
Contractual Allowances Statement Three: Unique Specialized Hospital Funds; 
and Statement Four: Costs of Charity and Subsidized Community Benefits.  In 
addition to the basic information on revenue and expenses, each of these 
Statements has information that pertains to community benefit. 
 
Statement One: Summary of Revenue and Expenses 
This contains the broad financial information on Revenue and Expenses as well 
as Assets and Liabilities.  It also identifies Bad Debt as a separate line item 
under Operating Expenses.  Charity Care is separately identified as a “Deduction 
from Revenue”, in accordance with standard hospital accounting procedures.  
For Terre Haute Regional Hospital, the figures relevant to community benefit are 
(Example III): 
Example III 
1. Total Gross Patient Service Revenue:  $254,448,613 
2. Deductions from Revenue:   $153,496,010 
3. Total Operating Revenue:    $101,538,948 
4. Operating Expenses:    $   92,535,966 
a. Bad Debt   $7,170,599 
5. Net Operating Revenue over Expenses:     $9,002,981 
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Statement Two: Contractual Allowances 
Statement Two contains the shortfall from charges through the various contracts 
carried by the hospital.  This includes the government programs Medicare and 
Medicaid as well as negotiated discounts in commercial insurance (Example IV). 
Example IV   
Revenue Source               Gross Patient  Contractual      Net Patient 
Revenue  Allowances   Service  
Revenue 
Medicare   $120,250,142  $90,013,547   $30,114,595 
Medicaid   $32,239,132   $26,070,765   $6,168,367 
Other State   $0    $0    $0 
Local Government  $3,621,018   $2,482,870   $1,138,148 
Commercial  
    Insurance   $98,338,321   $34,806,828   $63,531,493 
Total    $254,448,613  $153,496,010         $100,952,603 
 
Statement Three: Unique Specialized Hospital Funds 
This section includes the Community Benefit categories of Donations, Research, 
and Education.  Both income and expense from these categories are included, 
allowing the determination of a net expense figure.  There is also a section for 
reporting the number of professionals educated, the number of patients 
educated, and the number of community members educated (Example V).39  
                                            
39 In 2004 there was also a category “Bioterrorism Grant” (sic; presumably it refers to a 
“Bioterrorism Preparation Grant”) to indicate a special federal program providing grants to all 
Indiana hospitals to upgrade facilities and processes to be prepared for a bioterrorist threat.  For 
all hospitals, the grant equaled the expenses and therefore there was no net benefit or expense 
involved with that grant. 
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Example V 
Fund   Estimated Estimated Outgoing Net Dollar Gain  
Category  Incoming  Expenses to Others  or Loss after  
Revenue      Adjustment 
from Others 
 
Donations   $0    $102,209    ($102,209) 
Educational   $0    $0     $0 
Research   $0    $0     $0 
 
The information clearly includes both income and expense aspects of the 
categories, addressing one of the key criteria noted in the previous section of this 
chapter.  An obvious shortcoming of this information is that it is not indicated 
whether the donations to a separate hospital foundation are included – or if such 
a foundation even exists.  This has a definite effect on the completeness as well 
as validity of the donation information. 
 
Statement Four: Costs of Charity and Subsidized Community Benefits 
Statement Four gives the Charity Care allocation as well as additional costs of 
other community benefit programs provided.  For-profit and city/county hospitals 
are only required to report are gross figures (Example VI).  Nonprofit hospitals 
are asked for more detailed information, as will be shown in the following section. 
Example VI 
   Estimated   Estimated  Unreimbursed 
Category   Incoming   Outgoing  Costs by 
Revenue   Expenses   Hospital 
 
Charity   $38,385,535   $47,222,154   ($8,836,619) 
Community  
    Benefits   $0    $836,312    ($836,312) 
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There is a final comparison that gives a summary of the financial information by 
percentages as well as a comparison to other hospitals in their Peer Group. 
 
To provide an example of the additional information asked from nonprofit 
hospitals, comparable information from Statement Four is shown from Union 
Hospital, the nonprofit hospital in Vigo County (Example VII).40 
Example VII 
ISDH Annual Fiscal Report of a Nonprofit Acute Care Hospital 
Hospital: Union Hospital 
Year: 2004 City: Terre Haute Peer Group: Large 
 
For nonprofit hospitals there is additional information requested under Statement 
Four: Annual Summarized Community Benefit Statement on Nonprofit Hospital.  
It further explains:  
“This hospital is a nonprofit organization and files an annual 
community benefit statement with the Department under Indiana 
Code 16-21-9. Each nonprofit hospital must confirm its mission 
statement, document the number of persons and dollars allocated 
under its adopted charity care policy, and describe the progress of 
the community to achieve specific objectives set by the hospital.”   
 
This includes statements identifying the communities served, unique services 
available, and a copy of the hospital’s Mission Statement referring to the role of 
community benefits in that mission. 
Union Hospital responded to this 2004 report of these areas under Statement 
Four in the following manner (Example VIII):  
                                            
40 Information from Union Hospital on Statements One, Two, and Three are not included, as they 
include data in the same format as for the for-profit and county hospitals, as previously illustrated.  
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Example VIII 
 County Location:   Vigo  
Community Served:  Clay, Greene, Parke, Vermillion and Vigo  
counties in Indiana and Clark and Edgar 
Counties in Illinois 
   
Hospital Mission Statement 
“Union Hospital is a nonprofit regional medical center whose 
primary mission is to be served defined by community needs 
through the provision of a comprehensive range of quality, cost 
effective health services”. 
 
Unique Services  
- Medical Research   NO 
- Professional Education YES 
- Community Education  YES  
 
Type of Initiatives  
- Disease Detection   YES 
- Practitioner Education  NO 
- Clinic Support   YES 
 
Document Available 
- Community Plan   YES 
- Annual Statement   YES 
- Needs Assessment   2000 
Also the form asks for a three-year summary of the Charity Care Allocation and 
the number of people served by that care (Example IX).41 
                                            
41 The text accompanying this category reads: “Most nonprofit hospitals adopt a charity benefit 
policy to serve the medically indigent. On an annual basis, the hospital will confirm the eligibility 
and set aside dollars to ensure low-income persons can be offered needed inpatient and 
outpatient hospital services.” 
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Example IX 
Allocation of Dollars and Persons Served under Adopted Charity Policy 
 2002 2003 2004 
Persons served in last 
twelve months 
2,724 NR NR 
Charity Care Allocation ($2,581,585) ($3,258,474) ($3,793,367)
 
The sub-section titled Hospital Community Benefit Projects and the Projects' Net 
Cost allows hospitals to specifically identify community health education 
programs they have undertaken to improve the community’s health: “On an 
annual basis, all nonprofit hospitals will report on the progress that the local 
community has made in reducing the incidence of disease and improving the 
delivery of health services in the community.”  The form asks for “Name of 
Program and Description of Progress Made in Achieving Annual Objectives Net 
Costs of Programs.” In practice, there are varying responses to this section, 
ranging from a single figure under a vague heading (such as “All other 
initiatives”) to a five or six category breakdown defining the individual programs. 
 
Under the sub-section Hospital Community Benefit Projects and the Projects' Net 
Cost, Union Hospital only listed a single figure (Example X) – other nonprofit 
hospitals may choose to provide varying program details and breakdown: 
Example X 
All other initiatives:  ($2,278,686) 
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The next sub-section is titled Funded Programs and Community Benefits and this 
attempts to provide a standardized summary of all the community benefits in four 
categories and a final total: “Based on uniform definitions of costs, each nonprofit 
hospital must identify the costs of serving its community that are not reimbursed 
by government and other third party payers.”  The report asks for the 
“Unreimbursed Costs” for each of the four identified “Specialized Programs” and 
the final “Total Costs of Providing Community Benefits”. 
 
The first category is the (potentially) largest and most comprehensive, being: 
“Total unreimbursed costs of providing care to patients unable to pay, to patients 
covered under government funded programs, and for medical education, 
training.”  The other three are: “Community Health Education”; “Community 
Programs and Services”; and “Other Unreimbursed Costs”. 
 
In the final Summary of Unreimbursed Costs of Charity Care, Government 
Funded Programs, and Community Benefits, Union Hospital provided the 
following summary (Example XI): 
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Example XI 
Specialized Programs 
 
Unreimbursed 
Costs 
1. Total unreimbursed costs of providing care to 
patients unable to pay, to patients covered under 
government funded programs, and for medical 
education, training. 
 
($77,192,168) 
 
2. Community Health Education   
 
       ($13,215) 
 
3. Community Programs and Services 
 
 ($2,389,257) 
 
4. Other Unreimbursed Costs 
 
     ($297,463) 
 
5. Total Costs of Providing Community Benefits 
 
($79,892,103) 
 
 
To conclude, there is a final question under Identification of Additional Non-
Hospital Charity Costs: “In addition, some hospitals will have non-hospital 
organizations under its ISDH license that are providing community benefits in this 
fiscal year.”  This provides an opportunity to identify a community clinic or other 
related organization that provides charity care and the related amount of expense 
involved with that care.  Union Hospital had no other organization identified as 
Additional Non-Hospital Charity Costs. 
 
Evaluation of the Validity of the ISDH Data 
The annual Hospital Fiscal Reports are self-reporting and contain un-audited 
data.  In this situation there can be a question as to how valid the information 
might be.  Potential confusion in definitions, variations in record keeping at 
individual institutions, and error in data entry are also continual problems that can 
call data validity into question.  However this problem with self-reporting can also 
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affect the validity of data from the IRS Form 990, and is projected to continue to 
be a problem even after the revised IRS forms are in place.   
 
There are a few tests that can evaluate how much the data can be trusted.  One 
method is to look for unreported data or data that is the same in two years 
(suggesting that previous figures were copied to the next year).  A second 
method is to look for dramatic variations in data from different years from the 
same hospital.  This could be due to changing record systems, changes in the 
individuals who record or report the data, or even in shifts of fiscal years.  A third 
method can be to compare data that is in common between the ISDH reports and 
the IRS 990 (primarily in the case of nonprofit hospitals). 
 
To investigate missing or duplicated data, information from three Years of 
Reports (2001-2004) for all hospitals was examined: out of 321 records, there 
were 17 instances of missing data (5.3%).  Of these discrepancies, 6 were from 
nonprofit hospitals (3.3% out of 183 nonprofit hospital records), 5 were from city 
or county facilities (4.5% of 111 city-county hospital records), and 6 were from 
for-profit (22.2% of 27 for-profit hospital records).  While there was some data 
missing from nonprofit hospitals, it was at a lower rate than for public or for-profit 
hospitals – indicating that there can be a level of reliance on the ISDH data as 
submitted from the nonprofit hospitals.42 
                                            
42 These types of results could also be used to conclude that nonprofit hospitals are more 
“honest” in reporting data than other ownership types, particularly for-profit.  However since the 
ISDH reports were put into place primarily to assess the community benefit provided by nonprofit 
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To compare individual hospital consistency from year-to-year, data from 
individual hospitals compared the consistency of data from four years (2002 to 
2005) for “dramatic variations”.  Specifically the figure tested was Charity Care as 
percentage of Operating Expense.  For the purposes of this example, “dramatic 
variations” were defined as having a figure that in one year varied by 300% or 
more from the other three years.  The following lists the incidents of those 
variations. 
# of “Dramatic Variations” in Data: 2002-2005 
Total:   20 of 107  (19%) 
Nonprofit:  9 of 61 (15%) 
City/County:  8 of 37 (22%) 
For-Profit:  3 of 9  (33%) 
Again, nonprofit hospitals were found to be consistent more often than the other 
ownership forms, particularly for-profit hospitals.  And while the frequency of 
these anomalies does seem to be somewhat high, the figures indicate one 
incident of a discrepancy that is found in any one of the four years, but 
(generally) not in any more than one of the years.   
 
If only inconsistencies are included that occur more than once during the four-
year period, the nonprofit inconsistencies are at 5%, perhaps an acceptable level 
for data analysis. 
                                                                                                                                  
hospitals – and other facilities are included although not required to file (except for broad financial 
figures of expense and revenue) such a conclusion would probably be rash.  
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Comparing the IRS Form 990 to the ISDH Data 
Another approach to evaluate the validity of the ISDH database is to compare 
comparable information on the ISDH Fiscal Reports43 with that reported on the 
year-end IRS Form 990.44  Despite the uncertainties involved with the IRS 990 
forms, consistency in reporting between the two sources could imply that the 
information being reported to the state and federal government are based on 
similar processes and formats.  Inconsistency could indicate that various reports 
are compiled and distributed by different segments of the organization or are 
based on different criteria, emphasizing a need to further substantiate various 
reports. 
 
Although the IRS 990 data is self-reported, it has a consistency and a national 
acceptance that can make such comparisons useful.  Two figures – Total 
Operating Revenue and Total Operating Expense – are found on both the IRS 
and the ISDH reports (although labeled slightly differently).  These financial 
figures are considered basic information for hospitals, so comparing their level of 
agreement is one way to determine consistency in reporting.  Chart 2-1 illustrates 
the percentage of agreement of the two databases for Operating Revenue for the 
year 2005 for 54 nonprofit Indiana hospitals.  The data is arranged at random 
                                            
43 The ISDH Hospital Fiscal Reports (2005) used for this comparison are from fiscal year 2005, 
being the last year that comparable reports are available for all hospitals on both the IRS and the 
ISDH databases.  While the exact fiscal year for different hospitals varied, they are the same for 
every hospital on both the IRS and the ISDH reports. 
44 The IRS Forms 990 used for this comparison, as well as other uses in this dissertation, were 
accessed through the Guidestar website, www.guidestar.org. 
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(hospitals are arranged alphabetically, by county).  Chart 2-2 shows the same 
comparisons using Operating Expenses as a basis.   
Chart 2-1: Total Operating Revenue (2005) of Nonprofit Hospitals in Indiana 
Figure from ISDH Report as percentage of the figure from the IRS Form 990 
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Chart 2-2: Total Operating Expense (2005) of Nonprofit Hospitals in Indiana 
Figure from ISDH Report as percentage of the figure from the IRS Form 990 
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Chart 2-1 shows a relative consistency in Total Operating Revenue between the 
IRS and the ISDH reports.  Only six of the 54 Indiana hospitals show a relatively 
large discrepancy, or approximately 11% of the hospitals.45  Chart 2-2 also 
shows a relative consistency in Total Operating Expense between the IRS and 
the ISDH reports.   
 
Again only six hospitals of the 54 Indiana hospitals (four of them the same as for 
Operating Revenue) have large discrepancies, with the majority of the hospitals 
(89%) showing relative comparability.   
 
It should be noted that the ISDH Expense is slightly lower than IRS Expense, 
while ISDH Revenue is slightly higher than IRS Revenue.  This could be due to 
the reports being filled out at separate times after the close of the fiscal year.  
These figures are continually revised as estimated reimbursement is replaced by 
actual reimbursement and as anticipated Revenue that becomes uncollected is 
shifted to Bad Debt, making it a function of Expense rather than Revenue. 
 
In comparing the ISDH Total Operating Revenue and Total Operating Expense, 
we find some slight variations – and several larger discrepancies.  The slight 
variations are somewhat more explainable, and indicate some of the variability of 
the record keeping and accounting challenges faced by hospitals.  In several 
                                            
45 Gaps in Charts 2-1 and 2-2 indicate nonprofit hospitals that are missing either ISDH or IRS 990 
Reports in the databases.  54 of the 75 nonprofit hospitals (71%) in Indiana have both reports 
available. 
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conversations with hospital controllers46 they indicated that variability in the 
expense and revenue figures can be due to the timing of precisely when the 
reports are filled out in relation to the end of the fiscal year.  This is due to 
needed adjustments to the financial reports because of changes in actual 
reimbursement vs. estimated reimbursements.  But these variations should not 
be dramatic and rarely exceed 5%.  Exhibit 2F shows how these two databases 
compare. 
 
Exhibit 2F: Comparison of ISDH and IRS Financial Reports 
 
Total Operating Revenue:    Total Operating Expense: 
   % of IRS/ISDH Report        % of IRS/ISDH Report 
 
Over 120% -   4     Over 120% -   6 
106%-120% -   5    106%-120% -   6 
95%-105% - 30     95%-105% - 28 
Under 95% -   6      Under 95% -   5 
 
In comparing the Indiana ISDH Fiscal Reports for 2005 with the IRS Form 990 for 
the same year, the ISDH has reports on 62 hospitals defined to be private 
nonprofit organizations.  The IRS Form 990 provides information on 45 of these 
hospitals.47  Of these 45 hospitals, comparing IRS Revenue to ISDH revenue as 
a percentage (with 100% being a relatively similar match between the two 
databases, a figure below 100% meaning a higher figure was reported on the 
                                            
46 These conversations were part of the follow-up to the mailed questionnaires, outlined more 
specifically in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. 
47 There are several factors that explain “missing” IRS Form 990s for some hospitals.  In several 
cases separate facilities that are part of the same system file ISDH forms separately but the Form 
990 compiles information from these two or three facilities into a single report.  Also several 
Catholic hospitals that are part of a system either filed IRS Form 990s together or were not 
available at all. 
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ISDH report than on the IRS report, and a figure above 100% meaning a higher 
figure was reported on the IRS report) the following results were found: 
 
Of the 45 nonprofit hospitals, 28 (62%) had comparable revenue figures - within 
the seemingly acceptable 5% margin.  Of the remaining 17 hospitals, 5 (11%) 
reported revenue figures on the ISDH reports that were under 95% of the IRS 
reported revenues and 12 hospitals (27%) reported a figure over 105% of the 
IRS figure, with the largest discrepancies being 164%, 187%, and 225%.  This 
difference could be due to the different reports being filed at different times, with 
one report (ISDH) being based on estimates of future reimbursement and the 
other report (IRS 990) not filed until after actual reimbursement revenue is 
received.   
 
In the comparison of Total Operating Expense, 30 of the 45 nonprofit hospitals 
(67%) had comparable revenue figures - within 5%, with 20 of those being nearly 
identical.  The expense level of comparability might be expected to be more 
consistent than the revenue as it would not be subject to the same 
reimbursement uncertainties as the revenue figures.  However, while more than 
half were virtually identical the subsequent comparability was slightly less than 
for the revenue.  One-third of the hospitals exceeded the 5% margin of 
difference.  Six hospitals (13%) reported expense figures on the ISDH reports 
that were less than 95% of the IRS reported expenses.  Nine hospitals (20%) 
reported a figure on their ISDH report that was more than105% of the IRS figure, 
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with the largest discrepancies being 164%, 192%, and 226%.  This level of 
difference in the expense figures is a bit harder to explain.  With only three 
exceptions, the discrepancies in the expense and revenue figures for specific 
hospitals are similar, indicating an internal consistency.  In the exceptions it may 
be that different people – or even different departments – filled out the IRS and 
the ISDH forms, perhaps at two different times and unwittingly using different 
figures.48 
 
Donations – IRS and ISDH Data: The fact that over 1/3 of Indiana’s nonprofit 
hospitals hospital showed significant differences in revenue and expense figures 
between the ISDH reports and the IRS reports (“significant” meaning greater than 
a 5% discrepancy), can at least raise a question of the validity of the ISDH 
Reports, as well as potentially with the IRS Form 990.  However when a similar 
comparison between the two reports is made focusing on donation figures, the 
lack of consistency becomes extreme.  Of the nonprofit hospitals filing both the 
ISDH and IRS Form 990 reports, over half (23 of the 45, or 51%) declared $0 
donated “Incoming Revenue from Others” on the ISDH report; only one of the 45 
declared no contributions on the IRS Form 990. 
 
Of the 22 hospitals that did declare donations on both the ISADH and the IRS 
forms, all reported much greater amounts on the IRS Form 990 than on the ISDH 
form.  This may be explained because it is stipulated by the ISDH: “The term 
                                            
48 The hospital with the discrepancy of over 200% more on the IRS Form 990 than on the ISDH 
report was reporting the Gross Revenue and Expense figures on the IRS Form 990 rather than 
the Net, after deductions from revenue. 
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does not include the value of donations designated or otherwise restricted by the 
donor for purposes other than charity care” (emphasis added).  This stipulation 
implies that unrestricted contributions should be treated as offsets to charity care.  
It further means that the reported contribution figure is not equal to the total 
amount of community support generated by donations.  Finally the form focuses 
on the net amount donated by the organization as being part of their community 
benefit, meaning the gross level of community support is further eroded.49   
These distinctions are not part of the IRS Form 990. 
 
The ISDH and IRS databases have additional discrepancies.  One is while the 
IRS 990 form separates government grants from private contributions. The ISDH 
donation figure does not define whether government grants are included in 
donations.  As was previously mentioned, there is also an ambiguity because of 
the unspecific relationship of contributions to or from a hospital’s foundation – 
however a hospital foundation’s information can be accessed via a separate IRS 
Form 990, a situation that is not possible through the ISDH database. There is 
also not a similar provision in the IRS Form 990 to exclude restricted 
contributions, making definitive comparisons even more difficult. 
 
This wide variability calls into question how well the ISDH Report can be utilized 
to evaluate donation figures.  It also causes a concern about the criteria used by 
                                            
49 It further states: “The donation statement should include donations from hospital accounts only, 
and do not include values from other revenue streams” meaning that contributions received by a 
separate foundation, for whatever purpose, is not part of this figure.  This situation is addressed in 
detail in Chapter Six. 
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different hospitals to determine those donations.  These discrepancies point out 
the need to try and more specifically determine and verify the process and 
criteria of the ISDH reports, a process that is outlined in Chapters Five and Six.  
It also emphasizes that to assess the level of philanthropic behavior of a hospital, 
the ISDH reports may not be as useful as the IRS Form 990.  Finally, this does 
raise some caveats as the new IRS Form 990 and Schedule H forms come into 
use.  As the forms further define expenditures related to community benefit it is 
important that they also do not artificially limit the full picture of community 
support both to and by the hospital.  
 
Evaluating the Indiana Database:  
Comparing the ISDH Data with Other Data Sources 
The Indiana State Department of Health database, the Hospital Fiscal Reports, 
seems to be as comprehensive and accessible database for evaluating 
community benefit as those that are currently available.  Not only does it collect 
information on all areas related to community benefit, it also collects income that 
might offset donations, education, and research expenses.  In addition, for-profit 
and public hospitals are expected to provide a great deal of information regarding 
community benefit, although they have no legal requirement to supply this 
information.  It may be that this lack of requirement could be one reason for 
having zero expenses noted for some of the categories, as there is no advantage 
to this for-profit facility to track and report this data.   
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Yet there are questions about the comparability and validity of many of the 
criteria reported.  At the very least it becomes a caveat for any voluntarily 
provided and unaudited reports.  This is a concern that extends to the IRS Form 
990 that is considered to be one of the better resources we have for making 
fiscal analyses of nonprofit organizations.  The revised Form 990 – and most 
particularly the Schedule H for hospitals – should provide a vast improvement in 
the available data for evaluating community benefit.  However, there are still 
numerous areas that will remain ambiguous.  Subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation will begin to detail many of these ambiguities, particularly those that 
make it difficult to determine not only the validity of the actual community benefit 
provided but also the philanthropic behavior of nonprofit organizations.  One 
advantage of the IRS Form 990 is it allows us to examine the data of an 
individual hospital or other nonprofit entity.  A corresponding concern is how 
these individual hospital reports may be collected into summary reports and used 
for public policy purpose to develop potential standardized evaluations of those 
same individual hospitals.  Whether those standards accurately reflect the 
commitment and actions of the individual hospital to meet the identified needs of 
its defined community, is uncertain.  
 
If we accept the premise that information provided by hospitals is a good-faith 
effort to provide the relevant information, the ISDH database does provide a 
potential insight into not only the level of community benefit provided but also the 
types of information that could be reported nationally once the Schedule H form 
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becomes routine.  As an active state database, it can serve as an example to 
anticipate the kinds of information that might be reported on the revised IRS 990 
form.  Using the ISDH data to evaluate comparative information can also 
highlight potential concerns that might arise through developing subsequent 
reports and standards.  The ISDH database does provide information on health 
promotion expenditures that the IRS form does not.  Conversely the IRS form 
seems to be more definitive in identifying the donation information than the ISDH 
form.  The next step is to determine what the ISDH database and the IRS Forms 
990 reveal about the specific elements of Indiana hospital community benefit and 
philanthropic behavior.  Following that there is a need to evaluate the specific 
validity of that information related to health promotion programs and donations 
using information and input from the organizations themselves.   
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CHAPTER THREE: WHAT DOES THE ISDH COMMUNITY BENEFIT 
DATABASE TELL US ABOUT INDIANA HOSPITALS?
Chapter Three asks: “What does an existing reporting requirement from one 
state (Indiana) tell us about nonprofit hospital community benefit and 
philanthropic behavior?”  The primary conclusion is that while reports based on 
these requirements may provide useful information for investigating individual 
hospitals, broader conclusions about behavior of hospitals or categories of 
hospitals, as a group, are limited.  The principal reason for this limitation is that 
averages, median figures, and summaries don’t account for the variety of factors 
that are necessary to adequately evaluate organizational behavior and 
motivations.
The chapter maintains that the community benefit reports required by a state, 
while perhaps gathering data that goes beyond the requirements of the Internal 
Revenue Service, do not adequately capture the actual behavior of the hospitals. 
It further maintains that summary reports based upon averages of hospitals and 
even of sub-categories of hospitals do not accurately reflect the behavior of 
individual hospitals.  The chapter concludes that only by examining individual 
hospital practices can we properly understand, measure, and evaluate the 
relative philanthropic behavior of hospitals and their corresponding commitment 
to the benefit of their communities.  This is an important consideration, as current 
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efforts of policymakers seem to be to evaluate affect that very behavior, 
especially in regards to the area of providing charity care.
Chapter Three explores the publicly available information from Indiana, a state 
that requires community benefit reports and has collected detailed financial 
statements from each hospital in the state since 1997.  It analyzes what such 
summary and individual reports tell us about nonprofit hospitals in general and 
about the level of the community benefit and philanthropic behavior they provide 
in particular.  Finally it considers what these reports convey about hospitals 
based on sub-categories based on ownership and involvement with a healthcare 
system, particularly religious system affiliations.  
As a result of these examinations, the chapter first concludes that the Indiana 
general summaries, and comparisons to external standards based on such broad 
summaries, could result in misleading conclusions about the level of community 
benefit actually provided by individual facilities or even groups of hospitals.  It 
further concludes, while reporting requirements and general standards might 
encourage compliance, specific hospital data has a level of variability and even 
validity that can frustrate more defined analysis.  Finally the chapter observes 
that to determine the commitment of a hospital to community benefit requires 
looking at an individual hospital’s practices, an approach that is a focus of 
subsequent chapters.  How this reporting process has worked in Indiana 
provides an indication of the limitations that even revised IRS reports might face 
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attempting to capture a true picture of the community benefit provided by all 
hospitals in the United States.1
Chapter Three is divided into four parts.  Part One gives an introductory overview 
of Indiana hospitals and their statewide structure according to the Indiana State 
Department of Health (ISDH) reports.  Part Two evaluates how well the ISDH 
Summary reports present a realistic picture of the level of community benefit 
provided by Indiana hospitals.  It does this through a comparison of the ISDH 
summary to a compilation of the ISDH reports from individual Indiana community 
hospitals.  Part Three uses the compilation of Indiana community hospitals to 
denote the overall Community Benefit figures provided by all Indiana hospitals.  
This part also more specifically examines how the reports portray the provision of 
Charity Care, the element of Community Benefit most often cited by regulatory 
and legislative oversight agencies.  It finally includes a brief analysis of 
Uncompensated Care, to show how this alternative measurement might affect 
reports of charity care in Indiana and elsewhere, particularly noting the 
complicating factor of bad debt.  Part Four further segments the examination of 
the level of Charity Care provided by Indiana community hospitals into sub-
categories.  It first compares the data from nonprofit hospitals to for-profit 
hospitals.  Two other comparisons are also presented: namely hospitals within a 
                                           
1 This limitation is confirmed by a 2009 IRS report of a study of 500 nonprofit hospitals that noted 
wide diversity and lack of legal standards and accounting consistency among the hospitals.  
Internal Revenue Service, “IRS Tax Exempt Study” (February 2009), available at 
www.irs.gov/charitites/charitable/articvle/),,id=203109,00.html (last accessed 2/16/2009); and 
“IRS Releases Long-Awaited Report on Hospital Pay and Services,” The Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, (February 12, 2009).
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system as opposed to independent hospitals, and those with religious affiliation 
vs. non-religious affiliation.  It uses these breakdowns to determine how well 
these sub-category summaries identify factors that affect hospital community 
benefit, charity care, and philanthropic behavior.  The chapter ends with a 
summary of the above examinations and draws the conclusion that an 
assessment of individual hospitals is needed to realistically evaluate the level of 
Indiana hospital community benefit and philanthropic behavior.
An Overview of Indiana Hospitals 
According to the American Hospital Association Guide to the Healthcare Field
(2005), in 20042 there were 138 hospitals in Indiana.3  108 of these are noted as 
being “General medical and surgical” hospitals, the most common designation for 
a hospital.  This designation primarily includes those hospitals considered to be 
community hospitals – serving the broad healthcare needs of their community by 
providing emergency services and a reasonable range of surgical and treatment 
facilities.  The American Hospital Association defines community hospitals as: 
                                           
2 In an effort to provide consistent and comparable figures across multiple databases, information 
for this section is based on 2004 data.  As of the time when the data was collected, this is the last 
year that has consistent data across all sources.  Hospital accounting also has a delay in 
compiling final financial figures, due to adjustments that need to be made due to reimbursement 
patterns.  When comparative data is used in this thesis, the span 2002-2004 is generally used, 
although 2001-2004 is occasionally used (especially in the first part of the chapter) when it seems 
to be helpful to show a wider context for data changes.
3 Any “counting” of hospitals has a level of uncertainty depending on whether merged faculties, 
systems, and satellite clinics report separately or as a single unit.  The AHA annual survey relies 
on reporting entities, generally treating members of systems as separate hospitals, but including 
merged facilities as single reporting entities.  As a comparison, the American Hospital Directory 
(http://www.ahd.com - accessed 2/19/2007) lists 172 hospitals in Indiana, with system hospitals 
listed separately.  Other data sources for updated hospital listings include the US News and 
World Report (152 Indiana hospitals: 
http://usnews.com/usnews/health/hospitals/state_dir/dir_in.htm - accessed 2/19/2007) and the 
Agape Center (219 Indiana hospitals: http://www.theagapecenter.com/Hospitals/Indiana.htm -
accessed 2/19.2007).
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“All nonfederal, short-term general, and special hospitals whose facilities are 
available to the public.” (AHA 2008)  The Indiana State Department of Health 
(ISDH) further differentiates this definition between general and specialty 
hospitals, as does this paper.  This follows the distinction made by many states 
that defines a community hospital as one that: 1) provides acute care and 
outpatient services, including patient education; 2) principally serves a local area 
(i.e. non statewide); 3) does not have a single specialty focus; and 4) refers 
complex cases to a tertiary hospital.4  
The American Hospital Association (AHA), in addition to the 108 general 
community hospitals in Indiana, also identifies 38 hospitals designated as 
specialty hospitals.  These hospitals provide services either for specific diseases 
(e.g. psychiatric or tuberculosis), designated treatments (e.g. rehabilitation, 
alcoholism, or obstetrics), or defined patient populations (e.g. women or children) 
– or are part of a college, prison, or other type of institution.  Besides the AHA, 
one other reliable source of general hospital information is the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, which identifies 113 hospitals in Indiana.5  The slight variations in 
these two standard sources show the level of ambiguity that may exist when 
counting the number of hospitals in a given state.
                                           
4 Rhode Island Executive Office of Health and Human Services, “What is a Community Hospital?” 
available at www.ohhs.ri.gov/taskforce/documents/CommunityHospitalWorkingDefinition.doc last 
accessed 9/28/2008.
5 Kaiser figures were only available from 2004, reflecting earlier reports (from 2002-2003), which 
could also explain some of the discrepancies.  
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According to the AHA Guide, 57 of the community hospitals in Indiana are 
nonprofit (53%), 38 are city or county government facilities (35% - not counting 2 
hospitals operated by the Veterans Administration), and 11 are for-profit (10%).  
How these figures compare to the Kaiser Family Foundation figures – and how 
the ownership compares to national percentages – is shown in Table 3A.
Table 3A: 
OWNERSHIP OF COMMUNITY HOSPITALS – Indiana and Nationally
AHA Guide 
(2005):
Indiana
AHA Guide 
(2005):
National
Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
(2004):
Indiana
Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
(2004):
National
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
Total 108 4,936 113 4,919
Non-
profit 57 53% 2,958 59.9% 60 53.1% 2,967 60.3%
City/
County 38 35% 1,100 22.3% 37 32.7% 1,117 22.7%
For-
profit 11 10% 868 17.6% 16 14.2% 835 17.0%
The data comparison shows Indiana has significantly more public (city/county) 
hospitals than the national average (57% more public hospitals than the national 
percentage) and fewer for-profit hospitals (43% fewer nonprofit hospitals than the 
national percentage).  Indiana also has a slightly lower prevalence of nonprofit 
hospitals than the national average (12% fewer nonprofit hospitals than the 
national percentage).6
The database from the Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) contains 
information collected from the financial reports of all hospitals in Indiana – and is 
                                           
6 Differences in percentages were calculated using AHA Guide (2005) figures.
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the primary source of information used for this study.  The ISDH lists 132 
hospitals in Indiana in 2004 (the year selected for this comparison). 107 of these 
are community, medical-surgical general hospitals.7  Table 3B compares the 
numbers of community hospitals in Indiana as designated by the ISDH database 
with the data from the AHA and Kaiser. 
Table 3B: OWNERSHIP OF COMMUNITY HOSPITALS – Indiana 
ISDH 
Database: 
Indiana (2004)
AHA Guide 
(2005):
Indiana
Kaiser Family 
Foundation 
(2004):
Indiana
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
# of 
hospitals
% of 
hospitals
Total 107 108 113
Nonprofit 61 57% 57 53% 60 53.1%
City/County 37 35% 38 35% 37 32.7%
For-profit 9 8% 11 10% 16 14.2%
The actual ISDH database contains information on 107 hospitals termed “Acute 
Care Facilities” by the ISDH.  These are further differentiated by Peer Group –
Large, Medium, and Small – based on number of beds, types of services, 
number of surgeries performed, and number of discharges.8  Table 3C compiles 
the distribution by Peer Group as well as by ownership type, and the relative 
percentages of these size and ownership types (as of 2004).
                                           
7 The remaining 25 hospitals (19% of all Indiana hospitals) are designated specialty facilities 
either offering long-term care (15 hospitals) or rehabilitation (4 hospitals) or other specific 
services (6 hospitals).
8 As stated in Chapter Two of this thesis, the specific standards for the “Peer Group” 
differentiation is not defined by the ISDH information, and is an internal designation unique to 
Indiana.  There is not a corresponding national equivalence.
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Table 3C:
Distribution of Indiana Hospitals with available reports in the ISDH 
Database: Peer Group Size; Ownership; and System/Independent Status
Total %
Peer 
Group: 
Large
%
Peer 
Group: 
Medium
%
Peer 
Group: 
Small
%
Total 107 25 23% 43 40% 39 37%
System 58 55% 16 64% 25 58% 17 44%
Independent 49 45% 9 32% 19 42% 31 56%
Nonprofit 61 57% 22 36% 23 38% 16 26%
System 42 69% 15 68% 18 78% 9 56%
Independent 19 31% 7 32% 6 22% 6 44%
City/County 37 35% 2 5% 15 41% 20 54%
System 7 35% 0 0% 2 13% 5 25%
Independent 30 65% 2 100% 13 87% 15 75%
For-Profit 9 8% 1 11% 5 56% 3 33%
System 9 100% 1 100% 5 100% 3 100%
Independent 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Over three-quarters of Indiana’s hospitals are designated either as medium or 
small, with over one-half of the small hospitals being city or county owned.  A 
majority of these small hospitals are located in rural communities, as sole 
providers for their town and/or county.  It could be that one consequence for 
these hospitals, related to community benefit, is they may have higher levels of 
charity care, as patients do not have a choice of facilities nor do providers have 
the options to easily transfer patients.9  Therefore alternative provisions of 
healthcare are limited.  One other aspect of note is that only one for-profit 
hospital is designated as being “large”, lending credibility to the claim that for-
profit hospitals firms will seek smaller hospitals as they have the greater 
opportunity to be run efficiently (Herzlinger and Krasker 1987).
                                           
9 How community demographics might affect community benefit and charity care is a factor that is 
not taken into consideration in this paper.  This is because the purpose of the paper is to evaluate 
the internal behavior and decision processes of hospitals rather than noting the numerous 
external influences that might affect the level of such care.  Evaluating such additional external 
factors could be a focus for future research.
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In relation to hospital systems, the American Hospital Association Fact Sheet 
(AHA 2008) notes that 2,755 community hospitals in the United States are part of 
systems.  This represents 56% of the community hospitals in the United States.  
55% of Indiana hospitals are part of systems, comparable to the national 
average.  
59 of the 107 hospitals in Indiana (55%) are part of fifteen health systems.10  
This includes three for-profit healthcare systems:11
 Triad Hospitals, Inc. (Plano, Texas)12 – 5 hospitals 
 Province Healthcare Corporation (Brentwood, Tennessee) – 2 hospitals
 HCA (Nashville, Tennessee) – 1 hospital
Indiana has 51 hospitals affiliated with 12 nonprofit systems.  Five of the 
nonprofit hospital systems are headquartered out-of-state and all of these are 
religiously affiliated.  Four are Catholic systems and one is a Jewish hospital 
system: 
 Ascension Health System (Saint Louis, Missouri) – 13 hospitals
 Sisters of St Francis Health Services (Mishawaka, Indiana) – 7 hospitals
 Jewish Hospital Health Services (Louisville, Kentucky) – 3 hospitals
 Trinity Health (Novi, Michigan) – 3 hospitals
                                           
10 As with other hospital listings, this may not be an exact count of actual facilities nor may it be 
consistent with other listing formats.  Some system facilities may report as a combined entity 
rather than as separate facilities.  An example of this is Clarian Health Partners that reports 
Methodist Hospital, Riley Children’s Hospital and the Indiana University Medical Center as a 
single entity.
11 It should be noted that the Clarian Health Partners system in Indiana contains one for-profit 
hospital (in Avon).  However, the system is designated as a nonprofit system.
12 Cities in parentheses indicate the location of the system headquarters.
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 Little Company of Mary Sisters Healthcare System (Evergreen Park, 
Illinois) – 1 hospital  
There are also seven nonprofit systems headquartered within Indiana (all non-
religiously affiliated):13
 Clarian Health Partners (Indianapolis) – 8 hospitals
 Parkview Health (Fort Wayne) – 5 hospitals
 Community Health Network (Indianapolis) – 4 hospitals
 Community Healthcare (Gary) – 2 hospitals
 Cardinal Health System (Muncie) – 3 hospitals
 Bloomington Hospital and Health System (Bloomington) – 2 hospitals14
Evaluating the General Level of Indiana Hospitals Community Benefit 
Part Two explores how well the ISDH Summary Reports correspond to a 
compilation of individual community hospitals.  This comparison is done first for a 
specific year (2004) and second over a three-year period (2002-2004).  The 
conclusion of this comparison is that the summary reports may not be particularly 
helpful when trying to assess the level of philanthropic behavior of Indiana 
hospitals. 
                                           
13 For consistency, these system designations are based on 2004 data.  Because the healthcare 
system landscape in Indiana – as well as elsewhere in the United States – is continually shifting 
there have been changes since 2004 in some of this information.  
14 As of the spring of 2008, Bloomington Hospital is considering becoming part of the Clarian 
Heath Partners system.
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The Indiana State Department of Heath (ISDH) provides two primary sources of 
information on hospital community benefit.  The first is the Fiscal Reports of 
individual hospitals for each year.  The second is a yearly ISDH Summary of all 
Indiana hospitals for a given year.  These Summaries are compiled each year by 
the ISDH to provide a snapshot of the fiscal and community benefit provision of 
Indiana hospitals.  This is the primary method for the state of Indiana to draw 
general conclusions about the relative financial and community benefit operation 
of hospitals in the state.  This ISDH Summary is compiled by the state health 
department and includes all hospitals in Indiana, including specialty hospitals as 
well as community hospitals.  Since community hospitals are included in the 
ISDH Summary – but are not separated from specialty hospitals, the author of 
this paper compiled the individual reports of community hospitals in Indiana.  This 
separate (unofficial) compilation is the basis for an overall picture of community 
benefit as provided by community hospitals in Indiana.
All information on Community Benefit used in this chapter, including data from 
the Indiana Hospital fiscal reports, is compared with two standards.  The first 
standard is Total Community Benefit as a percentage of total operating 
expenses, with a suggested standard of 5%.  The second is Charity Care as a 
percentage of total operating expenses, with a suggested standard of 4%.  These 
two percentages correspond to the standards enacted by the state of Texas,15
which as shown in Chapter Two of this thesis are among the most stringent in the 
country.  Figures used for this analysis, are those provided by Indiana hospitals 
                                           
15 Texas Health and Safety Code Section 311.045.
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and reported in the ISDH reports, required by all Indiana hospitals since 1994 
and publicly available since 1997.16  As generally defined, Community Benefit is 
determined as Charity Care plus net donations, net research, and net education 
expenses in addition to community health program expenses.  Where 
Uncompensated Care is also compared, it is determined as Charity Care plus
Bad Debt.17
An Examination of ISDH Summary Reports: One consequence of doing a 
separate compilation of individual (community) hospitals from the database is it 
provides an initial comparison of how well general summaries realistically portray 
the actual community benefit and philanthropic behavior of individual hospitals.  
The ISDH Summary is used to report on the general trends and status of hospital 
community benefit in Indiana, through public press releases as well as in reports 
to the state legislature.  It could be assumed that similar broad summary reports 
will be shared by the Internal Revenue Service in the future and used to draw 
conclusions about hospital community benefits in the United States as well as the 
overall effectiveness of their revised reporting systems in tracking charity care 
and other forms of community benefit.  Therefore it is relevant to look at not only 
what the ISDH Summaries tell us but also to examine how well they correspond 
to compilations from individual hospital figures.
                                           
16 See Chapter Two of this paper for details on the legislation behind these reports.
17 The details outlining the rationale for selecting these criteria are contained in Chapter Two of 
the dissertation. Also see Chapter Two for further definition of uncompensated care.  
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The analyses that follow first show comparable data from 2004 ISDH Summary 
and from a compilation of the 2004 reports of the individual community hospitals.  
This provides a snapshot of the relative levels of Indiana hospital’s community 
benefit for a given year.  The analysis then compares 2002-2004 data – both 
from the ISDH Summary and the individual hospital compilation – to expand the 
scope of the analysis as well as to show how the figures change over the years.18
The comparison of the ISDH Summary and the individual hospitals compilation 
helps evaluate the validity of the summary reports.  These comparisons also help 
show the relative consistency of the data that are reported and, assuming the 
data is valid, how the commitment of Indiana hospitals to providing community 
benefit might be changing.  
ISDH Summary of ALL Indiana Hospitals Community Benefit – 2004: According 
to the ISDH Summary, in 2004 all Indiana hospitals had a total Operating 
Expense of $12.065 billion.  The total community benefit provided by Indiana 
hospitals was $445.3 million, or 3.7% of the operating expense.  Charity care 
was 76% of the community benefit figure, or $337.7 million.  This corresponds to 
charity care as 2.8% of operating expense.  Other community benefit expenses, 
including research, education, and donations, was $107.6 million.  Figure 3A 
summarizes these figures.
                                           
18 As of March 2008, data for 2005 and 2006 was also available on line.  For 2006, only general 
financial expense and revenue is reported.  Part of this is due to a change in staff at the ISDH 
and may be altered in the future.  As of June 2008, the entire ISDH website was being redone 
and the specific current data as well as historic data was no longer publicly available.  
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Figure 3A: 2004 Indiana Hospitals ISDH Summary Figures: ALL Hospitals
 Operating Expense: $12,065.4 million
 Total Community Benefit: $445.3 million
o 3.70% of operating expenses
 Charity Care: $337.7 million
o 2.80% of operating expenses
o 76% of community benefit expenses
Compilation of Indiana COMMUNITY Hospitals Community Benefit – 2004:
According to a compilation of individual hospital reports, in 2004 Indiana 
community hospitals had a total Operating Expense of more than $11.6 billion.19  
The total community benefit reported by Indiana hospitals was $1,496.4 million, 
or 12.9% of the operating expense.  Charity care was 36% of the community 
benefit figure, or $542.1 million.  Other community benefit expenses, including 
research, education, and donations, was $954.3 million (Figure 3B).
Figure 3B:
2004 Indiana Hospitals Compilation Figures: COMMUNITY Hospitals
 Operating Expense: $11,604.8 million
 Total Community Benefit: $1,496.4 million
o 12.89% of operating expenses
 Charity Care: $542.1 million
o 4.67% of operating expenses
o 36% of community benefit expenses
                                           
19 These and subsequent figures are based on compilations done by the author, using individual 
hospital information from the ISDH Fiscal Reports.  It should be emphasized that ALL hospitals in 
Indiana reported in every year and so the figures compared represent a complete panel study.
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These figures show how a Compilation of Indiana Community Hospitals differs 
from the ISDH Summary (which includes all Indiana hospitals, including specialty 
facilities).  This is shown in Table 3D.
Table 3D: Comparison of ALL Indiana Hospital Data (from ISDH Summary) 
and Indiana COMMUNITY Hospitals only
(from Individual Hospital Report Compilation)
- For 2004 (in $ million – Actual dollars spent, not adjusted for inflation)
Operating 
Expense
Total 
Com-
munity 
Benefit -
Expense
Total 
Com-
munity 
Benefit -
As a % of 
Operating 
Expense
Charity 
Care -
Expense
Charity 
Care -
As a % of 
Operating 
Expense
Charity 
Care -
As a % 
of Com-
munity 
Benefit
ALL 
Hospitals
(ISDH 
Summary)
$12,065.4 $  445.3   3.70% $337.7 2.80% 76%
COMMUNITY 
Hospitals 
only
(Compilation 
of Individual 
reports)
$11,604.8 $1,496.4 12.89% $542.1 4.67% 36%
Community hospitals individually reported 60% more charity care in 2004 than 
was ultimately reported as being provided by all hospitals (adding specialty 
facilities) in the ISDH Summary.  And the level of Total Community Benefit was 
more than three times as much as the ISDH Summary reported.  Lacking 
information on specific processes, it can only be assumed that the ISDH either 
disallowed or simply did not count significant amounts of the Charity Care and 
other Community Benefit Expenses that were claimed by community hospitals –
or used different criteria for their calculations.  Another possibility is that hospitals 
reported as Charity Care (or even as other community benefit) costs that should 
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be more properly reported as Uncompensated Care – although the Charity Care 
figure is clearly identified in the reports.20  
The comparison of the two datasets indicates one of the potential problems that 
can arise when regulatory agencies compile summary figures.  A detailed 
analysis of why the figures vary is difficult, as there is little information on 
precisely how the ISDH Summary is determined.  The relative similarity of the 
operating expenses could be due to the smaller budgets of specialty hospitals, 
which are also a small percentage of the total hospitals in Indiana (25 of the 132 
total number of Indiana hospitals, or 19%).  However the disparities in charity 
care and total community benefit expenses seem to be considerably more than 
can be explained through differences in accounting procedures.21  
One additional way to examine the validity of the ISDH Summary as compared to 
the compilation is to look at multiple years of data and evaluate how well the 
2004 data reflects other years.  Since the Charity Care figures seem to have a 
disparity, but also should be a more precise figure than the more inclusive and 
more disproportionate Community Benefit figures, Charity Care would seem to 
lend itself more readily to comparisons.  Charity Care is also the figure that 
                                           
20 An alternative explanation for the percentage discrepancy is that the ISDH Summaries include 
specialty hospitals, and these hospitals may provide a relatively low level of Charity Care.  These 
low levels could cause the percentage of Charity Care reported in the Summaries to also be low.  
However this does not explain why community hospitals might have a higher level of total Charity 
Care than the Summary records, making this explanation invalid.
21 A 2007 change in personnel responsible at the ISDH for these reports complicated efforts by 
the researcher to reconcile these variations.  Three contacts with the new staff finally elicited 
2006 data, but it was presented in raw form and did not contain delineations comparable to 
previous years.  A final contact did provide a key to the numerous raw data categories, but was 
not helpful in providing comparable data or in being able to reconcile past disparities. 
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policymakers focus on most frequently.  Charity Care as reported on the ISDH 
Summary report is therefore compared to the Community Hospital Compilation, 
over a three-year period.  
Table 3E shows the change in Operating Expense and Charity Care from 2002-
2004 for all Indiana hospitals (from the ISDH Summary reports) compared to the 
Operating Expense and Charity Care reported during the same period for Indiana 
community hospitals.22   (All ratios are expressed as a function of Total Operating 
Expenses.)  
Table 3E: Charity Care as a % of Total Operating Budget 
– ISDH Summary Figures and Community Hospital Compilations
(in $ Millions – Actual dollars spent, not adjusted for inflation)
ISDH 
Summary 
Operating 
Expense
Community 
Hospital 
Compilation
Operating 
Expense
ISDH 
Summary 
Charity 
Care
Allocation
Community 
Hospital 
Compilation
Charity Care
Allocation
ISDH 
Summary
RATIO 
CC/ 
Operating 
Expense
Community 
Hospital
Compilation
RATIO CC/ 
Operating 
Expense
2002 9,870.0 $9,423.9 $320.9 $455.1 3.3% 4.8%
2003 11,121.6 $10,703.6 $305.3 $506.6 2.7% 4.7%
2004 12,065.4 $11,515.1 $337.7 $542.1 2.8% 4.7%
The table shows a regular increase in Operating Expense for both the ISDH 
Summary and the community hospital compilation.  The community hospital 
budget is approximately 95% of the ISDH Summary for all three years, with both 
figures growing at a comparable rate.23  However the discrepancy noted in the 
                                           
22 As emphasized earlier in the chapter, ALL hospitals in Indiana reported in every year and so 
the figures compared represent a complete panel study.
23 The actual percentages are – 2002: 145.5%; 2003: 174.1; and 2004: 167.9%.
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2004 Charity Care figure is replicated in both 2002 and 2003.24  Both 2002 and 
2003 show a similar situation of the community hospital compilation exceeding 
the ISDH Summary – by a factor of more than 150%.25  The ISDH Summary 
records not only a Charity Care figure that is below the 4% standard but that also 
declines from 2002 to 2003 and 2004.  In contrast the community hospital 
compilation remains constant at approximately 4.7% of the Operating Budget, a 
figure that would exceed the 4% standard.  
The significance of this particular discrepancy has two related factors.  First it 
indicates how summary reports and conclusions of general figures (such as a 
report on the “percentage of charity care provided by Indiana hospitals”) can be 
misleading.  Second it indicates that more in-depth and individualized information 
is needed to determine precisely what is being reported as well as the process of 
that reporting.  This leads to a conclusion that while government reporting 
requirements might encourage general compliance, the validity of cumulative 
summary data and resulting conclusions could be suspect – especially if the 
purpose is to use these summaries to draw conclusions about hospital 
philanthropic behavior.
                                           
24 These expense figures are actual dollars, not adjusted for inflation.  As the primary use of the 
figures in these sections is to compare percentages of different expenditures during the same 
years – and changes in those actual percentages – inflation-adjustment is not necessary.  In this 
thesis, the figures have not been adjusted for inflation, except where significant and these are 
noted accordingly.
25 The actual percentages are – 2002: 142%; 2003: 165%; and 2004: 161%.
209
Since the ISDH does not do more specific summaries of different categories of 
hospitals (such as by ownership or size), and because of the uncertainties 
involved in these reports, there is no further investigation and analysis of the 
Summary Reports in this paper.  The preceding analysis shows that to determine 
the charity care and community benefit levels of specific sub-categories of 
hospitals – or even of individual hospitals – requires more individualized 
examination, such as investigating and compiling the specific reports of individual 
hospitals.  The next section and subsequent sections of this paper examine data 
based on the Compilation, in more detail.
The Community Benefit of Indiana Community Hospitals
In 2004 Indiana community hospitals (according to the compilation of individual 
reports) spent $1,496.4 million on community benefit, or 12.86% of their total 
operating expenses.  This compiled figure far exceeds the 5% standard.  One 
interpretation of this figure could be that Indiana community hospitals provide an 
exceptional level of programs for the benefit of their communities.  However, an 
alternative conclusion could be that because this figure is so much higher than 
the standard of 5%, additional information may be reported.26  There can be a 
caution in drawing conclusions from gross figures such as this compilation.  If the 
purpose of a statistical comparison is to evaluate the commitment of an individual 
hospital to its community, it can be more illustrative to compare that hospital to 
                                           
26 This questioning is also encouraged due to the fact that the Compilation figure is much higher 
than the ISDH Summary, as observed earlier in this chapter.  Even though this Summary is 
shown to have limited usability as an evaluation standard, the discrepancy between the Summary 
and the Compilation at least indicate that further verification of the Compilation figure is 
warranted.
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an average of the hospitals or to the median hospital – rather than to a total 
compilation.  Looking at the compilation figure in terms of the individual hospitals, 
the overall discrepancies might indicate problems with how some individual 
hospitals report the figures – or at the least there is a wide disparity in the reports 
from individual hospitals due to some factor.  Figure 3C shows the distribution of 
community benefit for Indiana community hospitals. 
Figure 3C: 2004 Community Benefit Compilation – All Community Hospitals
Community Benefit Expense as a % of Total Operating Expense
Test Value = 5.0
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N = 109
Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of community benefit expense is = 5%27
N: 109
Median Hospital: 10.5%
Mean: 11.7972
SD: 10.125
t: 7.009
The primary purpose of Figure 3C is to graphically portray the wide disparity in 
the level of individual hospital reports of community benefit.  The average of the 
                                           
27 Test for H0: The mean = 5.0 can be rejected with a high degree of significance (t = 7.009).
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individual hospitals (11.79%) far exceeds the 5% standard;28 the median figure of 
a “typical” Indiana hospital is 10.5%, slightly lower but still far exceeding the 5% 
standard.  The conclusion is that Indiana hospitals do provide more than 5% 
community benefit (i.e. 11.8%) and therefore are in compliance with national 
standards.  
However, when arranged individually, more than one-quarter of the Indiana 
hospitals (31 hospitals or 29%) are under the 5% standard; 27 of those hospitals 
are under 4%.  At the other extreme, 26 hospitals (24%) report over 17% of their 
budget is devoted to community benefit; 16 of those hospitals (15%) report more 
than 20% of their total operating expense budget is spent on Community Benefit, 
further showing the wide disparity.  The highest reported expenditure is 52.4%.  
The results shown in Figure 3C also indicate that there is a very significant 
difference in the mean level of community benefit reported by individual hospitals 
and the 5% standard. 
In 2004, the median Indiana hospital provided 10.5% of its total operating budget 
for community benefit, more than double the national standard.  The standard 
deviation of over 10 (SD = 10.125), indicates a high degree of variability among 
individual hospitals in actual reported community benefit expenditures.  The 
exceptionally high t- score of 7.009 allows us to reject the null hypothesis with a 
very high level of significance and we cannot assume that most hospitals expend 
                                           
28 The difference in the figures of 12.86% and 11.7% is that the first is the ratio of total community 
benefit as a percentage of total operating expenses, for all community hospitals in aggregate.  
The latter is an average of individual hospital community benefit/operating expense ratios.
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5% on community benefit.  The alternative hypothesis is – Ha: The % of 
community benefit expense is < or > 5%.  Because both the mean and the 
median hospital exceed the 5% standard, the hypothesis that Ha: The % of 
community benefit expense is > 5% can be verified.
However, one uncertainty in this breakdown is determining which hospitals fall 
into the various quartiles and why their reporting should vary so greatly.  One 
possibility is that some hospitals have an extraordinary commitment to providing 
benefits to their community while others are far more self-serving.  Another 
conclusion is this difference might be due to varying ownership or other factors –
such as management styles or community demographics.  A further 
consideration is that these figures do not tell precisely what is being counted as 
Community Benefit – or even whether Charity Care is separated from other forms 
of community benefit.  As Charity Care is a primary focus of governmental 
evaluation and potentially could be more specific as to what exactly is being 
recorded, this subset of Community Benefit is examined next.  
Evaluation of Charity Care: According to the compiled data, community hospitals 
in Indiana in 2004 appear to provide an adequate level of charity care.  In 2004, 
the 105 community hospitals in Indiana (those with viable charity care data for 
that year, out of 109) reported in aggregate $542.1 million in Charity Care, or 
4.67% of total operating expenses, satisfying the Texas 4% standard.  However, 
as Figure 3D shows, the distribution of charity care reported by individual 
213
community hospitals in 2004 has a wide disparity among individual hospitals –
with a high number concentrated at the low end.  
Figure 3D: Charity Care: All Community Hospitals in Indiana – Compilation 
2004
Charity Care Expense as a % of Total Operating Expense
Test Value = 4.0
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N: 106
Median Hospital: 2.8%
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The average (mean) for community hospitals is higher than 4% charity care: 
6.06%.  The standard deviation of 8.64 indicates a high degree of variability 
among individual hospitals in actual reported charity care expenditures.  The t-
score of 2.046 allows us to reject the null hypothesis with a level of significance 
                                           
29 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 2.406).
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and we cannot assume that most hospitals expend 4% on charity care.  If we use 
the average to draw conclusions, we could conclude that Indiana hospitals do 
provide much more than 4% charity care and therefore are in compliance with 
national standards.  However, the median hospital reports only 2.8% charity care, 
significantly lower than the average and the 4% standard.  The results indicate 
that there is significant difference in the level of charity care reported by 
individual hospitals and the 4% standard, with an extremely high standard 
deviation (SD = 8.64).  
If we use the charity care standard of 4% of operating revenue, 70 hospitals 
(67%) report providing charity care at less than the 4% standard; 34 hospitals 
report providing more than 4% charity care.  At the low extreme, 42 hospitals 
(40%) reported less than 2% in charity care; 21 hospitals (20%) reported less 
than 1%.  At the high extreme, three hospitals reported providing more than 30% 
in charity care, with one hospital reporting 52%.  
While 25% of the hospitals report devoting 10% or more of their operating budget 
to charity care, these help raise the Indiana average.  This not only helps skew 
the averages and medians, but it raises questions about whether these hospitals 
are unusually beneficent in providing charity care, have reported information 
based on different criteria, or are hospitals that provide significant charity care 
due to being a sole provider, possibly being located in a particularly poor 
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community, not located near public hospitals, or other environmental factors.  
This disparity also calls into question conclusions based solely on these reports.
A brief look at three-year figures (2002-2004) reveals a consistency in reporting, 
meaning 2004 is not an unusual year.  Table 3F shows how the overall level of 
Charity Care by community hospitals (of all ownership types) in Indiana changed 
over a three-year period, as well as the percentage of the operating expenses 
represented by that charity care.  
Table 3F: Community Hospital Compilation – 2002-2004
(Actual dollars spent, not adjusted for inflation)
Operating Expense
Charity Care 
Allocation
Charity Care/
Expense
2002 $     9,481.4 million $        454.7 million 4.80%
2003 $   10,752.4 million $        467.8 million 4.35%
2004 $   11,604.8 million $        542.1 million 4.67%
As Table 3F shows, there appears to be a relative consistency in the percentage 
of charity care reported by all Indiana community hospitals, exceeding the 4% 
standard.  While between 2002 and 2003 there is a drop of nearly 10%, it still 
remains above the 4% level and the subsequent rise in 2004 gives the 
impression that the level of charity care by community hospitals remains 
sufficient and relatively consistent.  
Table 3G shows a statistical analysis of charity care presented by individual 
Indiana community hospitals over the three-year period. 
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Table 3G: 
Charity Care Provided by All Indiana Community Hospitals (Compilation)
2002 2003 2004
N 107 109 105
Mean 5.6578% 6.0727% 6.0637%
t30 2.340 2.332 2.439
Median 2.00% 2.19% 2.80%
The level of charity care appears to be even higher than it is in the aggregate, 
with the mean level of charity care being 5.6% and higher, while showing the 
same small fluctuations in 2003 and 2004.  The median level of charity care, 
while still below the 4% standard, shows an increase in 2004.  The t = 2.332 to t 
= 2.439 indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected with a degree of 
significance that is similar to the t(104) = 2.439 for 2004.  
These figures lead to a conclusion that the high Indiana figure of hospital 
providing more than 4% of expenses for charity care (both as a means and as a 
median) is due to a few hospitals reporting an extremely high percentage of 
charity care rather than there being a broad state compliance with specific charity 
care levels.  More individualized analyses are needed to determine how well 
these reports reflect individual hospital behavior.  The preceding analysis of 
Charity Care shows how a few hospitals with extraordinary reports can skew 
average or compilation figures.  Median figures help provide a more clear picture 
of a “typical” hospital, but still provide few clues to the underlying motivations, 
practices, or other factors that might affect these results.
                                           
30 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 2.332 to 2.439).
217
The above raises the question of how and why individual hospitals have 
discrepancies.  To determine this requires looking at varying types of hospitals as 
well as individual hospital data.  But before further evaluating individual hospital 
data or various sub-categories of the Indiana hospital sector, a comparable 
summary of Uncompensated Care shows how factors related to charity care –
especially the issue of bad debt – could indicate one variability in how hospitals 
are recording non-revenue producing care.  Since Uncompensated Care is the 
standard advocated by the American Hospital Association (as opposed to the 
Charity Care of the Community Benefit standard used by the CHA/VHA) – this 
could be the figure that different hospitals might use (especially for-profit and 
public hospitals.  See section on “Hospital Ownership” below).  One evaluative 
standard that is used is Uncompensated Care as 6% of total operating expenses, 
corresponding to standards of the American Hospital Association (Mann et al 
1997).
Uncompensated Care in Indiana Community Hospitals: Table 3H shows how 
Uncompensated Care has changed for Indiana community hospitals from 2002-
2004.
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Table 3H: Uncompensated Care as a % of Expense 
– Indiana Community Hospitals Compilation
(in $ Millions – Actual dollars spent, not adjusted for inflation)
Uncompensated 
Care
Ratio UC/Exp Change in 
UC Ratio 
from 2002
Ratio: 
Charity 
Care 
Expense
2002 $       939.5 9.52% 4.80%
2003 $    1,069.8 9.54% + 2.1% 4.35%
2004 $    1,097.4 9.10% - 4.4% 4.67%
Despite a decline in Uncompensated Care, the overall percentage of Operating 
Expense is more than 9%, over 50% higher than the standard of 6%.  During the 
same period, the average Charity Care provided by Indiana community hospitals 
varied between 4.35% and 4.8% of total operating expense, more than the 4% 
standard but by much lower a factor than for Uncompensated Care (20% higher 
than the standard in the highest year, 2004).  As Uncompensated Care is 
considered to be charity care plus bad debt, a comparatively lower level of 
Charity Care than Uncompensated Care could suggest that Indiana hospitals 
have a high percentage of Bad Debt compared to Charity Care.  Chart 3-1 shows 
the level and changes in Bad Debt in relation to Charity Care from 2002-2004.
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Chart 3-1: Community Hospital Uncompensated Care
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While the actual amount of Bad Debt by Indiana community hospitals has 
steadily risen, there has been a slight fluctuation in Uncompensated Care due to 
the variability of Charity Care.  When Bad Debt is compared as a percentage of 
Operating Expenses (Table 3I), a slight increase is noted, while the percentage 
of Charity Care and Uncompensated Care show a slight decline.
Table 3I: Bad Debt as a % of Expense 
– Indiana Community Hospitals Compilation
(in $ Millions – Actual dollars spent, not adjusted for inflation)
Operating 
Expense Bad Debt
Ratio: 
Bad Debt/ 
Expense
Ratio 
UC/Exp
Charity 
Care 
Allocation
Ratio: 
Charity 
Care 
Expense
2002 $     9,481.4 $       519.2 5.47% 9.52% $        454.7 4.80%
2003 $   10,752.4 $       578.5 5.38% 9.54% $        467.8 4.35%
2004 $   11,604.8 $       652.1 5.61% 9.10% $        542.1 4.67%
Indiana hospitals seem to identify more shortfall as bad debt than charity care 
(e.g. bad debt is 20% higher than charity care in 2004).  This reflects one 
potential concern of policymakers that there may be an incentive for hospitals to
declare less lost revenue as bad debt and shift this over to charity care, 
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especially as government policy increasingly focuses on charity care as an 
evaluative standard.  The uncertainty of how individual hospitals report bad debt 
and whether they include some of this bad debt as part of charity care further 
complicates reported figures.
Summary of Part Three: There are notable disparities between summary figures 
compiled by the state of Indiana and aggregate information determined by 
individual hospitals reports.  According to the ISDH Summary, Indiana hospitals 
are significantly under the desired levels of charity care and community benefit.  
Conversely, according to a compilation of community hospitals using individual 
ISDH reports, Indiana hospitals exceed those levels of expenditure. When 
individual hospitals are arrayed according to their percentage of community 
benefit and charity care expenditures, a wide disparity is noted.  This disparity 
calls into question how useful average, median, compilation, or summary figures 
might be for evaluating individual hospitals or even different groups and types of 
hospitals.  When the uncertainties surrounding uncompensated care and its 
relation to community benefit and charity care are considered, this compounds
the questions of the validity of the comparability of the reported figures.  To 
further examine how Indiana hospitals actually provide charity care, serve 
community benefit, and exhibit philanthropic behavior requires a more detailed 
and individualized investigation.  The next section provides breakdowns 
differentiating for ownership types, system membership, and religious affiliation. 
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Analysis of Indiana Aggregate Data: Hospitals Differentiated by Ownership, 
System Membership, or Religious Affiliation
Part Four uses individual hospital ISDH data reports to compare the general level 
of charity care based on two comparisons – hospital ownership and system 
affiliation.  The system analysis is further segmented into religiously affiliated 
systems and non-religious systems. The purpose of this examination is to 
determine if the variability in reporting by community hospitals as a whole seen in 
the previous section becomes more consistent when sub-categories of hospitals 
are investigated.  One consequence of this examination is to determine whether 
valid conclusions can be made regarding the affect of these factors on 
community benefit and charity care.
The first evaluation is based on hospital ownership.  Since policy makers 
specifically focus on the community benefit standard and nonprofit hospitals, how 
nonprofit hospitals differ particularly from for-profit hospitals is a recurring 
question in previous studies.  One implication of various policy makers is that 
nonprofit hospitals should provide a higher level of charity care and community 
benefit than for-profit hospitals.  This section examines whether this is true in 
practice for hospitals in Indiana – or if the voluntary reporting process even 
allows us to make this determination.  A second evaluation is based on system 
affiliation.  Centralized systems can have an influence on the practices and 
procedures of their member hospitals, an influence that could be an expression 
of coercive isomorphism (as outlined in Chapter One).  This section looks at the 
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relevance of differences in the levels of community benefit and charity care 
provided by system-affiliated hospitals from facilities that are independent.  As 
one aspect of system affiliation, the next section specifically looks at the affect of 
religious affiliation on Indiana hospital charity care.  Religiously affiliated hospitals 
are not only part of systems, most are also part of the Catholic Health 
Association (CHA), a primary architect of the most widely accepted community 
benefit standards.  How this religious affiliation might encourage charity care and 
community benefit is the focus of the third evaluation.
Evaluation #1: Hospital Ownership 
An extensively debated and studied aspect of hospital community benefit 
revolves around the question of whether nonprofit hospitals differ from for-profit 
hospitals in the level of charity care and community benefit they provide.  One 
summary of this research found a greater number of studies indicated that 
nonprofit hospitals provide a higher level of community benefit than for-profit 
hospitals, although the differences were not overwhelming nor were the criteria 
used in the different studies necessarily similar  (Schlesinger, Mitchell, and Gray 
(2003), and Schlesinger and Gray (2006b).  The data on Indiana hospitals is 
evaluated to determine if it is possible to make a meaningful comparison in 
Indiana based on hospital ownership – and whether ownership differences might 
explain differences in hospital percentages of charity care and community 
benefit.
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Table 3J presents the total levels of community benefit and charity care (as 
reported on the ISDH forms for 2004) according to the ownership of the 
hospitals.  
Table 3J: 
Indiana Community Hospitals Compilation –
Percentage of Community Benefit and Charity Care: 
By Ownership Type (2004)
OWNERSHIP Total Community Benefit Charity Care
Nonprofit 13.7%   2.7%
City/County   9.5% 10.8%
For-Profit   7.4%     8.0%
Table 3J shows two significant factors.  The first is that the level of charity care 
reported by nonprofit hospitals is significantly below that of public and for-profit 
hospitals.  The second is that the level of total community benefit for both city-
county hospitals and for-profit hospitals is LESS than (sic) what is reported for 
charity care alone.  One possible conclusion from the second factor is that the 
ISDH reporting formats and requirements are different for nonprofit hospitals than 
they are for other ownership types: i.e. for-profit and public hospitals report 
community benefit separately from charity care – while nonprofit hospital include 
charity care in their total community benefit figures.  However this is only 
speculative and a lack of more detailed data available from public and for-profit 
hospitals makes verification difficult.  
A further complication to this comparison is whether hospitals report gross or net 
community benefit.  As the nonprofit hospitals report two different community 
benefit figures in two different sections of the ISDH report it is difficult to 
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determine how comparable the different compilations are (as an example, in 
2004 only one of the 67 nonprofit hospitals shows a correspondence in the 
figures from the two sections).  This discrepancy points up the problem of 
requiring additional information without also ensuring that the data that show the 
relationship between the two is also shared.  Because of this uncertainty of what 
is counted as community benefit, only charity care is evaluated for the remainder 
of this chapter.  The next two chapters of this dissertation will investigate factors 
that specifically affect community benefit for nonprofit hospitals.
Before attempting to interpret the charity care figure, one other important caveat 
to raise is whether for-profit and public hospitals are actually reporting “charity 
care” as being uncompensated care (as defined by the American Hospital 
Association), which includes bad debt as part of “charity care.”  This is an 
important question, since the exclusion of bad debt from charity care is a criteria 
developed by nonprofit hospital associations (i.e. the Catholic Health Association 
and Voluntary Hospitals of America) and there does not seem to be an incentive 
for hospitals that are not nonprofit (i.e. public or for-profit) to also adopt those 
specific reporting criteria.  
Noting these caveats, Table 3K shows a statistical comparison of the three 
ownership types. 
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Table 3K: 
Indiana Community Hospitals –
Percentage of Charity Care: By Ownership Type (2004)
Nonprofit For-Profit Public
N 60 8 37
Mean 2.7003 9.2288 10.8714
Std. Deviation 2.45784 6.54767 12.39995
t31 -4.096 2.259 3.371
Median 2.06 8.49 7.54
The average (mean) percentage of charity care reported by for-profit and public 
hospitals is much higher than the mean charity care reported by nonprofit 
hospitals.  This is also true for the median hospital.  However extremely high 
standard deviations (for-profit: 6.5; public: 12.4; and nonprofit: 2.5) – approaching 
or exceeding the mean of each of the types – indicates a wide degree of variation 
within each of the types. The t- scores allow us to reject the null hypothesis with 
a level of significance and we cannot assume that most hospitals expend 4% on 
charity care, regardless of ownership type.  For each ownership type, the median 
hospital reports less charity care than the average, although nonprofit hospitals 
still report considerably less than for-profit and public hospitals.  For-profit 
hospitals and public hospitals exceed the 4% standard while nonprofits are 
considerably under that 4% standard.
Another comparison is to evaluate the percentage of hospitals in each ownership 
type that report less than the 4% standard.  Table 3L shows this comparison for 
2004:
                                           
31 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can 
be rejected with a degree of significance for all ownership types (t = 2.259, 3.371, and -4.096).
226
Table 3L: Percentage of Indiana Hospitals with less than 4% Charity Care in 
2004: By Ownership Type
Total Number 
of Hospitals
Number of 
Hospitals with 
less than 4% 
Charity Care
% of Hospitals 
with less than 
4% Charity 
Care
Nonprofit 60 50 83%
For-Profit 8 3 38%
Public 37 17 46%
Table 3L shows a very high percentage of nonprofit hospitals reporting less than 
4% Charity Care, giving credence to the average and median figures.  A Mann-
Whitney (U test) indicates the difference in the percentage of charity care 
provided by different hospital ownership types in 2004, is not statistically 
significant:
Percentage of charity care provided by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in 2004:
Nonprofit         - n1: 60
For-Profit         - n2:   9  
U: 143.5
Z = 2.24
P(1) = 0.0125    P(2) = 0.0251
Percentage of charity care provided by nonprofit and public hospitals in 2004:
Nonprofit         - n1:  60
Public              - n2:  37 
U: 709
Z = 2.97
P(1) = 0.0015    P(2) = 0.003
Percentage of charity care provided by public and for-profit hospitals in 2004:
Public              - n1: 37 
For Profit         - n2:   9 
U: 174
Z = -0.19
P(1) = 0.4247    P(2) = 0.8493
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The comparison of the medians of both for-profit vs. nonprofit hospitals and of 
nonprofit vs. public hospitals, the z value and U value yield a p < 0.05, indicating 
the difference between the two samples is significant (p as a two-tailed test), but 
not highly so.  This allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the two samples 
have similar medians and are from similar populations.  However the low z value 
and higher p-values between public and for-profit hospitals do not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis, and indicate there could be a degree of similarity 
between the medians of charity care provided by for-profit and public hospitals.  
However uncertainty of the figures reported by for-profit hospitals (as well as 
potentially of public hospitals) could also call these conclusions into question, as 
is detailed below.
There is another approach to evaluate the validity of the charity care figures of 
different hospital types: the consistency of reporting from year-to year.  While it is 
possible that one year would see a high influx of charity care patients for a 
specific hospital while a following year would see very few, it is unlikely this 
would be a prevalent situation, as most hospitals serve relatively similar 
populations each year.32  Tables 3M, 3N, and 3O show how the percentage of 
charity care for each of three years compares for nonprofit hospitals, for-profit 
hospitals and public hospitals, respectively. 
                                           
32 A further consideration is, if vast fluctuations in yearly charity care figures are determined to be 
a “normal” phenomenon, then evaluating yearly charity care figures becomes a questionable 
policy practice.  If this is a typical situation, that data might be better compared over a two or even 
a three-year period rather than one year.
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Table 3M: 
Indiana Community Hospitals – Percentage of Charity Care: 
By Ownership Type: Nonprofit (2002-2004)
2002 2003 2004
N 60 62 60
Mean 2.3735 2.6645 2.7003
Std. Deviation 2.16913 2.67042 2.45784
t33 -5.808 -3.938 -4.096
Median 1.67 1.74 2.06
% of Hospitals 
under 4% standard 80% 82% 83%
Table 3N: 
Indiana Community Hospitals – Percentage of Charity Care: 
By Ownership Type: For-Profit (2002-2004)
2002 2003 2004
N 6 8 8
Mean 11.2233 8.8013 9.2288
Std. Deviation 7.74918 7.65054 6.54767
t34 2.283 1.775 2.259
Median 11.58 6.94 8.49
% of Hospitals 
under 4% standard 33% 38% 38%
Table 3O: 
Indiana Community Hospitals – Percentage of Charity Care: 
By Ownership Type: Public (2002-2004)
2002 2003 2004
N 38 38 37
Mean 10.4113 11.2187 10.8714
Std. Deviation 9.48068 13.38912 12.39995
t35 4.169 3.324 3.371
Median 10.27 7.21 7.54
% of Hospitals 
under 4% standard 34% 47% 46%
                                           
33 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%. Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can 
be rejected with a degree of significance (t = -3.938 to -5.808). 
34 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 
cannot be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 1.775 to 2.283) for all three years. 
35 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can 
be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 3.371 to 4.169).
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There appears to be a relative consistency across the three-year figures for each 
of the ownership types, giving a level of validity to the reported figures.  A Mann-
Whitney (U test) shows the difference in the percentage of charity care provided 
by different hospital ownership types over the three-year period is not statistically 
significant.  This is similar to the results for 2004 (above):
Comparison of the medians of the percentage of charity care provided by 
Nonprofit and For-profit hospitals – 2002-2004:
    Nonprofit         - n1: 182
For Profit         - n2:   27  
U: 1845
Z = 2.09
P(1) = 0.0183    P(2) = 0.0366
Comparison of the medians of the percentage of charity care provided by 
Nonprofit and Public hospitals – 2002-2004:
Nonprofit         - n1:  182
Public              - n2:  113 
U: 6222.5
Z = 5.7
P(1) = <.0001    P(2) = <.0001
Comparison of the medians of the percentage of charity care provided by 
Public and For-profit hospitals – 2002-2004:
Public              - n1: 113 
For-Profit         - n2:   27 
U: 1757
Z = -1.22
P(1) = 0.1112    P(2) = 0.2225
The high z value and U value for the three-year public vs. nonprofit comparison 
yield a p < 0.001, indicating the difference between the two samples is highly 
significant (p as a two-tailed test).  This allows us to reject the null hypothesis 
with a high degree of significance that the two samples have similar medians and 
are from similar populations.  The for-profit vs. nonprofit comparison also has a p 
value of < .05, indicating the difference between the two samples is significant 
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but less so than between public and non-profit hospitals.  The higher p value of 
the comparison between public and for-profit hospitals does not allow us to reject 
the null hypothesis, indicating a potential comparability between the medians of 
the two populations.
The above comparisons permit three conclusions.  First, the relative consistency 
of figures over the three years allows us a degree of trust that the figures 
reported are consistent.  All three ownership comparisons show a relative level of 
consistency in the reported figures, with only for-profit hospitals indicating a high 
degree of difference in the 2002 figures as compared to the other two years.  
This could be due to three hospitals not reporting for that year (as opposed to 
other years when all but one of the nine Indiana for-profit hospitals reported).  
This also leads to one conclusion that differences found in computations 
involving for-profit hospitals could be due to the relatively small number of for-
profit hospitals in Indiana.  This small number of hospitals can mean a single 
hospital could cause a significant shift in the averages for that category.  If there 
are noteworthy yearly fluctuations in the data reported by that hospital, the 
comparative data might be skewed even more.
Second, the means and median figures showing nonprofit hospitals providing 
less charity care than for-profit and public hospitals can be assumed to have a 
relative degree of validity.  To understand why nonprofit hospitals might provide 
(or report) less charity care requires further research into demographic and 
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operational criteria that might account for the difference.  Third, for-profit 
hospitals and public hospitals seem to have a relative similarity in their 
percentage of charity care.  However, this conclusion also assumes validity in the 
for-profit hospital charity care figures, an assumption that might not be warranted.  
An examination of for-profit hospitals charity care figures is the topic of the next 
section.
For-Profit Charity Care: One specific example shows how the for-profit charity 
care figure might be questioned.  This example also demonstrates how individual 
hospital situations can unduly influence broader conclusions from self-reported 
data, without also taking into consideration individual hospital processes and 
contexts.  St. Joseph Hospital in Fort Wayne, Indiana is a 211-bed facility that 
was originally founded as a Catholic hospital.  Situated within a relatively poor 
area of central Fort Wayne, its location encourages a comparatively frequent use 
by individuals and families with inadequate health insurance or private means.  In 
1998 St. Joseph was acquired by Quorum, a for-profit hospital chain (which in 
2000 was bought by another for-profit system, Triad).  St. Joseph converted from 
a non-profit Catholic hospital to a for-profit hospital in 1999, yet maintained the 
original name.  There continued to be a high level of charity care from St Joseph 
Hospital, providing 14% in 2002 and 17% in 2003.  However these figures are 
now counted as for-profit charity care, although the hospital itself has not 
changed location or (presumably) the population of patients it serves.  One 
additional factor in this example is that in 2004 there was NOT a high level of 
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charity care reported at St Joseph (3.3%), but there is no explanation or other 
information available as to why this might have dropped.  This example is one
instance of how specific data from any hospital, but particularly a for-profit 
hospital that is less subject to some types of policy scrutiny than a nonprofit 
hospital, can vary with seemingly little explanation or clear rationale.
To further illustrate the variability in individual for-profit hospitals, Table 3P shows 
the percentage of charity care reported by the nine for-profit hospitals in Indiana 
for the years 2002-2004 (in the table, every other hospital is designated as bold 
and centered –to more clearly define the figures for individual hospitals).
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Table 3P: 
Charity Care as a Percentage of Operating Expense 
Reported by Indiana For-profit Hospitals (2002-2004): 
Year
For-Profit 
Hospital
%Charity Care / 
Operating Expense
2004 A 8.49%
2003 A 15.40%
2002 A 2.90%
2004 B 19.60%
2003 B 16.54%
2002 B 16.51%
2004 C 3.97%
2003 C 0.94%
2002 C NR
2004 D NR
2003 D NR
2002 D NR
2004 E 16.00%
2003 E 0.46%
2002 E 11.58%
2004 F 0.61%
2003 F 0.00%
2002 F NR
2004 G 3.33%
2003 G 17.85%
2002 G 14.62%
2004 H 12.28%
2003 H 12.28%
2002 H 20.64%
2004 I 9.55%
2003 I 6.94%
2002 I 1.09%
Only one hospital (For-Profit Hospital “B”) has less than a 50% fluctuation in their 
level of reported charity care in any two years,36 although Hospital “B” did report 
an increase of nearly 20% between 2003 and 2004.  Three of the nine hospitals 
(33%) did not report figures for at least one year.  One hospital (For-Profit 
Hospital “H”) reported the exact same operating expense and charity care figures 
                                           
36 In a similar three-year comparison of public hospitals, 21 of the 37 hospitals (57%) reported a 
charity care fluctuation of more than 50% in two years.  
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in 2004 as they had in 200337 – leading to the suspicion that they may have 
simply copied the 2003 figures to complete the form for 2004.  Figure 3E shows 
the relative distribution of charity care by for-profit hospitals over a three-year 
period, indicating the wide variability in the reported figures.  
Figure 3E: For-Profit Charity Care – 2002-2004
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Mean = 7.8363
Std. Dev. = 7.36128
N = 27
Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%38
N: 22
Mean: 9.6173
t: 3.758
Median Hospital: 11.6%
The standard deviation that exceeds the mean shows a wide disparity of 
individual for-profit hospitals.  However the relatively low t-score (especially in 
2003) does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis with a high degree of 
significance.  Because of this disparity and seeming contradiction, conclusions 
are difficult to draw based upon the limited statistical evidence.  Table 3Q shows 
the for-profit charity care figures over a three-year period.
                                           
37 Not only the ratio of charity care was similar but also the actual dollar figure for both operating 
expense and charity care were exactly the same for those two years.
38 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 3.758).
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Table 3Q: For-Profit Hospital Charity Care – 2002-2004
Test Value = 4.0
2002 2003 2004
N 6 8 9
Mean 11.2233% 8.8013% 9.6173%
Std. Deviation 7.74918 7.65054 6.54767
t39 2.283 1.775 3.758
Median 11.58% 6.94% 11.6%
Table 3Q shows a significant variability in the yearly data, indicating a potential 
lack of consistency in individual hospital data as well as for the entire population.  
The median especially shows a considerable fluctuation in 2003 as well as yearly 
differences in the mean that allow for limited conclusions.  Running a Mann-
Whitney (U test) to compare the medians of for-profit and nonprofit hospital 
charity care over the three-year period also finds a lack of comparability:
Nonprofit - n1: 182 
For-profit - n2:   22  
U: 3069.0  
Z = 4.07973
The high z value and U value yield a p < 0.001, indicating the difference between 
the two samples is highly significant (p as a two-tailed test).  This allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two samples have similar medians and are 
from similar populations.
The initial compilations indicate that there would seem to be a significant 
difference in the charity care provided by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals – with 
for-profit hospitals far out-performing nonprofit hospitals.  However because of 
                                           
39 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can 
be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 1.775 to 3.758) for two of the three years; it is 
confirmed for 2003.
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the questionable data from for-profit hospitals – and the limited number of for-
profit hospitals – any conclusions that might be drawn from these figures are
suspect.  The variability of the for-profit charity care figures coupled with the 
uncertainty of what precisely is being reported as charity care and as community 
benefit – along with the small number of for-profit hospitals in Indiana – make 
further comparisons of for-profit to nonprofit hospitals difficult.  A similar lack of 
detail from the ISDH Reports on public hospitals also makes meaningful analysis 
difficult.  Because of the lack of clarity of for-profit hospital information and as the 
focus of this paper is on nonprofit philanthropic behavior and community benefit 
standards, no additional comparisons with for-profit hospitals are included as part 
of this paper.  Although the focus of this paper is on nonprofit hospitals, a brief 
look at how nonprofit and public hospitals compare is warranted.  
Public Hospital Charity Care: Running a Mann-Whitney (U test) to compare the 
medians of public and nonprofit hospital charity care over the three-year period 
(2002-2004) finds a lack of comparability similar to that of nonprofit hospitals and 
for-profit hospitals:
Nonprofit         - n1:  182
Public              - n2:  113 
U: 6222.5
Z = 5.7
P(1) = <.0001    P(2) = <.0001
The high z value and U value yield a p < 0.001, indicating the difference between 
the two samples is highly significant (p as a two-tailed test).  This allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two samples have similar medians and are 
237
from similar populations.  Figure 3F shows the level of charity care reported by 
public hospitals from 2002-2004.
Figure 3F:
Charity Care: Public Hospitals in Indiana – Compilation 2002-2004
Charity Care Expense as a % of Total Operating Expense
Test Value = 4.0
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Mean = 10.8335
Std. Dev. = 11.76648
N = 113
Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%40
N: 113
Mean: 10.8335 %
Standard Deviation: 11.76648
t: 6.174
Median Hospital: 8.68 %
As Figure 3F shows, although the average and median of public hospitals in 
Indiana is well over the 4% standard, there is a great deal of variability in 
individual hospitals.  Table 3R provides a statistical comparison of the three-year 
figures, indicating a relative consistency in reporting and in the high standard 
deviation as well as t-values.  
                                           
40 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 6.174).
238
Table 3R: 
Indiana Community Hospitals –
Percentage of Charity Care: 
By Ownership Type: Public (2002-2004)
2002 2003 2004
N 38 38 37
Mean 10.4113 11.2187 10.8714
Std. Deviation 9.48068 13.38912 12.39995
t41 4.169 3.324 3.371
Median 10.27 7.21 7.54
% of Hospitals 
under 4% standard 34% 47% 46%
As the final row shows, nearly 50% of public hospitals report less than the 4% 
standard, despite the high medians and means.  Because public hospitals have 
the same lack of detail on information as for-profit hospitals, no further 
comparisons are made in this paper.  But it can be concluded that despite the 
variability, public hospitals have a higher reported level of charity care than 
nonprofit hospitals (see Table 3S, below).  Whether this is due to their location, 
or other factors is beyond the scope of this current paper, but could be the 
subject of further investigation.
Evaluation #2: Nonprofit Hospitals in Indiana – Charity Care: 2002-2004
The next examination is of nonprofit hospitals, to determine whether their 
consistency of charity care figures has the same variability as found in for-profit 
and public hospitals.  Table 3S shows a statistical comparison of the charity care 
provided by nonprofit hospitals over a three-year period of time.
                                           
41 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can 
be rejected with a degree of significance (t = 3.371 to 4.169).
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Table 3S: Nonprofit Hospital Charity Care – 2002-2004
Test Value = 4.0
2002 2003 2004
N 60 62 60
Mean 2.3735 2.6645 2.7003
Std. Deviation 2.16913 2.67042 2.45784
t42 -5.808 -3.938 -4.096
Median 1.72% 1.94% 2.00%
Nonprofit hospitals in Indiana seem to be relatively consistent in the aggregate 
level of charity care they provide.  Both the mean and the median figures show a 
slight increase over the three-year period, but both figures are well below the 4% 
standard.  The high t-scores indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected with 
a high degree of significance.  The standard deviation that approximates the 
means in all three years indicates that there is a high degree of variability in the 
reported figures from individual hospitals.  However, from 2002-2004, 19 of the 
59 nonprofit hospitals in Indiana (32%) had a fluctuation in charity care of more 
than 50% between any two years, a lower percentage than either for-profit (88%) 
or public hospitals (57%).  In addition, 10 of these 19 hospitals had charity care 
of less than 4% (in the year with the highest percentage).  This encourages 
further investigations into other factors affecting a hospital’s charity care.  One 
organizational aspect that might affect the extent and reporting of charity care is 
involvement with a healthcare system.  
                                           
42 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can 
be rejected with a degree of significance (t = -3.938 to -5.808).
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Evaluation #3: Hospital Systems
As outlined in Chapter One, the concept of coercive isomorphism leads to the 
hypothesis that a system could encourage member hospitals to practice and/or 
report a higher and more consistent level of charity care than might be seen in 
independent hospitals.  A further hypothesis is that hospitals affiliated with a 
religious system – especially a Catholic system – might have an even higher and 
more consistent level of charity care, as it is the Catholic Health Association that 
has emphasized standardizing the community benefit standards and presumably 
encourages their member hospitals to comply with those standards.
As stated earlier in this chapter, 42 of the 61 nonprofit community hospitals in 
Indiana (69%) are part of a system; the other 19 (31%) are independent.  Table 
3T shows how charity care and community benefit compares based on system 
affiliation.
Table 3T:
Community Benefit and Charity Care Compilation based on 
Nonprofit Hospital System Affiliation – 2004 
Charity Care
Total 
Community 
Benefit
In System 3.0% 13.0%
Independent 1.7% 15.6%
Hospitals in systems seem to provide more charity care than independent 
hospitals, although their total community benefit expenditures seem to be similar 
(although system hospitals report slightly less community benefit).  As stated 
earlier, the broader data of community benefit is not specifically evaluated in this 
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chapter but it is included in this table to show how reporting can vary.  If all 
community benefit is included, independent hospitals seem to report a higher 
level (17% higher) than system hospitals.  But if only charity care is recorded, 
then independent hospitals report nearly 50% less than system hospitals.  An 
individual hospital analysis of community benefit is the subject of the next two 
chapters.  Figures 3-G and 3-H show how the charity care provided by Indiana 
hospitals in systems and not in systems compare graphically.
Figure 3G: Charity Care: System Hospitals in Indiana – Compilation 2002-
2004
Charity Care Expense as a % of Total Operating Expense
Test Value = 4.0
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Mean = 3.1049
Std. Dev. = 2.68344
N = 127
Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%43
N: 127
Median Hospital: 2.19 %
Mean: 3.1049 %
SD: 2.68344
t: -3.759
                                           
43 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can be rejected with a degree of significance (t = -3.759).
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Figure 3H: Charity Care: Indiana Non-System Hospitals – Compilation 2002-
2004
Charity Care Expense as a % of Total Operating Expense
Test Value = 4.0
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Mean = 1.3693
Std. Dev. = 0.96202
N = 55
Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%44
N: 55
Median Hospital: 1.22 %
Mean: 1.3693 %
SD: 0.96202
t: -20.280
Hospitals that are not affiliated with systems report a much lower level of charity 
care than those in systems.  Looking at the figures of charity care reported by 
independent vs. system hospitals (Table 3U) further compares these disparities.
                                           
44 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 can be rejected with a very high degree of significance (t = -0.280).
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Table 3U: Nonprofit Hospital Charity Care based on 
Nonprofit Hospital System Affiliation – 2002-2004
Test Value = 4.0
System Non-System
N 127 55
Mean 3.1049% 1.3693%
Standard Deviation 2.68344 0.96202
t45 -3.759 -20.280
Median 2.19% 1.22%
Hospitals affiliated with systems have both a higher mean and median of charity 
care than independent hospitals.  The figures seem to confirm that system 
hospitals provide a higher and a more consistent level of charity care than do 
independent hospitals.  The difference in system and non-system hospitals could
be due to system hospitals placing a higher degree of standardization on their 
members.  However, even system hospitals have a standard deviation (2.68) that 
approaches the mean (3.10), showing a wide difference in individual hospitals.  
Running a Mann-Whitney (U test) to compare the medians of systems and 
independent hospital charity care over the three-year period also finds a lack of 
comparability:
System         - n1: 127 
Independent - n2:   55  
U: 5033.5  
Z = 4.72155
The high z value and U value yield a p < 0.001, indicating the difference between 
the two samples is highly significant (p as a two-tailed test).  This allows us to 
                                           
45 Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%.  The t-score for system hospitals 
(-3.759) indicates the null hypothesis can be rejected with a degree of significance.  The high t-
score for non-system hospitals (-20.280) indicates the null hypothesis can be rejected with a very 
high degree of significance.
244
reject the null hypothesis that the two samples have similar medians and are 
from similar populations.
These comparisons suggest that when evaluating a hospital’s charity care, 
differences in system membership may indicate a potential influence.  However, 
a high variability makes it difficult to conclude how much membership in any
system might affect individual hospital behavior, as distinct from other 
demographic or operational factors such as larger societal and governmental 
expectations.  One final comparison is appropriate before looking at the 
individual practices of nonprofit hospitals related to community benefit and
philanthropic behavior.  Since system affiliated hospitals are seen to have a 
significantly higher level of charity care – and since a majority of system hospitals 
are affiliated with Catholic religious systems – there can also be the supposition 
that religious affiliation could make a difference.  
Evaluation #4: Hospitals Differentiated by Religious Affiliation:
Whether religious hospitals are any different from other nonprofit hospitals is a 
matter of some debate.  This is particularly true of Catholic hospitals, most of 
which are currently part of large systems that can have notable financial and 
political resources.  There have been limited studies of the differences between 
religiously affiliated hospitals and secular nonprofit hospitals, partially because of 
the indeterminacy of what might define a “religious” hospital.  In an era that has 
seen numerous purchases, mergers, and conversions of hospitals, the distinction 
245
of religious hospitals is becoming less pronounced.  Two studies of the affect of 
hospital ownership in California did include religious designation as a factor and 
found religious hospitals delivered a slightly higher incidence of uncompensated 
care than non-religious nonprofit hospitals (Campbell and Ahern 1993, Gruber 
1994).  Conversely, a study of Connecticut hospitals’ uncompensated care that 
included religious affiliation as part of their research found ambiguous results 
based on Catholic vs. non-Catholic affiliation (White and Begun 1998) although it 
did find a higher availability of what the authors termed “compassionate care 
services” (such as home health programs, social services, and patient 
representative services). Studies of nursing homes have found a similar 
ambiguity in the measurement of the affect of religious affiliation as opposed to 
nonprofit designation, although some interpretations have indicated an improved 
level of quality of care from religiously affiliated institutions (Bradley and Walker 
1998, Schlesinger and Gray 2006a, pp. 404-405, fn. 34,).
Contemporary religious hospitals are seen as responding to the same pressures 
and considerations as other nonprofit hospitals, including a need for more 
efficient business operations (Harrison and Sexton 2006) and the movement 
toward multi-corporate, multi-state models of organization (Singer 2006).  When 
differences of religious hospitals (especially Catholic facilities) are noted in the 
literature, they usually focus on the extent that healthcare practices are affected.  
A particular concern is how mergers between religious and secular entities affect 
the availability of reproductive services with religious and ethical considerations, 
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such as abortions and sterilizations (e.g. Singer 2006, White and Begun 1998-
1999, Bellandi 1998, and Tokarski 1995).
The specific designation of what defines a religious hospital can be difficult to 
identify, unless the hospital is specifically affiliated with a religious system.  
Names of hospitals can be misleading as any public or for-profit hospital can 
choose to either adopt a name with a religious context or to preserve the 
religious name of a hospital acquired during an ownership change.46  However it 
has been noted that in 1994 about half of all community hospitals in the United 
States were religiously affiliated (Becker and Potter 2002).  In particular Catholic 
Church affiliation is the most identified religious designation for hospital in the 
United States.  Approximately 12.5% of all community hospitals in the United 
States are Catholic Hospitals.47
Much of the difference of religious, Catholic-affiliated hospitals48 is attributed to 
historical influences and locations.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century religious orders and congregations established hospitals for the poor in 
neighborhoods where those needy individuals lived (White 2000). In many 
                                           
46 As previously noted, St Joseph Hospital in Fort Wayne, Indiana is one example of the
conversion of a Catholic hospital to for-profit status, while keeping its Catholic name.  This 
difficulty in measuring religious affiliation has also been noted in studies of nursing homes 
(Jeavons 1993, cited in Bradley and Walker 1998, p. 347 and 353).
47 According to the Catholic Health Association, 
www.chausa.org/Pub/MainNav/AboutCHA/overview.htm (last accessed 9/14/2008).
48 For the purpose of this description, “religious hospitals” primarily refers to Catholic hospitals.  
Catholic hospitals dominate the religiously affiliated hospitals in the United States and have 
significant influence.  The federal adoption of the Catholic Health Association community benefit 
standards is one example of this influence.  In the state of Indiana, 24 of the 107 community 
hospitals (22%) are religiously affiliated.  21 of these hospitals are Catholic hospitals (21%), 
within four Catholic systems.  This percentage is significantly higher than the national percentage 
of Catholic community hospitals, 12.5%.
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communities these neighborhoods remain home to poorer individuals and 
working families and are less likely to have health insurance or possibly, if 
working, to qualify for Medicaid.  Hospitals located in these areas are likely to 
continue to have a higher level of charity care (Schlesinger and Gray 2006a, pp.
397-398, citing Gray 1991 and Norton and Staiger 1994).  
While various factors may affect individual situations, an opinion may exist that 
religiously affiliated hospitals provide more charity care and community benefits 
than secular hospitals.  If this is true, it could be due to their ethical traditions, 
because of where they were initially located (in poorer areas of a community), or 
because of pressures by their system to adopt the CCA/VHA guidelines.  To test 
this opinion, looking at those hospitals with religious connections yielded the 
following results, outlined in Table 3V.
Table 3V: Percentage of Charity Care and Community Benefit:
By Religious Affiliation (2004) 
Actual dollars spent, not adjusted for inflation
Charity Care Ratio: CC/
Operating Exp
Religious 
System $119,241,960 4.47%
Non-Religious 
System (NP) $70,566,735 1.94%
No 
System (NP) $35,802,864 1.69%
Religious hospitals in systems seem to far outperform nonreligious hospitals in 
terms of their levels of charity care.  Figure 3I shows three-year figures for the 24 
hospitals in religious systems:
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Figure 3I: Nonprofit Religious System 3 year Charity Care (2002-2004)
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Mean = 3.9644
Std. Dev. = 2.64492
N = 72
Null Hypothesis - H0: The % of charity care expense is = 4%49
N: 72
Median Hospital: 2.64
Mean: 3.9644
SD: 2.64492
t: -.114
The mean of 3.96% is nearly at the 4% standard, although the median hospital 
(2.64%) is well below the standard.  A relatively low t-value (-.114) indicates that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and that the population means does 
approach the standard.  There seems to be a consistency in reporting charity 
care by religious hospitals that is lacking in other nonprofit hospitals.  It should 
also be noted that five of the top six figures represent rural, sole providers 
hospitals.  However, only nine of the 24 religious hospitals have a higher level of 
charity care than the standard of 4%.  The median hospital provided charity care 
of 2.64%, meaning well over half of the religious hospitals (i.e. 15 religious 
hospitals or 65%) are significantly below the 4% standard.  
                                           
49 Test for H0: The mean = 4.0 cannot be rejected with a degree of significance (t = .114).
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Running a Mann-Whitney (U test) to compare the medians of religiously affiliated 
(system) and non-religiously affiliated (system) hospital charity care over the 
three-year period finds a lack of comparability:
Religious      - n1: 72 
Nonreligious - n2: 54  
U: 3042.5  
Z = 5.41534
The high z value and U value yield a p < 0.001, indicating the difference between 
the two samples is highly significant (p as a two-tailed test).  This allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the two samples have similar medians and are 
from similar populations.
The conclusions of this comparison are varied.  On one hand it could be 
concluded that religious hospitals provide a higher level of charity care than non-
religious hospitals.  However, it could also be observed that a few rural hospitals 
that have a high level of charity care skew the averages, as the median figure 
shows.  An advocate for religious hospitals could state that this is an instance of 
the religious system affiliating with needy hospitals because of fulfilling their 
mission of providing care to those in need.  However, other factors such as 
location could also be affecting this level of charity care.  In order to better 
understand these differences requires looking at the details of the individual 
hospitals.  If this individualized level of investigation is needed to properly 
evaluate charity care – a relatively well-defined standard when compared to other 
community benefit elements – then individual hospital analysis is even more 
necessary when trying to assess philanthropic behavior.
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Summary of Part Four: Compilation of individual community hospital reports 
shows that in 2004 Indiana community hospitals provided 4.67% of the total 
operating expenses for charity care and 12.89% for total community benefit.  This 
compilation seems to indicate that Indiana hospitals meet the standard of 4% 
charity care and far exceed the standard for 5% total community benefit.  
However, by breaking down Indiana hospitals by different factors, varying 
evidence emerges.  In actuality, a majority of Indiana hospitals provide less than 
4% of care.  A few hospitals reporting much larger percentages of charity care 
help to influence the averages.
Nonprofit hospitals seem to report less Charity Care than for-profit hospitals or 
public hospitals.  Hospitals that are part of systems, especially religious systems, 
seem to provide more charity care than independent nonprofit hospitals.  
However, the variability among individual hospitals makes averages or even 
median comparisons inconclusive, even when categorized according to system 
affiliation or religious connections.  To uncover the factors that might lead to 
various differences requires looking at those individual hospitals rather than 
relying on averages, medians, and compilations.  That investigation is the topic 
for the next two chapters.  
Summary of Chapter Three: Chapter Three asks: “What does an existing 
reporting requirement from one state (Indiana) tell us about nonprofit hospital 
community benefit and philanthropic behavior?”  
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The primary conclusion is that while reports based on these requirements may 
provide useful information for investigating individual hospitals, broader 
conclusions about behavior of hospitals or categories of hospitals as a group are 
limited.  Averages, median figures, and summaries don’t account for the variety 
of factors that are necessary to adequately evaluate organizational behavior and 
motivations.  If nonprofit hospitals responded to regulatory or mandated
pressures to conform as a group, it might be expected that more similarity would 
exist among hospitals as a whole as well as among similar types of hospitals. 
However the theories surrounding philanthropic behavior indicate that pressure 
to provide community benefit stems from internal operational or leadership 
factors or a desire to attain legitimacy from either a defined community or 
professional standards of behavior.  These theoretical criteria help confirm
variations among individual hospitals, rather than similarities expected by the 
external mandates presented by regulations or systemic guidelines.
In conclusion, how well the ISDH data can be used to identify and quantify the 
philanthropic behavior of hospitals is problematic.  Whether general summaries 
can be used to draw conclusions about the individual actions of hospitals is 
questionable.  This is even more difficult when looking at the actual philanthropic 
behavior by Indiana nonprofit hospitals and the categories of community health 
education programs and donations.  To further investigate these areas, the next 
two chapters specifically look at Health Promotion and Donations as reported on 
the IRS Form 990 by individual Indiana hospitals.  Those chapters also include 
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information from a survey and follow-up interviews with representatives from 
Indiana hospitals – which help to not only verify the information but also can 
provide clues to help determine the type of process that is used by nonprofit 
hospitals to determine and report this type of organizational behavior. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
COMMUNITY HEALTH PROMOTION AND INDIANA HOSPITALS
The next two chapters explore available data from Indiana hospitals and their 
practice related to community health education and donation programs.  Chapter 
Four specifically focuses on the area of Community Health education.  The thesis 
hypothesizes that in practice these health education and donation activities are 
operated in different locations of the organization, making it difficult to present the 
two behaviors as a unified effort.  The hypothesis is that health education 
programs are motivated by normative values held by professional healthcare 
workers throughout the organization and so decisions and practices are 
scattered throughout the organization.  Conversely, donation programs are either 
located in a separate department or at the hospital leadership level.  This 
separation of community health education and donation programs leads to the 
conclusion that nonprofit hospitals do not unify the planning or reporting of their 
philanthropic benefit activities.  
The primary focus of the chapter is to determine how centralized and consistent 
the health education and health promotion programs are for hospitals in Indiana.  
This tests the first part of Hypothesis #2: Community health education programs 
are motivated by normative Stakeholder values and are scattered throughout the 
organization.  
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Introduction – Community Health Promotion and Education
A hospital’s community health education program1 is one of the two areas (along 
with donations) that in Chapter One are identified as indicators of a nonprofit 
hospital’s philanthropic behavior.  This chapter investigates the expenses of 
community health education provided by Indiana hospitals.  It first uses the 
Indiana State Department of Health (ISDH) data to determine the financial 
commitment to this program as reported by Indiana hospitals.  It then reviews a 
survey of Indiana hospitals to determine the validity of this data and the process 
each hospital uses to collect and report that information.  It concludes by relating 
these findings to the hypothesis that health education programs are found 
throughout a hospital’s organizational structure, reflecting the values of the health 
care profession to provide health information beyond the provision of primary 
healthcare. This corresponds to a desire to respond to the needs of various 
stakeholders rather than being driven by a coordinated strategy of the 
organization.
The Theoretical Basis for Health Promotion and Education Programs
Chapter One developed the theoretical background for nonprofit philanthropic 
behavior.  This theoretical approach identified five potential motivations for a 
nonprofit hospital to engage in philanthropic behavior: Externally mandated 
                                           
1 Throughout this chapter – and this paper as a whole – the terms Health Education and Health 
Promotion may be used interchangeably.  The two terms are generally synonymous and refer to 
preventive medicine and wellness information programs generally intended for the general public.  
This synonymous context should be assumed when the terms are used descriptively and singly.  
They are distinguished primarily when referring to the ISDH data, which does list them separately 
and so may reflect different figures reported by the individual hospitals under the separate 
categories.  Even with the ISDH data, there is not always a well-defined difference to how the 
terms are interpreted – a situation that is addressed in this chapter.
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behavior; a management function; leadership directed; separate organizational 
approach; and stakeholder discretion (Table 4A).
Table 4A: The Nonprofit Hospital Philanthropy Models
Nonprofit 
Philanthropy 
Model
External 
Mandate
(System)
Manage-
ment 
Function 
Leadership 
Directed
(CEO or 
Board)
Separate 
Organi-
zational 
Function -
Political
Stake-
holder 
Discretion
Organizational 
Motivation (from 
Young and 
Burlingame)
To comply 
with 
External 
Criteria
To ensure 
and/or 
increase 
firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
consti-
tuencies 
Organizational 
Structure
Imitative of 
Mandates
Embedded 
in Dep’t 
and
Manager 
Hierarchy
Practices at 
Leadership 
Level
Separate 
foundation or 
identified and 
publicly-
visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
Location of 
Philanthropic 
Activity
Similar to 
others in a 
System
Depart-
ment Level
(“D”)
Administrative 
Level
(“A”)
Foundation 
or separate 
organi-
zational 
entity (“F”)
Line-level 
Staff
(“S”)
Program decisions related to these models (or motivations for philanthropic 
organizational behavior) could be located within different places in the 
organization: Department (“D”), Administrative (“A”), separate organization or 
Foundation (“F”); or Staff level (“S”).2  An organization motivated by the External 
Mandate Model would be expected to reflect the structure and decision location 
of the system and other organizations within that system.
                                           
2 The letter designations are for categorization convenience and coincide with the categories 
identified in Appendix 4-8.  These designations are used later in this chapter and are included 
here to clarify their later use.
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The hypothesis of this thesis that the health education programs will be located 
throughout the organization corresponds to the stakeholder model of 
organizational philanthropy.  This model maintains that this behavior is a 
variable, normative response to different stakeholder groups on the part of the 
healthcare professionals working with those different groups.  The Stakeholder 
Discretion Model incorporates practices that arise at different levels in the 
organization as responses by various internal professionals to diverse external 
stakeholder requests and situations.  It is expected that since health education 
expenses are driven by the actions and reporting practices of individuals within 
the organization, there will be little correlation among the health education 
expenses based on various organizational types or even within specific systems.  
Indiana Health Promotion Data
On the new IRS Form 990, Schedule H, Part 1, Line 7e, hospitals are asked to 
report: Community Health Improvement Services and Community Benefit 
Operations.  The form asks for total and net expenses as well as the number of 
programs and people served.  No further definition of these programs is asked 
for and there are there no guidelines on what types of programs might qualify.  
These decisions are left to the discretion of the hospitals completing the forms.  It 
is noted that the figures are to be determined by filling out Worksheet 4, but the 
worksheet is not included in the report.  Therefore this worksheet is simply a 
convenience for a hospital to compute those figures and does not allow for public 
scrutiny of the individual program components.  Worksheet 4 simply indicates 
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lines for specific programs, and there is no further delineation or requirements 
except for separating Community Health Improvement Services from Community 
Benefit Operations.  This separation is not kept in the final figures that are 
reported, but grouped together as a single expense item (both gross and net).  
This latitude in reporting practices and decisions is also seen in the Indiana ISDH 
reports.  Although the ISDH reports actually ask for more detailed breakdowns, 
there is a similar lack of specificity in precisely what “should” be reported.  This is 
left to the discretion of the specific hospitals as well as those individuals actually 
reporting the information.
There are two categories of the ISDH Fiscal Report that seem to primarily report 
budget information on Community Health Promotion of every nonprofit hospital in 
Indiana: “Community Health Education” and “Community Programs and 
Services” (#2 and #3 itemized under “Summary of Unreimbursed Costs of 
Charity Care, Government Funded Programs and Community Benefits”, 
Statement Four).  There is not a clear definition of what is included in either of 
these – and the ISDH “Instructions for Completing the Hospital Fiscal Report” 
(2005) actually reveal a significant weakness in the reports themselves.  The 
reports filled out by the hospitals include a breakdown under “Section Three: 
Education” of both income and expense involved with “Medical Professionals”, 
“Hospital Patients”, and “Community Education”.  However the public reports 
simply group the expenses under a generic “Educational” category and do not 
differentiate educational programs for professionals from programs for the 
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community.3  It is assumed the “Community Health Education” figures under the 
“Summary of Unreimbursed Costs . . .” is taken from these figures, but that is not 
clear.  It also means that this detailed information is collected for all hospitals in 
Indiana, including for-profit and publicly owned facilities, but not reported for 
those hospitals – further limiting potential use.4  
The other category, “Community Programs and Services”, is collected in a 
separate part of the report from the hospital.  The explanations offered by the 
ISDH define these two areas:
“Community Health Education” means the reporting of the costs of 
providing these programs, and subtracting any revenue targeted 
toward these programs.  Programs offered include targeting 
specific health issues such as stress management, smoking 
cessation, weight control, and disease-specific programs.  Do not 
include in-service education programs, or programs designed to 
“market” the hospital” (ISDH “Instructions . . .” 2005, page 7).
“Community Programs or Services” are the hospital’s costs of non-
inpatient programs or services offered to residents of the 
community that increase access to necessary health care services.  
These services typically receive no or partial reimbursement.  
Examples include programs or rural care clinics, immunizations, 
school health programs, health screening, and transportation 
services.  Do not include previously reported donations, research, 
education, and/or charity net gains or losses (ISDH “Instructions . . 
.” 2005, page 9).
                                           
3 There is another section of the report that collects information of the number of professionals 
and patients educated – and the “Number of Citizens Exposed to Health Education Messages”.  
However this latter figure also is limited for evaluating the commitment of the hospital to 
community health education.  It should also be noted that, several hospitals report the population 
of the entire service area as being “exposed” to the message (e.g. three Indianapolis hospital 
reports list 1.5 million, 1 million, and 1 million as the figures) – rendering them relatively 
meaningless.
4 The ISDH contact was asked whether this data might be directly accessed, since it was part of 
the reports from the hospitals.  The reply was that since these figures were not in a consistent 
format for public reporting, the reports from the hospitals couldn’t be shared by the ISDH but 
would need to be secured from each individual hospital.
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The final sentence of the “Community Program or Services” definition helps 
discourage double counting.  However, there can be confusion as to how to 
locate a specific program.  For instance, a cholesterol or blood pressure test 
could be either “targeting a specific health issue” or a “health screening.”  A 
question could be where to locate the program’s expense (i.e. as “Community 
health Education” or Community Programs or Services”).  Is the determining 
factor the type of program that is offered or whether there is payment or 
reimbursement involved?  Some other potential confusions are whether staff time 
and facility overhead should also be included (which can be a considerable part 
of the cost), and how to specifically differentiate whether any education program 
“markets” the hospital as opposed to educates the public.  It should be noted that 
in the subsequent research interviews Community Benefit personnel raised these 
same confusions.
Two other places that could identify community health promotion expenses are 
the “Educational” category and the number of citizens exposed to the message.  
These are reported under Statement Three and as a category under Statement 
Four titled “Hospital Community Benefit Projects and the Projects’ Net Costs”.  
The latter has variable responses, with a majority of hospitals merely giving a 
single figure as “All Programs”, a figure that usually – but not always – mirrors 
the figure reported under “Community Health Education”. Other hospitals give a 
variety of levels of detail.  One other source of confusion is the category under 
the “Summary . . .” compilation as “Other Unreimbursed Costs”.  This category is 
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not defined by the ISDH (beyond stating it “offers an opportunity to insert other 
costs” – and several Indiana hospitals report this as a fairly significant 
percentage of the “Total Cost of Providing Community Benefits”.  While it is easy 
to dismiss these problems as being the weaknesses of one state’s reporting 
process, it should be noted that similar factors are in the Schedule H format 
developed by the IRS.  Due to these similarities, an evaluation of the Indiana 
data is an opportunity to see how valid similar self-reported information from 
national efforts might be.
The following analyses use two figures: the first is Health Education and the 
second is Health Promotion.5  Health Education is only the expense reported by 
Indiana nonprofit community hospitals under the ISDH designation “Community 
Health Education”.  Health Promotion includes both: i.e. “Community Programs 
and Services” added to “Community Health Education”.  The first term (i.e. 
Health Education) is a lower figure and is self-identified as specifically limited to 
those health education programs specifically designed for the general 
community.  The second category (i.e. “Community Programs and Services”) is a 
larger and more inclusive figure.  It potentially includes other community building 
and involvement efforts, intended to benefit the larger community.  Neither figure 
includes the larger designation “Total Cost of Providing Community Benefits”, 
                                           
5 In the interest of simplicity, the word “Community” is omitted both from references to Health 
Education and to Health Promotion.  Throughout the following chapters, both terms refer to 
programs offered for the benefit of the community rather than for patient or professional 
education.
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which includes Charity Care as well as the unspecific “Other Unreimbursed 
Costs.”   
Evaluating the ISDH Health Education Data
This section investigates Community Health Education expenses from the 
individual nonprofit community hospital ISDH reports and attempts to determine 
what kind of pattern might emerge.6  It first compiles and compares the Health 
Education and Health Promotion expenses reported in 2004 by all nonprofit 
hospitals in Indiana.7  It then evaluates these expenses based on the percentage 
of their operating budget spent on health education programs.  Providing these 
types of programs is not a specifically delineated requirement of nonprofit 
hospitals, separate from the broader community benefit designation.  Therefore 
the percentage of the operational budget hospitals expend on this activity is one 
way to investigate the relative commitment the organization has to this type of 
philanthropic behavior.
The expenses of Health Education Programs reported in 2004 by all 62 nonprofit 
hospitals in Indiana8 are summarized in Appendix 4-1.9  Appendix 4-1 also shows 
                                           
6 For this chapter and for Chapter Two, only nonprofit community hospitals are examined.
7 To clarify year designations: the data from fiscal year 2004 is reported on the 2005 ISDH 
Reports.  Throughout this paper, if the data itself is referred to it is referred as from (fiscal year) 
2004.  If the report itself is referred to, it is the 2005 report.
8 It should also be noted that there are 62 nonprofit hospitals in the listings, although ISDH data in 
Chapter Three indicated 61 nonprofit hospitals in Indiana.  This discrepancy is because two 
hospitals that are considered as one hospital for some reporting practices actually filed separate 
ISDH reports for 2004.  Information on both hospitals is included in this analysis.
9 The ranking reflects the size of the hospital’s expenses devoted to total Health Promotion, with 
“A” reporting the largest expenditure of nonprofit community hospitals in Indiana and “MMM” 
reporting the smallest level of these expenditures (both in actual dollars and as a percentage of 
total operating expense).  The ranking is included simply to allow for individual hospital 
comparisons between the charts in the Appendices.
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how these same hospitals rank when Health Education Expenses are defined as 
a percentage of the Total Operating Budget of the hospital.  Appendix 4-2 
compares the total funding for Health Promotion – when the category reported as 
“Community Programs and Services” is added to “Health Education.” 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine if there is any consistency in the 
level of health education expenses when individual data is looked at in detail.  
The separation of the individual hospitals also allows a comparison of the data 
that is subsequently used in the individual hospital surveys.  
Health Education and Health Promotion expenses of Indiana hospitals: One 
challenge in evaluating reported data is to determine how well aggregated, 
mean, and median figures reflect the behavior of individual hospitals or groups of 
hospitals.  This section compares these differing figures.  It could be presumed 
that if there is a level of consistency among data from a defined group of 
hospitals that the aggregate, mean and median figures should be somewhat 
comparable.  Conversely, the greater the disparity among these figures the more 
standards based on any one of these criteria could give an invalid comparison.  
                                                                                                                                 
Several clarifications should be made about the classification of the hospitals:  First, the 
“Hospital Designations” are included to preserve the relative confidentiality of the hospitals.  Even 
though the ISDH information is public, further analysis involves personal conversations and 
responses from selected individuals and their confidentiality was assured.  Second, there are 
slight discrepancies in some of the Nonprofit and County hospital designations.  The Ownership 
designation was assigned based on the AHA Guide (2006) while the ISDH designation did not 
always indicate the same Ownership.  For the purposes of this study, all hospitals reported by the 
ISDH as nonprofit hospitals are included –including three hospitals that are designated by the 
AHA as City- or County-owned.  Finally, for-profit hospitals and public hospitals In Indiana are not 
required to provide this same information on health education expense to the state, so they are 
not included in this analysis.
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This section compares these figures for Health Education and Health Promotion 
expenses of Indiana nonprofit hospitals.
In 2004, the 62 Indiana nonprofit community hospitals (as an aggregate) reported 
in the ISDH Reports spending $21,401,403 on Health Education, an average of 
.25% of their total operating budget.  The median hospital spent .08% of their 
budget on Heath Education.  As Health Education is part of the broader category 
of Health Education, the same hospitals reported spending $166,686,707 on 
Health Promotion, or 1.98% of their total operating budget.  The median hospital 
was .40%. Table 4B compares these figures:
Table 4B: Health Education and Health Promotion Expenses for Indiana 
Nonprofit Community Hospitals –2004
Total Expenditures 
by Indiana NP 
Hospitals
% of 
Operating 
Budgets -
Total
% of 
Operating 
Budgets -
Mean
% of 
Operating 
Budgets -
Median
Health Education $  21,401,403 .25%   .18% .10%
Health Promotion $166,686,707 1.98% 1.37% .44%
Ratio: HE/HP 12.65% 12.62% 13.13% 22.72%
According to these figures, actual aggregate expenditures for Health Education 
are 12.65% of Health Promotion – a percentage that is similar to the ratio of their 
expenses as a percentage of the operating budget (12.62%).  Comparing these 
ratios to the mean also shows a relatively similar percentage (13.13%) – or 4% 
higher than for the aggregate figures.  However, the ratio of the percentage of 
Health Education to Health Promotion for a median hospital is 22.72%, nearly 
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double that of either the aggregate (+179%) or the mean (+173%).  This large 
disparity between mean and median call into question the relative consistency of 
the figures recorded and reported.  These differences also illustrate that how an 
individual hospital is evaluated depends on which “standard” is used to determine 
a “typical” program.
As Table 4B also shows, Health Education and Health Promotion expenses (as a 
percent of operating expense) decline when looked at in the aggregate, the 
mean, or the median.  For Health Education, the mean is 28% lower than the 
aggregate while the median is 60% lower than the aggregate and 44% lower 
than the mean.  For Health Promotion, the mean is 30% lower than the 
aggregate while the median is 78% lower than the aggregate and 67% lower 
than the mean.  To better evaluate this disparity, the figures related to individual 
hospital need to be further investigated.  Figures 4A and 4B graphically present 
how individual hospitals are distributed according to their percentage of operating 
budgets spent on Health Education and Health Promotion.
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Figure 4A: Health Education as a % of Operating Expense (2004) 
All Indiana Nonprofit Community Hospitals
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Figure 4B: Health Promotion as a % of Operating Expense (2004) 
All Indiana Nonprofit Community Hospitals
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Figures 4A and 4B show that a high number of hospitals are grouped at the lower 
end of the percentage of operating expenses, reinforcing the figures that indicate 
the median hospital is significantly lower than the average or aggregate.  The 
disparity between the median and mean figures – as well as the difference with 
the aggregate percentage – shows how aggregate figures and averages can be 
misleading.  This is especially noteworthy when specific hospital data are 
examined.  As an example, the Health Promotion figures are dominated by three 
hospitals reporting over 4% (specifically: 21.57%, 12.78%, and 10.98%).  All 
three of these hospitals are part of the same system and are larger hospitals in 
Indianapolis.  Also, none of these hospitals reported any expense under Health 
Education, further skewing the aggregate and average figures.  Since this paper 
is primarily interested in the behavior of individual hospitals, only the mean and 
median figures are evaluated in the following investigation.  As the paper is also 
interested in individual hospitals, a focus is on comparing median figures as 
these compare a “typical” hospital (rather than a broader average).
Health Education and Health Promotion – Systems: It might be expected that 
hospitals affiliated with a system might have more consistency with other 
hospitals also in systems, as systems could encourage common recording and 
reporting processes among their affiliates.  A further supposition is that due to 
isomorphic influences, systems could also resemble each other, leading to a 
greater consistency among hospitals in systems than among independent 
hospitals.  A more delineated comparison of Health Education and Health 
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Promotion is based on system affiliation.  The following comparison investigates 
whether a hospital that is a member of a system has a similar level of community 
health education and promotion expenses with other system-affiliated hospitals.  
In 2004, of the 62 nonprofit community hospitals in Indiana, 44 are designated as 
being part of a system; 18 are independent.10  Table 4C shows the relative 
difference in the mean and median of Health Education and Health Promotion as 
a percentage of operating expenses.
Table 4C: Health Education and Health Promotion Expenses for System 
and Non-System Indiana Nonprofit Community Hospitals –2004
System: 
Health 
Education
Non-System: 
Health
Education
System:
Health 
Promotion
Non-System: 
Health 
Promotion
% of Operating 
Budgets - Mean .19% .15% 1.61% .77%
% of Operating 
Budgets - Median .09% .10% .40% .34%
The mean figures show a slight difference between system and non-system 
Health Education (with non-system hospitals reporting 21% less than system 
hospitals), and a noteworthy difference between system and non-system 
hospitals related to Health Promotion (with non-system hospitals reporting 52% 
less than system hospitals).11  However, when the medians are compared the 
difference between system and non-system hospitals is less pronounced, 
                                           
10 As previously noted, this number is slightly different than as reported in Chapter Three.  This is 
due to the shifting nature of system affiliation as well as different designations from in different 
sources (i.e. AHA Guide, ISDH reports, Internal Revenue Service, and Indiana Hospital 
Association).
11 The latter discrepancy could be affected by the three large reporting Indianapolis system 
hospitals as previously noted in the above example.
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especially for Health Education.  A Mann-Whitney (U test) shows the differences 
between system and non-system hospitals are not statistically significant, both 
for Health Education and for Health Promotion:
System and Non-System HEALTH EDUCATION12
P (two-tailed) = 0.83566
P >= 0.05, two-tailed test – The two samples are not significantly different
System and Non-System HEALTH PROMOTION13
P (two-tailed) = 0.64957
P >= 0.05, two-tailed test – The two samples are not significantly different
The null hypothesis is that the median expenditures for health education and 
health promotion for hospitals that are part of systems are similar to those that 
are independent.  Since the health education and health promotion comparisons 
both have a p-value > 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
the median health education and health promotion expenditures of system and 
independent hospitals are not significantly different.  The next section makes the 
same comparison for religious and non-religious hospitals.
Health Education and Health Promotion – Religious Systems: One hypothesis is 
that religious hospitals in systems could spend a higher level on these programs 
than nonreligious hospitals, due to being influenced by the Catholic Health 
Association’s emphasis on collecting and reporting an extensive amount of 
                                           
12 System - n1: 44, Independent - n2: 18, U: 410, Z = 0.217113.
13 System - n1: 44, Independent - n2: 18, U: 426, Z = 0.465242.
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community benefit information, including health education.  The following 
investigates this supposition.
In 2004, of the 44 nonprofit community hospitals in Indiana designated as being 
part of a system; 25 are part of a religious system; 10 are part of non-religious 
systems.14  Table 4D shows the relative difference in the mean and median of 
Health Education and Health Promotion as a percentage of operating expenses
Table 4D: Health Education and Health Promotion for Religious System and 
Non-Religious System Indiana Nonprofit Community Hospitals – 2004
Religious 
System: 
Health 
Education
Non-
Religious
System: 
Health 
Education
Non-
System: 
Health 
Education
Religious 
System:
Health 
Promotion
Non-
Religious 
System:
Health 
Promotion
Non-
System: 
Health 
Promotion
% of Operating 
Budgets -
Mean .18% .21% .15% .69% 2.84% .77%
% of Operating 
Budgets -
Median .04% .13% .10% .39% .40% .34%
The mean figures show a significant difference between religious and non-
religious system hospitals, especially for Health Promotion.15  However, when the 
medians are compared the difference between religious and non-religious 
system hospitals is less pronounced, especially for Health Promotion.  What is 
surprising is the median non-religious system hospital reports a significantly 
                                           
14 As previously noted, this number is slightly different than as reported in Chapter Three.  This is 
due to the shifting nature of system affiliation as well as different designations from in different 
sources (i.e. AHA Guide, ISDH reports, Internal Revenue Service, and Indiana Hospital 
Association).
15 Again, the Non-Religious System Health Promotion mean figure is supposedly affected by the 
three large reporting Indianapolis system hospitals, as previously noted.
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greater percentage of spending on Health Education than the median religious 
system hospital.16   A Mann-Whitney (U test) shows the differences between 
religious and non-religious system hospitals are not statistically significant, either 
for Health Education or for Health Promotion:
Religious and Non-Religious System HEALTH EDUCATION17
P (two-tailed) = 0.654988
P >= 0.05, two-tailed test – The two samples are not significantly different
Religious and Non-Religious System HEALTH PROMOTION18
P (two-tailed) = 0.924772
P >= 0.05, two-tailed test – The two samples are not significantly different
Since the health education and health promotion comparisons both have a p-
value > 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude the median 
health education and health promotion expenditures of religious and non-
religious hospitals are not significantly different.  A final comparison looks at the 
two largest Catholic systems in Indiana.  It could be hypothesized that their 
results should also be similar, since both systems are part of the Catholic Health 
Association and have similar values as well as systemic pressures to provide 
health education programs for their communities.
                                           
16 Since Health Promotion includes Health Education, one possible explanation is that religious 
systems report less activity as Health Education than non-religious hospitals, moving related 
expenses under a different category.  However this would only be able to be verified through 
tracing individual hospital internal records and reports, sources generally of limited availability.
17 System - n1: 25, Independent - n2: 19, U: 256.5, Z = 0.450185.
18 System - n1: 25, Independent - n2: 19, U: 241.5, Z = 0.0947758.
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Health Education and Health Promotion – Two Religious Systems: In 2004, of 
the 25 nonprofit community hospitals in Indiana designated as being part of a 
religious system, 21 belong to either the R1system (12 hospitals) or R2 system 
(9 hospitals).19  Table 4E shows the relative difference in the mean and median 
of Health Education and Health Promotion as a percentage of operating 
expenses.
Table 4E: Health Education and Health Promotion for Indiana Nonprofit 
Community Hospitals: R1 and R2 Catholic Systems– 2004
R1: 
Health 
Education
R2: 
Health 
Education
ALL 
Religious 
System: 
Health 
Education
R1: 
Health 
Promotion
R2: 
Health 
Promotion
ALL 
Religious 
System:
Health 
Promotion
% of 
Operating 
Budgets -
Mean .08% .31% .18% .41% .97% .69%
% of 
Operating 
Budgets -
Median .06% .15% .04% .39% .75% .39%
A Mann-Whitney test shows that the difference between R1 and R2 hospitals is 
not statistically significant:
                                           
19 In order to preserve confidentiality, as indicated in subsequent hospital surveys, these systems 
are designated as “R1” and “R2”.  These designations parallel designations used in the 
Appendices.
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R1 and R2 Health Education20
P (two-tailed) = 0.1930052
P >= 0.05, two-tailed test – The two samples are not significantly different
R1 and R2 Health Promotion21
P (two-tailed) = 0.277318
P >= 0.05, two-tailed test – The two samples are not significantly different
Since the health education and health promotion comparisons both have a p-
value > 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude the medians of 
the health education and health promotion expenditures of the two Catholic 
hospital systems are not significantly different.  
The preceding Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the difference in the 
percentages of Health Education and Health Promotion expenses by system or 
non-system hospitals religious or non-religious hospitals, or between two 
systems are not statistically significant (p-value of > 0.05).  However with the 
exception of Religious vs. Non-religious Health Promotion, a comparison of the 
actual p-values (two tailed) shows a declining level of p-value with each 
subsequent test (Table 4F):
                                           
20 System - n1: 12, Independent - n2: 9, U: 72.5, Z = 1.13147.
21 System - n1: 12, Independent - n2: 9, U: 69.5, Z = 1.10154.
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Table 4F: Comparison of p-values (two tailed) from Mann-Whitney Tests
System vs 
Non-System: 
Religious vs 
Non-Religious R1 vs R2
Health Education 0.83 0.66 0.19
Health Promotion 0.64 0.92 0.28 
The p-value for the comparison between the two Catholic systems for both 
Health Education and Health Promotion is quite a bit lower than for the other 
compressions, nearing the .05 level below which would start to indicate a 
significant difference between the two samples.  This starts to confirm the means 
and median comparison between the two systems indicating that R2 seems to 
invest more than twice as much of their budget for Community Health programs.  
But it also leads to a possible conclusion that religiously-affiliated hospitals are 
actually less similar to each other than they are to non-religious hospitals.
There are two primary observations that seem to be drawn from the ISDH data: 
the first is the disparity between ratios based on aggregate, means, and median 
figures.  This difference casts doubt on the consistency of reporting systems as 
well as on standards based on any one of these criteria.  Median figures seem to 
provide the most consistent comparisons.  The second observation is that the 
differences between hospitals do not seem to become less when looking at more 
defined levels of sub-groups.  In the case of the two religious hospital systems, 
there is actually a greater level of disparity within these systems than in the more 
aggregated levels.  Only by looking at individual hospitals might we be able to 
draw useful conclusions.  
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Survey of Indiana Hospitals
To compare health education data of different hospitals, individual contact was 
made with hospitals via a written questionnaire and personal follow-up 
conversations.  In the winter of 2007/2008, questionnaires were sent to 107 
Indiana hospitals to better identify the processes used by Indiana hospitals to 
determine and report expenditures for health education and donations on their 
ISDH Report.  Hospital representatives were asked if they would also be willing 
to take part in a short telephone or in-person conversation to elaborate on their 
responses.  The purposes of this questionnaire and survey process were two-
fold.  First was to better determine the relative validity of the figures reported by 
the hospitals on the ISDH Hospital Fiscal Report.  The second purpose was to 
determine the organizational process used to identify and report these figures.  
The former is important to better determine how well self-reported figures might 
be when used in public databases.  The latter identifies the organizational 
processes that most influence decisions for nonprofit hospitals to engage in 
philanthropic behavior.
All hospitals were sent a two-page questionnaire with a cover letter (see 
Appendix 4-522).  The letters were personally addressed to the individual 
identified as the “Community Benefit Representative” on each hospital’s 2005 
Hospital Fiscal Report.  The position or department of this designated 
representative was not consistent, but was assumed to be the person who 
                                           
22 Appendix 4-5 of this chapter does not include the questionnaire for donations.  That example is 
attached to Chapter Five.  For the mailing, both were sent as one document and filled out at the 
same time.
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actually filled out the report form, which can vary from hospital to hospital.  In 
most cases this individual was in the public relations or marketing departments.  
If there was a defined community benefit or health education position, that 
person was the designated representative.  In some cases it was someone in 
finance.  In several small hospitals it was the administrator or chief executive 
officer.  
The letters were sent in an Indiana University envelope to encourage it being 
opened and the cover letter was on Indiana University stationery to emphasize 
the credibility to the request.  A self-addressed, stamped envelope was enclosed 
to help encourage a return.  The questionnaire was designed so it could be 
relatively quickly filled out and returned.  The first page of the questionnaire 
addressed community health education programs; the second page sought 
information on donations.
All acute-care hospitals in Indiana were contacted, including for-profit and 
government-owned facilities.  Although these types of hospitals are not legally 
required to report on community benefit, they are included in the ISDH Hospital 
Fiscal Reports.  Out of the 107 community hospitals in Indiana, 9 are for-profit, 
37 are city or county facilities, and 61 are nonprofit.
Of the 107 questionnaires sent out, 42 were returned, from 36 actual 
respondents.  Three respondents filled out one questionnaire each but indicated 
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their responses applied to 2 other hospitals.  The returned questionnaires 
represented 53 hospitals, as multiple hospitals in five systems have community 
benefits coordinated by a single department, so that individual’s responses also 
applied to those other hospitals.  Two envelopes were undelivered and returned 
marked “Addressee Unknown,” leaving 105 envelopes delivered, for a 51% 
response rate from represented hospitals – or a 40% response in actual 
questionnaires returned.  In several cases the person responding was not the 
same person the information was addressed to.  This was usually due to turnover 
in this position rather than mistaken information.  40 nonprofit hospitals returned 
the questionnaires, 66% of nonprofit hospitals.  13 city or county facilities 
returned the questionnaire, 35% of government-owned facilities.  No for-profit 
hospital returned the questionnaire.  29 of the questionnaires indicated a 
willingness to participate in a follow-up in-depth conversation and 23 of these 
actually occurred.  
The written survey questions were chosen for three primary reasons.  Each 
question was designed to better understand the organizational location of the 
health education program activities, management, and data reporting process.  
The first question (#1) identifies where in the organization the actual reporting of 
this data occurs.  One hypothesis of the paper is that health education program 
decisions are scattered throughout the organization.  If true this would indicate 
there are multiple decision processes responding to varied publics, confirming 
stakeholder theory is an influence.  In such cases, the activities, management, 
277
and reporting of health education programs will also be scattered rather than 
focused in one department. This question helps identify whether the person 
indicated as being most responsible for reporting the figures is also the person 
who is the designated community benefit representative (or the person who 
completed the survey, if different).  If the same person isn’t responsible for both 
processes, it can indicate that verifying the validity of data may also be more 
difficult.  
The second question (#2) identifies the department in the organization 
responsible for managing the health education program.  This helps determine 
how closely the management of the health education programs is tied to the 
actual operations of those programs (to be identified in Question #3).  The third 
question (#3) determines where in the organization the actual health education 
programs are located.  The more departments that are involved with health 
education programs, the more the programs scattered throughout the 
organization.  A secondary purpose for the question is to determine the 
possibility that the health education programs are actually under-reported.  The 
less these programs are centrally controlled and reported, the more the 
possibility exists that additional unreported programs might also exist.  Appendix 
4-3 summarizes the responses (including the Hospital Designations).  The results 
of the community health education portion of the surveys follow:23
                                           
23 To avoid possibly skewing the results, only the actual responses from the returned 40 
questionnaires are shared.  Even though community benefit programs for multiple hospitals may 
be coordinated by one individual it doesn’t mean the decision process is always the same for all 
affiliated institutions.  However some results will add up to more than 40 because of input that 
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Community Benefit – Health Promotion Programs Responses:
1. Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting those figures?
Item Response24 Survey Response
    6      3   CEO
  14    12   Other Administration
  18    12   Department Head
    6       4   Support Staff
    9      5   Other (please specify):
Community Development Department 
– 6 Items; 2 Surveys
3 Departments (Finance, PR, Education) 
– 1 Item; 1 Survey
Controller – 1 Item; 1 Survey
Community Benefits – 1 Item; 1 Survey
2. Which department is most responsible for managing health promotion 
programs and budget?
Item Response Survey Response
   1        1  Administration
   29      22  Public Relations/Marketing
   12        8 Health Education25
     6        2 Fund Development/Foundation26
  12        8 Other (please specify):
Community Development Staff 
– 6 Items; 2 Surveys
Health Promotions and Community Relations
– 2 Items; 2 Surveys
Education Department – 1 Item; 1 Survey
Nursing Administration – 1 Item; 1 Survey
Community Health Enhancement Division 
– 1 Item; 1 Survey
Community Health Improvement Manager 
– 1 Item; 1 Survey
                                                                                                                                 
was shared in personal interviews when it was indicated that a response represented a single 
process that covered more than one of the affiliated hospitals.  In a few cases, a response may 
not have been given, leading to response rates less than the total.
24 “Item Response” indicates the number of hospitals that the response applies to. “Survey 
Response” indicates the number of actual individuals responding.  Because several hospitals 
systems a designated single person as the Community Benefit Representative, the Item 
Response exceeds the Survey Response.  Unless a category was left blank, 53 hospitals are 
represented under Item Response and 36 individuals under Survey Response.  The actual 
number of surveys returned was 42, because eight separate questionnaires were filled out by two 
people representing one multiple hospital system.  
25 One respondent indicated both PR and Health Education – and one multiple hospital 
representative indicated it was managed by PR, Health Education, and Other (Community 
Development).  Each is counted, meaning 60 and 41 responses are tabulated in this category.
26 The figures include Community Health Improvement as a department within the Foundation.  
This is from one respondent representing five hospitals.
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3. Are the above programs determined and operated by more than one 
department or entity?
Item Survey
Response Response
44    27  Yes
  9       9  No
- If the answer to #3 is “Yes”, how many departments or entities offer health 
promotion programs?
Item Survey
Response Response
    3      3  Two
    3      3  Three
   1      1  Four
  37    20  Five or more
Discussion on Written Questionnaire Responses
The primary impression from the questionnaires is that health education is 
handled in a wide variety of ways by Indiana hospitals, and in most hospitals the 
health education programs are widely scattered throughout the organization.  
This seems to support the hypothesis that health education is motivated by the 
stakeholder theory of philanthropic behavior.
Responses from the questionnaires indicate that the management, budgets, and 
reporting of health education programs are handled by various mid-level 
administrative staff and department heads.  Of the five responses that the (Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is the primary person who reports the results, four were 
small rural hospitals (part of a larger system) and one was a small county 
hospital.  This mirrors a common situation of the smaller hospitals where the 
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hospital CEO was also listed as the “Community Benefit Representative” on the 
ISDH report.
The most significant response is that 44 of the 53 hospitals (83%) indicated more 
than one department offers community health education programs, with 38 
having five or more departments involved with some kind of outreach programs 
(72% of all hospitals surveyed).  This indicates that rather than being a centrally 
controlled, top-down administrative directive, instead efforts to reach out into the 
community are found in many layers of the organization.  This suggests that 
these types of philanthropic programs are a product of organizational or 
professional culture rather than a leadership strategy.  This is one area explored 
further in the personal conversations.
Many of the returned questionnaires included written elaborations of the 
responses.  Many of these provide additional information on the process of 
providing community health education programs.  Following are specific written 
responses to individual questions.
Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting those figures?
This question received few written comments.  Three who checked “Other 
Administration” indicated this was the Chief Financial Officer, one that it was the 
Director of Public Relations, and one that it was the “Manager of Community 
Health”.  Under “Other”, one response indicated that the “Community Benefits 
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Department” was responsible for reporting the information, while two defined the 
“Controller” as being the one responsible.  One response indicated that the 
reporting was shared among three departments: “Fiscal”, “Community Relations”, 
and “Education”.
These responses indicate that reporting health education figures is a mid-level 
responsibility and the financial results – and possibly the entire report – are either 
reported at a department level or collected in one department and then passed 
along to another department (possibly finance) to complete the ISDH report.  
This is another area to further explore during the personal interviews.
Is the person indicated as being most responsible for reporting the figures also 
the designated community benefit representative?  Is it also the person who is 
completing the survey?
17 of the 36 respondents (47%) were the same person named on the ISDH 
website as the community benefit representative.  Only 5 survey respondents 
(14%) were also the person responsible for reporting the figure, or even at the 
same management level.  This leads to question how familiar they might be with 
the figures that are reported.  This is an area included in the follow-up interviews.
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Which department is most responsible for managing health promotion programs 
and budget?
The management of the health education programs and budget is primarily done 
by Public Relations or Marketing.  Eight responded that they had a Health 
Education Department who managed these programs.  “Other” responses 
included “Community Health Improvement Manager”, “Community Health 
Enhancement Division”, “Education” and “Nursing Administrator” (“ . . . 
coordinates many or a majority of these programs”).  Five responses (from one 
system) indicated that “Community Development” staff coordinated the 
programs.  One response noted that programs were run by a Community Health 
Improvement position in the Foundation office.
One impression from these responses is the health outreach efforts primarily 
serve a Public Relations or Marketing role, rather than a healthcare function.  A 
second impression is that Health Education in general, and Community Health 
Education in particular, is a separately designated departmental function in many 
hospitals.  These are two areas to confirm during the personal interviews. 
Are the above programs determined and operated by more than one department 
or entity?  Which ones?
A majority of the respondents (37 hospitals, or 70% of respondents) indicated 
that five or more departments operated health education programs (see 
Appendix 4-4 for individual responses).  One question to be explored in the 
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personal interviews is if this multi-department situation is a deliberate hospital 
leadership strategy to implement health education throughout the hospital or if 
the variety of locales for these programs is primarily because of grassroots 
efforts by employees in the departments.
Of those who answered “No” to this question, one identified “Administration” as 
responsible for the management of the health education program.  The others 
indicated public relations is responsible for the operation as well as the 
management of the programs.
Those who responded that multiple departments operated the various health 
education programs, identified the following departments (the number of 
responses that identify each department is in parenthesis):
 GENERAL DEPARTMENTS IDENTIFIED (listed in the order of the 
number of responses): Community (Health) Education (6), 
Marketing/Public Relations (6), Family Medicine Center (3), Laboratory 
Department (3), Nursing (3), Women’s Services (3), Emergency Medical 
Services/Ambulance (2), Obstetrics (2), Physical Therapy (2), Radiology 
(2), (Community) Wellness (2), Occupational Therapy/Health (2), 
Oncology Services (2), Community Outreach, Diabetes Center, Dietary 
Education, Education, Foundation, Imaging Department, Infection Control, 
Medical Education, Mental Health, Outpatient Physician Clinic, Pediatric 
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Services, Primary Care Clinic, Sports Medicine, and (other) Ancillary 
Services.
Other specific written responses are identified in Appendix 4-6:27
While the most frequently cited departments were Community Heath Education 
and Marketing/Public Relations, an additional 25 departments were listed.28  
These varied responses suggest that community health education could be seen 
as part of organizational values – or even a professional ethos of the health 
workers in the hospitals – rather than a deliberate administrative policy.  As 
previously stated, this is an area further explored in the personal conversations.
Do you have any other comments that help clarify any of the above?
Specific responses to this question are listed in Appendix 4-7.  Two aspects are 
of particular note.  The first is the comment that the figures themselves were 
either unknown or did not coincide with departmental records.  The second is that 
for at least one hospital, program costs did not include staff costs.  While this 
could suggest that healthcare workers provide many of the outreach programs 
relatively informally as part of their jobs, it’s of particular importance when trying 
to define the financial commitment to these programs by the hospital.  These are 
areas further explored in the personal interviews.
                                           
27 NOTE: any specific departments mentioned in these comments are also included in the 
tabulation above.
28 The prevalence of Health Education Department responses should be qualified, due to multiple 
responses from one system that centrally coordinates the outreach efforts of several hospitals.  
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Discussion on Personal Interviews
As stated earlier, 29 of the questionnaires indicated a willingness to participate in 
a follow-up in-depth conversation and 23 of these actually occurred.  These 23 
individuals represented 34 hospitals.29  Three interviews (with six individuals 
representing 12 nonprofit hospitals30) were done in person, with the other 17 
done via telephone.  Four of the telephone interviews were with county hospitals; 
the other 13 were with nonprofit hospitals.  The three personal interviews were 
with representatives of three of the largest hospital systems in Indianapolis, two 
of them Catholic systems.  The telephone interviews included two other large 
Indiana hospital systems.  The personal interviews lasted between 30 and 60 
minutes; the telephone conversations were between 5 and 15 minutes (with one 
lasting nearly 30 minutes).
The conversations were structured to encourage respondents to share the 
thoughts they felt were most significant.  Every interview discussed each of the 
items on the questionnaire.  They also sought reaction to five specific questions
prompted by the written responses (noted in the discussion above):
1. How aware of the reported figures is the designated Community Benefit 
Representative – and how well do those figures coincide with other 
departmental records? 
                                           
29 It should be noted that consent to the interviews was entirely voluntary and therefore the 
respondents were self-selected.  14 of the respondents represented multi-hospital systems with 
formal designations for health education or similar labels.  One respondent was the Chief 
Executive Officer of a small county hospital.  It is likely that the reactions from the interviews 
reflect a multi-hospital and formal health education program bias.
30 One meeting was with four representatives who represented six system hospitals.
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2. Do these figures include staff time and other overhead expenses? 
3. Are the expenses and programs dedicated to community health education 
a deliberate administrative and board decision, directed by middle 
management within departments, or determined by line-level employees 
providing programs as they see they are needed?
4. Do the outreach efforts within the hospital fill primarily a Public 
Relations/Marketing role – or a healthcare service role?
5. Is Community Health Education becoming a more formal department 
and/or program of the hospital than it has in the past?
Overview of the Interviews
The primary impression from the interviews is that attention to Community 
Benefit in general and Community Health Education in particular is becoming 
increasingly important among hospitals in Indiana.  Part of this could be due to 
those who responded to the questionnaire and agreed to the interviews were 
organizations and employees who had a particular interest in the topic and 
commitment to the process.
We might expect those hospitals that responded to the questionnaire as having 
and/or reporting a higher percentage of health education expenses than those 
who might have less of an emphasis on this practice.  Appendix 4-1 and 
Appendix 4-2 identify how the responding hospitals ranked in relation to their 
indicated expenditures on Health Education and on Total Health Promotion – as 
a percentage of Total Operating Expense.  While slightly more than half of the 
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respondents in each table fell into the top 50% of both the percentage of health 
education and of total health promotion expenditures, the differences are not 
significant.  The overall dispersal is fairly random, even among single systems 
(and particularly Catholic systems) that state they are more formally emphasizing 
centralized reporting of Community Benefit expenses.  
The random nature of the respondents gives broader validity that the conclusions 
of the questionnaire are an indication that responses could be applied to all 
Indiana hospitals and that there is a growing awareness of community benefit.  
13 of the respondents were publicly owned hospitals strengthening the 
conclusion that the awareness of and commitment to community benefit is not 
confined to nonprofit facilities.
During 19 of the 23 interviews (83%) the interviewee expressed a desire to more 
efficiently and completely collect available health education data.  However 18 of 
the interviewees (78%) indicated that the wide variety of programs done by 
different departments made this a challenge.  Even the hospital systems that 
have formalized and centralized the management of these programs indicated 
they were continually finding departments that were conducting qualified 
programs that they did not know about.  Nevertheless, 16 respondents (70%) 
said they were taking steps to have a more comprehensive reporting system.  
They also indicated that the new IRS reporting system was encouraging these 
steps, but that for the most part it was an effort that had been going on for 
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several years at the hospital.  15 specifically (65%) said they were instituting 
reporting criteria based on or similar to the CHA/VHA guidelines.31
Responses Related to the Questionnaire
The interviews reinforced the conclusion that the operation and reporting of 
health education programs is dispersed throughout the hospital rather than being 
strategically focused.  This was true even for organizations that had taken steps 
to more centralize the health education/community benefit activities.
Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting those figures?
In 12 interviews (52%), it was indicated that finance submits the ISDH Report to 
the state of Indiana (with two interviewees saying as the person responsible for 
community benefit, they are the ones who filled it out).  In seven cases it wasn’t 
known who exactly had this responsibility (this uncertainty was also expressed in 
one follow-up conversation with the hospital’s controller).  However 17 of the 23 
interviewees stated the figures were pulled from various departments of the 
hospitals, with the data being self-reported by different departments.  Five 
interviewees said they were not currently getting data from other departments, 
but three expected to have this capability by the end of the year.  The other two 
stated they were moving in that direction.  Approximately half of the respondents 
(12 of the 23, all representing larger hospital systems) said their community 
                                           
31 One reaction related to this reporting criteria was expressed by five of the respondents: 
because the name of the manufacturer of the industry-accepted software for reporting community 
benefit data (Community Benefit Information System Accounting, or CBISA) is Lyon Software, the 
similarity of the last name of the researcher encouraged them to return the questionnaire, 
assuming there might be a relationship to the software firm. 
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benefit program was a formal system-wide process that was standardized and 
centralized.  Three of these said a pre-determined annual amount from the 
hospital was identified as going to community health programs, a budget figure 
determined by the board and administration.  The other nine said that individual 
departments did their own recording and sent the results to one department for 
preparing the final report.  Two hospitals said that two or three departments filled 
out different sections of the report form, acting separately with their own 
information.  Even those with centralized systems said they weren’t always sure 
exactly what was included in some of the figures or how consistently they were 
reported year-to-year or across different areas of the hospital.
Which department is most responsible for managing health promotion programs 
and budget?
The response to this varied across hospitals.  Three indicated there was a 
“Community Benefit Team” or Management Team of various department 
managers that coordinated the overall efforts and one said that there was a 
board committee to review the programs.  Two indicated health promotion 
program management was actually coordinated by the hospital foundation that 
also helped with tracking and reporting.  Fifteen said there was no formal process 
or set budget but was rather the responsibility of individual departments to 
conduct programs as they saw fit, approved by the department head.  One 
observed they were not sure if there was an actual budget for health education 
programs.
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In terms of hospital policies, three said there was a formal hospital policy 
encouraging departments to initiate and conduct these types of programs.  One 
respondent outlined a process that seemed to reflect the approach of many 
hospitals: “Education assesses the needs. Administration encourages 
departments to participate. Community Relations publicizes the needs and 
receives requests, both internally and externally. Education approves the 
expenditures. Finance tracks and reports the expenses.”  Two indicated that the 
expense actually came from three different budgets (but not the same three, i.e.: 
#1: “Community Education, Social Responsibility, and Health 
Education/Community Benefit”; and #2: “Administration, Accounting, and 
Community Benefit”).
Are the above programs determined and operated by more than one department 
or entity?  If “Yes”, how many departments or entities offer health promotion 
programs?
In every case, the reaction to this question during the interviews is that more 
departments actually conducted programs than they had listed on the 
questionnaire.  Many of the programs were not formally shared with others in the 
hospital and in some cases with administration.  This was even true for those 
who initially checked “No”.  
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Responses to the Identified Questions
Many of the identified additional questions were addressed in the conversations 
about the above.  If they were not brought up in the conversations, the questions 
were asked as an additional part of the interview.  
1. How aware of the reported figures is the designated Community Benefit 
Representative – and how well do those figures coincide with other 
departmental records? 
Only three of the respondents knew whether the figures were correct or could 
specifically identify their origins.  Although 18 of the respondents were “officially” 
listed as “Community Benefit Representative” on the ISDH report, 15 did not 
actually fill out the form.  This uncertainty or questioning of the figures was the 
most common reaction expressed during the interviews, mentioned by 17 of the 
23 interviewees (74%).  Two interviewees mentioned one other complication: 
additional grants were used to cover health promotion costs and they did not 
think those expense or income figures were part of the reported figures (in one 
case, 34% of health promotion expenses were covered by these grants).
2. Do these figures include staff time and other overhead expenses? 
Two said that staff time but not overhead was part of the expense figures.  Three 
said neither staff time nor overhead was included.  The other 21 said they didn’t 
know since the information came from other departments.  One of those said 
they suspected it varied depending on “what the department head wants to 
292
claim”.  Another respondent mentioned the expense figures included the 
education of professional healthcare staff, a practice they were seeking to 
change.
3. Are the expenses and programs dedicated to community health education 
a deliberate administrative and board decision, directed by middle 
management within departments, or determined by line-level employees 
providing programs as they see they are needed?
This was fairly evenly split.  Six respondents (26%) said that there was a 
centralized administrative directive.  Nine (39%) noted it was up to the various 
departments while eight (35%) indicated decisions were made on a staff level
(see Appendix 4-4 and Tables 4G and 4H).  However, even those who said there 
was a formal process indicated that it allowed for or even encouraged initiatives 
by individual departments and their employees.  For those who said decisions 
were the discretion of the various departments, programs were usually 
undertaken with the approval of the department head.  However there was 
uncertainty expressed by six interviewees whether that meant the department 
head initiated the programs or if they originated with line-level employees and the 
department head simply approved them.  
Designations for health education direction were created to better identify the 
various decision-making levels. There are four Designations: “A” is Administrative 
Direction, “D” is Department head Direction, “F” is Foundation Direction (or other 
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separate entity), and “S” is line level Staff Direction.  These are subjectively 
assigned by the researcher, but are based on the input from the questionnaires 
and the interviews.  These designations are based on where in the organization 
decisions are made to implement programs, fund new activities, evaluate current 
programs, and determine future community outreach goals, programs, and 
needs.  They also correspond to the nonprofit philanthropy models developed in 
Chapter One (Exhibit 4A):
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Exhibit 4A: The Nonprofit Philanthropy Models
Nonprofit 
Philanthropy 
Model
External 
Mandate
Management 
Function 
Leadership 
Directed
(CEO or Board)
Separate 
Organi-
zational 
Function
Stake-
holder 
Discretion
Organizational 
Motivation
(from Young 
and 
Burlingame)
To comply 
with 
External 
Criteria
To ensure 
and/or 
increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community and 
social 
responsibility
To 
strengthen 
economic 
and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
consti-
tuencies 
Organizational 
Structure
Imitative of 
Mandates
Embedded in 
Dep’t and
Manager 
Hierarchy
Practices at 
Leadership 
Level
Separate 
foundation 
or identified 
and 
publicly-
visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
Expected 
Organizational 
Location of 
Philanthropic 
Function
(Similar to 
regulatory 
mandates 
or system 
structures)
Linked with 
primary 
mission or 
operation:
DEPARTMENT
(D)
Board or CEO 
leadership:
ADMINISTRATIVE
(A)
Separate 
foundation 
or identified 
and 
publicly-
visible 
department:
FOUNDATION
(F)
Dispersed 
throughout 
organization
STAFF
(S)
Administrative Direction (“A”) indicates a top-down organizational commitment to 
health education and outreach programs, with the board and/or administration 
implementing a definitive policy establishing program and funding parameters.  In 
“A” hospitals community outreach is a key strategic priority of the entire 
organization and has strong administrative and/or board or even system-wide 
oversight and direction.  The community outreach effort in these hospitals is 
formal but the specific organizational form the program takes seems to be more 
varied.  For “A” hospitals, the community outreach efforts have helped to re-
shape the system structure rather than fitting within a pre-existing administrative 
organizational structure.
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Department direction (“D”) indicates health education and outreach programs are 
the responsibility of a designated department – established by administration but 
with program operation delegated to that department, that has a degree of 
latitude to plan, coordinate, and report on activities. In “D” designated hospitals, 
community outreach tends to be seen as one activity of the hospital but is no 
higher an administrative priority than any other department or function.  “D” 
hospitals seem to have health education programs fairly well 
“compartmentalized” within a single area and as a defined segment within a 
formal administrative structure.  In these hospitals, various departments may still 
do program operation but they are initiated and evaluated by the mid-level 
department and/or director.  In these hospitals there were fewer departments 
identified as operating community education programs – with many of these 
indicating no other department operating such programs.  Many “D” hospitals are 
larger hospitals with the resources to have Health Education as a separate 
department.  However several small hospitals also had separate departments, 
with outreach programs indicated as one responsibility of a single public relations 
director.
Foundation direction (“F”) identifies that the health education programs are 
operated out of the hospital foundation.  In this case the health education 
program budget and operation is managed by the foundation staff and board, 
generally in addition to having a responsibility for also raising funds from 
individual, corporate, and grant sources.  One (non-religious) hospital system 
296
identified this structure for their programs and responsibility of the foundation.  
Interestingly in this case, the hospital’s foundation actually had limited 
responsibility for raising additional contributions, a typical role for most hospital 
foundations.  Funding for the health education expenses was done through an 
annual transfer of funds from the hospitals.
Staff direction (“S”) indicates that health outreach programs are scattered 
throughout the hospital with seemingly little administrative or departmental 
direction.  In “S” hospitals it is the various staff members in multiple departments 
that appear to take the initiatives and create the opportunities to conduct a 
variety of health outreach activities.  “S” hospitals tend to be informal in their 
approach to health education.  They expressed some uncertainty as to how 
many outreach programs are done or who is doing them.  Many questionnaires 
of “S” hospitals indicated responsibilities for management, reporting, and 
operation of the program were often located at different levels of the 
organization.  Some “S” hospitals are part of a larger system with a centralized 
health education division, but in practice the programs seem relatively dispersed 
throughout the organization.  In these cases the department is primarily a 
reporting mechanism rather than providing program direction and initiation.
Tables 4G and 4H show the different levels of health education program 
decisions, from the questionnaires (if the hospital was not interviewed) and from 
the interviews.  The interviews confirmed (and in cases revised) the information 
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from the questionnaires.  There could be a suspicion that larger hospitals would 
be more formalized (and perhaps more likely to have separate departments and 
more formal processes). Table 4G further divides the responses by hospital size 
(according to the ISDH designation) to show how the figures might vary 
depending on the relative size of the hospital.  To identify the effect and 
consistency of system membership on health education program decisions and 
reporting (the External Mandate Model, above), Table 4H divides the responses 
by religious system, nonreligious system, and independent ownership. 
Table 4G: Location of Community Health Education Decisions –
By Hospital Size
Total Large Medium Small
FROM INTERVIEWS 23 6 7 10
Administrative level: “A” 3 2 - 1
Department level: “D” 9 1 3 5
Staff level: “S” 7 2 3 2
Foundation level: “F” 4 1 1 2
FROM QUESTIONNAIRE
(No Interviews) 22 4 8 10
Administrative level: “A” 1 - - 1
Department level: “D” 12 2 4 6
Foundation level: “F” 1 - - 1
Staff level: “S” 8 2 3 3
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Table 4H: Location of Community Health Education Decisions –
By System Designation
Total Religious 
System
Non-Religious
System
No 
System
FROM INTERVIEWS 23 10 7 6
Administrative level: “A” 3 - 2 1
Department level: “D” 8 2 2 4
Foundation level: “F” 4 - 4 -
Staff level: “S” 8 8 - 1
FROM QUESTIONNAIRE
(No Interviews) 22 5 1 16
Administrative level: “A” 1 - - 1
Department level: “D” 12 4 - 8
Foundation level: “F” 1 - 1 -
Staff level: “S” 8 1 - 7
Tables 4G and 4H show a relative lack of consistency of the location of the 
health education function related to organizational size or system involvement.  
The only category that seemed to reflect one hypothesis of this chapter – that 
health education programs would be found scattered throughout the hospital –
were Catholic systems.  Interestingly, those same Catholic hospitals actually 
might have been expected to be primarily “D” hospitals – as Catholic systems 
might be more apt to follow standardized department criteria in accord with the 
CHA/VHA community benefit guidelines.  This could lead to the hypothesis that 
Catholic hospitals would be more inclined to have a formal Community Benefit 
Department to coordinate these programs.  However this was not the case as 
Catholic systems was found to vary in how centralized the efforts were, with most 
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of them locating community health education programs scattered throughout the 
hospital and occurring on the staff level.32
Three respondents (representing seven hospitals) indicated their organization 
has a tithing program – meaning the board and administration passed a policy 
that 10% of the net revenue (after expenses) is to be spent on community 
outreach programs.  In one case this was a formal granting program to other 
agencies.  In the other two it was a transfer of funds to the hospital’s foundation, 
and the foundation subsequently either disbursed the money back to the 
appropriate departments, or the foundation actually administered and conducted 
the outreach programs.  The first hospital is designated as an “A” decision-
making process; the other two as an “F” process.
4. Do the outreach efforts within the hospital fill primarily a Public 
Relations/Marketing role – or a healthcare service role?
Responses to this question were varied – with 19 responding “a little of both”.  
The reactions indicated that these programs have multiple benefits and attempts 
to “define” their purpose as one or the other are probably artificial at best.  One 
potential misleading aspect of this question is how the practice of “public 
relations” is defined or interpreted by different individuals – and subsequently 
whether the interpretation of the function of public relations is self-serving (i.e. as 
simply a means to influence public and/or consumer image of the organization) 
                                           
32 This variability was even found within the each of the two Catholic systems that participated in 
the survey and took part in the interviews.  Neither of the two systems interviewed had a 
completely consistent response (see Appendix 4-8).
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or customer-serving (i.e. primarily serves as a means of communication between 
the organization and its publics).33  A third possibility is that the health education 
efforts of the organization may merely be “assigned” to a public relations 
department for purposes of organizational convenience (i.e. it is considered by 
administration as the “logical” department to put these programs under).  This 
latter conclusion is especially consistent with the response from a majority of 
hospitals that multiple departments actually conducted the various programs.  In 
this case it may simply be the role of the public relations department to collect 
and report this information.  The reality is that each public relations or marketing 
program can serve multiple roles and can reflect several motivations 
simultaneously.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to parse out the nuances of 
this definition, and the conclusion “a little of both” is probably the most accurate 
observation that can be made within the limitations of this particular study.
5. Is Community Health Education becoming a more formal department 
and/or program of the hospital than it has in the past?
Even those without a formal department felt the answer to this was “Yes”.  The 
IRS Schedule H requirement was credited for accelerating the trend but nearly ¾ 
of the respondents (16 of 22) indicated this was part of a direction that had 
existed within the healthcare organization before those governmental actions.  
This trend confirms the isomorphism explanation for this type of behavior, 
                                           
33 A problematic consideration for those critics who maintain public relations is primarily self-
serving is the example of a hospital developing a needed community health education program 
but in order to not seem self-serving the existence of that program is not communicated to 
potentially interested publics.  In such an extreme situation, there would be no way for the public 
in need to know this “pure” service program even existed!
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whether influenced (“coerced”) by federal regulations or by the increased 
systemic guidelines such as those developed by the CHA/VHA related to 
community benefit standards.  Earlier in the chapter (e.g. Table 4C and 4D) the 
systemic influence is called into question, but later in this chapter a comparison is 
made of the differences in expenditures by systems as opposed to independent 
hospitals that might shed some additional light on this question. 
Relationship between Location and Health Education/Promotion Expenditure
One key question that arises from this identification of the location of the 
decision-making process in the organization is whether there is a relationship 
between where in the organization the decisions and reporting occur and the 
percentage of health education and health promotion expenditure spent by an 
organization on these programs.  Table 4I shows the hospitals that were 
interviewed and their program location, arranged from the highest to lowest 
percentage of health promotion expenditure:
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Table 4I: Interviewed Hospitals - Percentage of Expenditures on Health 
Education/Promotion Programs and Organizational Location –
By Percentage of Expenditure (Highest to Lowest Health Promotion%)
Hospital
Desig.
2005
Own.
2005
System?34
Peer 
Group
Direction
Admin, 
Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff?
% TOTAL 
HP/Oper
Exp
Com. Hlth Ed 
Exp / Tot. 
Oper 
Expense
INTERVIEWS
F NP NR4 S D 2.821% 0.297%
G NP No M D 2.430% 0.498%
I NP No S D 1.471% 0.736%
M NP No L S 1.094% 0.015%
P NP R1 M S 1.044% 0.322%
V NP R2 L A 0.748% 0.594%
U NP NR1 L F 0.790% 0.404%
X NP NR2 L D 0.732% 0.557%
Y NP R1 S D 0.640% 0.000%
AA NP No L A 0.528% 0.000%
BB NP R1 M S 0.479% 0.028%
EE NP R1 M S 0.414% 0.313%
FF NP NR1 S F 0.397% 0.237%
II NP R1 S S 0.367% 0.119%
JJ NP R1 S S 0.361% 0.070%
NN NP NR1 S F 0.327% 0.300%
SS NP R1 L S 0.233% 0.057%
VV NP NR1 M F 0.200% 0.029%
WW NP NR3 M D 0.192% 0.128%
XX NP No M D 0.188% 0.066%
CCC NP R1 S S 0.065% 0.000%
GGG NP No S A 0.006% 0.006%
KKK NP R1 S D 0.000% 0.000%
There appears to be little correlation between amount of expenditure and the 
organizational location of the program. Table 4J summarizes these variations 
among departments, using data from the interviews only.
                                           
34 System Designations are: R = Religious System; NR = Nonreligious Systems; No = No 
System.  The numbers correspond to common systems (e.g. R1 = all hospitals part of the same 
Religious System #1; R2 = all hospitals part of Religious System #2; and so on).
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Table 4J: Percentage of Operating Expenditures on Health Education and 
Health Promotion – By Location: 2004
Interviews Only
Health Promotion Expense as 
% of Operating Budget
Health Education Expense as % 
of Operating Budget
Location 
(Number)
Average Median Average Median
A (3)   .32% .53% .20% .01%
D (8) 1.05% .64% .32% .13%
F (4)   .43% .33% .24% .24%
S (8)   .51% .37% .12% .06%
Those programs that are located at a department head (“D”) level appear to 
spend significantly more than hospitals that locate the program elsewhere in the 
organization.  This holds true for both Health Promotion and Health Education 
expenses.  Health Promotion programs located at the Staff (“S”) line level are 
next, followed by Foundation (“F”) and Administration (“A”) having the lowest 
level – although for Health Education expenses, these are slightly different.  
Table 4K shows the figures for all hospitals that returned the questionnaire (and 
also had reported ISDH Health Promotion and Education figures).
Table 4K: Percentage of Operating Expenditures for Health Education and 
Health Promotion – By Organizational Location within the Hospital: 2004
All that Responded to the Questionnaire35
Health Promotion Expense as 
% of Operating Budget
Health Education Expense as % 
of Operating Budget
Location 
(Number)
Average Median Average Median
A   (3)   .32% .53% .20% .01%
D (13) 1.07% .73% .21% .10%
F  (5)   .55% .40% .40% .30%
S (11)   .50% .39% .15% .09%
                                           
35 Only hospitals are included that BOTH reported ISDH data AND ALSO responded to the 
questionnaire.  It is noted that 10 hospitals responded to the questionnaire that did not have ISDH 
financial data.
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Again, those hospitals that located the programs at the Department level had 
significantly larger percentages of Health Promotion expenditures than other 
locations, although Foundation-based programs reported a higher percentage of 
Health Education programs.  It should be re-emphasized that the more important 
expense figure is Health Promotion, as this seems to (generally) include Health 
Education programs but also takes into account other programs to improve 
health in the community.
While the limited nature of this study makes generalized conclusions difficult, 
there are some preliminary observations that can be made from these figures.  
The first is the variability found in the location of the management of these 
programs.  There appears to be little consistency in the studied Indiana hospitals 
in how and where various programs are located.  The second observation is that 
when the programs are managed at a departmental level, a higher percentage of 
health promotion expenses are found.  This could be because if there is a 
designated department there is also a more formalized program for creating and 
managing these programs.  This formalized responsibility could also motivate a 
department head to better collect and report the programs offered throughout the 
hospital, since a majority of hospitals indicated that five or more departments 
actually provided health education programs – including those that were 
managed at a departmental level.
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The seeming lack of consistency in the Indiana nonprofit hospitals as a whole 
raises the question whether hospitals that are part of a system show a greater 
consistency.  Isomorphism theory would suggest that systems would influence 
their member hospitals to structure themselves in a similar manner.  There could 
be the implication that this similarity could also lead to similar levels of 
expenditures.  Table 4L shows the interviewed hospitals arranged by system 
affiliation.
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Table 4L: Interviewed Hospitals - Percentage of Expenditures on Health 
Education/Promotion Programs and Organizational Location –
By System
Hospital
Desig.
2005
Own.
2005
System?
Peer 
Group
Direction
Admin, 
Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff?
% TOTAL 
HP/Oper
Exp
Com. Hlth Ed 
Exp / Tot. 
Oper 
Expense
INTERVIEWS
P NP R1 M S 1.044% 0.322%
Y NP R1 S D 0.640% 0.000%
BB NP R1 M S 0.479% 0.028%
EE NP R1 M S 0.414% 0.313%
II NP R1 S S 0.367% 0.119%
JJ NP R1 S S 0.361% 0.070%
SS NP R1 L S 0.233% 0.057%
CCC NP R1 S S 0.065% 0.000%
KKK NP R1 S D 0.000% 0.000%
V NP R2 L A 0.748% 0.594%
U NP NR1 L F 0.790% 0.404%
FF NP NR1 S F 0.397% 0.237%
NN NP NR1 S F 0.327% 0.300%
VV NP NR1 M F 0.200% 0.029%
X NP NR2 L D 0.732% 0.557%
WW NP NR5 M D 0.192% 0.128%
F NP NR4 S D 2.821% 0.297%
G NP No M D 2.430% 0.498%
I NP No S D 1.471% 0.736%
M NP No L S 1.094% 0.015%
AA NP No L A 0.528% 0.000%
XX NP No M D 0.188% 0.066%
GGG NP No S A 0.006% 0.006%
There seems to be less consistency than might be expected, especially between 
the two religious systems.  Even within the R1 system, two hospitals locate the 
management of health promotion programs in departments, while the others are 
at the staff level.  Table 4M summarizes the interviewed hospitals by type of 
system:
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Table 4M: Percentage of Operating Expenditures on Health Education and 
Health Promotion – By System: 2004
Interviews Only
Health Promotion Expense 
as % of Operating Budget
Health Education Expense as % 
of Operating Budget
System
(Number)
Average Median Average Median
Catholic 
System (10) .44% .37% .15% .06%
Nonreligious 
System (7) .78% .40% .28% .30%
No System 
(6) .95% .53% .22% .02%
What is surprising is that independent hospitals report a much higher percentage 
of Health Promotion expense than the system hospitals – and the religious 
system hospitals report the lowest level of expense.  This could be counter to 
expectations that might assume that religious hospitals would provide a higher 
level of health promotion expenses because of their mission as well as the 
influence of the CHA Community Benefit guidelines to better collect this type of 
information.  This lower level of reporting by the religious (Catholic) hospitals is 
also seen in the (seemingly) more defined Health Education expenses.
Table 4N shows a similar situation in a summary of all hospitals that returned the 
questionnaires. 
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Table 4N: Percentage of Operating Expenditures on Health Education and 
Health Promotion – By System: 2004
All that Responded to the Questionnaire
NOTE:
10 hospitals responded to the questionnaire that did not have ISDH financial data
Health Promotion Expense 
as % of Operating Budget
Health Education Expense as % 
of Operating Budget
System
(Number)
Average Median Average Median
Catholic 
System (13)
.45% .48% .13% .12%
Nonreligious 
System (8)
.81% .79% .37% .40%
No System 
(11)
1.01% .75% .19% .10%
Again, definitive conclusions based on this limited study are difficult to make.  
However the figures seem to indicate that it is not religious system hospitals that 
provide the highest level of health education and promotion programs for their 
communities.  Instead independent hospitals show a much higher level of health 
promotion expenditure.  The reasons for this is speculative, but one possible 
explanation could be that independent hospitals are more influenced by local 
boards and control and therefore more concerned about the needs of their 
community than a centralized system.  One explanation could be that Catholic 
hospitals are more honest and therefore don’t inflate their figures.  It could also 
be explained that where more formalized reporting systems are in place (in 
systems) there is a more limited definition of health promotion.  Regardless, 
these findings provide a potential question to further investigate in future 
research as well as in the analysis of donations in the next chapter,
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Conclusions
The initial hypothesis of this chapter (related solely to health education/promotion 
programs) is: Community health education/promotion programs are motivated by 
normative Stakeholder values and are scattered throughout the organization.  
That hypothesis seems to be both confirmed and expanded by the evaluation of 
the hospitals as reported in the chapter.  The majority of questionnaires and 
interviews indicate five or more departments conduct such programs, regardless 
of where in the organization the programs are reported or managed.  This alone 
seems to confirm the hypothesis.  At the same time, the general commitment to 
the concept of providing health education programs does seem to be a formal 
part of a large percentage of the responding hospitals, with departmental 
responsibility (“D”) being the largest designation for this management (although 
less than half of the hospitals fall within this location for program management).  
However even in Department coordinated programs, the specific decisions of 
what programs are presented, which publics to address, and how the expenses 
and other details of the program operation are reported are primarily left to the 
individuals throughout the hospital hierarchy.  The next largest designation is the 
staff level (“S”) that reflects the Stakeholder motivation.  Only a small percentage 
of hospitals indicated the administration (“A”) was the primary organizational level 
for the program management, a designation that would indicate a different 
Leadership motivation.  
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This emphasis on staff and departmental location for health education programs, 
indicates that the primary interest of the hospital leadership is to have a structure 
in place that addresses health education – and/or to encourage programs that 
serve these purposes – but that it is less interested in controlling the details of 
the specific programs that are actually executed or publics addressed.  This 
multi-level situation complicates the conclusions that can be drawn.  On the one 
hand the departmental management focus seems to indicate a more revenue-
based motivation behind the programs, based in resource dependency theory or 
encouraged through coercive isomorphism by an overall system.  Conversely 
those hospitals indicating a staff-level of management strengthen the normative 
isomorphism explanation behind the Stakeholder Discretion Model for 
philanthropic behavior.  In addition, in the departmentally focused programs there 
is still the situation of having programs operated within multiple departments 
throughout the hospital, even though the information is collected in a centralized 
structure.  This means the programs may be managed on a departmental level 
but are still loosely coupled within the broader organization.  The combination of 
formal structure and individual staff autonomy could be an organizational 
approach for health education programs to meet the organizational needs as well 
as the interests and needs of a variety of stakeholders.  However it can 
complicate policy efforts that seek to standardize and compare different hospital 
programs. 
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The ISDH data suggests that system hospitals spend more on health promotion 
than independent hospitals; within systems, non-religious hospitals seem to 
spend more than religious hospitals.  However these generalizations also have 
noteworthy variations – and the hospitals interviewed and surveyed actually 
report lower expenditures for system hospitals than independent hospitals.  Only 
by looking at individual hospitals within their specific management and 
community context are we able to understand meaningful differences or 
similarities.  
By examining the data from the ISDH Hospital Fiscal reports and the results of 
the written questionnaire and the personal interviews, four other conclusions 
seem to emerge.  First, the data that are currently shared regarding hospital 
community health education expenses are variable and uncertain.  The fact it is 
self-reported not only by the hospital itself but even within the hospital leads to a 
broad uncertainty as to what is included and how definitive those figures are.  It is 
unlikely that the new IRS Form 900 and Schedule H will change this, as the 
information on health education that is being collected is relatively undefined, 
meaning the results from the Indiana database could be a fairly good indicator of 
how national responses may also be reported.  Another weakness is an 
uncertainty whether personnel and overhead costs are also included in expense 
figures.  The guidelines of the CHA/VHA do include these,36 but to be reliable this 
                                           
36 It also should be observed that while the CHA guidelines indicate that staff time should be 
reported as a community benefit expense, it might be assumed that Catholic hospitals would be 
more inclined to report this personnel figure along with direct program expense.  In this case 
Catholic hospitals could be expected to have a significantly higher level of health education 
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information will need to be communicated throughout the hospital rather than just 
to those who are assigned this responsibility.  Even in hospitals and systems with 
formal programs, this hospital-wide awareness will need to be implemented to 
accurately collect this type of information.  Because of this variability, it is 
probable that there could be an under-reporting of community health education 
expenses by nonprofit hospitals.
Conversely, a second conclusion also emerges: the IRS has accelerated the 
adoption of the CHA/VHA criteria for reporting community benefit through the 
process of asking for the information.  This could have the eventual effect of a 
more consistent reporting process throughout the nonprofit hospital field.  One 
question will be how many of the details on community health education will be 
made public.
Third, the responses seem to suggest that a charity care emphasis by 
policymakers may be at the expense of improved community health education.  
That less attention is paid to this area is reflected in that none of the data or 
consistency problems that have been identified in this paper are addressed in the 
revised IRS regulations.  
                                                                                                                                 
expenditure than non-Catholic hospitals.  However, the surveys found that Catholic hospitals 
actually report spending less on health expense than non-religious hospitals, meaning it is 
doubtful the staff expense is included.  This lack of inclusion may be due to those Catholic 
hospitals ignoring the CHA guidelines or it may be that the ISDH reporting process discourages 
including staff expenses.
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Finally, the variety of internal processes within different organizational levels for 
determining and reporting community health education programs confirm the 
neo-institutional approaches that emphasize the decoupling of decision-making 
in nonprofit organizations.  These processes also demonstrate the importance of 
professionalization as an impetus to legitimacy and to shape a standard 
organizational culture and ethics.  The empowerment of departments and 
employees at the organizational grassroots or staff level becomes a primary way 
for a hospital to encourage the philanthropic behavior by those within the 
organization.  This staff empowerment also helps the hospital demonstrate its 
commitment to nonprofit organizational philanthropic behavior, beyond the self-
interested behavior implied by resource dependency motivations.  The 
hypothesis that donations are treated differently by hospitals than health 
education programs is the next area to investigate.  
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APPENDIX 4-1: Health Education Expenses: 200537
Hospital 
Designation
2005
Owner-
ship
2005
System?
Peer
Group
Community 
Health
Education 
Expenses
Com. Health
Ed Exp /
Total Oper 
Expense
X NP NR2 L $8,254,240 0.557%
V NP R2 L $2,419,335 0.594%
U NP NR1 L $1,714,949 0.404%
K NP R2 L $1,509,614 1.131%
W NP No L $870,562 0.331%
D NP R2 L $551,289 0.313%
J NP R2 M $533,953 0.538%
LL NP No L $498,006 0.160%
KK NP NR6 L $480,870 0.186%
GG NP NR3 L $401,370 0.395%
O NP R3 L $361,315 0.204%
SS NP R1 L $350,000 0.057%
Q NP NR1 M $338,245 1.019%
T NP No L $312,655 0.097%
EE NP R1 M $300,000 0.313%
AAA NP NR5 L $282,589 0.107%
I NP No S $230,777 0.736%
G NP No M $212,282 0.498%
MM NP No M $179,446 0.299%
DD NP NR2 M $172,642 0.138%
ZZ NP R2 M $161,531 0.150%
L NP R3 M $160,409 0.413%
WW NP NR5 M $149,563 0.128%
XX NP No M $114,825 0.066%
N NP R4 M $112,672 0.132%
UU NP No M $111,552 0.208%
JJ NP R1 M $101,868 0.070%
H NP No L $87,884 0.036%
Z NP NR6 M $86,660 0.073%
P NP R1 M $81,878 0.322%
RR NP R2 M $52,000 0.038%
M NP No L $34,362 0.015%
NN NP NR1 S $33,963 0.300%
II NP R1 S $30,558 0.119%
E NP No S $25,221 0.059%
BB NP R1 M $21,686 0.028%
                                           
37 Financial data on this and other tables are from the 2005 ISDH reports – with data from the 
hospitals’ 2004 fiscal year.
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Hospital 
Designation
2005
Owner-
ship
2005
System?
Peer
Group
Community 
Health
Education 
Expenses
Com. Health
Ed Exp /
Total Oper 
Expense
BBB NP No M $19,879 0.100%
HH NP R1 S $15,000 0.088%
VV NP NR1 M $7,868 0.029%
CC NP No S $7,330 0.082%
OO NP NR2 S $6,098 0.015%
R NP R2 M $3,335 0.009%
QQ NP R3 M $621 0.001%
GGG NP No S $501 0.006%
KKK NP R1 S $0 0.000%
PP NP R2 M $0 0.000%
LLL NP NR5 M $0 0.000%
A NP NR3 L $0 0.000%
B NP NR3 L $0 0.000%
C NP NR3 L $0 0.000%
CCC NP R1 S $0 0.000%
AA NP No L $0 0.000%
EEE NP R2 L $0 0.000%
S NP R1 L $0 0.000%
Y NP R1 S $0 0.000%
DDD NP R1 S $0 0.000%
MMM NP NR6 S $0 0.000%
HHH NP No S $0 0.000%
III NP No S $0 0.000%
JJJ NP No M $0 0.000%
Bold indicates a hospital responding to the questionnaire.
Underlined bold indicates a hospital consenting to a personal interview.
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APPENDIX 4-2: Health Promotion:
Community Programs and Services + Health Education Expenses:
2005
Hospital 
Designation
2005 
Owner-
ship
2005
System?
Peer
Group
$Total Com 
Progr and
Srv +Hlth 
Ed
Expenses
% TOTAL HP/Oper
Exp
A NP NR3 L $59,441,297 21.568%
B NP NR3 L $36,580,002 12.781%
C NP NR3 L $11,482,069 10.975%
X NP NR2 L $10,844,880 0.732%
D NP R2 L $6,906,217 3.922%
H NP No L $4,513,532 1.869%
U NP NR1 L $3,352,049 0.790%
V NP R2 L $3,046,770 0.748%
T NP No L $2,667,326 0.830%
M NP No L $2,463,933 1.094%
S NP R1 L $2,436,247 0.890%
W NP No L $1,960,077 0.745%
O NP R3 L $1,854,323 1.050%
AA NP No L $1,581,317 0.528%
K NP R2 L $1,572,114 1.178%
SS NP R1 L $1,419,102 0.233%
E NP No S $1,399,757 3.271%
J NP R2 M $1,215,384 1.225%
LL NP No L $1,062,242 0.340%
G NP No M $1,036,872 2.430%
N NP R4 M $893,619 1.051%
KK NP NR6 L $884,835 0.342%
Z NP NR2 M $696,097 0.590%
DD NP NR2 M $543,532 0.435%
JJ NP R1 M $527,396 0.361%
F NP NR4 S $506,793 2.821%
I NP No S $461,554 1.471%
L NP R3 M $441,671 1.138%
GG NP NR3 L $401,370 0.395%
EE NP R1 M $396,613 0.414%
AAA NP NR5 L $391,221 0.148%
R NP R2 M $367,416 0.974%
BB NP R1 M $366,990 0.479%
Q NP NR1 M $338,245 1.019%
XX NP No M $325,489 0.188%
RR NP R2 M $323,564 0.239%
P NP R1 M $265,615 1.044%
WW NP NR5 M $223,839 0.192%
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Hospital 
Designation
2005
Owner-
ship
2005
System?
Peer
Group
$Total Com 
Progr and
Srv +Hlth 
Ed
Expenses
% TOTAL 
HP/Oper
Exp
MM NP No M $200,945 0.335%
ZZ NP R2 M $161,531 0.150%
QQ NP R3 M $150,269 0.248%
FF NP NR1 S $122,454 0.397%
OO NP NR2 S $122,235 0.301%
PP NP R2 M $118,453 0.267%
UU NP No M $111,552 0.208%
Y NP R1 S $96,705 0.640%
II NP R1 S $94,160 0.367%
HH NP R1 S $66,964 0.391%
EEE NP R2 L $62,500 0.045%
VV NP NR1 M $53,876 0.200%
CC NP No S $42,231 0.475%
NN NP NR1 S $37,045 0.327%
BBB NP No M $27,349 0.137%
CCC NP R1 S $18,095 0.065%
DDD NP R1 S $8,473 0.054%
GGG NP No S $501 0.006%
KKK NP R1 S $0 0.000%
LLL NP NR3 M $0 0.000%
MMM NP NR6 S $0 0.000%
HHH NP No S $0 0.000%
III NP No S $0 0.000%
JJJ NP No M $0 0.000%
Bold indicates a hospital responding to the questionnaire.
Underlined bold indicates a hospital consenting to a personal interview.
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APPENDIX 4-3: Responses to Questionnaires – By Hospital 
Designations
Hospital
Designation
2005 
Ownership
2005 
System?
Peer
Group
INTERVIEWS
AA NP No L
BB NP R1 M
CCC NP R1 S
EE NP R1 M
F NP NR4 S
FF NP NR1 S
G NP No M
GGG NP No S
I NP No S
II NP R1 S
JJ NP R1 M
KKK NP R1 S
M NP No L
NN NP NR1 S
P NP R1 M
SS NP R1 L
U NP NR1 L
V NP R2 L
VV NP NR1 M
WW NP NR5 M
XX NP No M
Y NP R1 S
YY County No L
Hospital
Designation
2005
Ownership
2005 
System?
Peer
Group
NO INTERVIEWS
E NP No S
EEE NP R2 L
FFF County No S
HH NP R1 S
MM NP No M
N NP R4 M
Q NP NR1 M
T NP No L
TT County No S
UU NP No M
W NP No L
X NP NR2 L
No ISDH County No M
No ISDH County No S
No ISDH County No M
No ISDH County R5 M
No ISDH County R5 S
No ISDH City-Cty No S
No ISDH County No S
No ISDH County No S
No ISDH County No M
No ISDH County No S
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APPENDIX 4-4: Responses to Questionnaires – Health Education
Administrative, Department Director, Foundation or Staff Decisions
Hospital
Desig.
2005
Own.
2005
System?
Peer 
Group
Direction
Admin, 
Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff?
INTERVIEWS
AA NP No L A
BB NP R1 M S
CCC NP R1 S S
EE NP R1 M S
F NP NR4 S D
FF NP NR1 S F
G NP No M D
GGG NP No S A
I NP No S D
II NP R1 S S
JJ NP R1 S S
KKK NP R1 S D
M NP No L S
NN NP NR1 S F
P NP R1 M S
SS NP R1 L S
U NP NR1 L F
V NP R2 L A
VV NP NR1 M F
WW NP NR5 M D
X NP NR2 L D
XX NP No M D
Y NP R1 S D
Hospital
Desig.
2005
Own.
2005
Syste
m?
Peer 
Group
Direction
Admin, 
Dept,
Fdn,
Or Staff?
NO  Interviews
YY Cnty No L S
E NP No S D
EEE NP R2 L D
FFF County No S D
HH NP R1 S S
MM NP No M S
N NP R4 M D
Q NP NR1 M F
T NP No L D
TT County No S A
UU NP No M D
W NP No L S
No ISDH County No M S
No ISDH County No S D
No ISDH County No M D
No ISDH County R5 M D
No ISDH County R5 S D
No ISDH City-Cty No S S
No ISDH County No S D
No ISDH County No S D
No ISDH County No M S
No ISDH County No S S
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Appendix 4-5: Questionnaire and Cover Letter
Community Benefit Representative 
XYZ Hospital, City, IN - Zip
Dear Ms/Mr. ______:
I would greatly appreciate your help!  I am trying to verify the figures and process 
reported to and by the Indiana State Department of Health regarding hospital 
community benefits in Indiana.  I am conducting a research project as part of a 
program with INDIANA UNIVERSITY and THE CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY.  
The project is to study the health promotion and donation programs Indiana 
hospitals provide for the benefit of their communities.  
Part of the purpose of the study is to better clarify the benefits Indiana hospitals 
provide through community wellness and health education programs – and the 
process hospitals use to make these decisions.  This is part of a larger research 
project evaluating the extent that Indiana hospitals give back to their 
communities.
There is a second part of the questionnaire that also seeks additional information 
on the category of “donations” – funds identified as given by the hospital to other 
causes in the community. Would you mind taking a couple of minutes to fill out 
the enclosed questionnaire? Because the study focuses on Indiana hospitals, 
your assistance is critical for the success of this project!
The questionnaire should take less than ten minutes to complete, and all 
responses will be kept confidential.  I will be happy to return to you a summary of 
all the completed responses for your own information.  THANK YOU!   Your 
involvement is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Al Lyons
PhD Candidate, Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University
P.S.: PLEASE NOTE: All answers remain strictly confidential.  Specific 
information shared will not be reported to any others – either within the hospital, 
the state hospital system, or any governmental entities.  Results will be 
assembled in aggregate summaries and information conveyed through papers or 
reports based on this study will be presented in a way that readers will not be 
able to connect information with specific hospitals nor infer anything specific 
about your hospital.
PLEASE RETURN TO:
Al Lyons, 9616 Harbour Pointe, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, 812-824-7082, 
allyons@sopris.net
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Indiana Community Benefit Questionnaire
Hospital Name                                                                            
City                                                                               , Indiana
Report for the Year          2005           Fiscal Year Period:       
Community Benefit – Health Promotion Programs:
The 2005 Indiana Hospital Fiscal Report 
http://www.in.gov/isdh/regsvcs/acc/fiscal05/002408.htm states ___________ Hospital 
had the following expenditures for Costs of Subsidized Community Benefits:
Estimated Incoming Revenue- $ X
Estimated Outgoing Expenses- $ X
Unreimbursed Costs by Hospital- $ X
1. Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting those figures?
____ CEO
____ Other Administration
____ Department Head
____ Support Staff
____ Other (please specify):
2. Which department is most responsible for managing health promotion 
programs and budget?
____ Administration
____ Public Relations/Marketing
____ Health Education
____ Fund Development/Foundation
____ Other (please specify):
3. Are the above programs determined and operated by more than one department 
or entity?
____ Yes
____ No
- If the answer to #3 is “Yes”, how many departments or entities offer health 
promotion 
programs?
____ Two
____ Three
____ Four
____ Five or more
 Which ones?
Do you have any other comments that might help clarify any of the above?
Page 1 of 2
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Appendix 4-6: Responses to Health Promotion Questionnaire #3
Are the above programs determined and operated by more than one 
department or entity?  Which ones?
 Community Education, Indiana Poison Center, Healthnet, Women’s 
Services, Medical Education
 Physical Therapy, Dietary Education
 Individual departments are responsible; No centralized location (4 
responses, by multiple hospitals in one system)
 Numerous departments, with six programs listed as examples
 Occupational health, Outpatient Physician Clinic staff, Infection Control 
Nurse, Imaging Dept., Lab Dept., PT/OT Dept., Nursing Administration, OB Staff
 Resource Center (focused on community), Wellness (focused on 
employees), Comp Center (focused on businesses) – there is some overlap
 PR/Community Education
 Health Ed, Sports Medicine, Women’s Center, Family Medicine Center
 Health Education and Marketing
 Marketing/Public Relations, Community Wellness, 3 Grant Programs, 
Women’s Services, Oncology Services, Pediatric Services, EMS
 Education, Lab, Radiology, Oncology Services, Business Development –
all working together
 Clinical departments contribute to Community Health Promotion programs 
in the form of “Health Fairs”
 Foundation, Obstetrics, Marketing, EMS/Ambulance
 Health Education, Nursing, Lab, Radiology, Public Relations and other 
Ancillary Services
 Marketing, Community Outreach, Family Medicine Center, Center for 
Family Practices, Nappanee Family Medicine
 Various departments such as Community Health, Primary Care Clinic, 
Diabetes Center, Mental Health, Nursing, etc.
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Appendix 4-7: Responses to Health Promotion Questionnaire –
“Do you have any other comments that help clarify any of the 
above?”
 “How the summary of Community Benefits table was calculated is 
unknown to me, it does not match the report I submitted.  However, it could 
reflect data submitted by our Finance Department.”
 “Most marketing positions also have other job responsibilities, like Human 
Resources”
 “Cost of programs reported does not include cost of human resources 
involved in the programs.  Only the non-salary expenses were reported”
 “One department oversees the program, but every department is 
responsible to support CB efforts.  For example: Radiology does mammograms, 
Community Relations does donations, and EMS does the emergency services”
 “We offer a wide variety of community health education programs and 
training programs including smoking cessation, Safe Sitter babysitting training, 
free prenatal and child birth classes, free well baby checkups (home visit), health 
fairs, health screenings, plus we support other agencies who share in our 
mission by donating free office and meeting space”
 “Our department that offers health education has been combined with 
marketing, giving the dept a title of Community Health Relations.  The two 
departments that were combined were Marketing and Community Health.”
 Many departments run health and wellness programs.  All report activities 
to Marketing, which compiles all information to submit in Community Benefit 
Report to ISDH.  This info is then combined with financial info in Accounting, and 
submitted.”
 Reporting of the above costs of subsidized Community Benefits should 
have been as follows: 
o Incoming Revenue - $   85,696
o Outgoing Expense - $ 904,964
o Unreimbursed Costs by Hospital - ($819,268)
 Note: ISDH reported all as “$0”
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CHAPTER FIVE: DONATIONS AND INDIANA HOSPITALS
This chapter continues the exploration of available data from Indiana hospitals 
and their activities related to community health education and donations.  This 
chapter focuses on the area of donations, building on the analysis of health
education expenditures in the preceding chapter.  It investigates one hypothesis 
of this paper: Donation programs are either motivated by Political considerations 
and are located in a separate department or by Ethical/Altruistic motivations so 
are Leadership Directed and located at the hospital leadership level.
Chapter Five uses the same organizational framework as developed in Chapter 
Four to address the question: “How and why do Indiana nonprofit hospitals make 
financial contributions?”  It presents a similar analysis of reports and surveys to 
explore how individual hospitals determine and disburse donations to their 
community.  It also notes how these donations relate to efforts by nonprofit 
hospitals to attract contributions from their communities.  
Following an introduction outlining the factors relating to hospital donations, 
Chapter Five first evaluates the donations data collected by the Indiana State 
Department of Health (ISDH) to determine what this data might reveal about the 
reporting of this area by Indiana hospitals.  The second part of this chapter 
compares IRS data with the ISDH data to determine the comparability of the two 
reporting documents.  Part three of the chapter reports the results of two surveys 
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of individual Indiana hospitals that explore the specific processes involved with 
developing and presenting health education programs.  The information gained 
from the statistical analysis and the surveys is then applied to the hypothesis that 
Donation programs are either located in a separate department or at the hospital 
leadership level.  If true, this effectively separates donations from the health 
education programs that are embedded in the organization either at the 
management or stakeholder levels.  
Introduction
Nonprofit Hospitals and Motivations for Donations: According to earlier 
explanations of organizational philanthropic motivations, donations fulfill either 
Young and Burlingame’s Political model for philanthropy, providing the hospital 
with community influence and participation – or their Ethical/Altruistic motivations, 
expressing values of the organization’s leadership.  These motivations contrast 
with Health Education programs that seem to be primarily driven by Stakeholder 
Discretion as well as by Departmental/Management motivations. These 
motivations are outlined in Table 5A.  
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Table 5A: The Nonprofit Philanthropy Models
Nonprofit 
Philanthropy 
Model
External 
Mandate
Manage-
ment 
Function 
Leadership 
Directed
(CEO or 
Board)
[ETHICAL/
ALTRUISTIC]
Separate 
Organizational 
Function
[POLITICAL]
Stake-
holder 
Discretion
Corporate 
Motivation
(from Young 
and 
Burlingame)
To comply 
with 
External 
Criteria
To ensure 
and/or 
increase firm 
profitability
To meet 
community 
and social 
responsibility
To strengthen 
economic and 
community 
power
To satisfy 
multiple 
consti-
tuencies 
Corporate 
Structure
Imitative 
of 
Mandates
Embedded 
in Dep’t and
Manager 
Hierarchy
Practices at 
Leadership 
Level
Separate 
foundation or 
identified and 
publicly-visible 
department
Dispersed 
throughout 
organi-
zation
It is theorized that decisions and actions regarding donations would be centered 
at the hospital leadership level, primarily driven by Ethical/Altruistic motives.  
Conversely if donations fulfill a Political model for giving, a motivation is to 
provide the hospital with community influence and participation.  This political 
benefit could be strengthened if the donation function is decoupled from the 
delivery of healthcare itself and located in a separate department of the hospital 
or even in a separate foundation.  In both motivations, donations become 
decoupled from operations. 
One reason for this decoupling is that nonprofit hospitals1 may seek contributions 
from their constituency as well as make donations to other organizations.  If 
either or both giving processes are placed into a separate foundation or other 
entity, this can effectively separate these two aspects of the donation process 
                                           
1 As will be shown later in this chapter, for-profit hospitals also may receive donations.  However, 
it is not clear how proactively they seek such contributions.
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from operations.  A consequence of this decoupling is that it can be difficult to 
accurately compare both incoming and outgoing donations with related health 
care activities.  These complications can be increased in situations where single 
fund development departments serve multiple facilities especially for systems 
with a single foundation that serves individual hospitals or groups of hospitals.  
Such foundations are generally treated as separate organizational entities, 
meaning their income and expense figures may not be captured in hospital 
reports. The new Schedule H forms are not expected to address this problem in 
the future, as the category of donations is treated in a very general manner and 
allows individual hospitals to self-interpret what exactly they count and report on 
those forms.  The focus of policy on charity care and the lack of attention to other
community benefit figures mean that other philanthropic behavior of nonprofit 
hospitals is potentially being undercounted or even overlooked. It also leads to 
difficulties for comparisons between hospitals or to pre-determined standards.  
One additional complication of identifying donations to the community as 
opposed to those from the community is that while a hospital’s net donation to 
the community might be considered as part of “community benefit” (as it is in the 
ISDH Reports as well as the IRS Schedule H), donative theorists might 
conversely theorize that it is the donations from the community that indicate an 
organization’s worthiness for tax exemption.  One example of this apparent 
contradiction is in the articles arguing both of these points by John D. Colombo 
(Colombo 2005, Hall and Colombo 1991a and 1991b).  By subtracting incoming 
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contributions from outgoing donations, policies have the effect of diminishing the 
relative level of the both types of donations
The Use of Donations by Hospitals: As stated in the Introduction to this paper, 
the Association for Healthcare Philanthropy (AHP) reported that healthcare 
facilities generated over $7 billion in contributions in 2005 – or approximately 2% 
of all giving in the country.2  About one-third of the money that was raised by 
nonprofit hospitals in 2002 was used for projects involving community benefit, a 
trend that has been relatively consistent going back to 1988.  Chart 5-A shows 
the total percentage of funds contributed to nonprofit hospitals in the United 
States between 1998 and 2003 that went to support community benefit-related 
programs and projects, including Research and Teaching as well as support for 
Hospice.
                                           
2 HFMA News, (2006). The figure of total giving also includes proceeds from investments, 
pledges and planned gift expectations, making it not an exact match to the Giving USA figures.
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Chart 5-A: Total Percentage of Contributions used for Community Benefit-
Related Purposes by US Nonprofit Hospitals – 1988-2002
From AHP Report of Giving: 1988-2002
While this AHP Report on Giving does not identify health education per se as a 
category, it does differentiate Charity Care as well as Community Benefit 
(separately from Education3 and Hospice).  Chart 5-B shows the relative 
percentage of these uses.
Chart 5-B: Total Percentage of Contributions used for Charity Care and 
Community Benefit Purposes by US Nonprofit Hospitals – 1988-2002
From AHP Report of Giving: 1988-2002
                                           
3 “Education” may include professional education or community health education programs.  The 
AHP survey does not specifically define the term.
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The figures and results from this survey suffer from the weaknesses of any self-
reported survey.  The fluctuations not only are due to individual hospitals 
reporting different uses differently but also to inconsistencies in which hospitals 
reported from year to year.4  However, the figures do indicate that not only is 
community benefit one of the major uses of contributions by hospitals (along with 
operations and construction, and purchasing new equipment) but that there may 
also be a slight rise in the percentage of funds raised for community outreach 
programs and a slight decline in the amount given for charity care as Chart 5-A
shows (AHP 1908-2002).
ISDH Data on Donations
The first step in trying to identify the donative behavior of Indiana hospitals is to 
investigate the donation information shared in the ISDH reports.
Donations are the third category reported on Statement Three, for all hospitals in 
Indiana.  The 2005 ISDH Fiscal Reports noted that all hospitals in Indiana had 
the following donation information, as indicated on Table 5B:
                                           
4 It should be pointed out that in four years the results of this survey were not reported due to low 
response rates and that the final two years were figured on a fiscal rather than calendar year 
basis – showing further difficulties with self-reported data.
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Table 5B: Donations by Indiana Hospitals
Donations Donations Net
Ratio: Net 
Donations/
Received Outgoing Donations Donat. Out
For-Profit5
$205,518 $945,484 $739,966 78.26%
Public $10,975,284 $9,133,776 $(1,841,508)     (20.38%)
Nonprofit $ 9,984,376 $12,871,139 $2,886,763 22.43%
TOTAL $21,165,178 $22,950,399 $1,785,221 7.78%
The final Net Donation figure (TOTAL: $1,785,221) is considered to be the actual 
donations from the hospital that are counted as part of their community benefit 
expenditure for the year.  From the final ratio it is also seen that while hospitals 
reported more than $22 million in donations to others, less than 10% of those 
were considered to be net donations and qualified as community benefit 
expenses.  Even for nonprofit hospitals, only a little over one of every five 
donated dollars are considered to be community benefit.6  Table 5C shows a 
comparison of the donations by system affiliation.
                                           
5 There could be a question why or how for-profit hospitals might receive and report donations.  
Some of this could be income they receive through a nonprofit foundation affiliated with the 
hospital.  However, not all for-profit hospitals that report incoming donations also have a nonprofit 
foundation.  Another situation could be that individuals make contributions to the hospital because 
they are a hospital, with no consideration of the ownership.  The latter scenario could particularly 
apply to hospitals that historically have been community public hospitals and in that role have 
sought and received donated community support, but have recently been bought by a for-profit 
chain.  As the ISDH data does not indicate source of donations – and there are no IRS 990 forms 
to investigate these sources further – the exact motivations or sources involved can only remain 
speculative. 
6 There is a question that is raised by only counting “net donations” as community benefit rather 
than “Donations Outgoing.”  The ethics for a hospital to use income from one source – given for a 
particular implicit or explicit purpose – to offset expenditure to an unrelated purpose could be 
questioned.  For example: in terms of health education, it is understandable that a health 
education class might charge a fee to attend, but the fee does not cover the costs of offering the 
class.  The net expense would be the actual cost to the hospital of providing the service.  But a 
contribution made to a hospital also may have nothing to do with a different donation made from
the hospital.  There is no stipulation that the hospital must make a subsequent donation because 
it received the first contribution.  
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Table 5C: 2005 Net Donation (Outgoing) as % Operating Expenses7 –
Indiana Hospitals: By Ownership and System8
System Independent TOTAL
Nonprofit .0830% (.0769%) 0.04%
For-profit 0.11% N/A 0.11%
Public (.1170%) (.0759%) (0.08%)
TOTAL .0793% (.076%) .0216%
The table leads to the conclusion that there is a significant difference between 
Net Donations made by system-affiliated hospitals and hospitals not associated 
with a system.  Hospitals that are part of a system give a higher level of 
donations than they receive, while conversely independent hospitals receive 
more contributions than they give.
Whether there is a difference based on religious affiliation is noted in Table 5D:
Table 5D: Indiana Hospital Donations: Differentiated by Religious Affiliation 
As a % Operating Expenses
$ Donat.
Rec’d
$ Donat.
Outgoing
$ NET 
Donat.
% Donat
Rec’d
% Donat.
Outgoing
% NET 
Donat.
Religiously 
Affiliated $ 3,667,868 $3,800,697 $853,078 0.1250% 0.1295% 0.0291%
(NP) Non-
Religiously 
Affiliated 
$17,497,310 $19,149,702 $1,650,392 0.2018% 0.2209% 0.0190%
When net donations are compared as a percentage of operating expenses, 
religious hospitals (.029%) appear to give a higher percentage of net donations 
                                           
7 The ratios are computed by dividing the total operating expense by the total donations from all 
hospitals, from the different categories.  This provides a comparison of the total ownership 
categories of hospitals in Indiana, rather than comparing a typical hospital (median).  
8 It should be emphasized that the figures measure donations made by the hospital to other 
entities.  A positive figure indicates that more donations made by the hospital than were received 
by the hospital from other contributions.
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than non-religious (nonprofit) hospitals (.019%).9  However, both are far below 
the level of for-profit hospitals (.11%, as noted on Table 5C).  One further 
comparison of religious vs. non-religious hospitals is the percentage of Net 
Donations compared to Outgoing Donations: 
Ratio of Net Donations:
Net Donations as a percentage of Outgoing (Gross) Donations
 For Religiously affiliated Hospitals: 22.4%
 For Nonprofit Non-Religiously affiliated Hospitals:      8.6%
When the comparison is extended to a percentage of outgoing donations, the 
difference between religious and non-religious hospitals is even greater (22.4% 
for religious vs. 8.6% for non-religious).  While these figures could be used to 
conclude that religious hospitals are more philanthropic than non-religious 
hospitals, the above data does not answer the question of whether the hospital 
foundation is included in either of the donation figures (i.e. received or outgoing).
In addition, since the net donation is considered to be part of the hospital’s 
community benefit commitment, so there could be a perceived incentive (created 
by the community benefit standards) to count as much as possible as donations 
to others and to record as little as possible as income from others.  It could also 
be concluded that for-profit hospitals are more philanthropic than both, as for-
                                           
9 It should be noted that the total religious percentage of .029% when added to the nonreligious 
percentage of .019 % is .048% - and seems to exceed the .04% total for all nonprofit hospitals in 
the final column of Table 3-21.  This is due to rounding as well as the greater number of 
nonreligious hospitals.
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profit hospitals far exceed this ratio at 78.2% (see above, Table 5B).  But the 
latter conclusion could also be skewed due to for-profit hospitals not (generally) 
seeking incoming donations (although they do report receiving some level of 
contributions).  These uncertainties emphasize some of the difficulties in properly 
evaluating hospital donation activity.
To better assess the donation behavior of Indiana hospitals, there is an 
opportunity to evaluate the validity of the donations figures shared by Indiana 
hospitals on the ISDH Fiscal Report as compared to figures recorded on the 
hospital’s IRS Form 990.  IRS reports identify both contributions from others as 
well as donations by the hospitals to other organizations.  One further caveat is 
that on the ISDH report, any contributions that are restricted for specific purposes 
do not need to be counted – only those contributions that are unrestricted.  This 
practice of differentiating restricted donations from unrestricted donations (which 
need not be documented on the ISDH Report – and is not a distinction that is 
made either on the current IRS Form 990 or on the new Schedule H report by the 
IRS), can lead to further discrepancies in the figures reported as contributions 
coming to the organization.
Comparing the ISDH Fiscal Report to the IRS Form 990: There is not (currently) 
a simple way to compare both the outgoing and incoming donations – as well as 
the net donations – using the IRS Form 990.  However this form in its current 
structure can reveal quite a bit of information about both donations received by 
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an organization as well as given from that organization.  To gain the best picture, 
it’s important to also include the figures from hospital foundations.  89 of the 107 
hospitals in Indiana have foundations (83%): there are 39 nonprofit hospital 
foundations (representing 56 hospitals, through system relationships), 31 public 
hospital foundations, and 2 for-profit hospital foundations.  All of these file the 
IRS Form 990 as well as include their donation activity on the ISDH fiscal reports.
The discrepancy between the incoming donations figure on the ISDH Report and 
the IRS 990 as reported by hospitals is significant.  If income from hospital 
foundations is also added there becomes even more of a gap.  Table 5E shows 
how the ISDH Incoming donations figures for 200510 compared to the IRS 990 
figure – both for nonprofit hospitals as well as for affiliated foundations of those 
hospitals.
                                           
10 It should be acknowledged that the figures used for this comparison are from 2005, as opposed 
to the previous ISDH information that was from reports identified as 2004.  This is due to the 
variability of hospitals that report their financial information on a fiscal year that is different than a 
calendar year.  The IRS Form 990 notes an organization’s fiscal year (meaning that for some 
hospitals a 2005 return may actually include 3 months, 6 months, or even 9 months of 2004 data) 
while the ISDH data makes no such distinction.  This variability also lends confusion as to which 
year is actually being compared, one other factor that complicates comparative reports.  
The more recent figures were also easier to verify in the questionnaires and interviews.  
After the author compared IRS data and ISDH data from both 2004 and 2005, the data from 2005 
IRS returns seemed to compare more favorably with the ISDH reports from 2005.  A decision was 
made to use the more comparable information (i.e. the 2005 IRS data as well as the ISDH 2005 
reports) for this section’s comparison between IRS and ISDH data.  
Since the data being compared in this section is not tied to figures in the previous 
section, this change should not affect any of the conclusions reached in this section. 
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Table 5E: Comparison of ISDH Contributions and IRS 990 Contributions
2005: Indiana Nonprofit Hospitals and Hospital Foundations (Total)11
2005 ISDH 
Fiscal 
Report
(Gross)
2005 
Hospitals: 
IRS 990
Additional 
Donations 
Reported by 
Hospital 
Foundations 
in 2005: IRS 
990
TOTAL IRS 
Donations: 
Hospitals 
PLUS 
Foundations 
Direct Public 
Support $7,485,875 $17,819,146 $27,201,072 $52,506,093
Indirect Public 
Support $60,586,561 $28,064,707 $88,651,268
Government 
Grants $14,156,225 $3,862,618 $18,018,843
TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
(from others)
$7,485,875 $89,109,828 $55,921,049 $152,516,752
It’s evident that there is a significant discrepancy.  “Direct Public Support” 
reported only by the hospital on the IRS form records more than twice the 
amount of contributions as is reported on the ISDH fiscal report.  If the results 
from separate hospital foundations are also included, the level of “Direct Public 
Support” reports six times the amount of contributions than reported on the ISDH 
fiscal reports.  If government grants are added in – as well as “Indirect Public 
Support” – the amount of contributions to Indiana hospitals as reported to the IRS 
is nearly twenty times the level reported on the ISDH forms.  
For the purposes of comparison, this paper focuses on the category “Direct 
Public Support”, seeking to identify private community contributions (which 
includes private foundation and corporate grants), rather than government 
                                           
11 Only 26 of the 57 nonprofit hospitals identify income from donations on the 2005 ISDH report.  
32 nonprofit hospitals report donations on the 2005 IRS Form 990.  The figures in Table 5-5 
include all of the hospitals reporting information under each report.
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support.  This can lead to a further complication, as it is not designated on the 
ISDH reports whether United Way support (which is generally recorded on the 
IRS forms as “Indirect Support”) or government grants can be counted as 
donations – although the wording implies that donations “mean” only “direct” 
public contributions.  But these are not defined criteria.  Also, the category 
“Indirect Public Support” may include inter-organizational transfers of funds 
between a hospital and a related foundation, rather than being an external 
donation of additional support.12  While there is a possibility of donations being 
double-counted with a contribution being recorded at one entity (i.e. a hospital’s 
foundation) and then being transferred to another entity (i.e. the hospital) and 
then being also recorded as a contribution to that organization, there is limited 
ability to track each donation and identify that situation.  There are various 
loopholes in most reporting systems and the IRS Form 990 is no exception.  
However as was pointed out earlier in this dissertation, the Form 990 is as 
reliable a data source as we currently have available and the steps the IRS has 
taken to strengthen the form should strengthen this validity even more.  
Nevertheless, identifying any organization that intentionally or unintentionally 
misreports data can be difficult to assess.13  Comparing yearly reports may also 
complicate the tracking of transfers between organizations as donations received 
in one year may be transferred in another year.  This is especially true in the 
case of multi-year campaigns or transfers from a foundation’s endowment to a 
                                           
12 As indirect Public Support also includes gifts from United Way, excluding that figure could 
diminish the true extent of public support for a hospital.
13 One example of this difficulty with self-reporting is outlined in a 2002 report in the Chronicle of 
Philanthropy found that nearly 1/3 of the nonprofit organizations that reported more than $1 
million in contributions also reported $0 in fundraising costs.
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hospital that may occur only during major building programs.  Donations received 
over two, three, or more years may be transferred in a lump sum in a single 
future year.  Such situations are but a few examples of challenges that arise in 
evaluating donations to (and from) hospitals.
Another complication is that not all nonprofit hospitals in Indiana file an IRS Form 
990. Several hospitals may be included in one system’s filing – or while individual 
hospitals in a system may file separately there may be a single foundation for 
multiple system hospitals.  Table 5F compares the ISDH and the IRS incoming 
contributions for individual nonprofit hospitals.  
Table 5F: Comparison of donations received by Indiana nonprofit hospitals 
(2005 Reports of 2004 Data)
% IRS 990 % IRS 990
Direct TOTAL 
Contribution / Contribution /
ISDH Donations ISDH Donations
4059% 5567%
3391% 5229%
1623% 1623%
1376% 2280%
434% 454%
420% 647%
310% 310%
288% 288%
274% 1562%
203% 659%
101% 107%
100% 113%
100% 100%
% IRS 990
Direct 
% IRS 990
TOTAL 
Contribution / Contribution /
ISDH Donations ISDH Donations
98% 98%
87% 213%
69% 100%
21% 1174%
20% 100%
17% 374%
10% 237%
9% 175%
5% 105%
0% 663%
0% 453%
0% 423%
0% 211%
Bold = Comparable Figures (i.e. within 15%)
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It should be noted that only 26 of the 57 nonprofit hospitals in Indiana claim any 
net donations on the ISDH report, so the table lists only those 26 hospitals.14  
Only 22 of the nonprofit hospitals identify contributions received on both the IRS 
and the ISDH reports.  The average ratio of IRS 990 Direct Contributions to ISDH 
Contributions is 501%; however, the median is 100% - that could indicate the two 
forms for a “typical” hospital agree.  The average ratio of IRS 990 Total 
Contributions to ISDH Contributions is 895%; the median is 310%.  When only 
public donations are compared, only five hospitals have comparable figures on 
their ISDH and IRS reports (identified as Direct Public Support).  If Total 
Contributions from the IRS Form 990 are compared, seven hospitals have 
comparable figures.  Four of these hospitals have comparable ratios for both 
figures, indicating they probably do not receive much Indirect Support or 
Government Grants.
If the actual incoming contribution figures are used from only those nonprofit 
hospitals that recorded contributions on BOTH the IRS and the ISDH Report, the 
discrepancy is even more pronounced, as Table 5G shows.
                                           
14 It should also be noted that only 32 of the 57 nonprofit hospitals report donations on the IRS 
Form 990.  
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Table 5G: Comparison of ISDH Contributions and IRS 990 Contributions
2005: Indiana Nonprofit Hospitals
(Those indicating figures on BOTH reports)
2005 ISDH 
Fiscal Report
2005 Hospitals: 
IRS 990
% of 
Difference:
ISDH/IRS
Direct Public 
Support $4,920,479 $12,751,637 39%
TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
(from others)
$4,920,479 $74,810,227 7%
The donations reported on the ISDH reports are less than half of those reported 
on the IRS form 990 (39%).  One possible conclusion could be that 
approximately 61% of private donations received by Indiana hospitals are 
restricted and therefore don’t need to be included in the ISDH Fiscal Report.  
Another conclusion could be that the two reports are filled out differently with 
different figures.  There is currently no way to specifically define why and how the 
differences arise.  Appendix 5-1 shows actual figures for all nonprofit hospitals in 
Indiana, as reported in 2005, and illustrates the discrepancies found between the 
two reports.
In comparison, many of the public hospitals do file a Form 990 and have 
comparable donations (and other financial) information available.  Also the 
foundations associated with 31 public hospitals, as well as the two foundations 
affiliated with for-profit hospitals, are required to file a Form 990.  Therefore much 
Form 990 information is available on public and for-profit hospitals and their 
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related foundations.  Table 5H summarizes the available information for 2005 of 
public and for-profit hospitals from IRS Forms 990.
Table 5H: Public Hospitals and Foundations: Available IRS 990 Information 
All Public 
Hospital 
Foundation
990s
Public 
Hospitals 
with 990s 
(AND also 
have 
foundations)
Public 
Hospitals
with 990s –
BUT NO 
Foundation 
TOTAL: 
Public 
Hospitals 
and 
Foundations
For 
Profit 
Hospital 
Founda-
tions
Direct Public 
Support $7,446,996 $3,502,071 $3,918,066 $14,867,133 $172,256
Indirect Public 
Support $50,897 $239,091 $50,897 $340,885 $5,500
Government 
Grants $144,475 $11,810,439 $69,475 $12,024,389 $88,590
TOTAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
(from others)
$7,724,259 $15,551,601 $4,111,946 $27,387,806 $266,346
ISDH $542,929
The figures in Table 5H show that public hospitals receive significant direct 
support, although the 31 public hospitals and their foundations received 
approximately one-third of what was received by the 32 nonprofit hospitals ands 
their foundations - $14,867,133 for public hospitals compare to $45,020,218 for 
nonprofit hospitals (according to the IRS Form 990 figures).
Outgoing Donations to Others
Similar discrepancies are found when trying to verify donations made by 
hospitals to other organizations in the community.  Foundations and other 
affiliates can compound the confusion, since inter-organizational transfers of 
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funds may be categorized as contributions or may be recorded elsewhere on the 
balance sheets.
The first comparison could be of the ISDH data with the IRS data.  However as 
the chart included in Appendix 5-1 shows, there is a very weak correlation of 
reported grants from the IRS Form 990 with either the gross or net outgoing 
donations (to others) as reported on the ISDH reports.15  Part of this may be due 
to only including hospital information and not that of the hospital foundation or 
other affiliates.  Or it could be due to variability of reporting criteria for the two 
forms.  Regardless, because of the wide discrepancy and the lack of detail 
available on the ISDH Reports, the data used for the remainder of this analysis 
will be taken solely from the IRS Form 990.
Outgoing Contributions to Others: Specific Information from the IRS Form 990
It is possible to gain a more complete understanding of the exact nature of these 
donations through details and supplements to the IRS Form 990s.  The following 
section details findings from a review of all hospital and hospital foundation 990s 
from the state of Indiana for the fiscal year 2005.  Table 5I shows the grants 
made as identified on the IRS Form 990 (as indicated on Part II, line 22 on the 
second page of the IRS Form 990).
                                           
15 The IRS Form 990 records the Gross donations to an organization.  However the new 
Schedule H asks for net donations as well as gross to determine how much of the donation is 
counted as “community benefit.”  This is similar to the ISDH format.
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Table 5I: Grants and Donations Made: Hospitals and Foundations Together
Total Dollars
“Contributed”
PUBLIC Hospitals
Fdn Only (11 hospitals) $        4,953,696
Hosp and Fdn (9 hospitals) $        1,611,232
- Hospital $162,975
- Foundation $1,498,257
Public Total (20 hospitals) $    6,546,928
FOR-PROFIT Hospitals16
Foundation (2 hosp)
FP Total $    1,017,255
NON-PROFIT Hospitals
Hosp only (NOT part of a system) $        1,948,698
Hosp and Fdn (NOT part of a 
system) $10,289,343
- Hospital $3,960,420
- Foundation $6,328,923
NP SubTotal (NOT part of a system) $12,238,041
[All NP Hosp Only] [$5,909,118]
NP Systems $216,610,651
- Hosp $115,677,668
- Fdn $100,932,983
Non-Profit TOTAL $228,848,692
ALL TOTAL $236,480,875
As can be seen, according to the IRS form 990 a majority of the donations made 
by Indiana hospitals (91%) came from nonprofit hospitals and foundations 
affiliated with systems.  Looking at all nonprofit hospitals approximately 52% of 
the nonprofit total donations were from hospitals and 48% from their foundations. 
Table 5J shows that when public and for-profit hospitals are included, there is a 
                                           
16 Since For-Profit hospitals do not file 990 forms with the IRS – nor are there corporate tax 
returns publicly available – so they are not included in this comparison. However for-profit 
hospitals in Indiana reported on the ISDH fiscal reports $945,489 in donations, which would 
double the for profit totals on the table if they added in.
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distinctly even split between hospital foundations and hospitals in making 
donations.  
Table 5J:
Grants and Donations Made: Hospitals and Foundations - Separate
Total Dollars
“Contributed”
FOUNDATIONS
Public – No Hosp 990 $4,953,696
Public – with Hosp 990 $1,498,257
For-Profit $1,017,255
Nonprofit - Non-system $6,328,923
Nonprofit - System $100,932,983
TOTAL - FOUNDATIONS $114,731,114
HOSPITALS
Public – with Fdn 990 $162,975
Nonprofit – No Fdn $1,948,698
NP – with Fdn (Non-system) $3,960,420
Nonprofit – with Fdn (System) $115,677,668
TOTAL - HOSPITALS $121,749,761
TOTAL – ALL HOSPITALS 
and FOUNDATIONS $236,480,875
When all types of hospitals are included (public and foundations associated with 
for-profit hospital as well as nonprofit), 51% of the contributions come from the 
hospitals while 49% from the foundations.  This shows that if only hospital 
donations are included in donation figures, the amount donated will be only about 
half of the actual figure that hospitals are responsible for.  
There is a further question about these donations and that is the extent they 
reflect and support external community needs and the extent they are simply 
internal transfers or support other interests of the hospitals.  This information can 
be separated into the primary purposes of the donations, separated into 
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categories of: 1) self-benefit and internal use; 2) self-benefit but for community 
benefit programs; and donations to others in the community for 3) education and 
scholarships; 4) health care needs (provided by others); and for 5) other 
community non-healthcare organizations and needs (see Table 5K).  
Table 5K: Use of Grants Made by Indiana Hospitals
When these uses are separated, it can be seen that approximately 80% of the 
donations indicated on the IRS Form 990 could be considered internal transfers 
and use.  This does not mean that the donations are being recorded fraudulently.  
Many of these transfers are donations made for specific purposes to a foundation 
for use by the hospital (such as for construction or equipment payments).  
However it should be cautioned that this distinction is not effectively differentiated 
in either the current or revised IRS Form 990s.17
To better understand the donation behavior of specific nonprofit hospitals, 
donation activity was included in the survey of Indiana hospitals outlined in 
Chapter Four. 
                                           
17 Information on Table 5-8 is taken from Appendix 5-4, which details the specific programs and 
project reported by individual Indiana hospitals and hospital foundations under “Grants and 
Allocations” on the 2005 IRS Form 990s.
A
Self-Use:
Internal 
Transfers
B 
Self-Use:
Community 
Benefit
C 
Self/Comm:
Education/ 
Scholarships
D 
Community
Health 
Organiza-
tions
E 
Community 
Non-Health 
Organiza-
tions
TOTAL
$186,271,594 $37,619,651 $2,382,951 $5,990,783 $3,614,013 $235,878,992
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Questionnaires about Donations
In the questionnaire sent out in 2008 to Indiana hospitals18 a page was included 
for feedback on the donations programs of the individual hospitals (see Appendix 
5-2).  This part of the questionnaire had four questions regarding reporting and 
management functions.  These questions were designed to gain information 
about where in the organization where decisions were made about contributions 
as well as how the contributions were managed and reported.  The first question 
was intended to locate the level of the organization for contribution decisions.  
The second question was to identify the reporting process within the hospital.  
One purpose for this question is to determine if the person(s) responsible for
reporting contributions was the same as those responsible for the decisions to 
make the contributions, to manage the contribution process, or to report the level 
of donation activity.  The third question was to determine which specific 
department was responsible for managing the donations processes and whether 
the management was focused at the same organizational level as the decision-
making process.  It also asked if the management of contributions was in a single 
department of the hospital.  The fourth question sought to identify the 
organizations and the specific causes supported by the hospital’s donations.
There are two complications and potential misunderstandings that could arise 
from these questions.  The first is that the information being tested is from the 
hospital not from a hospital foundation.  The second is that the process of making 
donations may differ from the process of accepting or encouraging donations.  
                                           
18 For specific details of the survey process, see Chapter Four.
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Both of these questions were the focus of the follow-up interviews.  The 
responses below were focused solely on the hospital and on the process of 
making contributions from the hospital.
Response from Questionnaires
Three hospitals (of the 42 who actually returned questionnaires) did not fill out 
this page; their donation information was “$0” and they marked the question as 
“Not Applicable”.  For the others (33 individual responses representing 50 
hospitals), the results of the donations19 portion of the surveys are as shown in 
Exhibit 5-1:20
                                           
19 The results from the first page of the questionnaire addressing health promotion programs are 
covered in Chapter Five. 
20 To avoid possibly skewing the results, only the actual responses from the returned 39 
questionnaires are shared.  Even though community benefit programs for multiple hospitals may 
be coordinated by one individual it doesn’t mean the decision process is always the same for all 
affiliated institutions.  However some results will add up to more than 40 because of input that 
was shared in personal interviews when it was indicated that a response represented a single 
process that covered more than one of the affiliated hospitals.  
In a few cases, a response may not have been given, leading to response rates less than 
the total.
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Exhibit 5-1: Donations – Revenue Received and Payments Made
1. Who in the hospital is most responsible for determining that expense?21
Item Survey
Response Response
   13    10    CEO
     2      2    Other Administration (no title)
     5      5    CFO
     2      2    Vice President for Community Relations 
     7      2    Other (please specify):
Administrative Grant Making Committee
Controller
   10     7    Department Head
     4      2    Support Staff
     6      2    Other (please specify):
Hospital Board of Directors has set a 
policy for expenditure of 10% of net 
revenue 
– 5 item; 1 survey response
Community Benefit Committee of the 
     Board of Directors 
– 1 item; 1 survey response
2. Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting the above figure?22
Item Survey
Response Response
     6      3    CEO
   16     13    Other Administration(8 item and 8 survey 
    responses noted “CFO” as responsible)
   17    12    Department Head
     7      5    Support Staff
     6       2    Other (please specify):
Community Development staff and 
Finance 
– 6 items; 2 survey responses
                                           
21 1 hospital did not check this category, so for both response rates are lower by one.  The 
hospital that did not respond noted that only a special event was held and the only expenses and 
income for the program were expenses and income from that event.
22 2 hospitals indicated that both an “Administrative” (CFO) and a “Department Head” were jointly 
responsible for reporting.  This means 52 item responses and 35 survey responses were 
recorded.
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3. Which department is most responsible for managing the donation program 
and budget?
Item Survey
Response Response
   10     10    Administration
   16     12    Public Relations/Marketing
     1       1    Health Education
     6       1    Fund Development/Foundation
     0       0    Human Resources
   18       9    Other (please specify):
General Accounting - 3 items; 1 survey
Community Development 
– 6 items; 2 surveys
Community Benefits – 1 item; 1 survey
Each Department handles their own 
donations – 2 item; 2 surveys
Finance, Community Relations, and 
Education – 1 item; 1 survey
Health Promotions and Community 
Relations – 5 items; 2 surveys
The responses fall within three broad categories. The first approach (grant-
making process) is a formal policy and leadership process for determining and 
distributing grants.  In this situation the hospital acts similar to a grant-making 
foundation, supporting community projects and organizations that fall within given 
criteria.  This type of orientation reflects the Political model or the 
Leadership/Ethical model of contributions.  The difference is whether the Board 
or Administration determines the actual contributions or if these decisions are 
carried out by a different segment of the hospital or a separate hospital 
Foundation.  The second type (marketing process) is primarily an administrative 
process that is handled at a mid-administrative or departmental level.  These 
donations reflect a marketing orientation and a Marketing or Management model 
for contributions and is undertaken primarily to increase profitability.  The third 
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category (informal process) indicates that recommendations come from staff with 
approval by administration.  In these cases the amounts of the contributions are 
relatively small and tend to support ongoing relationships with various related 
organizations.  This category would correspond to the Stakeholder model and be 
a similar process and motivation as was found in Health Education programs 
(Chapter Four).  The questionnaires and interviews are evaluated in relation to 
these three processes.
1. Who in the hospital is most responsible for determining that expense?
The responding nonprofit hospitals indicated that the process for determining 
donations is much more strongly led by top administration and/or the board of 
directors than was the case for Health Promotion expense.  Two responses 
indicated they had internal grant making committees of top administration and 
two others that a committee of the board determines donation policies and 
reviews disbursements.  One respondent indicated the hospital board has 
implemented a “tithing” policy: 10% of the net revenue (calculated on the 
previous year’s finances) is placed into a community benefit fund to be disbursed 
for community health initiatives and programs.  Other responses ranged from the 
department head or vice-president of marketing or community relations had this 
approval responsibility (3 responses) and one identified the Controller as 
responsible (probably referring to the reporting rather than the decision process).  
One response stated: “Others recommend – CEO OKs.”  A primary objective of 
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the personal interviews is to further clarify the organizational location of these 
processes and levels.
2. Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting the above figure?
The reporting process was primarily located at the mid-administrative level, 
similar to the health education process.  When specified, the primary department 
responsible was finance, with public relations or community development as a 
second designation.  In almost every case the reporting process was the same 
for contributions as it was for health education.
3. Which department is most responsible for managing the donation program 
and budget?
These responses were more varied, with a split between administration 
responsible for managing the program (possibly reflecting a grant-making 
orientation) and public relations or marketing (possibly reflecting the hospitals 
with a marketing-orientation).  Four respondents specified multiple departments 
managed the funds, with Community Benefits and/or Public Relations as one of 
them.  The hospital foundation was identified by two respondents as responsible 
for administering outgoing donations as well as encouraging donations to the 
organization.  One respondent indicated that “Administration also has ‘Donation 
Funds,’ ” suggesting that an alternative informal approach is used by leadership 
to make contributions to causes as opportunities arise.  This is one area that was 
further explored in the personal interviews.
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4. Which organizations received those donations and for what purposes?   
Responses to this question were extensive and varied (see Appendix 5-3).  Most 
respondents emphasized that there were numerous organizations supported in 
various ways.  Details of these organizational donations are an aspect to 
investigate further in the interviews.  
Conclusions from the Questionnaires
The questionnaires indicate that donations by many nonprofit hospitals are a 
broad effort, especially in terms of the numbers of organizations supported.  It 
also seems to be a formal process in several hospitals, with the implication that 
making community donations is an important part of a hospital’s external 
relationship effort.  This role seems to range from informal support for community 
partners to almost a formal community grant-making position.  The role of 
donations as a form of marketing is one that is not only implicit (as in any 
corporate donation) but also acknowledged by the prevalence of community 
relations and marketing departments in the decision and management process.
The management of the programs (Question #3) as well as the decision-making 
processes (Question #1) actually fall fairly equally between the three broad 
categories, indicating that different hospitals make contributions for different 
motivations.  Ten survey respondents indicated that the CEO managed the 
program as well as made the donation decisions.  This corresponds to the first 
approach (grant-making process) and reflects the Leadership/Ethical model of 
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contributions.  However if the actual contributions were carried out by a different 
segment of the hospital than administration, it could confirm the Political model 
for these organizations.  In almost all the cases this seemed to be the situation 
and is an area to more specifically explore in the interviews.  
For the remainder of the hospitals the decision-making process was somewhat 
scattered at various levels throughout the hospital leading to a possible 
conclusion that either contributions were part of the formal management structure 
or were more informally organized on a stakeholder level.  The management of 
these programs fell equally into two distinct areas.  One area reflected the 
second type (marketing process) and seemed to indicate that making 
contributions was primarily an administrative process that is handled at a mid-
administrative or departmental level.  Twelve individuals surveyed from 16 
hospitals indicated this level of program management.  These could reflect a 
Marketing or Management model for contributions that is undertaken primarily to 
increase profitability or otherwise support the healthcare provision from the 
hospital.  The second area reflected the third category (informal process) and 
corresponds to the Stakeholder model.  Nine respondents representing eighteen 
hospitals indicated the “other” category that primarily reflected this variability.  
Eight of the eighteen hospitals indicated one or more departments actually 
carried out the programs, again reinforcing the stakeholder orientation.  
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To further explore the donation process at individual hospitals telephone or 
personal interviews with self-selected survey respondents were conducted.  
These interviews were done with the same individuals, at the same time, and fit 
the same criteria as were outlined in Chapter Four.  This portion of the personal 
interviews had four key objectives related to these initial responses about 
donations.  The first objective is to determine the validity of the ISDH donation 
figure from the Hospital Fiscal reports.  The second is to verify the process the 
hospital uses to allocate donations.  The third objective is to define the role the 
hospital’s foundation or fundraising program plays in this process – both in terms 
of soliciting contributions as well as in making donations.  The fourth priority is to 
discover the types of policies that determine the types of organizations 
supported.  In addition the interviews addressed the two potential complications 
identified earlier in the chapter: whether the information being tested is from the 
hospital or from the foundation; and whether the process of making donations 
differs from the process of accepting or encouraging donations.  
Personal Interviews
The personal interviews tended to reinforce the questionnaire responses as well 
as present an even more complex organizational process revolving around 
donations.  The most common response to the first question (regarding the 
validity of the donation figure as reported by the ISDH report) was that the 
donation figure from the ISDH report did not match the figures they had.  In most 
cases it was low – and a majority of responses indicated they did not know where 
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that figure might have come from.  These responses suggest those who report 
the results of the programs and those who are responsible for determining and 
managing the programs could be separated and the processes de-coupled.  In all 
cases they said the donation figure was from the hospital not the foundation –
although nearly half expressed the feeling that the income was probably reported 
by the foundation.  In no cases did they know this for sure.  
Two conversations show the potential complexity involved with these donations.  
One respondent stated that they felt the income figure was from a county 
tobacco grant, and that the donations from the hospital were most probably for 
community fundraising events (such as sponsoring charity auctions or races) or 
marketing expense for advertising.  Another noted that the net donations was 
“$0” since the income is a transfer from hospital’s foundation, but the donations 
were an expense determined by the hospital’s board of directors – essentially 
using the hospital as a pass-through.
The second objective was to identify the process the hospital uses to allocate 
donations.  Responses tended to group themselves according to the three levels 
noted earlier.  Three smaller hospitals identified a more informal process, 
allowing department managers to make small donations as needed out of their 
budget or to make recommendations to administration for approval on a case-by-
case basis.  Four other hospitals (tending to be medium sized or independent 
facilities) indicated a marketing approach, with requests either going directly to a 
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community relations department as part of their budget or coming to the 
marketing department from administration.  One respondent indicated the 
marketing budget for community sponsorships was a total of $10,000 per year.
The prevalent grant-making responses were from the larger hospitals and 
system-related institutions that showed various levels of organizational 
sophistication.  Two indicated they had formal tithing programs where 10% of the 
net revenue each year was given to community programs.  In one hospital this 
was accomplished by giving the funds to the hospital’s foundation to distribute; in 
the other hospital the community health education department administered the 
funds.  The former (foundation-administered) program has been in place for ten 
years and until 2007 accepted community requests.  In 2007 they discontinued 
this program and use the funding to initiate and operate their own outreach 
programs.  The latter (internally-administered) program has an external 
application process that works like most any grant-making foundation.  They 
have broad criteria for the grants, supporting projects that address “the needs of 
underserved populations, emphasizing sustainability for existing and pilot social 
service programs with measurable outcomes.”
Two other system hospitals indicated a multi-level approach to donations.  One 
has an administrative committee that screens community requests (via a formal 
grant application) and allocates an annual $150,000 donation budget. They have 
broad criteria for projects (“of benefit to the greater community”) and last year 
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received about $1 million in requests.  This same hospital has a budgeted 
allocation in the marketing department for event sponsorships that can be 
applied for by employee staff.  Major requests for capital campaign support or 
other large community projects goes to the president’s office and are allocated by 
board approval.  A second system hospital has a similar sponsorship fund in the 
marketing department, with a “discretionary” fund administered by the 
administrator for any requests over $10,000.  Their primary donation 
determinations are by board committee that allocates a budgeted amount of 
donations every quarter (applied for by community request) and makes special 
larger grants on a yearly basis.
One large hospital has a “corporate contributions committee” under the health 
promotion director that reviews applications and allocates about $150,000 per 
year to area organizations.  The criteria for grants emphasize projects for 
improved health, youth, and diversity but also may provide general support to 
any community organization.  Another large hospital has a grant request form 
and stresses projects that address community health needs, but also will fund 
any “strong organization that provides significant services to the community”.
The third objective of the interviews was to define the role the hospital’s 
foundation or fundraising program plays in this process – both in terms of 
soliciting contributions as well as in making donations.  A majority of the 
responses indicated that the hospital’s fundraising efforts were essentially 
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separate from their donation program.  One stated that the health promotion 
program of the hospital received a yearly grant from their hospital’s foundation, 
and another mentioned their foundation had a separate process for providing 
support to community organizations.  Most respondents indicated their 
foundation was a separate program specifically to generate support for the 
hospital – and that the processes of encouraging contributions from the 
community and giving donations to the community were separate.  Three smaller 
hospitals indicated there was no foundation or fundraising program and that any 
incoming contributions were either from unsolicited bequests or gifts through their 
hospice program, from grants, or from an annual fundraising event.
The fourth priority was to discover the policies that determine the types of 
organizations supported.  As mentioned above, most organizations have broad 
flexibility to respond to a variety of community needs – but most indicated a 
preference for health-related organizations and projects.  One small hospital 
noted their contribution was in-kind, donating 5,000 square feet of space for 
community use, which they valued at $2,000 per month.
As stated earlier, the interviews also addressed the two potential complications 
identified earlier in the chapter: whether the information being tested is from the 
hospital or from the foundation; and whether the process of making donations 
differs from the process of accepting or encouraging donations.  In only one case 
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was the foundation mentioned as being central to the donation process.23  In all 
other responses the donation information was from the hospital not the 
foundation.  Investigating the second complication found only three institutions 
had a link between accepting contributions and making donations (and one of 
those was the formal foundation and outreach structure indicated in footnote 
#190).  In the other two cases the funding activity was fairly low and involved a 
single event or program where the proceeds went to a predefined cause.  In all 
other cases the process of making donations was separate from the process of 
encouraging contributions from the public.
Analysis of Responses – Location of Donations: The primary purpose of the 
questionnaires and the interviews was to identify where in the organization the 
decision process regarding donations was primarily located.  To evaluate this 
requires two stages.  The first is to look at the correspondence between the 
distribution of donations from the organization only.  The second is to look at the 
“donation process” in toto: i.e. both the distribution and the receiving of 
donations.
The first stage – decisions to donate – are scattered among various locales and 
the three broad categories of processes defined earlier.  These categories are: 
the grant-making process (a formal policy that reflects the Political model of 
                                           
23 In that instance the health system had been structured so that all donations and outreach 
programs from all the hospitals in the systems were managed by that foundation.  In addition the 
hospital tithed a defined percentage of their annual net revenue to the foundation for conducting 
outreach programs.
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contributions, although there could also be an indication of the Leadership/Ethical 
model); the marketing process (an administrative process at a departmental 
level, reflecting a Marketing or Management model); and an informal process 
(from staff with approval by administration, corresponding to the Stakeholder 
model).  Table 5L summarizes those decision processes:
Table 5L: Location of Decisions to Make Donations to Others
Grant-Making 
Process:
Administration –
Ethical/Altruistic
Grant-Making 
Process:
Foundation –
Political
Management 
Process:
Departmental
Informal
Process:
Stakeholder
14 20 5 3
As indicated above, the overwhelming majority of hospitals treated donations as 
a grant-making process, with nearly 50% primarily positioning donations as a 
Political motivation (i.e. in a separate organization) but with also with 1/3 
positioned as potentially an Administrative location (or Ethical/Altruistic 
motivation).  This suggests that donations are treated by the hospitals primarily 
as providing support for causes either that leadership believes in or that will help 
provide political influence for the hospital within the community.  Two caveats 
should be emphasized.  The first is for many hospitals smaller donations can be 
made from staff levels, reflecting a Stakeholder Model.  The second is that 
donations are found in a mix of locations even in hospitals with a more 
centralized donation function, meaning that it can be misleading to assign this 
function to a single location for any hospital.  However the locations indicated in 
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Table 5L reflect the principle organizational location for the donation-making 
process.
The second stage for analysis of this process – to determine the primary location 
of both distribution and solicitation of donations – involves making a subjective 
determination of the primary location for the principle donation activities for each 
hospital.  This analysis is in two parts.  The first is to determine where decisions 
regarding donations are located and the second is to identify whether the 
donation program decisions process was located in the same place as the health 
education program decisions.  Table 5M summarizes those factors (see 
Appendix 5-5 for a breakdown by hospital):
Table 5M: Primary Location of ALL Donation Decisions and Operations –
Distribution AND Solicitation
Donation 
Decision: 
Administration
Donation 
Decision: 
Department
Donation 
Decision: 
Staff
Donation 
Decision: 
Foundation
Is Donation Decision 
in Same Location as 
Health Education?
16 8 0 18 No –28; Yes - 14
Out of 42 hospitals24 represented in the surveys, 18 (42%) indicated that the 
primary decision level was in a Foundation (or a separate department), 16 (38%) 
that it was in Administration, and 8 (19%) at a Department level.  28 of the 42 
hospitals (66%) indicated that donation decisions were located in a different level 
of the hospital’s organizational structure than health education programs.  Of the 
14 hospitals that indicated the same organizational level handled both health 
                                           
24 3 of the 45 hospitals surveyed indicated they did not have a donation program.
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education and donations, 5 noted that location was the Foundation (all from the 
same system).  This indicates that even though the decisions at these five 
hospitals are made at the same organizational level, both programs (health 
education and donations) are separated from the healthcare operations of the 
hospital.  Only 9 of the 45 hospitals surveyed (20%) had decisions made within 
the same organizational level within the primary healthcare structure – and 6 of 
these were at the department level (13%).  The other three had both decisions 
made at the administrative or leadership level. 
These results tend to confirm the two hypotheses regarding donation decisions, 
although there is a fairly even spilt between whether donations are at the 
Leadership level (indicating an Ethical/Altruistic motivation) or at the Foundation 
level (indicating a Political motivation).  It should also be noted that of the 
hospitals indicating donations were at the Leadership level, over half (9 out of the 
16) were smaller, independent hospitals.  The others were associated with one 
Catholic system or with a Jewish hospital system.  
Conclusions
It is hypothesized that the donation process would be largely decoupled from the 
central operations of the hospital in order to best fulfill the anticipated role of 
community influence presented by the Political or Ethical model of contributions.  
To aid this decoupling, the donation process is expected to be located in a 
separate department or foundation.  The types of causes supported would be 
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selected to secure a maximum level of community influence and visibility for the 
hospital. 
There were four specific hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter.  
The first was that donations fulfill either the Political model for giving or the 
Ethical/Altruistic model.  The Political model provides the hospital with community 
influence and participation.  In the hospital donations will be found in different 
parts of the hospital’s organizational structure than their healthcare operational or 
health education programs, allowing for both the maximum community political 
benefit as well as decoupling the donation process from operations.  This 
hypothesis was both confirmed and expanded.  The primary location of donation 
decisions was fairly evenly split between administrative level (indicating an 
Ethical/Altruistic motivation) and a Foundation location (indicating a Political 
motivation).  The fact that over 2/3 of the hospitals located donations in a 
different level than health education indicates a decoupling that hospitals practice 
in terms of these two elements of philanthropic behavior.  Such decoupling helps 
remove donations from healthcare decisions, which may be advantageous in 
terms of positioning the hospitals in the community but could be detrimental in 
terms of conveying to a community the extent of their philanthropic benefit.
This decoupling was further confirmed in that for every hospital that had a formal 
fundraising program (except one), the donation process was separate from the 
fundraising process.  The one exception had the entire outreach activities for all 
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system hospitals located formally within the foundation.  For over 40% of the 
hospitals surveyed the Political model seemed to hold; but for a comparable 
number of the hospitals a Leadership model seemed to be the primary 
motivation.  This suggests that hospitals make donation decisions based upon 
two possible motivations: the ethical values of the leadership or to seek 
community influence.  It is possible that both of these motivations could be 
influencing donation decisions, but to isolate one or the other without further
investigation can be difficult.  And a single general statement about any one 
motivation is probably misleading. 
A second hypothesis was that because of the complexities of the hospital 
organizational structures, efforts to accurately count and compare incoming and 
outgoing donations are extremely difficult to extract.  The processes in individual 
hospitals found through the surveys and interviews not only confirmed this 
complexity but also indicated that it actually is more involved and scattered than 
might have been anticipated.  This relates to the underlying concern about the 
comparability of various regulatory reports. One aspect that the interviews noted 
is that hospitals (at least those interviewed) are extremely aware of the need to 
document their activities and strive to accurately convey their activities.  However 
different management approaches and the variable nature and role that 
donations can play make the processes for determining and reporting that activity 
inconsistent.  
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Chapter Six summarizes results from the surveys in both Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five and draws some further conclusions from this thesis.
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APPENDIX 5-1: Comparison of Actual Donations Received, as Reported by 
Indiana Nonprofit Hospitals – ISDH and IRS Reports (2005)
ISDH Donations Est. IRS 990 IRS 990
Incoming Revenue from Others Direct Public Support Total Contributions
$4,685 $158,878 $244,960
$953,988 No IRS Report
$129,063 No IRS Report
$72,000 $0 $43,150,641
$0 $4,446 $120,349
$346,585 $0 $0
$348,776 $73,537 $4,093,024
$101,486 None reported None reported
$252,876 $10,264,519 $14,077,410
$44,625 None reported None reported
$166,197 $143,970 $354,793
$18,425 None reported None reported
$370,678 No IRS Report
$0 $0 $4,459,508
$0 $0 $280,603
$26,997 None reported None reported
$0 $3,000 $157,482
$6,152 None reported None reported
$706,654 $117,941 $2,640,184
$65,539 No IRS Report
$0 $0 $75,500
$21,958 None reported None reported
$0 $38,060 $368,673
$68,603 $68,603 $68,603
$0 $0 $2,505,077
$265,335 $25,590 $629,738
$93,472 $0 $619,453
$42,900 $132,970 $132,970
$0 None reported None reported
$0 None reported None reported
$0 $865,956 $1,512,228
$803,909 $809,836 $856,710
$0 None reported None reported
$0 $7,778 $2,625,992
$0 $0 $159,133
$1,667 $1,667 $1,886
$332,338 $15,339 $347,674
$0 $0 $125,367
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Appendix 5-2: Donations – Revenue Received and Payments Made
The 2005 Indiana Hospital Fiscal Report (Statement Three: Unique 
Specialized Hospital Funds) states __________ Hospital made the following 
donation for the benefit of the community:
TOTAL NET DONATIONS (From the Hospital – To Others) - $X
Estimated Incoming Revenue from Others - $X
Estimated Outgoing Expenses to Others - $X
Net Dollar Gain or Loss after Adjustment - $X
1. Who in the hospital is most responsible for determining that expense?
____ CEO
____ Other Administration
- ____ CFO
- ____ Vice President for __________ (please specify): 
- ____ Other (please specify):
____ Department Head
____ Support Staff
____ Other (please specify):
- Are others also involved with that decision?  (and if so, who?)
2. Who in the hospital is most responsible for reporting the above figure?
____ CEO
____ Other Administration
____ Department Head
____ Support Staff
____ Other (please specify):
3. Which department is most responsible for managing the donation program 
and budget?
____ Administration
____ Public Relations/Marketing
____ Health Education
____ Fund Development/Foundation
____ Human Resources
____ Other (please specify):
4. Which organizations received those donations and for what purposes?   
Do you have any other comments that help clarify any of the above?
Thank you for taking the time to help with this study!  Would you be willing to 
participate in a follow-up telephone conversation (approximately fifteen minutes) 
to discuss the above in more detail? ____ Yes ____ No  
Please return to Al Lyons: allyons@iupui.edu Page 2 of 2
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Appendix 5-3: Responses to Question #4
Which organizations received those donations and for what purposes?
a. Too many to list, typically agencies related to health services 
(American Heart Assoc, diabetes, cancer, etc.) also youth 
agencies, government agencies, Minority Health groups, and 
Health disparity groups
b. A wide variety of community organizations, for event sponsorship
c. Area nursing program
d. Organizations in the area who request assistance
e. There are multiple organizations who receive donations with 
significant support provided to nonprofit organizations who partner 
with the hospital to improve the health of the community – our 
mission.  Examples: Matthew 25 Health and Dental Clinic –
provides medical and dental care to low income and uninsured 
patients receives significant support from the hospital in the form of 
operating funds, in-kind lab processing, in-kind diagnostic services, 
to Matthew 25 patients and program support
f. Schools – health and wellness initiatives, local organizations and 
national organizations such as American Heart and American 
Cancer.
g. We are a small Critical Access Hospital with limited resources.  We 
donate meeting and office space to several community service 
agencies.  Some agencies utilize permanent office and meeting 
space while other organizations use space on a more limited basis.  
A pregnancy testing and care agency has a permanent office as 
does a marriage and family mentoring program.  Our county older 
adult services provide Medicare Part D counseling and medication 
assistance services two days per week.  An agency provides free 
tax preparation for low income residents during tax season.  The 
County Health Department uses hospital space to administer free 
childhood immunizations one day per month.  A weight loss group 
uses hospital space one night per week.  All of he above space is 
donated on a gratis basis to the organizations listed.  The hospital 
also provides housekeeping and pays all utility costs.  This has 
been an innovative way to bring needed social services to our 
community.
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h. Various organizations receive these funds for the purpose of 
purchasing healthcare products for the operation of the hospital
i. There are multiple health related organizations that receive 
donations.  Uses range form direct health services to promotion 
and research
j. Too lengthy to list – we mostly donate to organizations supporting 
health education or children’s initiatives
k. Donations recorded here were mainly for the state bio-terrorism 
grant and expenses were related to the use of those funds
l. Hospital foundation – community projects; local HS Sports
m. Local high schools, physicals for sports, money collected donated 
to schools, Boys and Girls Club, youth activities, public relations 
and community improvements
n. The hospital receives the above donations from the annual ball 
committee and foundation to purchase an identified piece of 
equipment for the hospital
i. There are no expenses for the hospital to receive these 
donations, the money that is received is the proceeds from 
the ball 
o. Wide variety – details attached to CB report
p. Various nonprofit agencies; purpose is to give to the community
q. SOAR Literacy program, schools, other nonprofits 
r. Multiple nonprofit organizations such as Boys and Girls Club, etc.
s. County organizations; patients unable to pay
t. Miscellaneous
u. American Red Cross, American Cancer Society, American heart 
Assoc, March of Dimes, Purdue University School of Nursing, etc.
v. Donations can be solicited and granted by any department in the 
hospital
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Appendix 5-4:
DONATIONS GIVEN by INDIANA HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS: 2005
From 2005 IRS Form 990
HOSPITAL FOUNDATION ONLY: PUBLIC HOSPITALS No Hospital 990
A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Hospital #125
o Gave $19,964
 Hosp for Equip: $18,464
 1st Baptist Church;        $1,500
 Foreign Health mission 
Hospital #2
o Grants and Allocations: $168,524 $168,524
Hospital #3
o Grants and Allocations: $158,770
 Hosp Equip $105,542
 Safe Kids $4,309
 Scholarships $1,075
 Prof Ed and PR, Health Promo $27,844
Hospital #4
o Grants and Allocations: $27,072
 Hosp Equip $26,572
 Comm Fdn   $500
Hospital #5
o Grants and Allocations: $2,010,277
 Hosp PR and Mktng $365,858
 Scholarships $209,190
 LifeLine and Assist Living $1,435,229
o Grants and Allocations: $191,909 (Add’l?)
 Scholarships $106,909
 Hospital $85,000
Hospital #6
o Grants and Allocations: $41,204
 Hosp Master Plan $41,402
Hospital #7
o Grants and Allocations: $1,114,482
 To hospital $60,738
 To hospital $289,003
 Hospice $267,655
 To clinic $359,094
 Healthy Communities $120,002
 Adult Day Care $6,490
 Scholarships $11,500
o Total: $ 1,201,694
 To Hospital $844,332
 To Clinic(add’l?)           $357,362 
                                           
25 The numbers of the hospitals are assigned at random and are included for the sake of 
convenience. They are not correlated to any criteria except for the category under which they are 
listed.
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A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Hospital #8
o Grants and Allocations: $21,102 [Last hosp 990 – 2004]
 To hospital $21,102
 Scholarships $7,000
Hospitals #9-11
o No Grants and Allocations: (3 Hospitals)
PUBLIC Independent Hospitals: HOSPITAL and FOUNDATION 990:
Hospital #41
o HOSPITAL: No Grants Noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $15,960
 Scholarships (Prof Loans) $15,500
 To Hospital $460
Hospital #42
o HOSPITAL: No Grants Noted
 Community Wellness $162,975
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $94,473
 Undesignated $96,506
o Incl. Ambulance: $87,450
 Adds other expenses such as patient newspapers
 “Contributions” Expense of $157
Hospital #43
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $36,205
 Equip for Hosp $25,830
 Equip for Community $4,175
 Donations to Comm. NP $6,200
Hospital #44
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $265,815
 Scholarships/Ed $25,045
 “Healthier Communities Program”$336,470
 Add’l $90,132 in other expenses (incl some wellness programs)
Hospital #45
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $34,142
 Total Exp $93,998
 To Hospital $24,835
 Scholarships $36,947
 To local charities $9,307
 Community Trail Project             $22,909
Hospital #46
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $288,337
 All to hospital $288,337
Hospital #47
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $2,376,149
 Incl CC and all other CB?
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $155,226
 To Hosp for equip $155,226
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  A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Hospital #48
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted
 $836,067 for Community Educ, incl
 Prof Educ $35,085
 Patient Educ $526,125
 Comm Educ $171,066
 Comm Prog $103,791
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $280,360
 To Hospital $200,788
 Scholarships $31,572
 Comm Prog (Fam Hlth Ctr) $50,000
Hospital #49
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted 
 No 990 for 2005 (2004 only)
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $175,905
 Hospital $134,050
 Scholarships $8,000
 Clinic and Parish Nurse $15,600
 Community Orgs             $10,500
 Total transferred: $391,886
 Incl promo expenses
HOSPITAL FOUNDATION ONLY 
FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #12
o Capital Contribution to Fdn: $11,002,575
o Chaplain program: $20,205
Hospital #13
o Grants and Allocations: $997,050 (Total: $1,112,677)
 Education $33,708
 Comm Hlth $607,319
 Comm NP          $356,023
o Indirect Contribution Received: $5,500
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  A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Nonprofit HOSPITAL 990 ONLY – No Foundation 990:
Hospital #14
o Grants and Allocations: $3,750 – No Info
Hospital #15
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
o CB REPORT: 
 Subsidized Services $12,772,126 (NET: $2,350,142)
 Non-duplicated Services $4,529
 Education (Prof and Student) $957,188
 HC Related Programs $89,921 (NET: $81,781)
 Wellness and Health Ed
 Total: $323,055 – NET: $312,655
 Donations to Orgs ($110,150) $32,200           $77,950
 In-Kind Donations and Services $96,077 $122,795        $739,565
 Total: $958,437 – NET: $923,641
o (NOTE: No Fdn 990) in Supplement: “FOUNDATION to Hosp: $1,094,498”
Hospital #16
o Grants and Allocations: $10,000 
 Scholarships $10,000
Hospital #17
o Grants and Allocations: $9,000
 Not Specified $9,000
Hospitals #18-21
o No Grants Noted – 4 Hospitals
NONPROFIT Hospitals: HOSPITAL and FOUNDATION 990:
Hospital #22
o HOSPITAL: No Grants Noted
 Tithing Program ($2.5 Mill) $2.5 Million
 $1,211,405 in Indirect contrib. Received (from Fdn???)
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $1,286,120
 To Hospital $1,251,428
 Scholarships $35,692
o “Contribution from parent co: $4,086,251”
 Listed on 990 as “Indirect Public Support”
Hospital #23
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $55,365
 Equip and Renovation $55,365
 Total transferred to hospital: $69,207 (incl. Reimb for Exec Dir salary)
Hospital #24
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $158,933
 CB REPORT: 
 Scholarship $250
 Comm Hlth Prog $127,108
 Comm NP         $31,575
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $165,431
 To Hosp for equipment $165,431
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  A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Hospital #25
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
 $433,331 in Indirect contrib. Received (from Fdn???)
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $325,227
 For Capital and Operations- $325,227
 $521,964 in Total to Hospital, incl. Operating expenses forgiven by 
hospital
Hospital #26
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $145,713
 To St Anthony (rival Hosp) $110,000
 Scholarships $35,713
o [NOTE Incl Aux, Hosp and Fdn – TOTAL: $2,488,044]
 Comm Prev and Well $945,421
 School-based Prog $41,651
 Spirit Care $8,928
 Med Res $82,076
 Educ $293,255
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $201,813
 To Hosp $172,100
 Hosp: Community Wellness $27,469
 Scholarships $18,500
Hospital #27
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
 $152,970 as “Indirect Contrib Received (from Fdn)
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $152,970
 Transferred to hospital - $152,970
 Total of $200,773 transferred to hospital, incl expenses
Hospital #28
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $23,255
 Comm Hlth Prog $5,887
 Comm NP           $17,368
o FOUNDATION: Tota; $195,962
 Grants and Allocations: $34,875
 Hospital - $31,875
 Scholarships $3,000
o Support Phys Office – underserved area - $161,087
Hospital #29
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $167,080
 $332,335 in Indirect Contrib Received (from Fdn)
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $332,338
 Capital and Operations - $332,338
Hospital #30
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $208,424
 To Parent System - $208,424
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $878,411(Total $1,208,004)
 Hospital grants $767,909
 Scholarship $25,000
 Comm Hlth prog $49,502
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A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs 
Hospital #31
o HOSPITAL: No Grants noted
 $1,421,877 in Indirect Contrib
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $395,831
 Scholarships $22,125
 To hospital and clinic $373,706
 To clinic in other city       $25,000
 To various FR causes         $930
Hospital #32
o HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $316,950
 To affiliates $133,784
 Health Initiatives $187,666
 Scholarships $650
 Comm Hlth Prog         $85,400
 Comm NP        $41,532
 Non-Defined Donations: $60,084
o FOUNDATION: No grants noted
Hospital #33
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $1,239,440
 Scholarships $34,500
 Partners for Community Impact $10,150
 To Hospital $1,199,290
Hospital #34
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $74,600
 To hospital $42,900
 Other orgs            $31,700
Hospital #35
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted 
 $32,226 in Indirect contrib. Received
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $3,351
 To hospital $3,351
Hospital #36
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted 
 $236,257 in Indirect contrib. Received
 CB Expense: $588,638
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $353,285
 Hosp Equip $148,000
 Hospice $53,607
 Scholarships and Ed $103,391
 LifeLine $48,020
 Other      $267
Hospital #37
o HOSPITAL: No grants noted 
 $99,108 in Indirect contrib. Received
o FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $753,720
 To hospital $753,720
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A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Nonprofit SYSTEM “A” HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #50
o HOSPITAL
 No Grants Noted
Hospital #51
o HOSPITAL
 No Grants Noted
 $60,321 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $104,359 (incl $43,329 in grants)
 To hospital $43,329
 Transferred $64,693 to hospital for expenses
Hospital #52
o HOSPITAL
 No Grants Noted
 $9,833 in Indirect Contrib Received
Hospital #53
o HOSPITAL
 No Grants Noted
o FOUNDATION
 No Grants Noted
Hospital #54
o HOSPITAL – 2006 ONLY (no 990 for 2005)
 No Grants Noted
 Net expense CB programs: $213,755
 $17,367 in Indirect Contrib Received
Hospital #55
o HOSPITAL
 No Grants Noted
 $8,000 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $37,105
 To hospital $8,000
 Clinic $24,000
 Nurse Educ $3,325
 Sr resource Ctr $1,870
Hospital #56
o HOSPITAL  
 No Grants Noted
 $219 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $24,256 ($13,917 in Grants)
 Scholarships $13,750
 To hospital $167
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A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships  Health      Programs
Hospital #57
o HOSPITAL  
 No Grants Noted
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $119,637 
 To hospital $119,637
Hospital #58
o HOSPITAL
 Grants and Allocations: $985,700
 $4,459,908 in Indirect Contrib Received (from Fdn)
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $5,797,257(incl Grants of $4,598,968)
 To Hosp #58 $4,459,908
 To Hosp #54 $        5,083
 To Clinic $129,179
 To Ped Rehab $        4,798
 Current Year Operating Exp transferred from Hospital: $916,141
Nonprofit SYSTEM “B” HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #59
o HOSPITAL  
 Grants and Allocations: $412,008 (to Fdn for CB)
 $9,079 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $377,800 (incl $370,752 in Grants)
 University (Nursing Prog) $104,957
 For Clinic $41,779
 Cancer Serv of Allen Cty $25,475
 County Rescue $25,475
 Misc Programs ($180,114)
 $438,036 in Indirect Contrib Received
Hospital #60
o HOSPITAL  
 No Grants Noted
 $1,064 in Indirect Contrib Received
Hospital #61
o HOSPITAL  
 Grants and Allocations: $130,006 
 CB Funding (via Fdn)     $50,003
 Hosp Funding (via Fdn) $80,003
 $500in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $1,153,356 (incl $1,135,561 in Grants)
 Hosp Building $1,058,148
 Children’s First Ctr $6,043
 Hospice $42,623
 Comm Hlth Prog $46,542
 $171,290 in Indirect Contrib Received
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  A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Hospital #62
o HOSPITAL  
 Grants and Allocations: $5,129,846 
 To Health Sys $5,022,846
 Comm Prog             $50,000
 Comm Health Prog             $57,000
 $255,482 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $133,923
 Hospice $61,141
 Hosp CB Programs $43,127
 Scholarships $11,250
 Comm Hlth Prog             $18,405
Hospital #63
o HOSPITAL  
 Grants and Allocations: $370,010 
 Scholarships $8,000
 Fdn Expenses $80,004
 Comm Hlth Improv (via Fdn) $282,006
o Tithing Program
 $50,367 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $337,887 (incl $331,315 in Grants)
 Hosp Hlth Prog $77,647
 Hosp Prog $37,306
 Comm Hlth Prog $13,646
 YMCA Bldg           $171,788
 Other Comm Prog           $ 37,500
 $362,010 in Indirect Contrib Received
Hospital #63
o HOSPITAL  
 Grants and Allocations: $3,045,000 
 To Fdn: Comm Hlth Improve $3,045,000
 $3,042,420 in Indirect Contrib Received
o FOUNDATION
 Grants and Allocations: $5,097,891 (incl 4,934,664 in Grants) 
 $3,205,825 in Indirect Contrib Received
- Outreach Prog – by Hosp $3,112,242
- Comm Hlth Prog         $1,433,381
- Community NP        $380,041
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A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health      Programs
Nonprofit SYSTEM “C” HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #64
- FOUNDATION: Indirect Contributions Received: $16,476,209 
o From Hospital 
- Grants and Allocations: $44,206,544 (Total: $47,035,439)
o Cash: $1,040,000
 Perf Arts Ctr and Arts Fdn        $1,040,000
o Non-Cash: $43,166,544
 Perf Arts Ctr $1,822
 Hosp #65 $       86,082
 Hosp #66 $43,078,640
Hospital #65
- HOSPITAL: Indirect Contributions Received: $86,082
- No Grants Noted
- Allocation from Fdn: $6,087,881
Hospital #66
- HOSPITAL: Indirect Contributions Received: $43,150,641 (from Fdn)
- No Grants Noted
Hospital #67
- HOSPITAL: Indirect Contributions Received: $27,059
- Grants and Allocations: $16,583,268
o Support to Parent: $16,503,268
o Arts Fdn           $80,000
Nonprofit SYSTEM “D” HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #68
- HOSPITAL
o No Grants Noted
- FOUNDATION
o Grants and Allocations: $275,000 (Total: $442,589)
 Bioterrorism Grant pass-through $60,154
 Scholarships $16,271
 Various Programs $199,352
Hospital #69
- HOSPITAL
o No Grants Noted
o Indirect Contribution Received: $210,823
- FOUNDATION
o Grants and Allocations: $949,440 (Total: $1,765,687)
 Various dept’s $1,765,687
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A   B         C        D E
Self- Self: Educ/   Community   Gen’l NP
Benefit CB    Scholarships   Health     Programs
Nonprofit SYSTEM “E” HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #70
- HOSPITAL: Grants and Allocations: $90,285,786 
o To affiliates $89,657,684
 Note: $85,835,000 to a single affiliate
o Education $3,320
o CB $10,000
o Comm Hlth $336,246
o Comm NP           
$278,536
- “Contributions” (noted as a separate, undefined line item from above)
o $1,845,891
- Indirect Contributions Received: $1,339,099
- Related FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $12,306,352 (Total: $12,461,569)
o Paid to Hospital $12,461,569
- Related FOUNDATION: 
o To Hospital: $26,699,931- $26,699,931
- Related FOUNDATION: Grants and Allocations: $1,542,106
o To Hospital: $1,542,106
Nonprofit SYSTEM “F” HOSPITALS and FOUNDATIONS
Hospital #38
- FOUNDATION 
o Grants and Allocations: $2,416,849
 Hospital #40 $529,048
 Hospital #40 $605,480
 Hospital #39 $593,728
 Hospital #39a $111,685
 Comm Hlth $211,832
 Comm NP           $248,074
o Indirect Contribution Received: $197,628
Hospital #39
- HOSPITAL 
o No Grants Noted
o Indirect Contribution Received: $133,430
 Contributions for the poor: $23,596
 Contributions for the community:           $228,358
Hospital #40
- HOSPITAL 
o No Grants Noted
o Indirect Contribution Received: $265,335
 Contributions noted as given, undefined: $708,862
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APPENDIX 5-5:
Responses to Questionnaires – Health Education AND Donations
Administrative, Department Director, Foundation or Staff Decisions
Hospital
Desig.
2005
Own.
2005
System?26
Peer 
Group
HEALTH 
EDUCATION 
Direction
Admin, Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff?
DONATIONS 
Direction
Admin, Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff
INTERVIEWS
AA NP No L A A
BB NP R1 M S F
CCC NP R1 S S F
EE NP R1 M S F
F NP NR4 S D D
FF NP NR1 S F F
G NP No M D D
GGG NP No S A A
I NP No S D S
II NP R1 S S F
JJ NP R1 S S F
KKK NP R1 S D F
M NP No L S F
NN NP NR1 S F F
P NP R1 M S F
SS NP R1 L S F
U NP NR1 L F F
V NP R2 L A A
VV NP NR1 M F F
WW NP NR5 M D A
X NP NR2 L D D
XX NP No M D F
Y NP R1 S D F
                                           
26 System designations are the same as noted in Chapter Four.  System Designations are: R = 
Religious System; NR = Nonreligious Systems; No = No System.  The numbers correspond to 
common systems (e.g. R1 = all hospitals part of the same Religious System #1; R2 = all hospitals 
part of Religious System #2; and so on).
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Hospital
Desig.
2005
Own.
2005
System?
Peer 
Group
HEALTH 
EDUCATION 
Direction
Admin, Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff?
DONATIONS 
Direction
Admin, Dept, 
Fdn, 
Or Staff
NO  Interviews
YY Cnty No L S F
E NP No S D A
EEE NP R2 L D D
FFF County No S D None
HH NP R1 S S F
MM NP No M S D
N NP R4 M D A
Q NP NR1 M F F
T NP No L D A
TT County No S A A
UU NP No M D A
W NP No L S D
No ISDH County No M S A
No ISDH County No S D D
No ISDH County No M D None
No ISDH County R5 M D A
No ISDH County R5 S D A
No ISDH City-Cty No S S A
No ISDH County No S D D
No ISDH County No S D A
No ISDH County No M S None
No ISDH County No S S A
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
Chapter Six concludes with a summary of the findings of the previous theoretical 
and empirical exploration on the philanthropic behavior of Indiana hospitals.  It 
presents how these findings could be applicable for strengthening current policy,
related to nonprofit organizations in general and nonprofit hospitals in particular.  
Following an update on recent legislative actions affecting health care and 
hospitals, the chapter summarizes the key points of the dissertation and how 
these illuminate the philanthropic behavior of Indiana hospitals.  It then revisits 
the original questions posed in the thesis and identifies how the answers to these 
questions relate to some of the challenges faced by policymakers.  Finally, 
conclusions are outlined showing how the findings from the thesis might be used 
to further public policy related to expand our understanding of nonprofit 
philanthropic behavior.  
A Legislative Update on Hospital Community Benefit
In February 2009, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued findings from a 
study of 500 nonprofit hospitals.  One purpose of the study was to assess the 
extent of community benefit the hospitals offered the communities they served.  
The IRS reported that the hospitals provided an average of 7 percent 
uncompensated care, or a median of 4 percent.  The next largest categories 
were medical education and training, research, and community programs.  In the 
report the IRS noted the limitations: “For example, although the IRS designated 
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the general categories of activties that could be reported as community benefit 
for purposes of the study, determining what was treated as community benefit 
(for example, bad debt or Medicare shortfalls) and how to measure it (cost versus 
charges) was largely within the [hospitals’] discretion.”1
The findings from the 2009 IRS study provide yet another example of the 
difficultites and variability of establishing standards based on “the application of 
imprecise legal standards to complex, varied, and evolving fact patterns.”2  In a 
response to the report, Senator Chares E. Grassley, Republican from Iowa and 
the ranking Republican on the Senate Finance committee noted: “I'm 
disappointed that the IRS didn't provide guidance to the hospitals on how to 
define community benefit and uncompensated care, so the numbers are likely to 
be overstated in some cases.”3
The IRS report and Grassley’s reply reflect the ambiguities that exist with current 
politcy attempts to quantify the charitable behavior of nonprofit hospitals.  As one 
example, the IRS report acknowledges that many hospitals may include bad debt 
as part of uncompensated care. Bad debt is a specific expense item that both 
                                           
1 Williams, Grant “IRS Releases Long-Awaited Report on Hospital Pay and Services,” Chronicle 
of Philanthropy (February 12, 2009), available at 
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/7118/irs-releases long-awaited-report-on-hospital-pay-and-
services, (last accessed 6/24/2009) citing Internal Revenue Service, “IRS Nonprofit Hospital 
Study – Final Report” (2009) available at 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=203109,00.html (last accessed 6/24/2009).
2 Ibid.
3 “Grassley: IRS Non-profit Hospitals Study is Helpful, Treasury Should Look at Restoring Charity 
Care Standards” (February 12, 2009) available at 
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=19329
(last accessed 6/24/2009).
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Grassley and the Catholic Hospital Associetion have held should not be included 
as part of community benefit. However, the American Hospital Association 
standards do advocate the inclusion of bad debt in uncompensated care.  As the 
report observes, how indvidual hospitals report this varies, grounding conclusions 
drawn from broad studies in uncertainty.  From a different perspective, the effort 
to determine the value of these tax exemptions is also uncertain.  In preparation 
for a May 12, 2009 Senate Finance Committee hearing, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation noted that while they computed the value of nonprofit hospital tax 
exemption in 2002 as being $6.1 billion, because of imprecise reporting 
requirements, variations in depreciation recording, and a lack of definition of how 
relationships between various entities should be reported, the “value of tax 
exempt status for nonprofit hospitals is extremely difficult to quantify.”4   
Grassley’s response was to question: “does it make sense to retain tax 
exemption for hospitals?”5  But the benefit of this response to society is dubious.  
As various commentators have observed, discontinuing tax exemption could
simply prompt nonprofit hospitals to change financial processes to protect assets 
or encourage those hospitals to become for-profit.6  Whether the actual 
charitable behavior of nonprofit hospitals can be improved through such policy 
decisions is questionable.
                                           
4 “Background Materials For Senate Committee On Finance Roundtable On Health Care 
Financing,” (JCX-27-09) Joint Committee on Taxation (May 8, 2009): 39-42 available at 
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdownandid=3557 (last accessed 6/24/2009).
5 Williams, Grant “Sen. Grassley Raises Question About Tax Exemptions for Hospitals,” 
Chronicle of Philanthropy (May 13, 2009), available at 
http://philanthropy.com/news/updates/8237/sen-grassley-raises-question-about-tax-exemptions-
for-hospitals, (last accessed 6/24/2009).
6 See for example: Meisel, Zachary F. and Jesse M. Pines, “Tax Break Under the Microscope,” 
Slate Medical Examiner (June 19, 2009) available at http://www.slate.com/id/2220784 (last 
accessed 6/24/2009).
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Current community benefit reporting focuses on the level of Charity Care
provided by nonprofit hospitals.  Because of the level of uncertainty that 
surrounds the quantification of their activities – and because of the doubts 
surrounding the effectiveness of the standards to change actual organizational 
behavior – it could be that a broader approach might be warranted.  This paper 
offers a perspective that this debate should be expanded to focus on criteria such 
as reporting the level of expenditures hospitals make to provide health promotion 
and donation programs for the benefit of their community.  By reporting their
philanthropic behavior, nonprofit hospitals could present a more realistic picture 
of their commitment to their communities than the current debate over uncertain 
levels of charity care and uncompensated care.  It also could provide models that 
could encourage more of this type of behavior.  It should also be acknowledged 
that the available data related to other areas of community benefit, as well as to
charity care, is imprecise and not reliable for meaningful comparisons to 
independent standards or to other organizations.  
This paper outlines how we might capture the motivations and realities of this 
behavior as well as to show how this behavior can be identified.  The overall 
dissertation presents a theoretical justification for reporting on philanthropic 
behavior provided by nonprofit hospitals.  It then shows how such behavior can 
be evaluated using data from Indiana hospital reports.  In this process, it also 
shows how current practices, guidelines, and reporting procedures provide 
variable and inconclusive results.  The inconsistency that currently exists among 
387
individual hospitals could be addressed through regulatory requirements that 
focus on documenting relevant types of procedures.  However even as current 
regulatory reporting becomes more defined, they nevertheless fail to adequately 
address those inconsistencies. 
A Summary of the Conclusions of the Dissertation
The dissertation defines four different organizational structures that correspond 
to the underlying primary motivations the organizational theory indicates as a 
rationale for philanthropic behavior by nonprofit organizations.  Built on the 
philanthropic motivations of for-profit companies, these structures are termed the 
Management Function Model, the Leadership Directed Model, the Separate 
Organizational Model, and the Stakeholder Discretion Model. The Management 
Function Model identifies practices institutionalized into the formal mid-
management levels of the organization and are embedded within the normal or 
existing organizational structures of the organization.  The Leadership Directed 
Model includes practices controlled by the personal actions of organizational 
leadership, particularly of the board and/or Chief Executive Officer. A Separate 
Organizational Model identifies practices centralized into a discreet entity to gain 
maximum exposure for the behavior, yet separate from its primary mission.  The 
Stakeholder Discretion Model refers to practices that arise at different levels in 
the organization as responses by various internal stakeholders to diverse 
external requests and situations.7  These four models are used to further identify 
                                           
7 It should be noted that a fifth model is added: the External Mandate Model.  This model 
hypothesizes that organizations within similar systems could resemble each other, due to 
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decisions located within different levels of the organization, allowing inferences to 
be made about the motivations of the organization to engage in philanthropic 
behavior based on the location of those practices.  The dissertation further 
maintains that nonprofit hospitals are especially valid subjects for determining 
this type of organizational behavior, as the community benefit standards denoted 
by the Catholic Hospital Association include aspects of operations that reflect 
philanthropic behavior – especially health education and donation programs. The 
next step is to determine whether adequate information might be available to 
determine this type of organizational behavior.
The Indiana State Department of Health’s (ISDH) Hospital Fiscal Reports 
database is evaluated to determine whether such information could be used for 
identifying levels and types of hospital community benefit.  It notes that the ISDH 
process not only provides comprehensive information related to community 
benefit but that it also reflects a level of detail that is now required on the IRS 
new Schedule H form for all nonprofit hospitals in the United States. The 
dissertation finds that there are questions about the comparability and validity of 
many of the criteria reported.  A corresponding concern is how accurately 
summary reports reflect the actual commitment and actions of the individual 
hospitals to meet the identified needs of its defined community.  It is further 
acknowledged that while the IRS form seems to be more definitive in identifying 
                                                                                                                                 
regulatory or systemic requirements.  The primary application of this model is to provide a 
theoretical basis for system hospitals resembling other hospitals in the same system.  Since this 
was not found to be the case – and because this model does not affect where decision in a single 
hospital might be located – only four models are used for the evaluation. 
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the donation information than the ISDH form, the ISDH database provides
information on health promotion expenditures that the IRS form does not.  Since 
the level of Health Education expenses is generally much more extensive than
donations, this lack of detail on the IRS forms makes future efforts to improve the 
collection of such information even more significant.
An investigation of the detail of the ISDH reports concludes that while these 
reports may provide some useful information for individual hospitals, broader 
conclusions about the behavior of nonprofit hospitals or categories of hospitals 
as a group are limited.  Averages, median figures, and summaries don’t account 
for the variety of factors that are necessary to adequately evaluate these types of 
organizational behavior and motivations. This is even more difficult when 
investigating the behavior of Indiana nonprofit hospitals as reflected in the 
categories of community health education programs and donations.  
To explore these two categories, the Community Health Education programs of 
Indiana nonprofit hospitals are first investigated in detail.  The thesis finds that 
the processes that provide and report community health education/promotion 
programs are scattered throughout the organization.  This decentralized 
decoupling suggests they are motivated by normative Stakeholder values
reflecting professional standards not easily standardized within centralized 
reporting systems.  While the general commitment to providing health education 
programs does seem to be a formal part of a large percentage of the responding 
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hospitals, the specific decisions of what programs are presented, which publics 
to address, and how the expenses and other details of the program operation are 
reported are primarily left to the individuals throughout the hospital hierarchy.  
This multi-level situation complicates the policy efforts that seek to standardize 
and compare different hospital programs. 
The dissertation next investigates the donations made by Indiana nonprofit 
hospitals.  This investigation confirms that the donation process was largely 
decoupled from the central operations of the hospital in order to best fulfill the 
anticipated role of community influence presented by the Political or Ethical 
model of contributions.  The donation process was located either in a separate 
department or foundation (related to the Political model) or centralized at an 
administrative level (confirming the Ethical model).  Furthermore, donations were
found in different parts of the hospital’s organizational structure than their 
healthcare operational or their health education programs, decoupling the 
donation process from operations as well as from the health education programs.  
While this decoupling helps remove donations from healthcare decisions, which 
may be advantageous in terms of positioning the hospitals in the community, it 
could be detrimental in terms of conveying to a community the full extent of their 
philanthropic benefit.
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The Philanthropic Behavior of Indiana Hospitals –
A Compilation and a Perspective
The initial question posed by this dissertation is “Does nonprofit philanthropy 
exist?”  If it does exist, this prompts a second question: “How much philanthropy 
does a nonprofit organization provide?” The findings of the dissertation show
that nonprofit philanthropy does exist and for some hospitals is fairly significant. 
The question of “How much philanthropy does a nonprofit organization provide?” 
varies greatly for individual hospitals and differences in reporting and 
organizational structures make individual comparisons inconclusive.  However, 
public policy seeks to draw broad conclusions about the relative value provided 
by nonprofit hospitals as a whole.  By collectively examining the total nonprofit 
hospital sector in a given state (such as Indiana) we can see that the level of 
philanthropic behavior is significant, even acknowledging the limitations of 
individualized comparisons.  
To illustrate this significance, Table 6A summarizes the total Health Promotion 
and Donation expense as reported by Indiana nonprofit hospitals for 2004.
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Table 6A (Data is from Tables 4C and Table 5B): Health Promotion 
Expenses and Donations for Indiana Nonprofit Community Hospitals –2004
Total 
Expenditures by 
Indiana NP 
Hospitals
% of 
Operating 
Budgets 
Health Promotion $166,686,707 1.98%
Gross Donations Made $12,871,139 .04%
TOTAL $179,557,846 2.02%
As Table 6A shows, in 2004 nonprofit hospitals in Indiana spent more than 2% of 
their operating budgets either on Health Promotion programs or in cash 
donations.  A majority of this expenditure was provided by health promotion 
programs, a non-required in-kind donation of services for the benefit of their 
community.  
To determine the significance of these figures, we could try to compare these 
efforts to for-profit contributions, using percentage of net pre-tax profit as a
guideline.  It might be conjectured that if nonprofit hospitals do have an intrinsic 
interest in their community their level of donations would exceed those of for-
profit companies, even though there are no tax benefits to tax-exempt hospitals.8  
According to the tax code, corporations may deduct contributions of up to 10% of 
their pre-tax profits from their income statement.  Nationally, corporate 
contributions in the United States in 2006 were 0.8% of pre-tax profits (Giving 
USA 2007), far below that level.  Table 6B shows how nonprofit hospital 
                                           
8 Conversely, if Grassley’s suggestion to remove tax exempt status from nonprofit hospitals does 
occur, such comparisons with for-profit hospitals could be very relevant.
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philanthropic expenditures relate to their net revenues (total revenue less 
operating expenses), being figures that might be related to pre-tax profits:
Table 6B: Health Promotion Expenses and Donations for Indiana Nonprofit 
Community Hospitals – as a Percentage of Net Revenues: 2004
Total Expenditures 
by Indiana NP 
Hospitals
Net Revenues
PLUS 
Expenditures
% of Net 
Revenues
Health Promotion $166,686,707 23.7%
Gross Donations Made $12,871,139 1.8%
TOTAL $179,557,846 $699,090,489 25.5%
In 2004, the nonprofit hospitals in Indiana in total realized $519,532,643 in net 
revenue.  If they had not spent an additional $180 million on programs for health 
promotion and donations, Indiana nonprofit hospitals would have earned nearly 
$700 million in “profits” (i.e. net revenue, or revenue over expenses).  As the 
figures show, more than 25% of the net revenue earned by hospitals in Indiana in 
2004 was returned directly to the community in services or donations.  The rest 
of these “profits” were reinvested for future community health care needs.  As 
one comparison, for-profit hospitals in Indiana during the same period made 
$945,484 in gross donations9 – or .4% of their net (pre-tax) profits; nonprofit 
hospitals gave donations of over 4 times that amount, or 1.8% of their net profits.  
Indiana’s for-profit hospitals not only did not give as much of their net donations 
                                           
9 Health Promotion program expenses are not able to be compared, as for-profit hospitals do not 
have to share that information.
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in donations as nonprofit hospitals did, they were 50% lower than the average for 
all for-profit corporations.10    
Final Observations
In June 2008, the Indiana State Department of Health began a process to 
redesign its website.  As part of that redesign process, several sections have 
changed as well as a number of data sources.  One of those sources that is no 
longer available is the Hospital Fiscal Report and accompanying Community 
Benefit information.  Whether that information will be added at a later time or will 
no longer be offered is conjetcure.  If there has been a decision to no longer 
make that data public (which was part of a 1994 Indiana state legislative action), 
it may very well have been prompted by the pending initiation of the IRS revised 
Form 990 and accompanying Schedule H. 
Drawing conclusions from this study of the data on Indiana hospitals – both from 
the ISDH and the IRS Form 990s – is difficult.  There is an inconsistency 
between the two databases as well as within each of the datasets that makes 
any specific conclusions suspect.  However there are several observations that 
the process can offer.
                                           
10 However it should be acknowledged that because of for-profit hospitals do not fully report 
health education expenses, these in-kind donations are not included in the for-profit hospital 
figures.
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The IRS Form 990 and Databases:
1. The IRS Form 990 revision and Schedule H should help the consistency 
and (perhaps) reliability of information supplied by nonprofit hospitals.  
This will mean that there is an opportunity for more detailed evaluations 
and accountability in the future.
2. The fact that for-profit and (many) public hospitals don’t have to file 
comparable information is a drawback for the undestanding of our 
healthcare system.  Until all hospitals are required to file comparable 
information, cross-sector comparisons and conclusions will undoubtedly 
be hampered.
3. Much information that would be helpful to have available, still won’t be part 
of the reporting system, meaning that evaluations of the type of 
information investigated in much of this thesis will continue to be difficult.
On Hospital Community Benefit:
1. There seems to be very little correlation between the amount of Charity 
Care provided by a hospital and their commitment to philanthropic 
programs.  However this may be a function of inadequate data rather than 
an actual indication of a trend or a body of practice.
2. Community Benefit seems to be most valuable as a political tool for 
government representatives and as a public relations tool for nonprofit 
hospitals.  Public policy could be misreading an important aspect of 
community benefit – primarily health education programs – by 
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emphasizing charity care (which seems to be a function of location more 
than charitable intent or practice).  If instead there was increased 
emphasis on health education programs, then they may be encouraging 
an area that actually can improve the health of Americans while being an 
area that hospitals can proactively address.
3. The hospital systems are increasingly making community benefit of all 
kinds a higher priority.  But the survey shows that this is happening at 
different levels and at different rates of organization.  This is even true for 
Catholic systems that might be expected to have a more coordinated 
approach to any area that their national association has been working with 
for nearly forty years.
4. The professional values and ethics of hospital employees seem to be 
driving much of the actions toward improved health education.  This 
appears to be true even for those that may not be considered as 
“professional healthcare workers” – i.e. those who fill public relations and 
administrative positions.
On Community Health Education: Three conclusions related to health education 
programs are drawn from the ISDH Hospital Fiscal reports, a written 
questionnaire, and personal interviews.  
1. The data that are currently shared regarding hospital community health 
education expenses are variable and uncertain.  Furthermore, it is unlikely 
that the new IRS Form 900 and Schedule H will change this, as the 
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information on health education that is being collected is relatively 
undefined.  
2. The IRS has accelerated the adoption of the CHA/VHA criteria for 
reporting community benefit, but has limited the details of the programs on 
the reports that will be made public.  While this should mean a more 
consistent reporting process, the lack of details on community health 
education makes drawing specific conclusions about community health 
education programs problematic.  This also leads to the conclusion that a 
charity care emphasis by policymakers may be at the expense of 
improved community health education. 
3. The variety of internal processes within different organizational levels to 
determine and report community health education programs confirm the 
neo-institutional approaches that emphasize the decoupling of decision-
making in nonprofit organizations.  They also demonstrate the importance 
of professionalization as an impetus to legitimacy and to shape a standard 
organizational culture and ethics.  The empowerment of departments and 
employees at the organizational grassroots or staff level becomes a 
primary way for a hospital to encourage the philanthropic behavior by 
those within the organization, at least in relation to health promotion 
programs.  However this level of decoupling makes unified reporting more 
difficult. 
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On Donations:
1. Because of the complexities of the hospital organizational structures, 
efforts to accurately count and compare incoming and outgoing donations 
are extremely difficult to extract.  The different management approaches 
and the variable nature and role that donations can play within the 
organization make the processes for determining and reporting that 
activity inconsistent.  Any future efforts to more specifically capture and 
understand hospital donation activities – both in receiving and giving 
donations – needs to address the situation of multi-organizational locales 
for the donation function.
2. One additional complication of identifying donations to the community as 
opposed to those from the community is that while a hospital’s net 
donation to the community might be considered as part of “community 
benefit” (as it is in the ISDH Reports as well as the IRS Schedule H), 
donative theorists might conversely theorize that it is the donations from 
the community that indicate an organization’s worthiness for tax 
exemption.  One example of this apparent contradiction is in the articles 
arguing both of these points by John D. Colombo (Colombo 2005, Hall 
and Colombo, 1991a and 1991b).  
On the Philanthropic Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations and the Implications for 
Philanthropic Study: The study of the nonprofit sector has traditionally focused on
nonprofit organizations as recipients of charity.  A perspective that has been 
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relatively neglected is that of nonprofit organizations as both recipients and 
donors of charitable resources.  Recognizing that nonprofit organizations play
this dual role within our communities, positions them as more complex entities 
within our social sphere than simply falling within a distinct nonprofit sector role. 
This broader understanding further complicates the simple three sector 
designation of our society as is commonly portrayed.  This can also call into 
question the significance that sector plays in determining an organization’s 
behavior.  The recent literature on social entrepreneurship has provided some 
indication of an organization being able to serve in multi-sector roles.  But even 
this literature has focused more on the profit generating activities of nonprofit 
organizations while overlooking the for-profit-like donor behavior that this thesis 
examines.  
As the field of philanthropic studies develops, one future direction for the field 
could include incorporating a much more extensive range of organizational 
behaviors than can be contained within simple single-sector considerations.  This 
broader and more individualized view of organizations can deepen our 
understanding of the multiple factors that affect any organizational activity.  At the 
same time, expanding the number and types of organizational considerations 
complicates regulatory policies that seek to standardize and categorize 
organizations that provide public benefits.  It is also important for policymakers to 
realize that such standardization might serve to constrain the very public-serving 
behavior they seek to nurture.
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